THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA 


CAMPAIGNS  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR.—X. 


THE  MAECH  TO  THE  SEA 


FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE 


BY 


JACOB    \).    COX,    LL.D., 

LATE   MAJOB-OKNERAL  COMMANDINO  TWENTY-THIRD   AKMY  COBFS 
AUTUOB  OF    "ATLANTA,"   ETC. 


40154 

NEW  YORK 

CHAKLES    SCRIBN.Ell'S    SONS 

1882  PROPfRTY  Ot 

bhiversity  of  Waterloo 

THE    LIBRAKY 


.A:i;,- 


COPYBIOHT  BY 

CHARLES  SPRIBNER'S  SONS 
1882 


Trow's 

PiUNTlNG   AND  BOOKBINDINU  CoMl'ANY 

80i-ai3  East  fztk  Street 

NEW   YORK 


PHEFACE. 


The  class  of  reaclers  which  has  been  most  in  the  author's 
mind  in  preparing  the  two  vohimes  assigned  him  in  the 
series,  is  that  which  includes  the  surviving  officers  and  men 
who  served  in  the  late  war.  His  aim  has  been  to  supple- 
ment their  personal  knowledge  by  the  facts  which  are  within 
the  reach  of  recent  research,  and  to  give  unity  and  sym- 
metry to  the  hiatoiy  of  the  campaigns  here  told,  by  examin- 
ing each  in  the  light  of  the  plans  and  purposes  of  the 
leaders  on  both  sides. 

The  limits  assigned  io  the  volumes  have  made  it  neces- 
sary to  choose  between  the  narration  of  incidents  which 
would  enliven  the  story,  and  that  fulness  of  strictly  military 
detail  which  seemed  necessary  to  make  the  several  cam- 
paigns clearly  intelligible,  and  to  enable  the  reader  to  judge, 
with  some  degree  of  satisfaction,  the  character  of  the  opera- 
tions. The  former  course  would  perhaps  have  made  the 
work  more  popular,  but  the  latter  has  seemed  likely  to  make 
it  more  useful  and  to  meet  the  wishes  of  those  for  whom  it 
has  been  chiefly  written.  It  is  still  hoped,  however,  that 
the  general  reader  will  not  find  it  difficult  to  follow  the 
movements  described,  and  that  the  eflfort  to  do  so  will  give 
to  such  a  broader  understanding  of  what  the  great  game  of 
war  really  is. 

The  maps  in  both  volumes  are,  with  two  exceptions,  re- 


Vi  PREFACE. 

duced  copies  of  the  official  siuTeya  made  by  the  engineers 
of  the  army.  For  the  originals  the  author  is  indebted  to 
the  courtesy  of  Cdneral  Poe,  U.  S.  Engineers.  In  reducing 
them  it  has  not  been  possible  to  preserve  all  the  details  of 
the  originals ;  but  the  eflfort  has  been  to  give  accurately 
what  is  most  essential.  The  reader  is  presumed  to  make 
reference  to  an  ordinary  hand-atlas  for  the  relations  of  the 
special  theatre  of  operations  to  that  of  the  whole  war.  To 
have  illustrated  the  text  by  larger  and  more  elaborate  maps 
would  have  thwarted  the  pui-pose  of  the  publishers  to  put 
the  series  within  the  r  jach  of  all. 

To  General  Drum,  Adjutant-General,  and  to  Colonel  Scott, 
of  the  War  Records  Office,  the  author  is  greatly  indebted 
for  access  to  unpublished  archives,  and  for  official  informa- 
tion without  which  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  reach 
the  degree  of  accuracy  which  he  hopes  will  be  found  to 
mark  the  more  important  parts  of  the  narrative  :  it  would  be 
vain  to  expect  to  escape  all  error  with  our  present  means  of 
investigation.  A  still  greater  debt  of  obligation,  if  possible, 
is  due  to  Major  E.  C.  Dawes,  late  of  the  Fifty-third  Ohio, 
who  has  not  only  given  the  use  of  his  valuable  collection  of 
books  and  documents  relating  to  the  war,  but  has  thought 
no  personal  trouble  too  great  in  assisting  to  verify  facts  and 
trace  events,  and  whose  zeal  in  investigation  has  been  a  con- 
stant aid  and  stimulus. 

Cincinnati,  September,  1883. 


.  ; 


•»       ■   -f 


CONTENTS. 


» - 


•     >  PASB 

List  op  Maps, ** 

CHAPTER  I.  .  . 

Planning  tub  Campaign,  .......      1 

CHAPTER  II.             ,                .  .    ., 
The  March  Through  Georgia, 21 

CHAPTER  III. 
Savannah, 43 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Middle  Tennessee — Pulaski  to  Spring  Hill,     .        .    63 

CHAPTER  V. 
Battle  op  Franklin, 81 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Battle  op  Nashville, 99 


viii  CONTENTS. 

CnAPTEll   VII. 

PAOB 

The  Puksuit   after  tiik    Battle —Rksults   ok   the 
Campaign 124 

t 

CIIAPTEU  \IU. 
FoUT  FiBiiEll, 137 

CHAPTEU  IX. 
Captuue  of  Wilmington— Battle  op  Kinston,    .        .  147 

CHAPTER  X. 
Savannah  to  Columbia, lO'J 

CHAPTER  XI. 

AvEUAsnono    and    Benton villb  —  Reunion    of    the 
Gband  Abmy, 177 

CHAPTER  XII. 
Stoneman's  and  Wilson's  Cavaluy  E-vpeditions,         .  199 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

GoLDsnoRo   TO  Raleigh— Surrender   of   Johnston's 
Aimv, 211 

APPENDIX  A. 
Forces  op  the  Opposing  Armies  in  Tennessek,  .       .  219 

APPENDIX   B. 
Organization  of  Opposing  Armies  in  Tennessee,        .  223 


CONTENTS.  ix 

APPENDIX  C. 
Confederate  Stragglers, 230 

APPENDIX  D. 
Battle  op  Franklin, a33 

APPENDIX  E. 
Strength  of  the  Opposing  Armies  in  the  Carolinas,  .  239 

APPENDIX  F. 
Organization  of  Opposing  Armies  in  the  Carolinas,  .  244 

Index, 251 


LIST    OF   MAPS. 


Atlanta  to  Savannah, 
Savannah  and  Vicinity,   . 
Middle  Tennessee,    .... 
Vicinity   op  Columbia,  Tenn., 
Battle-Field  op  Fkanklin, 
Map  OB  Battle-Field  of  Nashville, 
Fort  Fisher  and  Wilmington,  N.  C, 
Map  of  North  Carolina, 
Map  of  Battle  op  Kinston,    . 
Battle  op  Bentonvillk,  . 


PAGE 

,  20 
,  45 
.  62 
,  68 

.  83 
.  109 
189 
146 
157 
190 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN. 

When  Sherman  stood  upon  the  border  of  Alabama,  at  the 
close  of  October,  1864,  looking  toward  Gadsden,  and  follow- 
ing in  his  mind's  ejo  the  retreating  forces  of  Hood  w^.o  was 
marching  westward,  he  had  an  undoubting  conviction  that 
the  true  counter-movemenb  was  to  turn  his  back  upon  his 
adversaiy  and  march  away  for  Savannah  and  the  sea.  He 
had  formed  the  opinion  at  the  beginning  of  the  month,  but 
the  campaign  of  October  made  him  sure  of  it.  The  mobil- 
ity of  Hood's  army  was  such  that  there  was  little  hope  of 
coming  up  with  it  till  accident,  or  the  exhaustion  of  the 
countiy,  should  force  him  to  come  to  bay.  The  delays  to  a 
pursuing  column  may  be  indefinitely  increased  by  an  active 
and  well-handled  rear  guard,  and  the  moral  effect  of  allow- 
ing the  war  to  be  transferred  again  to  Tennessee  would  be 
eveiy  way  bad.  Still,  if  Hood  had  crossed  the  Tennessee 
anywhere  between  Stevenson  and  Guntersville,  in  the  bond 
of  the  river,  Sherman  would  have  i)ursuod  hiiu  ;  biit  when 

he  marched  to  Decatur,  and,  upon  General  li.  S.  Granger 
Vol.  X— 1 


2  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

showing  a  bold  front  there,  moved  still  further  west  to  Tus- 
cumbia,  nearly  at  the  Mississippi  line,  it  was  clear  as  day  to 
the  National  Commander  that  the  only  way  to  preserve  the 
moral  superiority  and  the  initiative,  was  to  put  in  operation 
his  previous  plan.  He  thought  it  probable  that  Hood 
■would  be  forced  to  follow  him,  especially  since  the  latter 
had  been  made,  by  a  recent  order  of  the  Confederate  Gov- 
ernment, subordinate  to  General  Beauregard,  who  had  been 
invested  with  the  military  command  of  all  the  territory  be- 
tween Middle  Georgia  and  the  Mississippi  River.  He  was 
no^  mistaken  in  his  forecast  of  Beauregard's  judgment  in 
this  respect,  as  will  soon  be  seen ;  but  Beauregard  did  not 
feel  authorized  to  take  actual  control  of  Hood's  movements 
under  the  somewhat  peculiar  orders  giv^n  by  President 
Davis.  To  trv  whether  an  indication  of  liis  counter-move- 
ment  would  call  Hood  back  from  the  west,  Sherman  marched 
again  into  Georgia  in  the  first  days  of  November,  and  con- 
centrated his  army  at  Rome  and  Kingston.  There,  upon 
the  second  of  the  month,  he  got  from  Grant  the  final  assent 
to  his  plan,  and  put  all  the  capacity  of  the  railroad,  now  re- 
paired, to  the  utmost  strain  to  remove  surplus  stores  and 
material  of  war  from  Atlanta  and  other  posts  in  Georgia  to 
Nashville. 

No  militaiy  operation  of  the  war  has  been  so  commonly 
misunderstood  as  the  campaign  on  which  Sherman  was  now 
entering.  The  brilliancy  of  its  design  and  the  immense  re- 
sults which  followed,  have  captivated  the  popular  imagina- 
tion and  deeply  impressed  students  of  military  history  eveiy- 
where ;  but  there  has  been  a  singular  tendency  to  treat  the 
conception  of  a  march  from  Atlanta  to  the  gulf  or  to  the 
ocean  as  if  that  were  an  invention  or  a  discoveiy.  People 
have  disi^uted  the  priority  of  idea,  as  if  it  were  a  patent 
right ;  and,  besides  the  military  claimants  of  the  honor  of 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  8 

the  invention,  non-combatants  of  both  sexes  have  entered 
the  lists  and  claimed  to  have  given  expression  to  the 
thought  of  such  a  movement  bt  .ore  Sherman  had  captured 
Atlanta.  General  Badeau,  the  historian  of  Grant's  cam- 
paigns, must  be  held  responsible  for  a  good  deal  of  this 
misapprehension,  which  he  seems  to  have  shared  himself; 
for  he  treats  Grant's  earlier  indications  of  Mobile  as  an  ob- 
jective point,  as  if  these  contained  the  essential  parts  of  the 
campaign  as  actually  conducted.  For  the  matter  of  that, 
we  have  seen,  in  a  former  volume,  that  Sherman  gave  a  suffi- 
ciently clear  outline  of  the  movement  in  his  letter  to  the 
General-in-Chief  before  the  campaign  of  Atlanta  had  opened 
in  the  spring.  In  that,  not  only  the  march  to  the  coast 
was  foreshadowed,  but  the  subsequent  campaign  through 
the  Carolinas,  which  was  to  make,  as  he  said,  "  short 
work  "  of  what  was  left  of  the  Confederate  Government  and 
cause. 

"Whoever  will  reflect  a  little,  will  see,  however,  that  not 
even  in  this  fuller  anticipation  of  the  outward  form  of  the 
movement  are  found  the  essential  features  which  gave  to 
Sherman's  decision  and  plan  in  October  their  peculiar  mili- 
tary character.  Unless  the  campaign  just  closed  had  been 
an  aimless  thing,  we  must  suppose  that  both  Grant  and 
Sherman  had  reflected  upon  what  should  be  done  when 
Atlanta  fell.  Every  intelligent  person  in  the  country,  iu  or 
out  of  the  army,  must  have  seen  that  the  successful  march 
of  a  gi'eat  army  from  Chattanooga  southward,  meant  not 
only  the  capture  of  Atlanta,  but  more.  The  problems  of 
war  are  not  matters  of  occult  science,  and  while  it  was 
hoped  that  in  some  decisive  engagement  Johnston's  army 
might  be  routed  before  it  reached  the  Chattahoochee,  it 
took  no  genius  to  see  that  if  its  retreat  to  Atlanta  should 
leave  it  with  a  still  formidable  organization,  further  opera- 


4  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

tions  would  be  necessary.  These  would  naturally  be  such 
as  would  turn  to  good  use  the  auxiliary  efforts  which  Cauby 
and  the  Navy  were  making  to  reduce  Mobile,  and,  by  reach- 
ing a  hand  to  Sherman  from  the  South,  put  the  whole  of 
Alabama  and  Mississippi  behind  a  wall  of  national  bayonets 
moving  Eastward,  and  driving  the  Confederate  Army  before 
them.  This  was  the  course  of  events  which  would  be  the 
natuinl  sequence  of  what  had  gone  before,  if  no  disaster 
befell  us ;  aud  had  things  worked  in  this  way,  we  should 
never  have  had  the  almost  absurd  debate  upon  the  question 
of  intellectual  authorship. 

It  was  Hood's  audacious  movement  upon  Sherman's  com- 
munications that  changed  all  that.  His  design  was  to  carry 
back  the  war  from  Central  Georgia  to  Tennessee,  as,  once 
and  again,  Lee  had  carried  it  back  from  Central  Virginia  to 
the  Potomac.  A  weak  general  would  have  made  haste  to 
puL  tl  e  National  Army  on  the  north  side  of  the  Tennessee 
to  cover  and  protect  his  communications ;  and  Hood's  pur- 
pose would  have  been  successfully  accomplished.  It  would 
have  been  much  better  than  this  to  have  followed  Hood 
across  Alabama,  striving  to  get  between  him  and  his  own 
djputs  of  supply,  though  this  might  have  had  no  really  deci- 
sive results.  To  provide  for  v  sulficient  force  to  keep  him 
from  reaching  the  Northfci'u  States  before  the  rapidly  col- 
lecting }'ecruits  should  swell  Thomas's  army  to  a  size  fully 
able  to  deal  with  him,  and  with  sixty  thousand  veterans 
strike  for  the  very  heart  of  the  Confederacy,  was  completely 
to  turn  the  tables  upon  the  enteriuising  Southern  general, 
and  make  his  very  audacity  prove  at  once  his  own  ruin  and 
the  ruin  of  the  cause  for  which  he  fought.  This  was  what 
Sherman  did,  and  the  determination  to  do  it,  in  the  actual 
situation,  before  any  base  upon  the  distant  seacoast  had  been 
secured,  called  for  the  very  highest  qualities  in  a  commander. 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  5 

The  moral  courage  which  decides  upon  a  daring  course,  when 
faihire  must  involve  terrible  and  far-reaching  consequences, 
is  far  greater  in  kind  and  in  degree  than  that  which  the  sub- 
ordinate or  the  soldier  in  the  rani  s  is  called  upon  to  show. 
'Ihe  cool-headed,  practical  skill  which  canies  out  such  a  plan, 
through  the  vicissitudes  of  a  campaign  where  the  c'rcum- 
stances  are  always  the  unexpected,  is  only  possible  to  one  who 
unites  physical  hardihood  to  mental  gi*asp  and  unbending  will. 

In  thus  fixing  his  purpose,  Sherman  had  no  assistance. 
He  had  hoard  nothing  from  Grant  in  reply  to  his  proposal 
of  the  movement,  though  the  latter  had  sent,  on  Octo- 
ber 11th,  a  conditional  approval,  which  the  interruption 
of  communications  had  prevented  Sherman  from  receiving. 
Thomas  advised  against  his  i^lan,^  and  on  November  1st 
Grant  suggested  to  him  to  resume  that  of  following 
Hood.*  But  Sherman  was  immovable  in  his  judgment,  un- 
less Hood  should  try  to  cross  the  Tennessee  somewhere  near 
him,  and  on  the  second  of  the  month  Grant  gave  formal  and 
final  consent.  Grant's  sympathies  were  never  lacking  for  a 
bold  and  decided  course,  but  in  this  instance  he  had  less 
faith  than  Sherman  that  all  would  go  well  in  Tennessee  in 
the  intei'val.  Lincoln,  as  he  himself  said  a  little  later,  "  was 
anxious,  if  not  fearful,"  but  did  not  interfere. 

So  long  as  it  seemed  probable  that  he  would  force  hi:? 
adversary  to  follow  him,  Sherman's  purpose  had  been  to 

1  Despatch  of  October  17th. 

"  Despatch  of  that  date :  '•  Do  you  not  think  it  advisable,  now  that  Hood  has 
gone  80  far  North,  to  entirely  ruin  him  before  Rtarting  on  your  proposed  cam- 
paign." Badeau  says,  vol.  iii.,  p.  02 :  "  Sherman  declared  Hood  would  follow  him; 
Grant  was  certain  that  the  rebel  aimy  would  go  North."  Neither  statement  ia 
quite  accurate.  He  wrote  this,  forgetting  that  in  the  despatch  of  November  Ist 
(which  he  himself  quotes  on  page  157)  Grant  said  :  "  I  believed,  and  still  believe, 
that  if  you  had  stai-ted  South  while  Hood  was  in  the  nuighborhond  of  you,  ho 
would  have  been  forced  to  go  after  you."  There  was  no  real  di£Ecreuce  of  opinion 
on  this  point. 


(f  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

leave  only  the  Fourth  Corps  (Stanley's)  in  addition  to  the 
troops  already  stationed  in  Tennessee,  and  these,  with  the 
recruits  which  were  rapidly  enrolling,  would  have  given 
Thomas  very  soon  an  anny  quite  large  enough  for  all  prob- 
able needs.  When  Hood  had  passed  Decatur,  however, 
Sherman  determined  to  send  back  Schofield  with  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  also,  reckoning  that  the  two  corps,  to- 
gether with  that  of  Major  General  A.  J.  Smith,  which  was 
ordered  to  join  Thomas  as  speedily  as  possible,  and  the 
garrisons  and  posts  in  Tennessee,  would  make  an  army 
equal  to  Hood's  at  the  opening  of  the  new  campaign.  The 
recruits  which  would  be  added  to  this  would  soon  give  it 
a  decided  sui)eriority,  the  real  risk  being  limited  to  the 
time  within  which  Thomas  should  be  concentrating  his 
forces. 

Three  divisions  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  were  at  this  time 
under  General  A.  J.  Smith  in  Missouri,  near  the  Kansas  bor- 
der, but  on  October  29th,  General  Rosecrans,  who  com- 
manded that  department,  was  directed  from  Washington  to 
send  Smith's  troops  to  Nashville,  and  promptly  put  them  in 
motion  for  the  Mississippi  River.  Sherman  had  hoped  that 
steamboats  might  meet  them  at  Booneville  on  the  Missouri 
and  transport  them  directly  to  Paducah  on  the  Ohio ;  but 
the  Missouri  was  so  low  that  navigation  could  not  be  de- 
pended upon,  and  Smith's  troops  were  obliged  to  move  by 
land  to  St.  Louis  from  Warrensburg,  where  they  were  on 
November  2d. 

SLorman  had  the  most  implicit  confidence  in  General 
Thomas's  ability  to  bear  the  great  responsibilities  to  be  im- 
posed upon  him,  writing  to  Halleck  that  he  was  better  suited 
to  the  emergency  than  any  man  he  had.  The  very  differ- 
ences in  temperament  between  the  two  men  seemed  to  adapt 
them  to  the  work  each  was  to  do.     The  task  before  Thomas 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  7 

was  to  conduct  a  cautious  and  purposely  dilatory  campaign 
till  his  reinforcements  should  bo  well  in  hand,  and  then,  re- 
suming the  aggressive,  to  drive  Hood  southward  and  follow 
him  wherever  he  should  go.  His  whole  career  had  borno 
witness  to  the  unflinching  courage  with  which  he  would 
meet  the  impetuosity  of  his  opponent,  and  the  tenacity  with 
which  he  would  stick  to  the  contest  even  if  the  odds  should 
be  against  him.  Yet  he  would  have  been  glad  to  avoid  the 
task,  and  had  said  to  Sherman,  when  the  plan  was  first 
opened  to  him,  that  the  one  thing  he  did  not  wish  was  to 
assume  the  part  allotted  to  him,  unless  Sherman  and  the 
authorities  at  Washington  deemed  it;  absolutely  necessary. 
With  the  addition  to  his  forces  of  Schofield's  Twenty -third 
Corps  he  believed  he  would  be  strong  enough  to  drive  Hood 
back,  but  this  increase  he  urged  as  indispensable,  and  as 
soon  as  Grant's  definitive  consent  to  the  new  plan  of  cam- 
paign was  received,  Schofield  was  ordered  to  march  to 
Eesaca  and  Dalton,  where  his  troops  were  to  meet  the  trains 
and  be  transported  by  rail  to  Nashville.  The  burden  of 
taking  to  the  rear  the  surplus  material  at  Atlanta  and 
of  carrj'ing  to  that  place  the  stores  Sherman  intended  to 
take  with  him,  was  overtaxing  the  railway,  and  it  was 
not  till  November  7th  that  the  last  of  Schofield's  com- 
mand procured  transportation,  though  he  had  gone  on 
to  Nashville  upon  the  4th,  for  the  pui-pose  of  arranging 
with  Thomas  the  details  of  the  operations  committed  to 
them. 

This  assignment  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  duty  under 
General  Thomas  had  been  at  Schofield's  own  suggestion,  and 
was  agreeable,  therefore,  to  both  officers.  Schofield's  depart- 
mental command  covered  East  Tennessee  and  part  of  Ken- 
tucky, and  his  presence  saved  the  necessity  of  any  change  in 
the  organization  there.      But  still  stronger  motives  were 


8  THK  MAR(>^H   TO  THE  SEA. 

found  in  tho  fact  that  the  strength  of  tho  Twenty-third 
Cori).s  had  been  reduced  below  ten  thousand  men  present 
for  diity,  by  tho  casualties  of  tho  campaign,  and  the  op- 
portunity would  thus  be  given  it  to  recruit  the  two  divi- 
sions already  belonging  to  it,  while  a  third  division  of  new 
troops  was  ordered  to  join  it  when  the  new  levies  should 
reach  the  front.  Schofield  also  believed  that  the  cam- 
jiaign  in  Tennessee  was  to  be  an  important  one,  full  of 
varied  military  problems  and  contingencies,  and  that  he 
could  be  quite  as  useful  there  as  in  any  other  field  of 
operations. 

For  a  full  understanding  of  the  situation  in  the  Confeder- 
ate arniy,  and  of  the  motives  which  controlled  Hood's  subse- 
quent plan  of  campaign,  we  must  go  back  to  the  beginning 
of  September.  The  fall  of  Atlanta  had  been  followed  by 
differences  between  Confederate  leaders  as  to  the  policy 
which  should  now  be  pursued.  Governor  Brown  of  Georgia 
had  assumed  the  responsibility  of  giving  a  general  furlough 
to  the  Georgia  militia,  ostensibly  for  the  purpose  of  gather- 
ing the  autumnal  crops.  Against  this  tho  President  of  the 
Confederacy  protested,  as  well  as  against  the  claim  of  Gov- 
ernor Brown  that  the  militia  of  the  State  were  in  the  field 
under  State  authority  for  the  defence  of  the  State,  and  that 
as  Governor  he  had  the  right  to  appoint  and  assign  the 
officers  to  these  State  forces,  and  to  keep  them  within  the 
State  boundaries.  This  assertion  by  the  State  executive  of 
a  very  mild  form  of  the  doctrine  of  State  rights,  was  looked 
upon  as  hardly  less  than  treason  by  the  Confederate  Govern- 
ment. A  war  begun  to  assert  the  doctrine  that  eveiy  State 
was  itself  the  judge  of  its  rights  under  the  Constitution  and 
of  the  measure  of  redress  when  it  considered  those  rights 
violated,  had  resulted  in  a  centralizatiou  of  which  no 
Northern  statesman  had  ever  di-eamed. 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  9 

On  September  8th,  Hood  telegvftpheJ  to  General  Bragg, 
at  liiehmond,  suggesting  that  all  the  reserves  of  Georgia, 
under  Gen(?ral  Cobb,  be  ordered  to  his  army,  and  that  Gen- 
eral Taylor  be  ordered  to  relieve  Hardee  in  the  command  of 
his  coqis,  bringing  with  him  all  the  troops  which  could  be 
spared  from  the  department  Taylor  was  then  commanding, 
and  which  included  Alabama  and  Mississippi.  No  imme- 
diate notice  seems  to  have  been  taken  of  this  at  Bichmond, 
and,  on  the  13th,  Hood  repeated  the  request  to  Davis  him- 
self, charging  Hardee  with  being  the  cause  of  all  the  de- 
feats his  army  had  suft'ered,  except  that  of  July  28th  at  Ezra 
Church.  A  week  later,  still  apparently  without  a  reply,  ho 
sketched  his  proposed  movement  upon  Sherman's  communi- 
cations, and  he  now  learned  that  the  Confederate  President 
would  immediately  visit  his  camp.  Accordingly,  on  Sep- 
tember 25th,  Davis  reached  Hood's  headquarters  at  Pal- 
metto, and  a  couple  of  days  were  spent  in  conference  not 
only  with  Hood,  but  with  his  principal  siibordinates.  The 
general  plan  of  Hood's  new  campaign  was  approved,  with  the 
understanding  that  if  he  should  succeed  in  drawing  Sherman 
away  from  Atlanta,  the  new  invasion  of  Tennessee  should  bo 
made  by  crossing  the  river  near  Guntersville,  not  far  from 
the  Georgia  line.  The  decision  upon  Hood's  demand  fur 
Hardee's  removal  from  his  coi*i)s  was  a  more  troublesome 
question  than  the  ai)proval  of  the  plan  of  operations.  The 
great  injustice  of  Hood's  charges  has  been  shown  in  tho 
stoiy  of  the  Atlanta  campaign ;  but  the  dissatisfaction  of  a 
commanding  general  with  a  subordinate  is  so  strong  a  rea- 
son for  a  change  that  it  will  rarely  do  to  ignore  it.  Liou- 
tenant-General  Richard  Taylor,  whom  Hood  suggested  as 
Hardee's  successor,  was  the  brother-in-law  of  Mr.  Davis,  and 
the  latter  very  well  knew  that  this  relationship  would  com- 
plicate tlie  difficulty  and  bo  seized  upcm  by  many  as  proof 
1* 


10  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  HEA. 

of  personal  motives  on  his  part  if  ho  sliould  give  Hood  his 
wish.  Ho  seems,  besidc^s,  to  have  had  a  real  respect  for 
Hardee,  and  to  have  heen  driven  to  very  serious  doiil)ts  of 
his  own  wisdom  in  giving  Hood  the  command  from  whioh  he 
had  hoped  so  mnch.  The  sohition  ho  reached  was  jjcrhaps 
the  best  the  situation  allowed.  Ho  determined  to  transfer 
Hardee  to  a  departmental  command,  including  Eastern 
Georgia  and  the  adjacent  territory  in  South  Carolina  and 
Florida,  a  promotion  in  form,  while  ho  combined  Hood's 
and  Taylor's  department  in  one  military  division  and  as- 
signed General  Beauregai'd  to  the  command,  with  the  under- 
standing that  Hood's  aniiy  organization  should  not  be  dis- 
turbed, though  Beauregard  was  expected  to  assume  the 
personal  control  whenever  he  might  deem  it  necessary  to  be 
with  the  troops. 

Hood  learned  of  the  intended  changes  by  a  communica- 
tion from  Davis  on  September  28th  or  29th,  and  the  formal 
orders  followed  in  a  day  or  two.  Davis  met  Beauregard  at 
Augusta,  in  the  first  week  of  October,  explained  to  him 
Hood's  plan  of  operations,  which  he  had  already  begun  to 
execute,  and  no  doubt  impressed  upon  him  the  policy  of 
making  no  unnecessary  interference  with  Hood's  pur^Doses. 
Certain  it  is  that  it  must  have  been  in  deference  to  some 
such  instructions  that  Beauregard  carefully  avoided  estab- 
lishing his  headquarters  with  the  army  in  the  field,  though 
he  kept  near  enough  to  Hood  to  have  frequent  conferences 
with  him,  until  the  latter  crossed  the  Tennessee,  some  six 
weeks  later.  Hood  was  already  across  the  Chattahoochee  on 
his  northward  march  when  the  formal  order  placing  Beaure- 
gard over  him  was  issued,  and  as  it  had  no  influence  upon 
the  campaign  till  the  Confederate  army  reached  Gadsden 
at  the  close  of  October,  no  mention  was  made  of  these 
changes  in  the  naiTative  of  operations  in  the  last  volume. 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  %% 

Beauregard  had  indeed  overtaken  Hood  on  October  0th,  at 
Cave  Spring,  near  Borne,  before  the  crossing  of  the  Coosa, 
but  the  conference  does  not  appear  to  have  had  any  signifi- 
cance. At  Gadsden,  however,  on  the  20th  and  21st,  the  two 
generals  fully  discussed  the  situation,  and  Hood's  proposal 
to  march  on  Guntersvillo  and  cross  the  Tennessee  there,  was 
approved  by  Beauregard.  It  was  arranged  that  Wheeler's 
cavalry  cori)s,  consisting  of  twelve  brigades  (to  be  increased 
by  another  sent  from  Jackson's  division)  should  closely 
watch  Sherman's  movement,  opposing  and  harassing  his  ad- 
vance, whatever  way  he  turned  ;  and  if  he  should  mai-ch  for 
the  sea,  Governor  Brown  and  General  Cobb  held  out  expec- 
tations that,  in  the  emergency,  seventeen  thousand  G  jorgia 
troops  could  join  Wheeler,  and  throw  themselves  across 
Sherman's  i)ath.  Beauregard  also  expected  in  this  event  to 
draw  some  five  thousand  men  from  the  Carolinas,  making, 
as  he  reckoned,  an  army  of  tw«mty-nine  thousand  to  oppose 
the  eastward  march  of  the  National  forces.' 

In  the  invasion  of  Tennessee,  Hood  would  be  accompanied 
by  part  of  Jackson's  division  of  cavalry,  and  FoiTest,  who  was 
between  Tuscumbia  and  Corinth,  was  ordered  to  join  him 
with  all  his  mounted  force.  At  Florence,  on  November  6th, 
and  before  beginning  his  movement  against  Schofield,  Hood 
had  present  with  him  41,185  infantry  and  artilleiy,  and 
3,544  cavalry,  making  an  aggregate  of  44,729.     About  No- 

« Beaurcfrard's  Official  Report.  Tn  this,  however,  he  has  nndprestimatcd 
Wheeler's  cavalry.  That  corps  reported  at  I.ovejoy  Station,  August  Ist,  an  "ef- 
fective "  total  of  enlisted  men  of  6,28.3,  and  it  does  not  appear  to  have  suffered 
notably  between  that  time  and  the  opening  of  the  new  campaign.  It  was  joined 
by  a  brigade  from  Jackson's  divitiion,  and  a  Kentucky  infantry  brigade,  which 
was  mounted.  These  made  about  two  thousand  seven  hundred  enlisted  men,  and 
adding  the  usual  proportion  of  officers  to  the  whole  list  of  "effectives,"  it  gives 
Wheeler  an  actual  force,  in  round  numbers,  of  10,000,  instead  of  7,000,  as  esti 
mated  by  Beauregard.  Hood  puts  the  number  at  10,000  (Advance  and  Retreat, 
p.  310). 


12 


THP]  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


vember  15111  lio  was  joined  by  Forrest  with  his  cavahy  corps, 
numbering  9,'JUU  present,  and  increasing  the  aggi'egate  to 
53,938  officers  and  men  present.' 

After  his  conference  with  Beauregard,  Hood  had  gone  but 
one  day's  march  from  Gadsden  toward  Guutersville  when  he 
suddenly  turned  his  columns  to  the  west,  making  first  for 
Decatur.  He  learned  that  Forrest  had  started  upon  a  raid 
northward  into  West  Tennessee,  and  that  it  was  uncertain 
how  long  it  might  be  before  that  cavalry  could  join  him. 
On  October  7th,  and  before  seeing  Beauregard,  he  had 
asked  General  Taylor  to  send  Forrest  a  second  time  into 
Tennessee  to  break  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railway, 
if  he  could,  or  at  least  to  occupy  Thomas's  forces  so  as  to 
create  a  diversion  in  his  favor.  Forrest  was  at  Cherokee 
Station,  where  ho  had  been  refitting  and  resting  his  com- 
mand, and  both  Taylor  and  he  misapprehended  Hood's  wish 
to  have  a  strong  cavaliy  force  with  his  moving  column  as 


'  These  flsrnros  nre  taken  from  the  offlciiil  returns  in  the  Ailjutant-Geucral's 
ofUce  at  Washington,  and  are  distributed  as  follows : 


Infantry. 


Cavalry. 


S.  D.  Lee's  corps 11,784  i  Lee's 

A.  P.  Stewart's  corps.    .  11,524     Stewart's. 

B.  V.  Chea' ham's  corps.  14,:W.5    Cheatham's. 
Engineers 484    Jackson'a. 


!KM)  I  JacV  :oii's  division . . 
!«8    Bnford's 
8.s()    Chidmers's     " 
321  I  Ilo.Uley's 

Escorts 


Totals :i8,117 


r.    i 


.  3,1 5'2 

.  3,857 

.  2,841 

.  2,.-)ll 

12,75-^ 


This  is  exclusive  of  Forrest's  artJllery,  and  of  .about  one  thousand  men  nuule  up 
of  the  Fifth  Missi8>ippi  Cavalry  iind  several  battalions  of  State  reserves  which 
joined  Forrest.  Ilo<ldey'8  division  was  left  in  Alabama  to  hold  the  line  of  the 
Tennessee  River.  The  "  present  sick  "  were  reported  at  2,000,  and  the  i)resont  on 
"  extra  duty  "  at  8,2()7,  but  these  last  were,  when  neces.-sary.  put  into  nrtioii  by  the 
Confederates.  Beauropard's  estimate  of  the  "'effective  "  force  (ilcducting  officers, 
etc.)  was  27.28,')  infantry  nnd  artillery,  and  7.7l'0  cavalry,  or  an  agH:rc{jatc  of  ."'S.OOO. 
This  is  less  than  two  tliirds  of  the  number  shown  to  be  present  by  the  oflicial  ro- 
turud.    Heuitlbo  Appendix  A,  2. 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  13 

soon  as  possible.  They  conceived  the  idea  that  a  strong 
diversion  in  his  favor  west  of  the  Tennessee  woukl  be  of 
most  use  to  him,  and  Forrest  accordingly  started  northward 
on  the  18th  and  was  at  Jackson,  Tenn.,  on  the  day  Hood  left 
the  Guntersville  road  to  move  westward.  But  Hood's  state- 
ment that  this  news  from  Forrest  was  the  reason  for  his 
change  of  plan  is  more  specious  than  sound.  Forrest  re- 
mained at  Jackson  till  the  28th,  when  Beauregard  and  Hood 
were  in  conference  near  Decatur,  and  the  orders  which  aj)- 
parently  stopped  him  there  could  have  brought  him  back 
to  Tuscumbia,  or  to  any  other  place  where  the  Tennessee 
could  be  more  easily  crossed  and  a  junction  with  Hood  more 
speedily  made.  It  is  more  probable  that  Hood's  real 
motive  was  to  get  rid  of  Sherman,  who  would  have  been 
close  upon  his  heels  at  Guntersville.  He  hoped  that  when 
he  should  cross  the  river  at  Decatur  or  at  Tuscumbia,  Sher- 
man would  hasten  to  concentrate  in  front  of  Nashville  to 
meet  him,  and  that  his  brilliant  strategy  would  thus  undo 
all  that  had  been  done  since  the  battle  of  Stone's  liiver. 
After  his  disappovatment  and  defeat,  it  was  natural  that  he 
should  seek  plausible  reasons  for  what  had  proven  so  disas- 
trous a  movement.  There  certainly  was  no  excuse  for  mak- 
ing so  radical  a  change  in  plans  without  consiilting  his 
superior,  and  his  doing  so  shows  that  he  was  determined  to 
treat  his  subordination  to  Beauregard  as  only  a  nominal 
thing,  while  he  sought  to  regain  his  own  prestige  by  a 
brilliant  stroke.' 

Beauregard,  amazed  at  the  sudden  change  of  movement, 
hastened  after  Hood  and  overtook  him  at  Decatur,  where  he 
had  expected  to  cross  the  river,  but  where  the  vigorous  de- 
fense of  the  post  satisfied  both  the  (^Confederate  officers  that 


'  Beauregard's  Report ;  also,  Taylor's  Destruction  and  Roconstniction,  pp.  207, 
SOS,  uud  Jordan  luid  I'riur'B  L'luui'tiigiu  of  l-'orrcsl,  iii>.  ,>.t,  b'M. 


14  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

it  would  be  quite  too  costly  to  force  a  crossing  there,  if  it 
could  be  done  at  all.  The  post  was  commanded  by  Colonel 
Doolittle,  of  the  Eighteenth  Michigan,  whose  bold  and 
judicious  use  of  the  garrison  promptly  repulsed  the  first 
efforts  to  carry  the  place.  General  R.  S.  Granger  arrived  with 
reinforcements  at  the  close  of  the  first  day.  A  brisk  sortie 
from  the  garrison  captured  over  a  hundred  prisoners  from 
Cheatham's  corps,  siDiking  a  couple  of  guns,  and  inflicting 
considerable  loss  in  killed  and  wounded.  Hood  now  marched 
to  Tuscumbia,  and  by  the  last  day  of  October  secured  an 
unobstnicted  crossing,  occupying  the  town  of  Florence  on 
the  northern  bank  of  the  river.  At  this  point  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Tennessee  is  interrapted  by  Muscle  Shoals  above 
and  Colbert  Shoals  below,  so  that  it  was  only  in  the  highest 
water  that  even  light  gunboats  could  pass.  Croxton's  bri- 
gade of  cavalry  was  in  observation  near  Florence,  but  was 
unable  to  make  any  serious  opposition,  and  pontoon  bridges 
were  soon  laid.  Could  Hood  then  have  marched  at  once 
upon  Pulaski  he  would  have  found  but  little  opposition 
south  of  Duck  River.  It  was  necessary,  however,  to  rear- 
range his  lines  of  communication  and  accumulate  at  Flor- 
ence supplies  for  the  campaign.  He  had  left  Gadsden  with 
twenty  days'  rations,  but  when  soldiers'  haversacks  are  over- 
loaded there  is  always  a  great  waste  of  food,  and  his  wagons 
had  been  unable  to  keep  up  with  the  troops.  The  prisoners 
taken  by  Granger  at  Decatur  reported  that  the  men  were 
half  mutinous  at  the  scanty  issue  of  supplies,  and  when 
Tuscumbia  was  reached  the  sustenance  of  the  army  had  be- 
come the  problem  demanding  first  attention.  Hood  pro- 
fesses to  believe  he  had  reason  to  expect  supplies  to  meet 
him  at  Tuscumbia ;  but  the  superintendent  of  the  railway 
reported  the  road  in  no  condition  to  furnish  the  requisite 
transportation,  and  in  spite  of  the  most  earnest  efforts  of 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  15 

Beauregard  and  Taylor  to  put  it  speedily  in  repair,  the 
greater  jmrt  of  the  three  weeks'  delay  at  Florence  must  prob- 
ably be  attributed  to  its  half  ruined  and  decayed  condi- 
tion. Stores  were  collected  at  j^oints  on  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  Railroad  in  Mississippi,  carried  to  Corinth  and  thence 
east  to  Cherokee  Station  upon  a  piece  of  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad  which  Forrest  had  been  able  to  protect. 
But  from  Cherokee  Station  to  Tuscumbia  was  a  gap  of  fif- 
teen or  sixteen  miles  where  the  road  had  never  been  rebuilt, 
and  here  the  army  stores  must  be  hauled  in  wagon  trains 
over  a  wretched  country  road,  which  became  a  quagmire  as 
soon  as  the  rains  began. 

Beauregard  does  not  seem  to  have  ventured  upon  any 
peremptory  interference  with  Hood  at  their  meeting  at 
Decatur,  but  acquiesced  in  what  was  done,  sharing,  no 
doubt,  the  hopes  of  the  latter  that  the  news  of  their  cross- 
ing at  Florence  would  be  quickly  followed  by  that  of  the  re- 
turn of  Sherman  to  Midtlle  Tennessee.  But  it  had  become 
evident  that  there  would  be  delays ;  and  Forrest,  who  had 
been  waiting  at  Jackson,  resumed  his  expedition  with  a  pur- 
pose of  attracting  Thomas's  attention  to  the  west  and  rear  of 
Nashville,  so  as  to  draw  troops  in  that  direction  and  prevent 
the  concentration  in  front  of  Hood,  where  alone  was  any  se- 
rious danger.  He  struck  the  river  on  the  29th,  a  few  miles 
above  Fort  Henry,  and  his  batteries  disabk^d  and  brought  to 
three  transports  and  a  "tin-clad"  gunboat,  the  Undine, 
The  latter,  after  a  stout  defence,  was  injured  in  her  machin- 
erv  and  was  run  ashore  and  abandoned.  Two  of  the  trans- 
l)orts  were  burned,  but  the  gunboat  and  the  other  transport 
were  in  the  possession  of  Forrest's  "horse-marines"  for  a 
couple  of  days,  when  the  transport  with  her  lading  of  stores 
was  recaptured  and  the  Undine  was  run  ashore  and  burned. 
Forrest's  first  appearance  on  the  river  was  at  the  most  north- 


16  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

ern  point  ho  reached,  and  he  returned,  making  demonstra- 
tions to  assist  his  purpose  at  various  j'l^^^'^  ak)ng  the  west- 
ern bank.  On  November  4th  he  appeared  opposite  John- 
sonville,  eighty  miles  directly  west  of  Nashville,  and  by 
a  noisy  cannonade  caused  a  jianic  in  the  garrison.  Three 
gunboats,  eight  transports,  and  some  barges  were  moored  to 
the  river  bank,  and  great  quantities  of  stores  were  in  ware- 
houses at  the  landing.  All  these  were  abandoned  and 
burned  by  tlie  crews  and  garrison,  and  the  troops  fled 
toward  Nashville,  tho  commandant  telegraphing  Thomas 
that  Forrest  was  across  the  river  and  marching  in  pursuit. ' 
But  Forrest  had  not  crossed,  and  continiied  his  march  up 
the  river.  At  Perryville  he  put  over  part  of  Eucker's  bri- 
gade, but  kept  the  body  of  his  troops  on  the  western  side, 
reaching  Cherokee  Station  on  the  15th  and  joining  Hood  at 
Florence  next  day.  The  dates  which  have  been  given  and 
the  character  of  Forrest's  movement,  ^  ^lich  came  in  contact 
with  no  National  forces  west  of  tho  river,  plainly  prove  the 
l)urposes  of  the  Confederate  generals.  Time  was  needed  to 
repair  the  railway  and  collect  supplies  at  Tuscumbia,  and 
this  was  the  easiest  way  to  get  it. 

Sherman's  attitude,  however,  was  not  without  its  influ- 
ence upon  his  adversaries.  They  knew  that  the  Twentieth 
Corps  was  still  at  Atlanta  and  that  Sherman  with  three 
others  was  observing  them  at  Rome  or  Kingston.  It  was 
quite  among  the  possibilities  that  he  might  march  westward 
across  Alabama,  destroying  all  railway  lines  and  close  in 
upon  the  rear  of  Hood's  army,  while  Thomas  delayed  him 
in  the  "  barrens  "  of  Tennessee,  where  the  country  could  do 
but  little  to  sustain  such  an  army.     The  desire  to  see  Sher- 

1  The  {TarrlRon  consisted  of  about  1,000  men,  of  the  Twelfth  United  States  col- 
ored troops,  Forty-third  Wisconsin  Infantry,  and  Eleventh  Tennessee  Cavalry, 
all  under  couimund  uC  Culuael  C.  U.  Tliumpiiuii,  vi  the  firtit-iiumed  regiment. 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  17 

man  begin  some  definite  movement  nndonbtetlly  worked 
upon  Hood,  and  after  the  expected  jjrepai'ation  for  his  ad- 
vance was  made  he  still  delayed  till  Beauregard  spiivred  him 
anew  to  his  work  by  urgent  despatches  of  a  kind  to  which  ho 
was  not  used.  It  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  ho 
was  bitterly  disappointed  in  finding  that  Sherman  did  not 
hasten  back  to  Tennessee,  and  was  oppressed  with  the  fore- 
boding that  if  this  part  of  his  jilan  failed  and  Sherman 
turned  eastward,  he  would  be  in  no  small  measiire  respon- 
sible for  the  impending  ruin  of  the  Confederate  cause. 

Returning  to  the  preparations  Sherman  was  making  to 
give  Thomas  forces  enough  to  cope  Avith  Hood  in  Tennes- 
see, we  find  that  on  October  30th  Wood's  division  of  Stan- 
ley's (Fourth)  corps  was  moving  by  rail  from  Chattanooga, 
and  by  November  3d  the  whole  coii^s  was  concentrated  at 
Pulaski,  eighty  miles  south  of  Nashville  and  forty-four  north 
of  Decatur,  upon  the  railway  connecting  those  places.  De- 
catur and  Athens  were  held  by  General  Granger,  who  com- 
manded the  District  of  Northern  Alabama,  whicli  also  includ- 
ed Huntsvillo  and  Stevenson ;  but  the  bridges  and  trestles 
on  the  railway  between  Pulaski  and  Athens  at  the  crossing  of 
Elk  River  had  been  destroyed  by  Forrest  in  the  latter  i)art  of 
September  and  had  not  been  rebiiilt,  and  Pulaski  was  there- 
fore the  terminus  of  the  direct  railway  line  south  from  Nash- 
ville. When  it  was  definitely  known  that  the  Confederate  army 
was  at  Tuscumbia  and  Florence,  Thomas  had  ordered  Stanley 
to  get  together  his  corps  at  Pulaski,  but  ho  did  not  put  Gran- 
ger under  his  command,  and  the  latter  continued  through  the 
whole  campaign  to  receive  his  orders  direct  from  Nashville. 

On  November  3d,  Schofield  started  Cooper's  divisicm  of 
the  Twenty-third  Coii)s  ui)on  the  railway  trains  for  Nash- 
ville, leaving  Cox's  division  for  several  days  at  Dalton  till 
transportation  could  bo  got  for  it.     Schofield  himself  went 


18  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

forward  with  the  advance,  and  when  he  reached  Nashville 
next  day,  Thomas  had  just  received  the  first  alarming  news 
from  Johnsonville,  and  hnrried  Schofield  in  person  with  Gal- 
lup's  brigade  (the  first  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  arrive) 
to  Gillem's  Station,  on  the  railway  from  Nashville  to  the 
abandoned  post.  Finding  no  enemy  near  Gillem's,  Scho- 
field marched  to  Johnsonville  on  the  6th,  and  was  able  to 
give  Thomas  the  truth  as  to  the  disgraceful  affair.  General 
Cooper,  with  Gallup's  and  Moore's  brigades  of  his  division, 
were  placed  at  Johnsonville  for  a  time,  with  orders  to  fortify 
it  in  accordance  with  a  general  plan  prepared  by  the  engi- 
neers. Schofield  returned  to  Nashville,  whence  he  was  sent 
on  the  11th  by  Thomas  to  Pulaski,  to  assume  command  of 
the  forces  assembling  there.  The  remainder  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Coi-ps  reached  Nashville  on  the  9th,  and  went  forward 
by  easy  stages.  On  the  15th,  Schofield  had  at  Pulaski  the 
Fourth  Corps  and  Cox's  division  of  the  Twenty-third,  Strick- 
land's brigade  of  the  latter  corps  was  at  Columbia,  and  the 
cavalry  under  General  Hatch  was  covering  the  front  and 
right,  toward  Florence  and  Waynesboro. 

AVhen  the  Fourth  and  Twenty-third  Corps  reported  to 
Thomas,  and  even  before  the  arrival  of  A.  J.  Smith  with  the 
divisions  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  his  official  returns  showed 
a  force  present  for  duty  just  about  equal  to  that  of  Hood, 
though  differently  divided,  being  stronger  in  infantry  and 
weaker  in  cavalry.  The  latter  numbered  5,591,  being  less 
than  half  Hood's  strength  in  that  arm,  but  the  infantiy  and 
artillery  were  48,975.'     "When  this  force  should  be  increased 


'  These  figures  give  the  "  present  for  duty"  on  October  Slst,  and  were  distrib- 
uted ns  follows :  Tourth  Corps,  12,.S31 ;  Twenty-third  Corps,  10,(124 ;  cavalry, 
5,591 ;  District  of  Tennessee,  18,661 ;  unassigned  detachments,  7,369 — total, 
54,5tM).  This  does  not  include  the  District  of  Etowah  under  Steeduian,  which 
first  appears  In  Thomas's  report  for  Noveniljer  20th,  and  which  numbered  6,421. 
The  official  returns  for  subsequent  dates  will  be  found  in  Appendix  A. 


PLANNIN(}   THE  CAMPAIGN.  19 

by  Steeclman's  garrisons  in  Northern  Georgia  and  at  Chatta- 
nooga, by  A.  J.  Smith's  corps,  and  by  detachments  which 
Thomas  was  o-uthorized  to  draw  from  Schofield's  depart- 
ment, Sherman  estimated  the  army  in  Tennessee  easily  able 
to  cope  with  Hood.  "When  he  should  leave  his  base  of  sup- 
plies in  Georgia,  the  necessity  for  guarding  a  long  line  of 
railway  would  cease,  and  Chattanooga  would  be  the  only 
I>laco  in  Thomas's  department  east  of  Nashville  which  it 
would  be  necessary  to  gai'rison.  The  supplies  in  store  at 
Chattanooga  were  all  that  would  be  needed  for  the  posts 
maintained  in  East  Tennessee.  Thomas  could  therefore 
concentrate  nearly  everj'thing  to  meet  Hood,  and  when  the 
latter  should  be  defeated  and  driven  southward,  the  lines  of 
operation  would  necessarily  be  rearranged.  As  soon  as  it 
seemed  probable  that  Hood  intended  to  make  Florence  and 
Tuscumbia  his  base,  Sherman  wrote  Thomas,  "You  must 
unite  all  your  men  into  one  army,  and  abandon  all  minor 
l)oints  if  you  expect  to  defeat  Hood."  The  long  delay  of  the 
Confederate  general  in  making  his  advance  from  the  Tennes- 
see gave  the  needed  time  for  j^reliminary  arrangements ; 
and  when,  on  November  12th,  parting  messages  were  ex- 
changed between  them,  Thomas  was  able  to  say  to  Sherman 
that  he  believed  he  should  have  "  men  enough  to  rain  Hood 
unless  he  gets  out  of  the  way  very  rapidly."  Thomas  was 
empowered,  in  the  absence  of  his  superior,  to  exert  all  the 
authority  of  Sherman  himself  in  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  the  new  campaign  was  begun. 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


< 


CHAPTEK  n. 

THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA. 

At  Rome,  when  parting  with  one  of  the  officers  he  was 
sending  back  to  Tennessee,  Sherman  said,  "  If  there's  to  be 
any  hard  fighting,  you  will  have  it  to  do."  He  perfectly 
understood  that  there  was  no  sufficient  force  in  Georgia  to 
thwart  his  plan  or  even  to  delay  his  march.  Before  leaving 
Atlanta  he  pointed  out  to  one  of  his  pi-incipal  subordinates 
that  a  National  army  at  Columbia,  S.  C,  would  end  the  war  un- 
less it  should  be  routed  and  destroyed.  Deprived  of  the  mate- 
rial support  of  all  the  States  but  North  Carolina,  it  would 
be  impossible  for  the  Confederate  Government  to  feed  its 
army  at  Richmond,  or  to  fill  its  exchequer.  The  experience 
it  had  With  the  country  west  of  the  Mississippi  proved  that 
a  region  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the  Confederacy  would 
not  furnish  men  or  money,  and  could  not  furnish  supplies ; 
while  anxiety  for  their  families,  who  were  within  the  Na- 
tional lines,  tempted  the  soldiers  from  those  States  to  desert, 
and  weakened  the  confidence  of  the  whole  army.  In  such  a 
situation  credit  would  be  destroyed,  the  Confederate  i.ai)er 
money  would  become  worthless,  its  foreign  assistance  would 
be  cut  off,  and  the  rebellion  must  end.  The  one  chance 
left  would  be  for  Lee  to  break  away  from  Grant,  overwhelm 
Sherman,  and  re-establish  the  Confederate  power  in  a  cen- 
tral position  by  the  abandonment  of  Virginia.  But  this 
implied  that  Lee  could  break  away  from  Grant,  who,  on  the 


22  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

south  side  of  Petersburg,  was  as  near  Columbia  as  his  oppo- 
nent, and  would  be  close  upon  his  heels  from  the  moment 
the  lines  about  Itichmond  were  abandoned. 

If  Sherman,  therefore,  should  reach  Columbia  with  an 
army  that  could  resist  the  first  onslaught  of  Lee,  the  last 
hope  of  the  Confederacy  would  be  cmshed  between  the 
national  forces  meeting  from  the  east  and  west.  Of  *?our8e, 
this  implied  that  Thomas  should,  at  least,  be  able  to  resist 
Hood  till  the  Eastern  campaign  should  be  ended,  when,  in 
the  general  collapse  of  the  Richmond  Government,  Hood 
must  as  certainly  abandon  the  liopeless  cause,  as  Johnston 
was  in  fact  forced  to  do  after  Lee's  sunender  in  the  fol- 
lowing spring. 

To  establish  a  new  base  upon  the  sea  was  a  necessaiy  part 
of  such  a  plan,  for  the  old  base  at  Chattanooga  must  be 
abandoned  from  the  start,  and  the  practical  separation  of 
the  Carolinas  from  the  Gulf  States  could  only  be  accom- 
plished by  a  great  and  thorough  destruction  of  railway  lines 
in  Georgia.  The  army  could  live  upon  the  country  while 
marching,  but  it  must  have  the  ordinaiy  means  of  supply 
within  a  very  few  days  from  the  time  of  halting,  or  it  would 
starve.  The  country  through  which  it  moved  was  hostile,  no 
local  government  could  be  made  to  respond  to  formal  requi- 
sitions for  subsistence,  and  the  wasteful  method  of  foraging 
itself  made  a  necessity  for  moving  on  into  new  fields.  A 
rapid  march  to  the  sea,  the  occupation  of  some  harbor  capa- 
ble of  becoming  a  fortified  base,  and  the  opening  of  lines  of 
ocean  communication  with  the  great  depots  of  the  North  must 
therefore  constitute  the  first  part  of  the  vast  project.  Be- 
yond this  Sherman  did  not  venture  to  plan  in  detail,  and 
recognizing  the  possibility  that  unlooked-for  opposition 
might  force  a  modification  even  of  this,  he  kept  in  mind 
the  alternative  that  he  might  have  to  go  west  rather  than 


THE   MARCH  THROUGH   (.KORGIA.  28 

east  of  Macon.  Ho  reqneHfed  that  the  fleets  on  the  coast 
might  watch  for  his  appearance  at  Morris  Island  near 
Charleston,  at  Ossabaw  Sound  just  south  of  Savannah,  and 
at  Pensacola  and  Mobilo.  If  he  should  reach  Morris  Island, 
it  would  naturally  bo  by  the  way  of  Augusta  and  the  left 
bank  of  the  Savannah  Eiver.  Ossal)aw  Soiiud  would,  in 
like  manner,  indicate  the  route  by  way  of  Milledgevillo,  Mil- 
ieu, and  the  valley  of  the  Ogeecheo.  The  Gulf  ports  would 
only  be  chosen  if  his  course  to  the  cast  should  bo  made  im- 
practicable. 

On  November  12th  comniunicatiou  with  the  rear  was 
broken.  The  railway  bridge  at  Alatoona  was  taken  to  jjieces 
and  can-ied  to  the  rear  to  be  stored  ;  but  from  the  crossing 
of  the  Etowah,  southward  to  Atlanta,  the  whole  line  of  the 
road  was  thoroughly  destroyed.  The  foundries,  machine- 
shops,  and  factories  at  Rome  were  burned,  lest  they  should 
be  again  turned  to  use  by  the  enemy,  and  on  the  14th  the 
army  was  concentrated  at  Atlanta.  Sherman's  force  nov/ 
consisted  of  two  corj^s  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  under 
General  Howard,  and  two  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
under  General  Slocum,  which  were  respectively  designated  as 
right  and  left  wing.  Logan  was  absent,  and  his  coi*ps  (the 
Fifteenth)  was  in  command  of  Major-General  P.  J.  Oster- 
haus.  The  division  of  General  J.  E.  Smith,  which  had  been 
distributed  along  the  railroad  in  Northern  Georgia,  had 
joined  that  coi*ps,  which  now  consisted  of  four  divisions, 
commanded  by  Generals  Woods,  Hazen,  Smith,  and  Corse. 
Blair's  coi-ps  (Seventeenth;  had  three  divisions,  viz..  Mow- 
er's, Leggett's,  and  Giles  A.  Smith's.  The  assignment  of 
Slocum  to  the  command  of  the  wing  left  the  Twentieth 
CoiTps  under  Brigadier-General  A.  S.  Williams,  with  Geary, 
Ward,  and  Jackson  as  division  commanders.  Davis's 
(Fourteenth)  corps  retained  the  organization  it  had  at  the 


24  THE3  MARCH  TO  THE  REA. 

close  of  tlio  Atlanta  campaip;n,  and  consisted  of  Carlin's, 
Morgan's,  and  Baird's  divisions.  The  cavalry  was  under 
Kilpatrick,  and  was  but  a  single  division,  composed  of  the 
two  brigades  of  Munay  and  Atkins.  T\w  numerical  force 
of  the  whole,  according  to  the  returns  of  November 
loth,  only  two  days  before  communication  with  the  North 
was  broken,  was  a  little  over  fifty  nine  thousand,  but  fur- 
loughed  men  and  recruits  hurried  so  fast  to  the  front  in 
those  last  davs  that  the  muster  at  Atlanta  hIiowchI  a  total  of 
over  sixty-two  thousand.'  No  pains  had  been  spared  to 
make  this  a  thoroughly  efficient  force,  for  an  army  in  an 
enemy's  country  and  without  a  base  cannot  afford  to  be 
encumbered  with  sick,  or  to  have  its  trains  or  its  artilleiy 
delayed  by  weak  or  insufficient  teams.  The  artilleiy  was 
reduced  to  about  one  gnn  to  a  thousand  men,  and  the 
batteries  usually  to  four  guns  each,  with  eight  good  horses 
to  each  gun  or  caisson.  Twenty  days'  rations  were  in  hand, 
and  two  Inmdred  roTinds  of  ammunition  of  all  kinds  were 
in  the  wagons.  Droves  of  beef  cattle  to  furnish  the  meat 
ration  were  ready  to  accompany  the  march,  and  these  grew 
larger  rather  than  smaller  as  the  army  moved  through  tlie 
country. 

The  determination  to  abandon  Atlanta  involved  also  the 
undoing  of  much  work  that  had  been  done  there  in  tlie 
early  aiitumn.  As  the  town  could  not  be  used  by  the  Na- 
tional forces,  the  defences  must  be  destroyed,  the  work- 
shops, mills,  and  dCpots  mined  and  biirned.  This  task  had 
been  given  to  Colonel  Poe,  Chief  Engineer,  and  was  com- 
pleted by  the  time  the  army  was  assembled  and  ready  to 
march  southward. 

>  FifteoTith  Corps,  infantry,  15,894;  SevcnU-enth  Corps,  11,733;  Fourteenth 
Corps,  13,902;  Twentieth  Corps,  13,741 ;  artillery,  1,812 ;  cavalry,  6,(HW-total, 
62,204. 


THK   MAIK^H    THllOUUH  (;KOK(!IA.  li 

On  the  morning  of  Novemhor  15th  tho  movomont  began. 
The  two  corjjH  of  ouch  wing  woro  ordore<l  to  inarch  upon 
Hojmrate  roads,  at  fii-st  diverging  Hhur])iy,  and  threatening 
l)()tli  Macon  and  Augusta,  but  having  the  neighborhood  of 
MiUodgevine,  tho  e«i)ital  of  the  State,  lor  their  place  of 
rendezvous  at  the  end  of  the  first  Htnge.  Slierman  himself 
uccouii)anied  tlxe  left  wing,  which  followed  tho  line  of  rail- 
way leading  from  Atlanta  to  Augusta;  for,  by  doing  so,  ho 
could  get  the  earliest  and  best  information  of  any  new  efTorts 
the  Confederate  Government  might  make  for  tlio  defence  of 
the  Carolinas.  In  this  way  lie  could  best  decide  upon  the 
proper  direction  for  his  columns  after  he  yhould  reach  the 
Oconee  River. 

After  leaving  tho  mountainous  region  of  Northern  Georgia, 
the  topograi)hy  of  the  country  is  determined  by  the  river 
courses,  which  run  in  radiating  lines  from  the  highlands  a 
hundred  miles  northeast  of  Atlanta.  The  Savannah  River, 
which  separates  the  State  from  South  Carolina,  flows  nearly 
southeast  in  a  very  direct  general  line  to  the  sea.  Augusta 
is  ou  the  right  bank  like  a  half-way  house,  and  Savannah,  on 
the  same  side  of  the  stream,  is  near  its  mouth.  The  Ocmul- 
gee  and  Oconee  Rivers  rise  near  Atlanta,  and  flow  in  parallel 
valleys  about  forty  miles  apart  in  the  same  southeasterly 
direction  nearly  two  hundred  miles,  when  they  unite  to  form 
the  Altaraaha,  whicli  enters  the  ocean  a  little  north  of  the 
Florida  line.  Macon  is  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Ocmulgee, 
about  a  hundred  miles  from  Atlanta,  and  Milledgeville, 
thirty  miles  northeast  of  Macon,  is  on  the  same  side  of  the 
Oconee,  which,  however,  has  a  direction  more  nearly  north 
and  south  above  the  city.  The  only  other  stream  of  any  im- 
portance in  this  paifc  of  the  State  is  the  Ogeechee,  which 
rises  midway  between  Milledgeville  and  Augusta,  but  grad- 
ually approaches  tho  Savannali,  so  that  for  fifty  or  sixty 
Vol.  X  —2 


26  THE  MARCH   TO   THK  SEA. 

miles  from  the  ocean  these  rivers  are  nearly  parallel  and 
from  fifteen  to  twenty  miles  apart. 

The  general  line  of  Sherman's  march  was  between  the 
Ocmulgeo  and  Oeonee  Rivers,  though  he  sent  his  right  wing 
at  first  along  the  Macon  Railroad  by  more  westerly  routes, 
for  the  purpose  of  deceiving  the  enemy,  and  to  diive  otif 
Wheeler's  cavalry  and  some  three  thousand  Georgia  militia, 
under  General  G.  W.  Smith,  which  had  been  assembled  at 
Lovejoy  Station  for  some  days.  Howai'd's  right  (Fifteenth 
Corps)  mai'ched  by  way  of  Jonesboro,  McDonough,  and  In- 
dian Spring  to  the  crossing  of  the  Ocmulgee  at  Planters* 
Factory,  the  Seventeenth  Corps  keeping  a  little  farther  oast, 
but  reaching  the  river  at  the  same  place.  Kilpatrick,  with 
most  of  the  cavalry,  was  upon  this  flank,  and  di'ove  the 
enemy*8  skirmishers  before  him  to  Lovejoy's.  Smith  had 
retired  rapidly  upon  Macon  with  his  infantry,  but  the  old 
lines  at  Lovejoy's  were  held  by  two  brigades  of  cavalry  with 
two  pieces  of  artilleiy.  Kilpatrick  dismounted  his  men  and 
charged  the  works  on  foot,  candying  them  handsomely.  He 
followed  his  success  with  a  rapid  attack  by  another  column, 
which  captured  the  guns  and  followed  the  retreating  enemy 
some  miles  towai'd  Macon.  The  cavalry  contiimed  its  dem- 
onstrations nearly  '">  '^orsyth,  creating  the  impression  of  aii 
advance  in  force  in  jhat  direction ;  then  it  turned  eastward 
and  crossed  the  Ocmulgee  with  the  iufantiy. 

A  section  of  pontoon  train  was  with  each  coqis,  and  How- 
ard put  down  two  bridges ; '  but  though  his  head  of  column 
reached  Planters'  Factoiy  on  the  18th,  and  the  bridges  wera 
kept  full  day  and  night,  it  was  not  till  the  morning  of  the 


'  The  pontoons  nseil  by  Sherman,  both  in  the  Atlanta  campaign  and  the  pres- 
ent one,  were  those  of  canvas,  of  which  tlie  frames  cenxld  lio  disjointed.  Tliolr 
lightness  and  serviceability  U'ft  little  *<)  be  desired,  and  they  proved  thoroughly 
satisfactory  in  hanl  and  constiut  eainiuiigii  use. 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.        27 

20tli  that  the  rear  guard  was  able  to  cross.  The  bank  on 
the  eastern  side  of  the  river  was  steep  and  slippeiy  from 
rain,  making  it  tedious  work  getting  the  trains  up  the  hill. 
His  heads  of  columns  were  jmshing  fonvard  meanwhile,  and 
reached  Clinton,  a  few  miles  north  of  Macon,  by  the  time 
the  rear  was  over  the  river.  Kilpatrick  now  made  a  feint 
upon  Macon,  striking  the  railway  a  littlo  oast  of  the  town, 
capturing  and  destroying  a  train  of  cars,  and  tearing  up  the 
track  for  a  mile.  Under  cover  of  this  demonstration  and 
while  the  cavalry  were  holding  all  roads  north  and  east  of 
Macon,  Howard's  infantiy  on  the  22d  closed  up  toward  Gor- 
don, a  station  on  the  Savannah  railroad,  twenty  miles  east- 
ward. Woods's  division  of  tho  Fifteenth  Corj)3  brought  up 
the  rear  and  was  approaching  Griswoldville. 

Eeturning  to  the  left  wing,  which  Sherman  accompanied, 
we  find  that  it  had  applied  itself  in  earnest  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  railway  from  Atlanta  to  Augusta,  making  thor- 
ough work  of  it  to  Madison,  seventy  miles  from  Atlanta,  and 
destroying  the  bridge  over  the  Oconee  River,  ten  or  twelve 
miles  further  on.  Here,  the  divergence  between  the  winga 
was  greatest,  the  distance  from  Slocum's  left  to  Kilpatrick, 
on  the  right,  being  fifty  miles  in  a  direct  line.  Sherman, 
however,  did  not  cross  the  Oconee,  but  directed  Slocum  to 
turn  southward  along  the  right  bank  of  the  river  with  Wil- 
liams's (Twentieth)  cori)s,  while  Davis's  (Fourteenth)  took 
the  interior  line  by  a  more  direct  route  to  Mil  ledge vi  lie, 
where  the  left  whig  assembled  on  the  23d,  the  advance  of 
the  Twentieth  Coii>s  having  entered  the  city  the  day  before, 
driving  out  a  small  force  of  the  enemy,  which  retreated  rap- 
idly across  the  river,  leaving  the  bridge  uninjured.  Slocura 
immediately  threw  out  Jackson's  division  to  the  east,  cover- 
ing and  securing  the  bridge  for  further  operations. 

Sherman's  advance  from  Atlanta  drew  from  Beaureguid  f), 


28  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

rattling  volley  of  telegraphic  despatches  to  all  the  Confed- 
erate officials,  civil  and  militai-y.  In  these  he  made  much  of 
the  fact  that  he  had  ordered  General  Taylor  in  Alabama  to 
move  with  his  available  forces  into  Georgia ;  but  Taylor  had 
no  available  forces,  and  could  only  go  in  person  to  Macon, 
where  he  arrived  on  the  22d,  just  in  time  to  meet  Governor 
Brown  with  his  Adjutant,  Toombs,  escaping  from  the  State 
Capitol  on  the  ajiproach  of  Slocum's  columns.  The  only 
organized  troops  were  Wheeler's  cavalry.  Smith's  division  of 
Georgia  militia,  and  a  couple  of  battalions  of  local  volun- 
teers. General  Howell  Cobb  was  nominally  Confederate 
commander  of  "reserves,"  but  there  seems  to  have  been  no 
reserves  to  command.  Hardee  had  been  there  the  day  be- 
fore, coming  up  from  Savannah,  and  judging  rightly  that 
the  spread  of  Sherman's  wings  from  Oconee  Bridge  to 
Planters'  Factory  argued  a  course  toward  Augusta  or  Savan- 
nah, he  declared  that  Macon  was  in  no  danger  and  directed 
Smith  to  move  his  division  rapidly  eastward,  to  interpose, 
if  possible,  between  Sherman  and  Augusta,  delaying  his 
march  and  obstmcting  the  roads.  Wheeler,  under  orders 
already  given,  would  continue  to  harass  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  National  forces.  Orders  from  Eichmond  had  ex- 
tended Hardee's  authority  over  the  theatre  of  operations  in 
Georgia,  and  having  given  the  best  directions  the  circum- 
stances allowed,  he  hastened  back  to  Savannah  to  strengthen 
its  means  of  defence  and  to  be  in  direct  communication  with 
Augusta,  Charleston,  and  Richmond. 

Beauregard  issued  from  Corinth,  Miss.,  a  proclamation  to 
the  people  of  Georgia,  calling  upon  them  to  arise  for  the 
defence  of  the  State,  and  to  "  obstruct  and  destroy  all  roads 
in  Sherman's  front,  flank,  and  rear,"  assuring  them  that  the 
enemy  would  then  starve  in  their  midst.  He  strove  to  raise 
vague  hopes  also  by  announcing  that  he  was  hastening  to 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORUfyV.  29 

jjiii  tliom  ill  (lefenco  of  tlieir  homos  and  firesides.  A  more 
practical  step  was  his  order  to  Hood  to  begin  the  Tennessee 
campaign,  the  only  counter-stroke  in  his  power.  At  Mil- 
ledgeville,  the  ai)proach  of  Sherman  was  met  by  an  Act  of 
the  Legislature  to  levy  en  masse  the  population,  with  a  hys- 
terical preamble,  picturing  the  National  general  as  an  ogre, 
and  exhorting  the  people  "  to  die  freemen  rather  than  live 
slaves."  The  act,  to  have  been  of  any  use,  should  have 
been  passed  a  month  before,  when  Hood  was  starting  west 
f  loiu  Gadsden.  It  was  now  only  a  confession  of  terror,  for 
there  was  no  time  to  organize.  Any  disposition  of  the  in- 
habitants along  his  route  to  destroy  roads  was  effectually 
checked  by  Sherman's  making  it  known  tha<"  ■'he  houses  and 
property  of  those  who  did  so  would  be  destroyed.  Such 
opposition  to  a  large  army  can  never  be  of  real  use ;  its  com- 
mon effect  is  only  to  increase  by  retaliation  the  miseries  of 
the  unfortunate  people  along  the  line  of  march,  and  in  this 
case  there  was,  besides,  no  lack  of  evidence  that  most  of 
them  were  heartily  tired  of  the  war,  and  had  lost  all  the  en- 
thusiasm which  leads  to  self-sacrifice.  Even  in  such  a  panic 
the  strife  of  political  factious  was  not  stilled,  and  the  oppo- 
nents of  Governor  Brown's  States-rights  policy  took  advan- 
tage of  the  flight  from  the  Capital  to  perpetrate  a  novel 
absurdity.  The  Lieutenant-Governor,  Wright,  w^as  also  a 
general  in  the  Confederate  army,  and  on  the  21st,  the  day 
before  our  occupation  of  the  Cajiital,  issued  a  proclamation 
from  Augusta,  declaring  himself  ex-nfficio  Governor  of  the 
part  of  tnc  State  east  of  the  Oconee,  and  ordering'  the  peo- 
ple under  tht  levy  en  masse  to  report  to  him,  by  reason  of 
what  a  Confederate  historian  calls  the  "  territorial  disabil- 
ity "  of  the  Governor.  •    The  proclamation  had  no  result,  but 

>  Jones's  Siege  of  Savannah,  etc.,  p.  18. 


30  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

the  ridiculousness  of  it  is  shown  by  the  faot  that  the  Geor- 
gia militia  under  Smith  were  moved  by  Brown's  orders  to 
Savannah,  reaching  there  on  the  30th,  and  General  Taylor 
returned  from  Savannah  to  Macon  after  that  time,  as  will  bo 
seen.  In  truth,  communication  by  courier  from  Augusta  to 
Macon  was  only  intermpted  while  the  army  was  passing. 

While  Taylor,  Brown,  Toombs,  and  Cobb  were  conferring 
at  Macon  on  the  22d,  the  division  of  Georgia  militia  under 
Brigadier  General  Phillips  was  marching  toward  Gordon  in 
the  effort  to  obey  Hardee's  order.  At  Griswoldville,  about 
eight  miles  out,  they  ran  into  Walcutt's  brigade  of  Woods's 
division,  which  was  the  rear  guard  of  the  right  wing,  and 
attacked  it  with  more  courage  than  discretion.  Walcutt  had 
been  making  a  reconnoisance  toward  Macon,  driving  back 
Wheeler's  cavalry,  and  was  recalled  by  General  Woods  to  a 
position  on  the  Duncan  Farm,  a  little  east  of  the  town.  Here 
his  flanks  were  protected  by  swampy  ground,  his  line  was  on 
the  crest  of  a  hill,  with  open  ground  in  front,  on  which  the 
enemy  must  attack.  This  Phillips  did  with  a  great  deal  of 
vigor,  putting  in  all  four  of  his  brigades,  and  striving  hard 
also  to  turn  the  flanks  of  Walcutt's  position.  He  was  supe- 
rior in  artillery,  as  Walcutt  had  only  two  guns  with  him, 
and  was  obliged  to  withdraw  these  early  in  the  engagement. 
But  the  infantry  attacks,  which  were  renewed  seveml  times, 
were  repulsed  with  severe  loss,  and  Phillips  retreated,  after 
several  hours'  fighting,  having  lost  over  six  hundred  in 
killed  and  v/ounded.  On  the  National  side.  General  Woods, 
who  was  present,  rejjorts  a  total  of  ninety-four  casualties. 
Walcutt  was  severely  wounded  in  the  leg,  and  the  command 
of  the  brigade  devolved  upon  Colonel  Catterson  (Ninety- 
seventh  Indiana)  during  the  latter  half  of  the  combat.  Both 
officers  distinguished  themselves  by  their  conduct  and  cour- 
age. 


THE  MARCPI  TH HOUGH   GEORGIA.  31 

Nothing  could  be  more  nsolcss  than  this  engagement,  for 
Phillips  had  before  him  two  corps  if  Walcutt  had  been 
driven  off;  but  he  had  been  ordered  to  move  along  the  rail- 
road, and  thought  he  was  obliged  to  do  so  till  he  should  be 
recalled.  This  was  done  as  soon  as  Smith  at  Macon  heard  of 
the  fight,  and  the  division,  at  the  instance  of  Taylor,  was  sent 
southward  by  rail  to  Albany,  which  was  the  end  of  the  rail- 
way in  that  direction.  Thence  they  marched  sixty  miles  to 
Thomasville  on  the  Savannah  and  Gulf  Railroad,  where 
Toombs  hectored  the  railway  officials  into  furnishing  trans- 
portation with  unwonted  promptness,  and  they  reported  to 
Hardee  in  Savannah  on  the  last  day  of  the  month.  Hardee's 
orders  to  Wheeler  now  directed  him  to  get  in  front  of  Sher- 
man's forces  and  cover  all  the  roads  by  which  he  might 
move.  Wheeler  accordingly  marched  south  of  the  Central 
Railroad,  swam  the  Oconee  River,  and  reached  Sandersville 
on  the  2Cth,  just  before  the  National  columns.  The  change 
of  position  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  followed  by  Kil- 
patrick,  who  moved,  ])y  Sherman's  direction,  to  the  front 
and  left  of  the  infantry,  there  being  no  enemy  whatever  on 
the  right  flank  after  crossing  the  Oconee. 

Sherman  had  not  delayed  at  Milledgoville,  but  had 
marched  again  on  the  24th.  Davis's  (Fourteenth)  corps  now 
became  the  flanking  column  on  the  left.  The  Twentieth 
Corps  (Williams's),  after  passing  Sandersville,  reached  the 
Central  Railroad  at  Teunille  and  marched  to  Davisboro,  de- 
stroying the  track  as  they  went.  From  Davisboro  both 
coips  of  the  left  wing  moved  by  the  same  road  to  Louisville, 
crossing  the  Ogeechee  River  before  reaching  that  place, 
where  they  camped  on  the  29th.  The  work  of  destroying 
the  railway  was  begun  by  the  right  wing  at  Griswoldville, 
and  of  the  hundred  miles  between  that  station  and  Millen 
very  little  of  the  road  was  left.     Howard  found  the  crossing 


32  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

of  the  Oconee  near  Ball's  Ferry  a  iliffienlt  operation,  for  tlio 
river  was  up  and  the  current  so  swift  that  the  forry  could 
not  be  used.  AVheeler's  cavalry  made  some  resistance  from 
the  other  side.  A  detachment  of  Blair's  corps,  directed  by 
the  engineers,  succeeded  in  constntcting  a  flying  bridge 
some  two  miles  above  the  ferry,  and  getting  over  to  the  left 
bank,  moved  down  to  the  principal  road,  which  had  been 
cleared  of  the  enemy  by  the  artillery  on  the  hither  side. 
The  pontoons  were  then  laid  and  the  march  resumed. 

On  leaving  Milledgeville,  Sherman  ordered  Kilpatrick  to 
make  a  considerable  detour  to  the  north,  feinting  strongly  on 
Augusta,  but  trying  hard  to  reach  and  destroy  the  important 
railway  bridge  and  trestles  at  Briar  Creek,  near  Waynesboro, 
half  way  between  Augusta  and  Millen.  He  was  then  to 
move  rapidly  on  JVIillen  in  the  hope  of  releasing  the  National 
prisoners  of  war  who  were  in  a  prison  camp  near  that  jplace. 
Kilpatrick  moved  by  one  of  the  principal  roads  to  Augusta, 
giving  out  that  he  was  marching  on  that  city.  After  he  had 
passed  the  Ogeeehee  Shoals,  Wheeler  heard  of  his  move- 
ment, and  rapidly  concentrated  his  force  on  the  Augusta 
road,  where  it  debouches  from  the  swamps  of  Briar  Creek. 
Kilpatrick,  however,  in  obedience  to  his  orders,  turned  the 
head  of  his  columns  to  the  right,  upon  the  road  running 
from  Warrenton  to  Waynesboro,  and  they  were  well  on 
their  way  to  the  latter  place  before  Wheeler  Avas  aware  of 
it.  MniTay's  brigade  was  in  the  rear,  and  two  of  his  regi- 
ments, the  Eighth  Indiana  and  Second  Kentucky,  consti- 
tuted the  rear-guard.  These  became  too  far  separated 
from  the  column  when  they  camped  at  evening  near  a 
place  called  Sylvan  Grove.  Wheeler  heard  of  their  where- 
abouts, and  attacked  them  in  the  middle  of  the  night. 
Though  surprised  and  driven  from  their  camps,  the  regi- 
ments stoutly  fought  their  way  back,  and  were  only  gradu- 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.  33 

ally  driven  in  on  the  rest  of  Murray's  brigade.  Wheeler 
followed  up  persistently  with  his  superior  forces,  harassing 
the  rear  and  flank  of  the  column,  and  causing  some  confu- 
sion, but  gaining  no  important  advantage,  except  that 
Kilpatrick  was  obliged  to  abandon  the  eflbrt  to  burn  the 
Briar  Creek  bridge  and  trestles,  and  to  turn  his  line  of 
march  southwesterly  from  Waynesboro,  after  destroying  a 
mile  or  two  of  the  railroad.  He  reported  that  he  herd 
learned  that  the  Millen  prisoners  had  been  removed,  and 
determined  to  rejoin  the  army  at  Louisville.  On  the  27th 
Murray's  brigade  passed  through  that  of  Atkins,  which  now 
became  the  rear-guard,  and  on  the  28th  this  order  was 
reversed,  each  brigade  taking,  alternately,  the  brunt  of  the 
continuing  fight  with  Wheeler.  Early  in  the  morning  of 
the  28th  Kilpatrick  himself  narrowly  escaped  capture,  hav- 
ing improperly  made  his  quarters  for  the  night  at  some 
distance  from  the  body  of  his  command,  the  Ninth  Michi- 
gan being  with  him  as  a  guard.  The  enemy  got  between 
him  and  the  column,  and  it  was  with  no  little  difficulty  he 
succeeded  in  cutting  his  way  out,  and  saving  himself  from 
the  consequences  of  his  own  folly.  The  long  causeway  and 
bridge  at  Buckhead  Creek  was  held  while  the  division 
passed,  by  Colonel  Heath  and  the  Fifth  Ohio,  with  two  how- 
itzers, and  Wheeler  there  received  a  severe  check.  The 
bridge  was  destroyed,  and  Kilpatrick  took  a  strong  i^osition 
at  Reynolds's  plantation.  Wheeler  here  attacked  in  force, 
but  was  decisively  repulsed,  and  Kilpatrick  effected  his 
junction  with  the  infantry  without  further  molestation. 
Wheeler's  whole  corps,  consisting  ot  Dibrell's,  Hume's,  and 
Anderson's  divisions,  was  engaged  in  this  series  of  sharp 
skirmishes,  and  he  boasted  loudly  that  he  had  routed  Kil- 
patrick, causing  him  to  fly  in  confusion  with  a  loss  of  nearly 
two  hundred  in  killed,  wounded,  and  captured.  Chafing 
2* 


31  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

at  this  rebuff,  Kilpatrick  obtained  permission  to  deliver  a 
return  blow,  and  after  resting  his  horses  a  day  or  two, 
marched  from  Louisville  on  Waynesboro,  supportetl  by 
Baird's  division  of  Davis's  (Fourteenth)  corps.  He  attacked 
Wheeler  near  the  town,  and  drove  him  by  very  spirited 
charges  from  three  successive  lines  of  barricades,  chasing 
him  through  Waynesboro,  and  over  Briar  Creek.  Wheeler 
admits  that  it  was  with  diihculty  ho  "  succeeded  in  with- 
drawing "  from  his  position  at  the  town,  but  seeks  to  take 
off  the  edge  of  his  chagrin  by  reporting  that  he  was  at- 
tacked by  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  as  well  as  by  Kilpatrick's 
cavalry.  Baird's  division  was  not  actually  engaged,  but  its 
presence  and  close  support  no  doubt  assisted  Kilpatrick,  by 
enabling  him  to  make  more  decisive  movements  than  he 
could  otherwise  have  ventured  on,  as  he  could  freely  use  his 
horsemen  on  the  flanks  of  a  solid  body  of  advancing  infantry. 
Millen  was  reached  on  December  3d,  by  Blair's  corps, 
which  Sherman  accompanied,  and  the  direct  railway  com- 
munication between  Savannah  and  Augusta  was  cut.  Three 
corps  now  moved  down  the  narrowing  space  between  the 
Savannah  and  Ogeechee  Eivers,  while  Osterhaus,  with 
the  Fifteenth,  marched  on  the  right  bank  of  the  latter 
stream  in  two  columns  some  miles  apart.  Howard  was  in 
person  with  this  corps  and  met  with  no  resistance.  Indeed 
from  Millen  onward  the  march  of  the  whole  army  was  a 
methodic  progress  with  no  noticeable  opposition,  for  even 
Wlieelei*'s  horsemen  generally  kept  a  respectful  distance, 
and  soon  crossed  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Savannah.  The 
country  became  more  sandy,  corn  and  grain  grew  scarcer, 
and  all  began  to  realize  that  they  were  approaching  the  low 
country  bordering  the  sea,  where  but  little  breadstuffs  or 
forage  would  be  found.  On  the  9th  and  10th  the  columns 
closed  in  upon  the  defences  of  Savannah,  Davis's  corps  rest- 


THE  MARCH  THttOUtlH   GEORGIA.  35 

ing  its  left  upon  the  Savanuali  Eiver,  Williams's,  Blair's,  and 
OsUnhaus's  continuing  the  line  toward  the  right,  near  the 
Ogeechee.  Cavalry  detachments,  and  skilful  infantry  scou!;^ 
were  sent  out  to  ojien  communication  with  the  fleet  and  to 
out  the  Gulf  Railway,  thus  severing  the  last  connection  of 
the  city  with  the  south.  But  before  tracing  these  oi)erations 
farther,  some  of  the  characteristic  features  of  the  march  just 
made  are  worthy  of  a  little  more  attention. 

The  destruction  of  railway  communication  between  the 
Confederate  Army  at  Richmond,  and  the  Gulf  States,  had 
been  a  very  important  part  of  Sherman's  purpose,  and  ho 
spared  no  pains  to  do  this  thoroughly.  A  battalion  of  me- 
chanics was  selected  and  furnished  with  tools  for  ripping 
the  rails  from  the  cross-ties  and  twisting  them  when  heated, 
and  these  were  kept  constantly  at  work  ;  but  the  infantry  on 
the  march  became  expert  in  methods  of  their  own,  and  the 
cavalry  also  joined  in  the  work,  though  the  almost  constant 
fikirmishing  on  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  army  usually  kept 
the  mounted  troops  otherwise  employed.  A  division  of  in- 
fantry would  be  extended  along  the  railway  line  about  the 
length  of  its  proper  front.  The  men,  stacking  arms,  would 
cluster  along  one  side  of  the  track,  and  at  the  word  of  com- 
mand, lifting  together,  would  raise  the  line  of  rail  with  the 
ties  as  high  as  their  shoulders ;  then  at  another  command 
they  would  let  the  whole  drop,  stepping  back  out  of  the 
way  as  it  fell.  The  heavy  fall  would  shake  loose  many  of 
the  spikes  and  chairs,  and  seizing  the  loosened  rails,  tho 
men,  using  them  as  levers,  would  quickly  pry  off  the  rest. 
The  cross-ties  would  now  be  piled  up  like  cob-houses,  and 
with  these  and  other  fuel  a  brisk  fire  would  be  made ;  tho 
rails  were  piled  upon  the  fire,  and  in  half  an  hour  would  be 
red  hot  in  the  middle.  Seizing  the  rail  now  by  the  two 
ends,  the  soldiers  would  twist  it  about  a  tree,  or  interlace  and 


36  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

twino  tlie  whole  pile  together  in  great  iron  knots,  making  them 
useless  for  anything  but  old  iron,  and  most  unmanageable  and 
troublesome,  even  to  convey  away  to  a  mill.  In  this  way  it  was 
not  difficult  for  a  corps  marching  along  the  railway  to  destroy. 
in  a  day,  ten  or  fifteen  miles  of  track  most  completely ;  and 
Sherman  himself  gave  close  watch  to  the  work,  to  see  that  it 
was  not  slighted.  Then  all  machine-shops,  stations,  bridges, 
and  culverts  were  destroyed,  and  the  masonry  blown  up. 

The  extent  of  line  destroyed  was  enormous.  From  the 
Etowah  liiver  through  Atlanta  southward  to  Lovejoy's,  for  a 
hundred  miles  nothing  was  left  of  the  road.  From  Fairburn 
through  Atlanta  eastward  to  Madison  and  the  Oconee  Kiver, 
another  hundred  miles,  the  destruction  was  equally  com- 
plete. From  Gordon  southeastwardly  the  ruin  of  the  Cen- 
tral road  was  continued  to  the  very  f^uburbs  of  Savannah,  a 
hundred  and  sixty  miles.  Then  there  were  serious  breaks 
in  the  branch  road  from  Gordon  northward  through  Mil- 
ledgeville,  and  in  that  connecting  Augusta  and  Milieu.  So 
great  a  destiniction  would  have  been  a  long  and  serious  in- 
terruption even  at  the  North  ;  but  the  blockade  of  Southern 
ports  and  the  small  facilities  for  manufacture  in  the  Confed- 
erate States  made  the  damage  practically  irreparable.  The 
lines  which  were  wrecked  were  the  only  ones  which  then 
connected  the  Gulf  States  with  the  Carolinas,  and  even  if 
Sherman  had  not  marched  northward  from  Savannah  the  ]'e- 
sources  of  the  Confederacy  woviid  have  been  seriously  crip- 
pled. The  forage  of  the  country  was  also  destroyed  through- 
out a  belt  fifty  or  sixty  miles  in  width.  Both  armies  co- 
operated in  this  ;  the  Confederate  cavalry  burning  it  that  it 
might  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  National  Army,  and  th6 
latter  leaving  none  that  'hey  could  not  themselves  use,  so 
that  wagon  transportation  of  military  supj)lies  across  the 
belt  might  be  made  more  difficult. 


THE  MAROH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.  87 

As  the  campaif^n  progresseil,  great  numbers  of  negroes  at- 
tached themselves  to  the  cohimna  and  accompanied  the 
march.  This  was  contrary  to  the  wisli  of  Sherman,  who  felt 
the  embarrassment  of  having  thousands  of  moutlis  added  to 
the  number  of  those  who  must  be  fed  from  the  country  as 
he  moved.  Those  who  had  less  responsibility  for  the  cam- 
paign did  not  trouble  themselves  so  much  with  this  consider- 
ation, and  the  men  in  the  ranks  generally  encouraged  the 
slaves  to  leave  the  i)lantations.  The  negroes  themselves 
found  it  hard  to  let  slip  the  jn-esent  opportunity  of  getting 
out  of  bondage,  and  their  uneducated  minds  could  not  esti- 
mate the  hope  of  freedom  at  the  close  of  the  war  as  having 
much  weight  against  the  instant  liberty  Avhich  was  to  be 
had  by  simply  tramping  away  aftw  the  blue-coated  soldiers. 

The  natural  result  was  that  the  regular  bivouacs  of  the 
troops  were  fringed  by  numberless  gipsy  camps,  where  the 
negi'o  families,  old  and  young,  endured  every  privation,  liv- 
ing upon  the  charity  of  the  soldiers,  helping  themselves  to 
what  they  could  glean  in  the  track  of  the  army  foragers. 
On  the  march,  they  tiaidged  along,  making  no  complaint, 
full  of  a  simple  faith  that  "Lincoln's  men"  were  leading 
them  to  abodes  of  ease  and  plenty. 

When  the  lower  and  less  fruitful  lands  were  reached,  the 
embarrassment  and  military  annoyance  increased.  This  was 
more  particularly  felt  in  the  left  wing,  wliich  was  then  the 
only  one  exposed  to  the  attacks  of  the  enemy.  Losing  pa- 
tience at  the  failure  of  all  orders  and  exhortations  to  these 
poor  people  to  stay  at  home,  General  Davis  (commanding 
the  Fourteenth  Corps),  ordered  the  pontoon  bridge  at  Eben- 
ezer  Creek  to  be  taken  up  before  the  refugees  who  were 
following  that  corps  had  crossed,  so  as  to  leave  them  on  the 
further  bank  of  the  unfordable  stream  and  thus  disembar- 
rass the  marching  troops.    It  would  be  unjust  to  that  officer 


88  THI2  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

to  boliovo  that  the  order  would  have  been  given,  if  the  effect 
had  boon  foreseen.  The  poor  refugees  had  their  hearts  so 
set  on  liberation,  and  the  fear  of  falling  into  the  hands  of 
the  Confederate  cavalry  was  so  great,  that,  with  wild  wailings 
and  cries,  the  great  crowd  rushed,  like  a  stampeded  drove  of 
cattle,  into  the  water,  those  who  could  not  swim  as  well  as 
those  who  could,  and  many  were  drowned  in  spite  of  the 
earnest  efforts  of  the  soldiers  to  help  them.  As  soon  as  the 
character  of  the  unthinking  rush  and  panic  was  seen,  all  was 
done  that  could  be  done  to  save  them  from  the  water ;  but 
the  loss  of  life  was  still  great  enough  to  prove  that  there 
were  many  ignorant,  simple  souls  to  whom  it  was  literally 
preferable  to  die  freemen  rather  than  to  live  slaves. 

When  Savannah  was  reached,  the  great  number  of  colored 
refugees  with  all  the  columns  were  i^laced  on  the  Sea  Islands, 
under  the  care  of  government  officers,  and  added  largely  to 
the  colonies  already  established  there.  The  Freedmen's 
Bureau  was  afterward,  in  great  measure,  the  necessary  out- 
growth of  this  organization. 

The  subsistence  of  the  army  upon  the  countiy  was  a 
necessary  part  of  Sherman's  plan,  and  the  bizarre  character 
given  it  by  the  humor  of  the  soldiers  has  made  it  a  striking 
feature  of  the  march.  It  is  important,  however,  to  distin- 
guish between  what  was  plai\ned  and  ordered,  and  what  was 
an  accidental  growth  of  the  soldier's  disposition  to  make 
sport  of  everything  that  could  be  turned  to  amusement. 
The  orders  issued  were  of  a  strictly  proper  military  charac- 
ter. The  supplies  in  the  trains  were  to  be  treated  as  a  re- 
serve to  be  drawn  upon  only  in  case  of  necessity,  and  a 
systematic  foraging  upon  the  country  for  daily  food  was  the 
regular  means  of  getting  rations.  Each  regiment  organized 
a  foraging  party  of  about  one-twentieth  of  its  numbers 
under  command  of  an  officer.     These  parties  set  out  first 


THE  MARCH  THIIOUOH  GEORCIA.  30 

of  all,  in  tlio  moruiiig,  those  of  tlio  same  hripuloH  nnd  «livi- 
sioiis  working  in  (^onocn't,  keeping  n(»ar  enough  together  to 
be  a  nnitual  Htipport  if  attacked  by  the  enemy,  and  aiming 
to  rejoin  the  column  at  the  halting  place  appointed  for  the 
end  of  the  day's  march.  The  foragers  became  the  bedu 
ideal  of  iiartisan  troops.  Their  self-confideuce  and  daring 
increased  to  a  wonderful  pitch,  and  no  organized  lino  of 
skirmishers  could  so  quickly  clear  the  head  of  column  of 
the  opposing  cavaliy  of  the  enemy.  Nothing  short  of  an 
intrenched  line  of  battle  could  stop  them,  and  when  they 
were  far  scattered  on  the  flank,  plying  their  vocation,  if  a 
body  of  hostile  cavalry  api)roached,  a  singular  sight  was  to 
be  seen.  Here  and  there,  from  bara,  from  granary  and 
smoke-house,  and  from  the  kitcl;en  gardens  of  the  planta- 
tions, isolated  foragers  would  hasten  by  converging  linos, 
driving  before  them  the  laden  mule  heaped  high  with  vege- 
tables, smoked  bacon,  fresh  meat,  and  poultry.  As  soon  as 
two  or  three  of  these  met,  one  would  drive  the  animals,  and 
the  others,  from  fence  corners  or  behind  trees,  would  begin 
a  bold  skirmish,  their  Springfield  rifles  giving  them  the  ad- 
vantage in  range  over  the  carbines  of  the  horsemen.  As 
they  were  pressed  they  would  continue  falling  back  and 
assembling,  the  regimental  platoons  falling  in  beside  each 
other  till  their  line  of  fire  would  become  too  hot  for  their 
opponents,  and  these  would  retire  reporting  that  they  had 
driven  in  the  skirmishers  upon  the  main  column  which  was 
probably  miles  away.  The  work  of  foraging  would  then  be 
resumed.  It  was  of  the  rarest  possible  occurrence  that 
Wheeler's  men  succeeded  in  breaking  through  these  enter- 
prising flankers  and  approaching  the  troops  of  the  line,  and 
as  the  columns  approached  the  place  designated  for  tlieir 
evening  camp,  they  would  find  this  ludicrous  but  most 
bountiful  supply  train  waiting  for  them  at  every  fork  of  the 


40  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

road,  with  as  much  regularity  as  a  railway  train  ruiming  on 
"  schedule  time." 

They  brought  in  all  animals  that  could  be  applied  to  army 
use,  and  as  the  mule  teams  or  artillery  horses  broke  down 
in  pulling  through  the  swamps  which  made  a  wide  border 
for  every  stream,  fresh  animals  were  ready,  so  that  on  reach- 
ing Savannah  the  teams  were  fat  and  sleek  and  in  far  better 
condition  than  thev  had  been  at  Atlanta. 

The  orders  given  these  parties  forbade  their  entering  oc- 
cupied private  houses,  or  meddling  with  private  property  of 
the  kinds  not  included  in  supplies  and  munitions  of  war, 
and  in  the  best  <.  'plined  divisions  these  orders  were  en- 
forced. Discipline  in  armies,  however,  is  apt  to  be  uneven, 
and  among  sixty  thousand  men  there  are  men  enough  who 
are  willing  to  become  robbers,  and  officers  enough  who  are 
willing  to  wink  at  irregularities  or  to  share  the  loot,  to  make 
such  a  march  a  terrible  scourge  to  any  country.  A  bad  emi- 
nence in  this  respect  was  generally  accorded  to  Kilj)atrick, 
whose  notorious  immoralities  and  rapacity  set  so  demoral- 
izing an  example  to  his  troops  that  the  best  disciplinarians 
among  his  subordinates  could  only  mitigate  its  influence. 
His  enterprise  and  daring  had  made  his  two  brigades  usually 
hold  their  own  against  the  dozen  which  Wheeler  com- 
manded, and  the  value  of  his  services  made  his  commander 
willing  to  be  ignorant  of  escapades  which  he  could  hardly 
condone,  and  which  on  more  than  one  occasion  came  near 
resulting  in  Kilpatrick's  own  capture  and  the  rout  of  his 
command.  But  he  was  quite  capable,  in  a  night  attack  of 
this  kind,  of  mounting,,  bare-backed,  the  fii'st  animal,  horse  or 
mule,  that  came  to  hand,  ,ind  charging  in  his  shir^  at  the  head 
of  his  troopers  with  a  dare-devil  recklessness  thf.t  dismayed 
his  opponents  and  imparted  his  own  daring  to  his  men. 

Then,  the  confirmed  and  habitual  stragglers  soon  became 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.        41 

numerous  enough  to  bo  a  nuisance  ujion  the  line  of  march. 
Here  again  the  dift'erence  in  i)ortions  of  the  army  was  very 
marked.  In  some  brigades  every  regiment  was  made  to 
keep  its  own  rear  guard  to  j^revent  struggling,  and  the  bri- 
gade provost  guard  marched  in  rear  of  all,  arresting  any  who 
sought  to  leave  the  ranks,  and  reporting  the  regimental 
commander  who  allowed  his  men  to  scatter.  But  little  by 
little  the  stragglers  became  numerous  enough  to  cause 
serious  complaint,  and  they  followed  the  command  without 
joining  it  for  days  together,  living  on  the  country,  and 
shirking  the  labors  of  their  comrades.  It  was  to  these  that 
the  name  "bummer"  was  properly  applied.  This  class  was 
numerous  in  the  Confederate  as  in  the  National  Army,  in 
I)roportion  to  its  strength,  and  the  Southern  jjcoijle  cried 
out  for  the  most  summary  execution  of  military  justice 
against  them.  Responsible  persons  addressed  s])ecitic  com- 
jilaints  to  the  Confederate  War  Secretary,  charging  robbery 
and  pillage  of  the  most  scandalous  kinds  against  their  own 
troops.  Their  leading  newspapers  demanded  the  cashiering 
and  shooting  of  colonels  and  other  officers,  and  declared 
their  conduct  worse  than  the  enemy's.  It  is  perhaps  vain  to 
hope  that  a  great  war  can  ever  bo  conducted  without  abuses 
of  this  kind,  and  we  may  congratulate  ourselves  that  the 
wrongs  done  were  almost  without  exception  to  property,  and 
that  murders;  rapes,  and  other  heinous  personal  offences 
were  nearly  unknown.' 

The  great  mass  of  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  lino 
worked  hard  and  continuously,  day  by  day,  in  marching,  in 
bridging  streams,  in  making  corduroy  roads  through  the 
swamps,  in  lifting  the  wagons  and  cannon  from  mud-holes, 
and  in  tearing  up  the  railways.     They  saw  little  or  notliing 

'  For  a  few  extracts  from  Southern  newspapers  corroborating  what  is  here 
8tat«<l  see  Appendix  C. 


42  'J'HE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

of  the  2'eople  of  the  country,  and  knew  comparatively  little 
of  the  foragers'  work,  except  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  it  and  the 
unspeakable  ludicrousness  of  the  cavalcade  as  it  came  in  at 
night.  The  foragers  turned  into  beasts  of  burden,  oxen  and 
cows  as  well  as  the  horses  and  mules.  Here  would  be  ii 
silver-mounted  family  carriage  drawn  by  a  jackass  and  a 
cow,  loaded  inside  and  out  with  everything  the  country  pro- 
duced, vegetable  and  animal,  dead  and  alive.  There  would 
bo  an  ox-cart,  similarly  loaded,  and  drawn  by  a  nondescript 
tandem  team,  equally  incongruous.  Perched  upon  the  top 
would  be  a  ragged  for.  ^^r,  rigged  out  in  a  fur  hat  of  a 
fashion  worn  by  dandies  of  a  century  ago,  or  a  dress-coat 
which  had  done  service  at  stylish  balls  of  a  former  genera- 
tion. The  jibes  and  jeers,  the  fun  and  the  practical  jokes 
ran  down  the  whole  line  as  the  cortege  came  in,  and  no  mas- 
querade in  carnival  could  compare  with  it  for  original  hu- 
mor and  rollicking  enjoyment.' 

The  weather  had  generally  been  perfect.  A  flurry  of  snow 
and  a  sharp,  cold  wind  had  lasted  for  a  day  or  two  about 
November  23d,  but  the  Indian  summer  set  in  after  that,  and 
on  December  8th  the  heat  was  even  sultry.  The  camps  in 
the  opcii  pine-woods,  the  bonfires  along  the  railways,  the 
occasional  sham-battles  at  night,  with  blazing  pine -knots  for 
weapons  whirling  in  the  darkness,  all  combined  to  leave 
upon  the  minds  of  officers  and  men  the  impression  of  a  vast 
holiday  frolic  ;  and  in  the  reunions  of  the  veterans  since  the 
war,  this  campaign  has  always  been  a  romantic  dream  more 
than  a  reality,  and  no  chorus  rings  out  with  so  joyous  a 
swell  as  when  they  join  in  the  refrain, 

"As  we  were  marching  through  Georgia." 

'  For  details  and  incidents  of  all  the  phases  of  the  march,  see  Colonel  Nichols's 
Story  of  the  Uruat  March  ;  lleininiscences  of  the  War,  by  Samuel  Toombs;  The 
Ninety-second  Illinois  Volunteers,  by  Gen.  Atkins,  etc.,  etc. 


CHAPTER  m. 

SAVANNAH. 

Savannah  was  then  a  city  of  about  twenty-five  thousand 
inhabitants,  on  the  Georgia  side  of  the  Savannah  River,  and 
had  been  the  home  of  a  well-to-do  people  who  had  made  it 
one  of  the  pleasantest  towns  of  the  South,  It  is  built  upon 
a  sandy  plateau  some  forty  feet  above  the  water,  and  though 
fifteen  miles  distant  from  the  ocean,  it  is  the  nearest  jjoint 
to  the  harbor  entrance  where  a  city  could  be  built.  A  little 
below,  the  land  sinks  almost  to  the  level  of  the  sea ;  the 
whole  coast  is  low  and  cut  into  islands  by  deep  sinuous 
natural  canals  or  creeks.  These  are  widely  bordered  by  the 
salt  marsh  which  is  all  awash  at  high  tide.  The  upland  on 
which  the  place  is  built  is  almost  like  an  island  in  the 
swamps,  and  has  a  width  of  six  or  eight  miles.  Other  up- 
land knolls  are  found  hero  and  there  through  the  region, 
and  these  were  usually  the  places  of  plantation  homesteads, 
in  the  midst  of  broad  rice-fields  which  had  been  reclaimed 
from  the  surrounding  marsh. 

The  Savannah  and  Ogeechee  Rivers  approach  each  other 
at  the  ocean,  as  has  already  been  stated,  so  that  the  tongue 
of  land  which  separates  them  is  scarcely  more  than  ten  or 
fifteen  miles  in  width  for  a  distance  of  nearly  fifty  miles 
from  the  sea.  Botli  rivers  are  bordered  by  the  rice  swamps 
which  make  a  natural  barrier  around  the  city  on  the  north- 
west, about  three  miles  away,  and  which,  in  their  oiiginal 


4i  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

condition,  were  the  savannahs  from  which  the  early  navif^a- 
tors  gavo  the  name  to  the  river.  Besides  these,  the  Little 
Ogeechee  flows  between  the  greater  stream  of  the  same 
name  and  the  Savannah,  skirting  the  eity  or  the  adjoining 
plantations  on  the  southwost.  The  natural  line  of  defence 
for  the  town  on  the  north,  therefore,  was  also  a  series  of 
suburban  plantations  with  their  rice-fields  in  front :  these, 
beginning  on  the  Savannah,  were  known  as  Williamson's, 
Daly's,  Lawton's,  and  the  Silk  Hope  plantations,  and  beyond 
them  the  Salt  Creek  marshes  and  the  Little  Ogeechee  con- 
tinued the  line  of  defence  to  the  railway  bridge  of  the  At- 
lantic and  Gulf  Railroad.  The  roads  into  the  city  were 
narrow  causeways,  heaped  high  enough  to  be  out  of  water 
when  the  rice-fields  were  overflowed,  as  they  often  were,  to 
a  depth  of  from  three  to  six  feet.  Extensive  dams,  canals, 
and  flood-gates  were  part  of  the  system  by  which  the  artifi- 
cial inundation  necessary  for  rice  tillage  was  made,  and 
these  works  were  easily  modified  so  as  to  become  an  essen- 
tial part  of  the  military  defence. 

The  Savannah  River,  from  the  city  to  the  sea,  is  a  broad 
estuary  with  small,  scattered  islands.  Immediately  in  front 
of  the  town  is  Hutchinson  Island,  much  larger  than  those 
below,  being  about  five  miles  long  and  dividing  the  river  into 
two  narrower  channels.  Nearlv  half  of  this  island  is  abovd 
Williamson's  plantation,  and  therefore  was  outside  of  the  nat- 
ural line  of  defence  above  described.  The  lower  half  of  it, 
however,  was  held  by  the  Confederate  troops,  as  its  occupa- 
tion was  necessary  not  only  to  holding  the  city,  but  to  the 
preservation  of  a  line  of  retreat  toward  Charleston.  Im- 
mediately above  Hutchinson  Island  was  Argyle  Island,  ten 
miles  long,  with  a  smaller  one  (Onslow  Island)  on  the  west 
of  it,  so  that  for  some  distance  there  were  three  channels  for 
the  river. 


SAVANNAH. 


45 


Before    Sliorman's  appearance  in  Eastern    Georpfia  the 
sea  defences  of  Savannah  had  been  the  only  ones  of  impor- 


Bavannah  and  Vicinity. 

tance,  and  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Pulaski,  in  the  spring  of 
18G2,  these  liiiJ  been  somewhat  contracted,  and  now  con- 


46  rHE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

sisted  of  a  line  of  redoubts  and  strong  detached  forts  along 
the  interior  channels  connecting  the  Savannah  Eiver  with 
the  Great  Ogeechee,  from  Fort  Jackson  to  Fort  MacAllister, 
These,  with  the  fortified  islands  in  the  river  and  a  work  or 
two  on  the  South  Carolina  side,  had  been  sufficient  for  the 
protection  of  the  town  from  expeditions  by  sea  and  naval  at- 
tacks. They  were  armed  with  heavy  ordnance,  ranging 
from  ten  inch  columbiads  to  smooth  thirty-twos,  with  some 
howitzers  to  bo  used  in  case  of  a  direct  assault.  The  ex- 
pansion of  the  mouths  of  the  Ogeechee  into  the  sea  is  known 
as  Ossabaw  Sound  ;  that  at  the  mouth  of  the  Savannah  is 
Tybeo  Sound,  and  Warsaw  Sound '  is  an  indentation  half 
way  between  the  two.  These,  with  other  entrances  along 
that  part  of  the  shore,  were  anxiously  watched  by  the  fleet 
under  Eear-Admiral  Dahlgren,  so  that  no  time  might  be 
lost  in  oi)ening  communication  with  Sherman  when  he 
should  reach  the  coast. 

7  AB  princii^al  naval  rendezvous  and  military  post  of  tho 
National  forces,  however,  was  at  Port  Royal,  twenty  miles 
farther  to  the  northeast,  at  the  mouth  of  Broad  River ;  and 
Major-General  J.  G.  Foster,  whose  headquarters  were  at 
Beaufort,  had  collected  large  quantities  of  supplies  ready  to 
be  shipped  to  Sherman's  army  as  soon  as  it  could  be 
reached. 

But  Hardee  w^as  unwilling  to  make  his  defence  of  Savan- 
nah upon  the  interior  line  of  fortifications,  if  he  could  avoid 
it.  To  do  so  would  involve  the  abandonment  of  the  Charles- 
ton Railroad  near  tho  city,  for  it  crossed  the  river  fifteen  or 
eighteen  miles  above.  If  this  part  of  the  road  were  given 
up,   his  only  conncictiou  with   Charleston  and  the  North 

'  Many  of  our  best  maps  call  this  name  Wassaw.     I  follow  the  authority  of 
Colonel  Jones,  author  of  The  Siege  of  Savannah,  and  a  long  time  resident  of  the 


SAVANNAH.  47 

'would  be  by  the  Union  Causeway  to  Hardeeville,  a  station 
about  six  miles  from  the  river  in  South  Carolina,  which 
would  become  the  terminus  of  the  railway.  This  cause- 
way, which  became  a  little  later  Hardee's  way  of  escape 
from  Savannah,  starts  at  a  ferry  near  the  lower  end  of  Hutch- 
inson Island  and  runs  northward  for  a  long  distance  through 
rice  swamps,  which  protect  it  from  lateral  approach.  It  had 
been  impossible  for  Hardee  to  accumulate  supplies  enough 
for  any  protracted  siege,  even  if  he  had  been  willing  to  al- 
low himself  to  be  invested  ;  and  the  difficulties  of  his  situ- 
ation would  be  greatly  increased,  if  fifteen  or  twenty  miles 
of  waggoning  over  a  single  road  were  necessary  to  the  intro- 
duction of  provisions  for  his  troops  and  for  the  citizens. 
His  first  purpose,  therefore,  was  to  make  and  hold  a  line 
between  the  Savannah  and  the  Ogeechce,  far  enough  out  to 
cover  the  Charleston  railway  bridge.  An  excellent  position 
had  been  selected  and  entrenched,  running  from  a  point 
above  the  bridge,  southwest  behind  Monteith  Swamp  to  the 
Great  Ogeechee  River.  Detached  works  had  been  built 
along  this  line,  and  infantry  and  artilleiy  had  been  put  in 
them,  but  Sherman  had  made  them  of  no  avail  by  marching 
Howard  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps  down  the  right  bank  of 
the.  Ogeechee,  flanking  and  turning  them,  so  that  Hardee 
had  no  choice  but  to  destroy  the  railway  bridge  and  fall 
back  to  his  interior  works  at  the  city. 

But  let  us  return  a  moment  to  the  last  days  of  November, 
when  General  Richard  Taylor,  by  the  aid  of  Toombs  as  State 
Adjutant,  was  bringing  to  Savannah  the  militia  derisively 
called  Governor  Brown's  army,  but  which  was  now  proving 
almost  the  sole  resource  of  the  Confederacy.  Never  was 
energy  more  timely  in  a  pinch  than  that  which  now  brought 
this  division  to  the  critical  point.  Taylor  had  hastened  to 
Savannah  in  advance  of  it,  and  while  consulting  with  Hardee 


48  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

on  November  29th,  news  came  that  a  division  of  National 
troops  under  General  Hatch  had  landed  that  morning  at 
Boyd's  Neck,  on  Broad  River,  and  was  marching  on  Graham- 
ville  and  the  Charleston  Eailroad,  about  twenty  miles  from 
the  Savannah  crossing.  General  Foster  had  ordered  this 
movement  as  one  likely  to  be  of  use  to  Sherman  whether  he 
arrived  at  Beaufort  or  at  Savannah,  and  had  Hatch  suc- 
ceed<3d  in  establishing  himself  on  the  railway,  it  is  hard  to 
see  how  Hardee  could  have  extricated  hims.elf  from  his  diffi- 
culties. The  Georgia  militia  wore  enlisted  on  the  condition 
that  they  were  not  to  bo  ordered  out  of  the  State,  but  Tay- 
lor and  Toombs  laid  their  heads  together  and  delighted  Har- 
dee by  arranging  with  General  G.  W.  Smith  to  switch  off  the 
trains  upon  the  Charleston  road  before  reaching  Savannah, 
and  in  the  night,  so  that  the  State  troops  awoke  at  the  sta- 
tion near  Graharaville  in  South  Carolina,  having  been  made, 
as  Taylor  humorously  tells  the  story,  "  unconseious  patri- 
ots.'" But  the  vigor  of  the  Confederates  had  been  lacking 
on  the  National  side.  Hatch  delayed  advancing  on  the  29th, 
when  there  was  nothing  between  him  and  the  railway  but  a 
handful  of  cavalry,  and  intrenched  a  position  near  his  land- 
ing place,  though  Grahamville  was  less  than  ten  miles  away. 
AVhen  he  advanced  next  day.  Smith  with  his  Georgia  troops 
was  ready  to  meet  him,  and  taking  advantage  of  the  swamps, 
which  gave  him,  near  Honey  Hill,  a  position  that  could  only 
be  approached  by  a  causeway,  the  advance  of  the  National 
column  was  checked  by  artillery.  Hatch  attempted  a  flank- 
ing movement,  but  the  Confederates  set  fire  to  the  broom- 
sedge,  which  was  dead  and  dry  in  the  late  autumn,  and  this 
prairie  fire  sweeping  down  before  the  wind  upon  our  troojDs 
forced  them  to  seek  cover  of   some  watercourse.     Hatch, 


'  Taylor's  Desttuctioii  and  Rcconstruotion,  p.  215.     Jones's  Siegj  of  Savan- 
nah, p.  .*](). 


SAVANNAH.  49 

however,  advanced  agaiu,  and  drove  the  enemy  hack  a  mile 
and  a  half  upon  an  intrenched  lino  which  had  been  pre- 
viously made.  Here  several  coiirageous  assaults  were  made, 
but  they  were  repulsed,  and  in  the  night  Hatch  retired  ui)()ii 
his  own  fortilications  near  Boyd's  Neck.  The  Cont'edoratos 
report  their  loss  as  less  than  lifty,  while  ours  was  over  seven 
hundred.  It  was  only  a  fresh  instance  of  the  manner  in 
which  irresolute  leadership  in  war  wastes  the  lives  of  men  by 
alternating  between  an  ill-timed  caution  and  an  equally  ill- 
timed  rashness.  No  maxim  is  supported  by  more  abundant 
proof  than  that  which  enjoins  audacity  and  speed  in  the  ear- 
lier steps  of  such  expeditions,  of  which  the  essential  feature 
is  that  they  should  bo  in  the  nature  of  a  siirprise. 

The  result  of  the  consultation  between  Hardee  and  Taylor 
was  that  the  latter  sent  a  report  to  the  Richmond  Govern- 
ment which  contained  a  very  just  estimate  of  the  situation. 
They  rightly  thought  that  Sherman  would  not  attempt  to 
enter  South  Carolina  before  establishing  a  new  base  of  sup- 
plies upon  the  coast,  and  that  the  greater  ease  in  following 
the  upland  roads  between  rivers  would  prevent  him  from 
moving  at  once  upon  Charleston,  where  his  route  would  bo 
across  numerous  deep  rivers  and  swamps.  They  assumed, 
therefore,  that  he  would  continue  to  move  on  Savannah,  and 
advised  that  Hardee  should  prepare  to  abandon  that  place 
before  he  should  be  completely  invested.  Then,  Hardee's 
troops  should  be  united  with  those  which  Bragg  was  now 
assembling  at  Augusta,  and  with  the  garrison  of  Charleston, 
and  all  the  scattered  detachments  in  the  Carolinas,  tho 
whole  should  be  vigorously  used  to  oi>pose  the  march  north- 
ward which  Sherman  must  be  expected  to  make  as  soon  as 
he  had  established  a  base  on  the  ocean.  No  sounder  mili- 
tary judgment  could  be  made,  and  the  subsequent  errors  of 
Beauregard  and  Bragg  grew  out  of  their  departure  from  it 
Vol.  X.— 3 


60  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

when  Sherman's  skilfnl  demonstrations  throw  them  into 
doubt  as  to  his  jmri^ose.  Writinj^  of  it  later,  Taylor  ex- 
pressed his  own  sense  of  the  crisis  by  saying  it  was  i)lain 
that  "unless  a  force  could  be  interposed  between  Sherman 
and  Lee's  rear,  the  game  would  l)e  over  when  the  former 
moved."* 

Hardee  assigned  troops  and  commanders  to  his  lines  of 
defence  as  follows.  From  the  Savannah,  at  "Williamson's 
jilantation,  to  the  Central  Railroad  crossing,  the  Georgia 
militia  under  General  G.  W.  Smith  hold  the  linos  with 
twenty  guns  in  position.  The  batteries  at  the  Central  Rail- 
road and  on  the  Louisville  road  with  the  lines  to  the  head 
of  Shaw's  Dam  were  held  by  the  troops  of  General  McLaws 
with  twenty-nine  pieces  of  artillery.  General  Wright  com- 
manded the  left,  reaching  from  Shaw's  Dam  to  the  bridge  of 
the  Gulf  Railway  over  the  Little  Ogeechee,  and  had  thiity- 
two  guns  in  position  on  his  front.  The  artillery  above  re- 
fciTed  to  was  the  heavier  armament,  besides  which  the  light 
artillery,  consisting  of  eleven  batteries  of  forty-eight  guns 
in  all,  under  Colonel  Jones,  was  distributed  as  the  necessity 
of  the  moment  demanded. 

The  forts  and  fixed  batteries  on  the  side  toward  the  sea 
were  under  the  command  of  Colonel  E.  C.  Anderson.  Of 
these,  Fort  McAllister  was  the  only  one  within  the  scope  of 
the  National  attack,  and  is,  therefore,  the  only  one  which 
need  be  described.  It  was  situated  at  Genesis  Point  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Great  Ogeechee  River,  commanding  the 
channel  of  approach  from  Ossabaw  Sound  and  covering  the 
important  bridge  of  the  Gulf  Railway  across  the  river.  It 
was  a  heavy  earthwork  with  its  principal  front  toward  the 
river  it  was  intended  to  command ;  but  the  gorge  had  also 


'  DcHtruction  anil  Reconstruction,  p.  218. 


SAVANNAH.  51 

been  closed  by  a  straight  infantiy  lino  with  works  for  the 
protection  of  artillery  at  intervals  in  it.  The  armament 
consisted  of  seven  heavy  guns  in  i)ermanent  position,  and 
eight  light  field  giins,  all  mounted  in  barbette.  The  river 
was  planted  with  torpedoes,  and  before  the  arrival  of  Sher- 
man, sub-terra  shells  had  also  been  placed  along  the  land 
face,  where  the  ditch  was  further  i)rotected  hy  palisades  and 
a  fraise.  As  it  was  possible  this  fort  would  become  isolated, 
it  had  been  sui^plied  with  about  fifty  days'  rations.  Its  garri- 
son was  about  two  hundred  men  under  command  of  Major  G. 
W.  Anderson.  Immediately  above  the  fort  the  river  makes  a 
double  loop,  the  straight  lino  across  either  neck  being  less 
than  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  while  the  course  by  the  stream  is 
nine  miles.  In  nearly  a  direct  line  across  the  broader  part 
of  the  loop  above  the  fort  is  the  Cheves  plantation  with  its 
rice-mill,  two  miles  away,  upon  the  other  bank  of  the  river. 
The  fort  was  at  the  edge  of  the  higher  ground,  and  south  of 
it  the  li.>;id  fell  away  to  the  broad  salt  marshes  over  which  the 
Hound  and  the  sea  could  be  seen  in  the  distance. 

Hardee's  whole  force  consisted  of  about  eighteen  thou- 
sand men,  from  which  must  be  deducted  about  one  thousand 
sick  in  hospital.  The  garrisons  for  the  forts  ou  the  sea 
front  were  small,  though  these,  of  course,  could  not  be 
evacuated,  as  the  navy  was  likely  to  make  some  efforts  at 
co-operation  with  Sherman.'  The  inhabitants  would  also 
be  available,  to  some  extent,  under  the  lei^t/  en  masse  which 


•  Jones's  Siege  of  Savannah  is  the  chief  authority  for  the  details  of  the  situa- 
tion within  the  Confederate  lines.  He  says  (p.  91)  that  the  rations  issued  by  the 
Cummisfiary  on  December  Kith  were  as  follows  :  viz.,  to  Confederate  troops,  11,- 
2111;  to  Militia,  3,249;  to  hospitals,  1,282;  total.  15,822.  Assuming  that  olllcers 
either  commuted  their  rations,  or  bought  from  the  Commissary,  about  2,000 
nuist  be  added  to  these.  Colonel  Jones  says  that  only  10,000  men  were  available 
for  active  duty  on  the  western  line,  but  this  would  depend  on  the  judgment  of  the 
general  in  command. 


52  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

the  Legialatiiro  Imd  ordered,  and  which  was  enforced  by 
Hardeo  under  a  i)roclamation  of  the  Mayor  issued  on  Nov- 
ember 28th. 

Such  was  the  situation  in  Savannah  when,  on  December 
10th,  the  National  army  closed  in  on  the  works  around  the 
city.  A  day  or  two  was  spent  in  bringing  the  several  cori)3 
into  position,  but  on  the  12th  the  investment  was  complete 
from  the  Savannah  River  to  the  Ogeechee.  Jackson's  divi- 
sion of  "Williams's  (Twentieth)  corps  rested  on  the  river  at 
the  extreme  left,  and  the  other  divisions  of  that  corps  ex- 
tended the  line  to  the  Central  Railroad.  Here  Davis's 
(Fourteenth)  corps  joined  it  and  reached  somewhat  beyond 
the  Ogeechee  Canal,  near  the  Lawton  i)lantation,  where  it 
unitml  with  the  left  of  Blair's  (Seventeenth)  corps.  Oster- 
haus's  (Fifteenth)  cor]is  completed  the  line  to  the  Great 
Ogeechee  River,  near  King's  Bridge,  a  structure  a  thousand 
feet  long,  which  ihe  en  -my  had  destroyed;  but  the  posts 
were  still  standing,  and  under  the  direction  of  Howard's 
chief  engineer.  Captain  Reese,  the  bridge  was  reT)uilt  and  lit 
for  use  by  the  13tli.  On  the  Central  Railroad  Slocum's 
pickets  were  close  to  the  thvoe-mile  post,  the  Confederate 
entrenched  line  being  a  quarter  of  a  mile  nearer  to  the  city ; 
but  the  works  were  farther  from  the  town  in  front  of 
Howard. 

During  the  last  few  days  brcadstuflfs  had  been  very  scarce 
in  the  country,  and  foraging  was  not  bringing  in  the  boun- 
tiful supply  which  had  been  usual.  The  bread  ration 
was  drawn  from  the  train,  and  rice  was  nearly  the  only 
thing  the  counti-y  now  furnished  the  troops.  Sherman's 
first  task,  therefore,  was  to  open  communication  with  the 
fleet  and  establish  a  base  of  supplies  by  means  of  transports 
plying  between  Ossabaw  Sound  and  Port  Royal.  Howard 
had  sent  a  skilful  scouting  officer.  Captain  Duncan,  with  two 


SAVANNAH.  53 

men  to  pass  Fort  McAllister  in  the  night  in  n  canoe,  and 
Duncan  had  succeeded  in  reaching  Admiral  Dahlgren, 
though  it  was  not  known  till  a  day  or  two  later.  Kilpatrick 
also  was  pushing  light  parties  of  horse  along  the  coast  for 
the  same  puii)OHe.  To  make  use  of  the  Ogeechee  liiver, 
however,  would  be  impossible  till  Fort  McAllister  was 
taken,  and  no  sooner  was  King's  Bridge  passable  than  Sher- 
man ordered  Howard  to  send  a  sulHcient  force  to  attack  and 
carry  the  fort  by  storm,  believing  that  the  more  i)ronii)tly 
this  should  be  done  the  less  the  loss  would  be  in  doing  it. 
Howard  assigned  Hazcn's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corjjs  to 
the  duty,  and  this  command  crossed  the  bridge  at  daybreak 
of  the  13th,  and  moving  down  the  right  bank  of  the  river, 
reached  the  vicinity  of  the  fort  before  noon. 

General  Howard  had  established  a  signal  station  at 
Cheves's  rice-mill  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  which  liaa 
already  been  referred  to,  and  there  a  section  of  DeGres's  bat- 
teiy  of  twenty-pound  Pan'otts  had  been  intrenched,  covering 
the  rear  of  the  investing  line.  Sherman  and  Howard  were 
both  at  the  signal  station  on  the  roof  of  the  mill,  communi- 
cating with  Hazen,  and  watching  for  boats  from  the  fleet. 

Hazen's  men  had  captured  a  picket  about  a  mile  from  the 
fort,  and  had  learned  of  the  position  of  a  lino  of  toi-pedoes 
in  the  road;  these  had  been  removed,  and  the  advanced 
brigade  under  Colonel  W.  S.  Jones  had  approached  within 
half  a  mile  of  the  fort  early  in  the  afternoon.  Jones  was 
anxious  to  attack  at  once,  but  Hazen  thought  it  wiser  to 
make  the  assault  with  portions  of  each  of  his  three  brigades, 
and  delayed  the  attack  till  they  could  be  brought  into  i)osi- 
tion.  The  reserve  was  placed  where  the  torpedoes  had  been 
found,  and  three  regiments  from  each  brigade  were  detailed 
to  make  the  assault.  Colonel  Wells  S.  Jones's  brigade  was 
on  the  left,  Colonel  Oliver's  in  the  centre,   and  Colonel 


54  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

Theodore  Jones's  on  the  right.  The  latter  of  these  found 
considerable  difficulty  in  getting  into  position,  and  it  was 
nearly  five  o'clock  before  the  signal  for  the  attack  could  bo 
given.  The  garrison  of  the  fort  had  recently  added  an  abattis 
to  their  defences  on  the  land  side,  but  had  not  had  time  to 
remove  the  largo  trunks  of  the  trees  from  which  the  branches 
for  this  use  had  been  taken.  These  trunks  gave  good  cover 
to  the  skirmish  line,  which  was  pressed  so  close  to  the  fort 
as  to  pick  off  the  gunners  and  prevent  the  effective  use  of 
the  artillerv. 

Meanwhile  Sherman  and  Howard,  full  of  impatience,  were 
watching  the  declining  sun  from  the  top  of  Cheves's  mill, 
and  signalling  their  orders  to  hasten.  A  tug-boat  from  the 
fleet  had  come  in  sight,  and  approached  as  close  as  it  was 
safe  ;  and  to  its  captain's  question  whether  the  fort  had  been 
taken,  which  reached  Sherman  jiist  as  Hazen's  signal  to  his 
troops  to  advance  had  been  given,  he  answered,  "  Not  yet, 
but  it  will  be  in  a  minute."  The  gallant  dash  of  the  line 
fiilfilled  the  promise.  A  short,  sharp  struggle  ensued,  and 
the  parapet  was  crowned  on  all  sides  by  the  detachments,  at 
nearly  the  same  moment.  The  attack  had  been  in  a  thin 
line  concentrating  as  they  reached  the  fort,  and  the  men 
passed  the  abatis,  the  palisades,  and  the  ditch  with  scarce 
a  perceptible  halt.  Their  greatest  loss  was  from  the  torpe- 
does which  exploded  under  their  feet  just  before  the  ditch 
was  reached.  Part  of  the  troops  on  the  extreme  flanks  got 
around  the  palisading,  where  the  angle  of  the  works  at  the 
river's  edge  was  not  so  well  protected,  and  were  helped  by 
the  fact  that  the  tide  was  out,  the  abatis  not  extending  be- 
low high -water  mark.  It  was  all  over  in  fifteen  minutes, 
and  the  National  flag  floated  on  the  staff  from  which  the 
Confederate  ensign  was  pulled  down,  while  the  victors  fired 
afeu-de-Joie.     Hazeu's  loss  was  24  killed  and  110  wounded; 


SAVANNAH.  53 

tliat  of  the  garrison  was  48.  There  was  no  formal  surren- 
der, but  officei-s  and  men  ceased  the  struggle  when  they 
found  that  thoy  were  overpowercul.  Colonel  W.  H.  Jones 
fell  severely  wounded  as  the  assault  began,  and  the  com- 
mand of  that  brigade  devolved  on  Colonel  Martin  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Eleventh  Illinois. 

The  capture  of  the  fort  had  an  importance  to  Sherman  far 
out  of  proportion  to  its  military  strength.  The  Great  Ogee- 
chee  was  now  open  and  vessels  could  reach  King's  Bridge  in 
rear  of  the  right  of  his  line.  So  the  rpiestion  of  a  base  on 
the  sea  was  already  solved,  and  the  ojiportune  presence  of 
the  tug  whicih  Sherman  had  signalled  from  Cheves's  mill 
enal)l(3d  hinx  to  send  despatches  that  same  night  to  Admiral 
Dahlgren's  flag-ship  in  Warsaw  Sound,  for  General  Foster  at 
Port  lioyal  and  General  Grant  at  City  Point.  Before  morning 
he  heard  of  General  Foster's  arrival  in  the  river,  though 
unable  to  reach  Fort  McAllister  because  of  tlio  torpedoes 
planted  below  it.  Thereupon  Sherman  again  took  a  small 
boat  and  joined  Foster  upon  his  steamer,  when  he  decided 
that  the  best  economy  of  time  would  bo  found  in  proceeding 
at  once  to  find  Admiral  Dahlgren  in  Warsaw  Sound.  The 
admiral  entered  earnestly  into  the  plans  for  co-operation, 
undertook  to  find  light-draught  vef.scls  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  supplies  to  King's  Bridge,  and  to  remove  the  ob- 
structions from  the  Ogeechee. 

Foster  reported  the  efforts  he  had  made  to  reach  the 
Charleston  railway,  and  that  .'ilthough  he  had  not  succeeded 
in  getting  actual  possession  of  any  point  of  the  road,  he  had, 
about  a  week  before,  intrenched  a  position  near  Coosaw- 
hatchee  from  which  his  guns  commanded  the  railroad.  Ho 
was  unable  to  be  in  the  saddle  owing  to  the  breaking  out  of 
an  old  wound,  and  this  was  a  serious  misfortune,  for  the 
juncture  was  one  in  which  the  presence  of  the  responsible 


5G  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

commander  is  the  only  guaranty  for  thorough  work  at  the 
front.  The  truth  was,  that  although  the  position  referred  to 
was  within  a  mile  of  the  railway,  the  enemy  continued  to 
operate  the  road  without  serious  interruption  as  far  as 
Hardeeville,  from  which  point  the  connection  with  Savannah 
was  made  by  the  Union  Causeway.  Within  the  range  of  the 
guns  at  Foster's  position  the  railway  was  used  chiefly  at 
night,  and  the  trains  were  kept  mnniug  till  the  evacuation 
of  Savannah,  a  week  later. 

Foster,  however,  was  directed  to  establish  himself  upon 
the  railway,  if  possible,  and  Sherman  returned  on  the  morn- 
ing of  December  15th  to  Howard's  headquarters.  Strong 
reconnoissances  had  meanwhile  been  made  by  the  corps 
commanders,  the  approaches  to  Hardee's  works  had  been 
carefully  studied,  and  the  preliminary  steps  taken  to  di'ain 
off  the  overflow  from  portions  of  the  rice-fields  in  front  of 
the  city.  By  mending  some  of  the  breaks  in  the  causeways 
and  canals,  and  especially  in  the  Ogeechee  Canal,  and  by 
rearranging  the  flood-gates  within  our  lines  so  that  they 
should  shut  out  the  w'ater  from  the  rivers  instead  of  shut- 
ting it  in,  the  depth  of  the  inundations  began  to  be  sensibly 
diminished.  Till  the  water  should  bo  a  good  deal  reduced 
an  assault  could  hardly  be  thought  of,  for  narrow  columns 
along  the  causeways  and  dykes  woiild  have  little  chance, 
and  in  the  overflowed  fields  the  certainty  of  ^U  wounded 
men  being  drowned  would  make  an  unjustifiable  waste  of 
human  life. 

On  the  night  of  the  11th,  General  Williams  of  the  Twen- 
tieth Corps  had  put  over  part  of  the  Third  Wisconsin  upon 
Argyle  Island,  and  next  morning  the  rest  of  the  regiment. 
While  these  troops  were  crossing,  three  anned  steamers  of 
the  Confederates  attempted  to  descend  the  river,  but  were 
tired  upon  by  AViuegar's  rifled  battery,  two  of  them  were 


SAVANNAH.  57 

driven  back,  and  one,  the  Ecsoluto,  was  driven  ashore  upon 
the  island  and  captured  with  its  crew  by  Colonel  Hawley 
and  the  Wisconsin  regiment.  Hardee  had  other  gunboats 
below,  and  the  presence  of  these  in  the  river  made  it  seem 
unadvisable  to  lay  pontoon  bridges  till  some  thorough  means 
of  protecting  them  could  be  arranged.  By  an  unfortunate 
mistake  the  Resolute  was  burned  by  her  captors,  when  she 
would  have  "been  of  inestimable  value  in  ferrying  troops  and 
supplies.  The  Confederates  had  carefully  removed  all  flat- 
boats  and  barges  from  the  river,  and  the  great  exposure  of 
detached  troops  on  the  South  Cai'olina  side,  with  no  as- 
sured means  of  communication  or  of  supply,  made  it  seem 
better  to  trust  to  Foster's  ability  to  complete  the  invest- 
ment on  the  east  by  seizing  the  railway  to  which  his  troops 
were  so  near. 

Large  (i[uantitios  of  rice  were  found  on  the  island,  and  for 
some  days  this  was  the  only  breadstuff  the  men  could  pro- 
cure, while  the  rice-straw  was  the  only  forage  for  animals. 
On  the  IGth,  Colonel  Carman  with  the  remainder  of  his  bri- 
gade joined  Hawloy  on  the  island,  while  at  the  same  time 
Wheeler  began  a  concentration  of  the  Confederate  cavulry 
oi)posite,  to  contest  any  landing  on  the  Carolina  shore. 

At  the  right,  Howard  was  making  corduroy  roads  to  con- 
nect the  camps  with  the  new  d''pot  that  was  i)reparing  at 
King's  Bridge,  and  was  hurrying  the  operations  which  were 
cxi)ected  to  drain  the  rice-fields.  His  divisions  and  Slo- 
cum's  were  also  an-anging  earthworks  to  receive  some  heavy 
rifled  guns  which  Sherman  had  directed  Foster  to  send  from 
Port  Royal,  as  the  light  artillery  brought  with  the  army 
could  not  cope  with  the  armament  of  the  Confederate  forti- 
fications. In  many  places  a  fringe  of  pine  woods  protected 
the  canqis  of  the  National  trt)ops,  and  it  was  noticed  that 
when  this  was  half  a  mile  deep,  the  shot  from  even  the 
3* 


58  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

heaviest  of  the  enemy's  guns  failed  to  pass  through  it. 
Around  the  plantation  houses  were  groves  of  giant  live-oaks 
festooned  with  the  tillandsia,  the  long  moss  of  the  South, 
and  the  hoadcpiarters  tents  were  picturesquely  dotted 
among  these. 

A  despatch  boat  had  been  waiting  on  the  coast  with  the 
mail  for  the  army,  and  Sherman  received  despatches  from 
Grant,  dated  the  3d  and  Gth  of  December,  in  which  he  di- 
rected that  an  intrenched  jjosition  be  established  at  any 
eligible  point,  and  that  the  bulk  of  the  army  should  then 
be  shipi^ed  by  sea,  to  join  the  forces  before  Richmond. 
Sherman  responded  to  these  at  some  length  on  the  16th, 
accepting  the  role  assigned  him  with  hearty  subordination, 
but  saying  that  his  own  expectation  had  been  to  reduce 
Savannah  and  then  march  to  Columbia.  To  the  officers  of 
Grant's  staff,  who  were  the  bearers  of  the  despatches,  he 
explained  more  fully  his  plans,  and  very  vigorously  urged 
the  advantages  of  the  movements  he  had  proposed,  so  that 
these  might  be  properly  laid  before  the  General  in-Chief.' 
It  happened,  however,  that  on  the  very  day  when  Sherman 
was  thus  replying,  Grant  had  himself  reached  the  conclu- 
sion to  leave  his  subordinate  free  to  choose  his  own  course, 
and  Halleck  was  writing  to  Sherman,  by  his  direction,  the 
authority  to  act  upon  his  own  judgment.  The  true  strategic 
l^irpose  of  the  campaign  was  thus  maintained,  but  as  the 
despatches  of  the  IGth  and  18th  did  not  reach  Sherman  till 
Savannah  was  in  his  possession,  the  effect  was  to  make 
him  less  decisive  than  he  would  otherwise  have  been  in 
jjutting  the  left  wing  of  the  army  into  positions  on  the 
Carolina  side  of  the  river,  and  in  committing  himself  to  siege 
operations  and  to  a  completed  investment,  from  which   it 


1  M;   authority  for  this  is  Colonel  G.  W.  Nichols,  of  Sherinau's  staff,  who  was 
present  at  the  conversation. 


SAVANNAH.  50 

would  not  have  been  easy  to  withdraw  wlien  the  expected 
transports  shouhl  appear  to  take  away  the  army.  As  a  mid- 
dle course,  therefore,  ho  determined  to  rely  mainly  upo:i 
Foster  for  operations  in  South  Carolina,  limitin^^  Slocum 
to  such  auxiliary  efforts  from  Argyle  Island  as  might  at  any 
time  be  withdrawn.  That  such  a  middle  course  was  a 
comparatively  weak  one,  no  one  was  better  aware  than 
Sherman,  but  it  was  that  which  duty  seemed  to  dictate. 
He  directed  his  Chief  Enginei  v,  Colonel  Poe,  to  lay  out  an 
intrenched  camp  at  Fort  McAllister,  which  might  be  held  in 
the  manner  indicated  by  General  Grant's  first  despatches, 
and  ordered  the  corps  commanders  to  i)ress  the  siege  with 
the  means  in  hand. 

In  the  hope  also  that  the  boldness  of  the  demand  might 
have  some  moral  effect,  ho  sent  on  tho  17th  a  formal  sum- 
mons to  Hardee  to  surrender,  but  this  was  refused.  We 
have  already  seen  that  the  Confederate  commander  was  de- 
termined not  to  allow  himself  to  l)e  shut  up  in  the  city,  and 
the  only  rpiestiou  with  him  was  how  long  he  could  stay 
without  too  seriously  endangering  his  escape.  J3eauregard 
had  reached  Augusta,  and  was  in  general  command,  and  this 
officer  had  accejited  and  earnestly  reiterated  the  views 
which  Hardee  and  Taylor  had  laid  before  the  Confederate 
Government  on  this  subject.  General  S.  Jones,  now  in 
command  at  Charleston,  was  ordered  to  Pocatligo  to  keep 
open  the  railroad  at  every  hazard,  and  a  bridge  of  boats 
was  built  across  the  two  channels  of  the  river,  from  Savan- 
nah to  Hutchinson  Island  and  thence  to  the  Carolina  shore. 

Meanwhile  the  waters  on  the  inundated  rice-fields  were 
slowly  subsiding,  Howard  and  Slocum  had  their  siege  bat- 
teries in  position,  some  of  their  divisions  had  prepared 
light  bridges  to  be  carried  by  the  men  and  thrown  across 
the  ditches,  and  other  preparations  were  made  for  an  assault 


60  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

which  must  havo  been  sanguinary,  but  which  they  boliovod 
could  bo  successfully  made.  On  the  19th  Carman's  brigade 
was  ferried  across  from  Argyle  Island  to  the  Carolina 
shore,  and  obtained  a  strong  defensive  position  at  Izard's 
mill,  but  the  fields  were  under  water  there  also,  and  Jl 
bridges  were  burned,  so  that  it  was  not  an  easy  thing  to 
advance.  The  movement,  however,  satisfied  Hardee  that  ho 
could  not  delay  longer,  and  he  began  the  evacuation,  first 
sending  over  a  strong  detachment  to  resist  fiercely  the  advance 
of  Carman  along  the  dykes.  Knowing  the  danger  of  Har- 
dee's escape,  and  believing  that  a  vigorous  effort  by  Foster's 
troops  might  still  prevent  it,  Sherman  started  in  person  by 
steamer,  on  the  18th,  to  visit  Foster,  whose  physical  condi- 
tion was  not  siTch  that  he  could  come  to  the  camp.  He 
spent  the  20th  at  Hilton  Head,  giving  directions  for  a  move- 
ment of  Hatch's  division  against  the  Union  Causeway,  and 
started  to  return  in  the  night ;  but  his  boat  was  delayed  by 
high  winds  and  by  grounding  at  low  tide,  so  that  he  did 
not  get  back  till  toward  evening  on  the  21st,  when  he  founil 
the  city  already  in  possession  of  his  troops.  Hardee  had 
completed  the  evacuation  in  the  night  of  the  20th,  and 
Geary's  division  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  being  the  nearest  to 
the  town,  had  marched  in  at  daybreak  next  morning.  Sher- 
man's despatch  announcing  the  possession  of  the  city  reached 
President  Lincoln  on  Christmas  eve,  and  its  publication 
was  received  by  the  country  as  a  Christmas  gift  of  priceless 
value.  The  moral  prestige  of  the  march  was  greatly  height- 
ened by  the  so  quick  capture  of  one  of  the  principal  South- 
ern cities  and  seaports.  The  escape  of  Hardee  was  a 
disappointment,  but  as  we  now  know  that  he  had  been  care- 
fully watching  the  roads  since  the  first  approach  of  the 
National  army,  with  the  determination  to  abandon  the  city 
before  the  investment   could  have  been  made   complete, 


SAVANNAH.  (jj 

the  only  question  was  whether  ho  should  make  the  evacua- 
tion a  iow  days  sooner  or  later. 

Hardee  had  only  been  able  to  remove  his  light  artillery 
w  ith  his  troops,  and  the  heavy  guns,  mounted  and  in  store, 
which  were  captured,  were  found  to  number  over  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty.  Thirty-one  thousand  bales  of  cotton  also 
Ml  into  the  hands  of  the  National  army  and  were  turned 
over  to  the  officers  of  the  Treasury  Department.  The  re- 
treating Confederate  army  moved  first  to  Charleston,  whence 
the  Georgia  militia  were  sent  to  Augusta,  that  they  might 
relieve  other  Confedei-ato  troops  there  and  serve  within 
their  own  State,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  their  enlist- 
ment. 


02 


FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 


CHATTER  IV. 

MIDDLE  TENNESSEE— PULASKI  TO  SPRING  HILL. 

"While  the  events  clescribed  in  the  last  chapters  were 
occurring  in  Georgia,  the  struggle  in  Middle  Tennessee  had 
reached  a  crisis.  We  have  seen  that  before  November  15th 
Forrest's  cavaliy  had  joined  Hood,  and  that  a  portion  of  the 
Confederate  infantry  occupied  Florence,  covering  the  bridge 
that  was  laid  there  in  preparation  for  the  advance  of  the 
whole  of  Hood's  army.  General  Thomas  had  committed  to 
General  Schofield  tho  command  of  the  trooi)S  immediat(ily 
ojiposed  to  Hood,  but  it  was  tho  universal  expectation  that  a 
rapid  concentration  of  the  National  forces  would  be  made 
in  time  to  prevent  the  Confederate  army  from  advancing 
far.' 

In  East  Tennessee  the  enemy,  under  Breckenridge,  made 
an  attack  upon  General  Gillem,  who  commanded  a  body  of 
our  cavalry  there  ;  but  this  was  simply  a  diversion  intended 
to  delay  the  concentration  of  our  forces,  like  that  made  just 
before  by  Forrest,  and  had  no  further  significance.  Sher- 
man's march  from  Atlanta  made  it  necessary  for  Hood  to  do 
promptly  whatever  he  meant  to  do,  and  his  cavalry  began  to 
make  demonstrations  toward  Lawrenceburg  and  W^aynes- 
boro  as  early  as  the  15th.  The  weather,  however,  had 
proven  a  formidable  obstacle,  delaying  the  rebuilding  of  the 
railroad   between   Tuscumbia   and   Cherokee    Station,   and 


>  For  organization  of  the  armies  of  Thomas  and  Uood,  set  Appendix  6. 


64  FRANKLIN   AND   NASIIVihLE. 

(l(!layin}^  still  moro  tlio  wagon  trains  which  woro  toiling 
through  tho  iinul  in  tho  cfTort  to  accumnlato  su[)i)lios  Hutli- 
oi(*nt  to  warrant  tho  opening  of  an  active  campaign.  Tho 
HtorniH,  of  which  only  tho  edgo  reached  Sherman  ntuvr  Ma- 
con, were  continuous  antl  severe  in  Tennessee,  alternating 
between  rains  and  severe  frosts,  covering  the  roads  with  a 
frozen  (unist  over  deep  mire,  just  strong  enough  to  make  tho 
utmost  obstniction,  without  getting  tho  solidity  necessary  to 
bear  up  tho  wagons  and  teams. 

Beauregard  had  left  Hood  on  tho  17th,  after  issuing  the 
order  which  directed  tho  latter  to  advance  Avith  the  least 
possible  delay,  and  on  the  2()th  had  reached  West  Point, 
Miss.,  whence  ho  telegraphed  to  Hood  to  '-push  an  active 
offensivo  immediately."  On  that  day,  Lee's  corps  marched 
ten  miles  out  from  Florence,  on  a  road  between  those  lead- 
ing to  Waynesboro  and  to  Lawrenceburg,  and  on  tho  21st 
tho  whole  of  tho  army  was  in  motion,  Hood  hoping  by  a, 
rapid  march  to  get  in  rear  of  Schofield's  f(jr(M>s  before  they 
could  reach  Duck  Eivor.  Schofield  received  wtn'd  on  tho 
20tli  from  Hatch,  who  commanded  his  cavalry,  that  the  ad- 
vance had  begun,  and  as  soon  as  it  Mas  evident  that  Hood 
was  moving  on  tho  Lawrenceburg  road,  he  sent  back  hi.i 
surplus  stoi-es  from  Pulaski,  and  prepared  to  retreat  to  Co- 
lumbia. Ho  had  ordered  Colonel  Strickland,  who  was  at  the 
last-named  place,  to  prepare  a  defensive  lino  by  which  he 
could  hold  the  town,  or  at  least  the  crossings  of  Duck 
liiver  at  tho  railway  and  pontoon  bridges.  On  tho  21st  the 
cavalry  reports  left  no  doubt  that  Hood  was  near  Lawrence- 
burg, and  the  next  morning  Cox's  division  of  tho  Twenty-third 
Corps  was  sent  to  Lynnvillo,  about  half  way  between  Pulaski 
and  Columbia,  where  it  was  joined  in  the  evening  by  Wag- 
ner's division  of  the  Fourth  Corps.  At  this  point  they  cov- 
ered an  important  cross-road  coming  in  from  Lawrenceburg 


MIDDLE  TENNESSEE.  G5 

to  the  railway.  Thomas's  dospatclics  to  Sohofu^ld  ho«l  all 
contained  tho  stronj^  wish  that  the  troops  niij^ht  rotrcnvt  as 
little  and  as  slowly  as  i)OHsil)lo,  for  on  Sunday,  tho  2()th,  hi*  had 
abandoned  the  expectation  of  seeing  A.  J.  Smith's  trot)ps  bo- 
fore  the  following  Friday.  H(*  expressed  a  hope  that  Pulaski 
might  be  held  till  then,  but  coincided  in  Schotield's  opinion 
that,  if  Hood  attemi)tcd  to  get  in  his  rear,  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  retire  to  Columbia,  covering  tho  railway.  The  min- 
gled and  continuous  storms  of  snow,  sleet,  and  rain  were 
delaying  Hood,  and  he  was  not  yet  so  far  North  as  to  make 
it  sure  that  he  would  not  seek  to  reach  the  railway  south  of 
Columbia.  On  the  23d,  Schofield's  movement  kept  pace 
with  Hood'.s,  Cox's  division  being  sent  ten  miles  farther 
north  to  Hurricane,  tho  crossing  of  tho  railway  by  tho 
Mount  Pleasant  and  Shelbyvillo  road,  and  Stanley,  with  tho 
whole  of  the  Fourth  Cori)s,  was  moved  to  Lynnvillo.  But 
during  the  night  Schofield  received  word  that  the  cavalry 
on  the  Mount  Pleasant  and  Columbia  Pike  were  unable  to 
resist  the  determined  advance  of  Forrest,  and  before  day- 
break of  the  24th  ho  put  his  little  army  in  rapid  motion  for 
Columbia.  Cox's  division,  having  tho  shorter  distance  to 
travel,  approached  the  town  first,  and  hearing  tho  noise  of 
the  cavalry  combat  on  the  converging  road  at  the  west, 
marched  by  a  cross-road  some  two  miles  out  of  town,  and 
reached  that  on  which  tho  fight  was  going  on  in  time  to  in- 
terpose the  infantry  skirmishers,  moving  at  double-qviick, 
between  FoiTest's  cavalry  and  the  brigade  of  Colonel  Capron, 
which  was  rapidly  retreating  into  the  place.  The  enemy 
was  quickly  checked  and  a  line  formed  behind  Bigby  Creek. 
It  was  now  a  little  after  seven  o'clock ;  in  less  than  three 
hours  Stanley's  head  of  column  came  up,  and  a  strong  posi- 
tion was  taken  by  tho  whole  command,  covering  the  town  on 
the  south.     Hood  did  not  succeed  in  getting  the  whole  of 


6G  FRANKLIN   AND  NA8HVILLE. 

his  forces  up  until  tlio  20tli,  his  utmost  exertions  having 
failed  to  move  his  army  faster  than  ton  miles  a  day.  Hcho- 
field  was  joined  on  the  man^li  by  General  Wilson,  who  took 
command  of  all  the  cavalry,  which  was  slowly  reinforced, 
and  ho  was  mot  at  Columbia  by  General  linger,  with  one  of 
the  brigades  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  which  had  been  left 
at  Johnsouvillo.  General  Cooper,  who  had  also  been  at 
Johnsonville,  was  ordered  by  General  Thomas  to  march 
with  his  brigade  from  there  to  Centre vi Ho,  a  crossing  of  the 
Duck  lliver,  thirty  miles  west  of  Columbia,  where  it  was 
thought  Forrest's  cavalry  might  tiy  to  pass  that  stream. 
Part  of  Ruger's  command  was  scattered  at  several  points  on 
the  river,  within  a  few  miles  of  Columbia,  to  protect  cross- 
ings and  fords  on  Schofield's  right  flank.  Wilson,  with  tho 
cavalry,  was  directed  to  ojierate  on  the  left,  covering  the 
country  in  tho  direction  of  Lewisburg  and  Shelbyville  as 
well  as  possible,  besides  watching  tho  fords  and  crossings  of 
the  river  above  Columbia. 

•  Schotield's  position  was  a  strong  one  if  the  attack  were 
made  upon  him  in  front,  but  it  had  the  great  disadvantage 
of  a  river  at  his  back.  No  lino  north  of  tho  river  coulJ.  be 
occupied  without  abandoning  tho  railroad  bridge  to  destruc- 
tion, and  this  would  be  needed  again  as  soon  as  a  forward 
movement  should  begin.  The  river  at  tho  town  makes  a 
horse-shoo  bend  to  the  south,  and  the  land  on  the  north 
bank  in  the  bend  is  low,  and  completely  commanded  by 
that  on  the  south.  Hood  was  too  wary  to  make  an  assault 
of  tho  lines,  and  contented  himself  with  a  shaii>  skirmis;hing 
engagement,  while  he  prepared  to  turn  Schofield's  position 
by  crossing  the  river  some  miles  above. 

Thomas  had  given  orders  to  Genei'al  Granger,  at  Decatur, 
prior  to  the  retrograde  movement,  under  which  that  officer, 
on  the  same  day  that  Bchofleld  abandoned  Pulaski,  with- 


MIDDLE  TENNESSER  07 

drew  las  garrisons  from  Atlions,  Decatur,  and  Huntsvillo, 
and  concentrated  his  division  at  Stevenson,  a  hundred  niil(>s 
cast.  The  relations  of  this  singular  divergent  movement 
will  be  considered  later ;  its  immediate  etlect  was  to  relievo 
Hood  of  any  embarrassment  as  to  his  right  Hank  in  operat- 
ing against  Sehofield.  The  gamson  at  Johnson vi lie  was 
ordered  to  remove  the  i)ublio  property  and  retire  to  Clarks- 
ville,  fifty  miles  northwest  of  Nashville. 

On  the  24:th,  a  careful  examination  of  the  country  satisfied 
Sehofield  that  he  must  expect  Hood  to  try  to  turn  his  posi- 
tion, and  he  informed  Thomas  of  liis  purpose  to  prei)are  an 
interior  and  shorter  line,  so  that  when  it  became  necessary 
he  could  retire  to  this  and  send  i)art  of  his  force  north  of 
Duck  River.  Thomas  still  urged  that  the  cftbrt  be  made  to 
cover  the  railway  and  pontoon  bridges  with  a  bridge-head,  so 
keeping  command  of  a  crossing  till  ho  should  be  ready  to 
advance ;  and  Sehofield  prepared  to  delay  and  obstruct 
Hood  to  the  last  moment,  urging  that  the  infantry  rein- 
forcements be  sent  to  him  as  fast  as  possible.  The  strong 
efforts  which  had  been  made  had  increased  Wilson's  cavalry 
to  about  seven  thousand  efjuipped,  five  regiments  being  sent 
forward  from  Nashville  between  the  24th  and  27tli  of  the 
mouth.  These,  however,  did  not  reach  him  at  the  front  till 
the  30th,  and  till  that  time  his  force  remained  inferior  in 
strength  to  Forrest's,  even  if  we  deduct  from  the  latter  llod- 
dey's  division,  which  seems  to  have  been  detached,  guarding 
Northern  Alabama. 

During  the  night  of  the  25th  Sehofield  ordered  Cox  to 
move  two  brigades  of  his  division  to  the  north  side  of  the 
river,  and  take  a  position  covering  the  pontoon  bridge  which 
was  at  the  ford.  On  the  26th,  this  was  strengthened  by 
breastworks  on  indenttd  lines,  where  the  brigades  and  regi- 
ments were  separately  intrenched,  taking  advantage  of  every 


68 


FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 


iri-egularity  of  tlio  ground  antl  of  groves  of  tiinbor  to  pro- 
tect the  force  from  the  cross-fire  of  artillery  which  the  en- 
emy would  have  from  the  higher  ground  on  the  south  of  the 
stream.     Pits  were  also  made  for  a  line  of  skirmishers  close 


Vicinity  of  Columbia,  Tenn. 

to  the  rivL  '•  bank.     The  Fourth  Corps  troops  were  brought 
into  the  interior  line  which  had  been  constructed  on  the 
other  side,  and  the  town  and  bridges  were  still  held. 
Hood  felt  cautiously  tho  ncvV  line  in  front  of  Columbia 


MIDDLE  TENNESSEE. 

but  still  did  not  attack,  and  the  whole  of  his  infantry  being 
uji,  he  began  a  movement  to  cross  the  river  above.  Forrest 
assembled  most  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  between  Hood's 
right  and  the  turniDike,  and  other  roads  leading  from  Lewis- 
burg  to  Franklin  eastward  of  Columbia,  trying  the  difterent 
fords.  Wilson  was  actively  at  work  to  prevent  the  crossing, 
watching  the  coiintry  as  far  as  Shelbyville.  The  indications 
of  Hood's  purpose  were  now  so  plain  tliat  SchofieJd  felt  ho 
could  no  longer  delay,  and  moved  the  whole  of  his  command 
to  the  north  side  of  the  river,  in  the  nigh!;  of  the  27th,  partly 
destroying  the  railway  bridge,  so  that  the  enemy  could  nob 
make  use  of  it.  He  was  also  obliged  to  destroy  the  pontoon 
bridge,  which  was  of  heavy  wooden  boats,  for  which  \u)  had 
no  means  of  transportation.  He  earnestly  assured  Thomas 
that  he  had  held  on  as  long  as  was  at  all  safe,  and  he  was 
plainly  right,  the  only  doubt  being  whether,  in  his  zeal  to 
give  Thomas  all  the  time  possible  for  the  intended  concen- ' 
tration,  he  was  not  taking  too  great  a  risk. 

Wilson  heard,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  28tli,  that  Forrest 
had  forced  a  crossizig  at  Haey's  mill,  eight  miles  above 
Columbia. '  He  tried  to  unite  his  forces  as  rapidly  as  possi- 
ble in  front  of  the  enemy,  but  Hurt's  c.oss-roads,  between 
Spring  Hill  and  the  Lewisburg  i)ike,  was  the  first  point  at 
which  he  was  able  to  make  any  continiied  stand.  At  eight 
in  the  evening  his  information  seemed  to  show  that  Forrest 
was  movrag  eastward  toward  the  Lowisburg  pike,  and  that 
none  of  the  enemy  had  gone  toward  the  Franklin  i)ike,  i:i 


'  The  official  rcjiorts  anrl  momoirs  on  both  rkIos  are  full  of  differences  as  to  the 
distance  from  Coluiablii  to  tlie  place  where  Hood'.s  infantry  crossed.  The  Con- 
federate aecount.s  say  nothiiii;  of  Hiiey's  mill,  and  do  not  dis, '  .ctly  t\\  the  place 
of  their  i)oiitooii  bridfxe.  By  tlie  courtesy  of  Capt.  11.  D.  Smith,  of  Columbia, 
who  was  in  Hood's  army  at  the  time,  I  am  able  to  nay  definitely  that  tlie  bridge 
was  laid  at  Lavis's  ford,  between  five  and  six  miles  from  CoUimuia.  Some  of  the 
cavalry  'jrossed  at  I    I'y's  mill. 


70  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

roar  of  Sohofiold.  At  ono  o'clock,  however,  he  received  in- 
formation that  pontoons  were  laid  at  Huey's  mill,  and  that 
Hood'.s  infantry  were  crossing.  This  he  immediately  de- 
spatched to  Schofield;  but  the  messenger  had  to  go  by 
Spring  Hill,  and  the  way  was  long,  so  that  the  intelligence 
was  only  received  at  daylight  in  the  morning.  A  brigftde  of 
infantry  (Post's  of  Wood's  division)  was  immediately  sent 
upon  a  reconnoissance  up  the  river,  accompanied  by  one  of 
Schofield's  staff,  with  orders  to  observe  and  report  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy.  Stanley  was  ordered  to  march  at  eight 
o'clock  with  two  divisions  of  his  corps  to  S2)ring  Hill,  eleven 
miles,  'saving  "Wood  in  support  of  Post's  reconnoissance,  and 
about  a  mile  in  rear  of  Cox's  di^'ision,  which  was  ordered  to 
hold  stubbornly  the  crossing  at  Columbia  and  the  tongue  of 
land  in  the  bend  of  the  river.  Ruger  was  ordered  to  hasten 
the  blockade  of  the  fords  and  roads  below  the  town  by  fell- 
«tng  ti'eos,  and  then  to  march  also  to  Spring  Hill.  Stewart's 
brigade  of  cavalry,  which  had  l^een  watching  the  lower 
fords,  had  been  ordered  the  jireceding  evening  to  proceed 
rapidly  to  join  Wilson  by  way  of  Spring  Hill ;  and  Ham- 
mond's brigade,  which  was  coming  from  Nashville  freshly 
remounted,  was  ordered  to  stop  at  the  same  place  and  move 
as  Wilson  should  direct.  As  another  precaution  Schotield 
had  telegraphed  Thomas,  asking  that  a  pontoon  bridge  be 
sent  to  Franklin,  m  here  the  wagon  bridge  had  been  carried 
away  by  a  freshet. 

Soon  after  daylight  the  Confederate  artillery  around  the 
whole  bend  of  the  river  opened  upon  the  division  en- 
trenched in  the  lower  lands  along  the  north  shore,  but  the 
l)recautions  that  had  been  taken  by  building  traverses  and 
angles  in  the  lines  prevented  any  serious  loss.  The  fire 
was  returned  from  our  batteries,  and  the  renewal  of  the 
artillery  combat  at   different   times  through  the  day,  by 


MIDDLE  TENNESSEE.  71 

allowing  that  Hood's  cannon  woro  in  position,  proved  also 
that  his  whole  army  could  not  have  moved. 

The  truth  was  that  Hood  had  left  two  divisions  of  Lee's 
corps,  and  the  whole  of  his  artillery,  in  Columbia,  witli 
orders  to  make  strong  demonstrations  in  the  niorning,  and 
to  force  the  crossing  of  the  river  later  in  the  day.  The 
roads  by  which  he  was  leading  Cheatham's  and  Stewart's 
C0111S  were  not  thought  practicable  for  the  cannon.  Scho- 
field  needed  time  for  Rugcr  to  comi)lete  his  Avork  at  the 
fords  below,  and  to  ship  by  rail  some  artillery  which  had  no 
horses  and  other  material  for  which  transportation  was 
lacking.  He  judged  also  from  the  strong  force  of  the  ene- 
my in  Columbia  that  Hood  was  not  unlikely  to  move  straight 
down  the  river  ui;)on  his  flank,  when  the  two  parts  of  tlie 
Confederate  army  could  co-operate.  He  therefore  modi- 
fied his  order  to  Stanley,  so  as  to  place  Kimball's  division 
near  Rutherford  Creek  crossing,  about  two  miles  from 
Wood,  and  let  Stanley  proceed  to  Si)ring  Hill  with  Wag- 
ner's division  alone.  Huger  was  ready  to  march  early  in 
the  day,  and  leaving  one  regiment  as  an  outpost  on  the 
right,  he  hastened  with  the  rest  of  his  two  brigades  over 
Kiitherford  Creek,  when  he  halted,  by  Schofield's  orders,  a 
short  distance  beyond  the  position  of  Kimball.  The  wagon 
trains  of  the  army  had  been  ordered  to  Spring  Hill,  and 
Stanley  reached  that  i)lace  about  noon,  and  just  in  time  to 
pi'event  their  capture  by  the  enemy's  cavalry. 

Forrest  had,  on  the  2Sth,  placed  Buford's  division  upon 
the  Lewisburg  and  Franklin  turni)ike,  Chalmers's  division  at 
Holland's  Ford,  about  seven  miles  east  of  Columbia,  and 
Jackson's  at  Hue>y's  mill,  between  Chalmers  and  Buford, 
while  he  himself,  with  his  escort,  and  Biffle's  demi-brigade 
attempted  Davis's  Ford,  two  miles  west  of  Chalmers.'     The 


Jordan  and  Prior'H  Campaigns  of  Forrost,  p.  (119. 


72  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

two  divisions  of  the  National  cavalry  were  broken  into 
smaller  detacliments,  part  of  them  well  out  toward  Slielby- 
ville,  the  nearest  to  the  infantry  being  part  of  Capron's 
brigade,  at  Rally  Hill,  on  the  Lewisbnrg  pike,  where  a 
branch  turnpike  turns  off  to  Spring  Hill.  The  resistance 
made  to  Buford  was  so  vigorous  that  he  could  not  got  over 
the  river,  but  Jackson  and  Clialmers  forced  a  crossing  after 
a  sharp  skirmish,  and  Forrest  himself  does  not  seem  to  have 
found  any  resistance.  He  soon  struck  the  Columbia  and 
Murfreesboro  road,  and  turning  Chalmers  and  Jackson  to 
the  east,  drove  Wilson's  detachment  beyond  Rally  Hill. 
The  enemy  was  now  between  the  main  body  of  our  cavalry 
and  the  i)arties  watching  the  fords  near  tht;  Lewisburg 
crossing.  These  were  collected  by  Major  Young  (Fifth 
Iowa  Cavalry)  and  under  his  lead  they  daringly  cut  their 
way  through.  "Wilson  now  called  in  his  deta  diments  to- 
ward Hurt's  Corners  as  rapidly  as  possible,  but  his  despatch 
to  Schofield  at  eight  o'clock,  giving  the  information  already 
referred  to,  shows  that  he  was  misled  as  to  Forrest's  jrar- 
poses.  It  is  true  that  the  latter  was  moving  eastward  with 
two-thirds  of  his  command,  but  he  was  doing  so  only  to 
clear  the  way  for  Buford,  and  at  Rally  Hill  he  was  in  pos- 
session of  the  only  macadamized  road  leading  dii'ectly  to 
Schotield's  rear  at  Spring  Hill.  Wilson  had  been  able  to 
rally  his  whole  command  at  Hurt's  Corners,  and  checked 
the  further  advance  of  the  enemy  in  the  evening,  but  Buford 
joined  Forrest  in  the  night,  and  early  in  the  morning  the 
whole  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  again  advanced.  Wilson 
made  a  brave  and  determined  resistance,  jiutting  Croxton's 
brigade  of  Johnson's  division  in  the  rear,  to  contest  every 
foot  of  the  way.  Capron's  brigade  of  the  same  division, 
which  had  been  badly  worsted  the  evening  before,  took 
the  advance  on  the  Franklin  road,  and  Hatch's  division  was 


MIDDLE  TENNESSEE.  73 

the  middle  of  the  cohimn  supporting  Croxton.  Forrest 
operated  by  flank  movements,  usin<^  his  heavier  foree  to 
turn  the  i^ositious  sehictod  by  "Wilson,  and  by  the  mid- 
dle of  the  forenoon  hud  gained  Mount  Carmel,  where  the 
Murfr<iesboro  and  Spring  Hill  road  crosses  the  turnpike^ 
on  which  our  cavalry  was  retiring.  Here  Coon's  brigade 
of  Hatcli's  division  occupied  a  barricade  which  liad  beeu 
previously  made  by  Capron,  and  the  rest  of  the  command 
moved  through  it.  The  enemy  made  two  determined 
charges  upon  it,  but  were  repulsed.  Wilson  continued, 
however,  to  retire  slowly  on  Franklin,  and  Forrest,  who  now 
hud  possession  of  the  direct  road  to  8i)ring  Hill,  covering 
that  by  which  Hood's  infantry  was  moving,  no  longer 
pressed  the  pursuit ;  but  leaving  a  detachment  in  observa- 
tion, he  moved  directly  ui^on  Spring  Hill,  where  Stanley 
arrived  almost  at  the  same  moment  with  lum,  as  we  have 
seen.  It  is  now  plain  that  Wilson  erred  in  adhering  to  the 
line  of  the  Lewisburg  and  Franklin  pike  after  Forrest 
gained  Eally  Hill.  By  doing  so  he  allowed  Forrest  to  cut 
him  olf  both  from  Schofiold's  infantry,  and  from  the  two 
brigades  of  cavalry  which  were  ordered  to  Spring  Hill  to 
reinforce  him,  and  Schofield  was  left,  during  the  whole  of 
the  critical  day  and  night  of  the  29th,  without  the  means  of 
learning  Hood's  movements  except  from  his  infantry  recon- 
noissances.  The  true  line  of  action  was  manifestly  to  regain 
the  road  from  Rally  Hill  to  Spring  Hill  in  the  night  of  the 
28th,  or,  failing  tliat,  to  have  made  a  rapid  march  by  Mount 
Carmel  to  Spring  Hill,  so  as  to  anticipate  Forrest  there. 

Hood  did  not  cross  Duck  River  with  his  infantry  in  the 
night,  as  had  beeu  expected,  but  Cleburne's  division  of 
Cheatham's  corps,  which  was  his  head  of  column,  crossed 
soon  after  daylight  in  the  morning  upon  the  i)ontoon  bridge 
at  Davis's  Ford,  followed  by  Bate  and  Brown.  Stewart's 
Vol.  X— 4 


74  FUANKLIN    AND   NASHVILLE. 

corps  came  next,  the  rear  being  bron^^lit  up  by  Johnson's 
division  of  Lee's  corps,  whii-h  was  temporarily  roi)orting  to 
Btftwart.  Hood  himself  accompanied  the  advance  guard, 
but  despite  all  his  effort.^  it  was  three  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon, or  later,  when  Cleburne  rea('])ed  the  Kallv  Hill  turn- 
l)ike  whore  it  crosses  Kuthorford  (>r(^ek,  two  and  a  half  miles 
from  Spring  Hill.  Ordering  Cheatham  to  remain  and 
hurry  the  crossing  of  his  other  divisions,  Cleburne  was  di- 
rected to  press  forward  and  attiiclv  whatever  force  there 
might  be  at  Spring  Hill,  where  the  noise  of  Stanley's  artil- 
lery warned  them  that  Forrest  was  meeting  with  opi^osition. 
But  tlie  distant  firing  at  Columbia  eoiild  also  be  heard,  and 
the  tenacity  with  which  Schotield  hung  on  to  the  lino  of 
Duck  River  apparently  raised  doubts  in  Hood's  mind 
whether  the  National  commander  might  not  have  received 
reinforcements  enough  to  cut  boldly  between  the  now  sepa- 
rated wings  of  his  army.  Post's  reconnoissance  had  gone  far 
enough  to  observe  the  movement,  and  it  is  probable  that  ib 
had  in  turn  been  seen  by  Hood's  command,  and  he  would 
thus  know  that  infantry  was  api>roa<^hing  his  line  of  march. 
But  whatever  the  reasons  which  induced  it.  Hood  ordered 
Stewart  to  form  his  coi-jis  in  lino  of  battle  south  of  Ruther- 
ford Creek,  facing  west,  and  this  instruction  necessai'ily  im- 
plies the  expectation  of  the  apin-oach  of  an  enemy  fi'om  that 
direction,  or  the  purpose  of  himself  making  an  attack  upon 
the  line  which  Scholield  had  i^repared  to  receive  him  by 
putting  Wood's,  Kimball's,  and  Ruger's  divisions  within  sup- 
porting distance  of  each  other  upon  the  extension  of  Cox's 
left.  He  may  have  thought  that  the  resistance  at  Spring 
Hill  would  be  slight  when  Cheatham  reached  the  field,  and 
that  this  corps  sweeping  down  the  turnpike  toward  Colum- 
bia would  meet  the  convergent  advance  of  Stewart  in  a  gen- 
eral attack  upon  Schofield's  flank.     The  advantages  of  the 


MIDDLli  TENNKSSEi:.  75 

defence  in  a  broken  and  wooded  countiy,  and  tlio  pradent 
disposal  of  bis  force,  hj  wdiicli  Soliofiold  had  now  some  miles 
of  line  facing  the  east,  would  possibly  have  made  siich  an 
attack  as  disastrous  as  the  ouo  at  Franklin  next  dav ;  but 
Hood  did  not  attack  there,  and  Stewart  remained  in  line  till 
Cheatham  had  l)een  repulsed  at  Sprini,'  Hill,  and  was  then 
ordered  up  when  darkness  had  fallen  and  it  was  thought  too 
late  for  further  action  that  night. 

^Yllen  Stanley  had  reached  Spring  Hiil  he  found  a  i^art  of 
Forrest's  command  already  in  the  outskirts  of  the  place.  Ho 
ordered  "Wagner  to  put  Oi:)dyckc's  and  Lane's  brigades  in 
position  to  cover  the  village,  and  advanced  Bradley's  brigade 
to  a  wooded  hill  about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  east  of  the 
turnpike,  which  commanded  the  approaches  from  that  direc- 
tion. One  battery  of  artillery  hud  accompanied  Wagner, 
but  Captain  Bridges,  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  Fourth  Corjis, 
had  followed  Stanley's  march  with  six  batteries,  leaving  one 
with  Wood's  division.  This  hiid  been  done  only  to  get  them 
well  forward  en  route  to  Franklin  ;  but  on  reaching  Spring 
Hill,  Captain  Bridges  had  with  wise  precaution  put  his  guns 
in  battery  on  a  commanding  bench  just  west  of  the  road, 
and  where  a  little  later  they  proved  of  great  use  and  most 
fortunate  in  position.  The  enemy's  cavalry  made  active  ef- 
forts to  reach  the  trains,  which  were  parked  by  the  roadside, 
and  also  to  destroy  the  railway  station  a  short  distance  west 
of  the  turn2)ike,  and  the  protection  of  all  these  kept  Opdycke 
and  Lane  fully  employed.  Bradley  was  engaged  at  the  same 
time,  but  the  affair  was  not  serious  until  the  arrival  of  Cle- 
burne's division  on  the  field.  This  officer  formed  his  com- 
mand along  the  Rally  Hill  road,  and,  advancing  at  right 
angles  to  it,  attempted  to  reach  the  Columbia  turnpike.  Ha 
does  not  seem  to  have  been  fully  aware  of  Bradle5''s  position, 
for  his  extreme  right   (Lowry's  brigade)  alone    reached  it, 


70  FIIANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

and  was  received  with  so  nido  a  shock  that  Cleburne  was 
quickly  forced  to  change  front  nearly  at  right  angles  in 
order  to  (nigago  his  opponent.  Bate's  division,  which  fol- 
lowed Cleburne,  had  formed  in  the  same  manner  and  tonic 
the  same  lino  of  direction.  It  had  nearly  reached  the  Col- 
unibia  road  when  Bate  discovered  that  CUeburne  had 
changed  direction,  and  his  orders  being  to  form  on  the  left 
of  that  division,  much  time  was  consumed  in  rectifying  tlio 
line.  Brown's  division  had  followed  Bate  and  had  been 
sent  forward  on  Cleburne's  right.  Bradley's  jiosition  had 
been  too  isolated  to  be  held  by  a  single  brigade  against  so 
extended  a  lino  of  battle,  and  after  his  first  sharp  encounter 
with  Clobiirne  ho  retreated  in  some  disorder,  he  himself 
being  severely  wounded.  The  brigade  was  (piickly  re- 
formed on  the  right  of  Lane,  at  the  southern  edge  of  the 
village  commanding  the  Colund)ia  road,  and  a  regiment  was 
detached  from  Opdycke  to  strengthen  it,  Wagner's  line  was 
now  a  semicircle,  reaching  from  the  Columbia  road  around 
the  eastern  side  of  the  place  to  the  railway  station  on  the 
northwest,  Opdycke's  brigade  being  stretched  out  till  it  was 
only  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers.  A  regiment  which  was 
with  tlie  trains  as  a  guard  was  also  utilized,  and  advantage 
was  taken  of  the  ground  to  present  the  strongest  front  pos- 
sible. Cleburne  and  Brown  followed  u])  Bradley's  retreat, 
but  were  met  with  so  continuous  a  fire  and  on  so  long  a  de- 
fensive line,  that  they  were  made  to  believe  they  were  in  the 
presence  of  a  superior  force.  The  concentration  of  artillery 
fire  upon  them  was  so  far  beyond  what  they  could  expect 
from  a  single  division,  that  it  checked  them  as  much,  per- 
haps, by  producing  the  conviction  that  they  had  most  of 
Schofield's  army  before  them,  as  by  the  severe  losses  caused 
by  the  terrible  fire  of  shrapnel  and  canister.  It  was  now 
gi'owing  dark,  and  Hood  having  reached  the  conclusion  that 


MIDDLE  TENNESSEE.  77 

he  needed  Stewart's  cori)s  also,  ordered  this  up  from  Ruther- 
ford Creek,  with  Johnson's  division  of  Lee's  corps  which 
accompanied  it.  Jackson's  division  of  cavahy  occuijicd 
Thompson's  Station,  three  miles  north  of  Spring  Hill,  and 
the  rest  of  Forrest's  horsemen  were  in  that  direction.  AVhen 
Stewart  arrived  it  was  already  night,  and  he  was  ordered  to 
bivouac  on  the  right  and  rear  of  Cheatham. 

Meanwhile  Schofield  had  issued  his  orders  that  Cox's  di- 
vision should  continue  to  hold  the  bank  of  the  river  opposite 
Columbia  till  nightfall,  if  possible,  and  then,  leaving  a  skir- 
mish line  in  position,  should  march  to  Spring  Hill,  followed 
in  turn  by  Wood's  and  Kimball's  divisions.  The  skirmishers 
were  directed  to  remain  till  midnight  unless  driven  off,  and 
to  join  the  rear  guard  of  the  army  or  follow  it.  The  divi- 
sions were  all  to  move  by  the  left  flank,  so  that  whenever 
they  should  halt  and  face  they  would  be  in  line  of  battle, 
and  could  use  the  road  fences  for  barricades  if  attacked  bv 
Hood.  The  whole  line  would  thus  be  shortened  from  the 
right  till  Kimball  only  should  remain  on  that  flank,  when  ho 
also  would  march  to  Spring  Hill.  By  this  arrangement  there 
was  the  least  risk  of  confusion  and  the  greatest  readiness 
for  any  contingency  which  might  arise. 

On  hearing  from  Stanley  that  he  was  attacked  l)y  infantry, 
Schofield  hastened  to  Euger's  division,  which,  it  wdll  be  re- 
membered, was  nearest  to  Spring  Hill,  and  led  its  two  bri- 
gades in  person  by  a  rapid  march  to  Stanley's  support.  As 
he  approached  the  village  he  found  i^ickets  of  the  enemy 
on  the  road,  but  thtse  were  driven  off  and  he  joined  Stanley 
at  seven  o'clock.  Whittaker's  brigade  of  Kimball's  divi- 
sion had  also  been  ordered  up,  and  followed  Ruger  closely. 
When  it  arrived  it  was  placed  on  the  right  of  Wagner's  line, 
to  cover  the  march  of  the  rest  of  the  column  as  it  should 
approach.     Learning  from  Stanley  that  some  force  of  the 


78  rilANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLM 

cuomy  was  at  Thoiupsoii'H  Station,  Schotield  immediately 
marched  with  Kuger's  division  to  that  jioint  to  ojien  the  way 
to  Franklin.  At  his  ai)i)roaeh  Jack.son  withdrew  his  cavalry 
and  linger  was  placed  in  jjosition  there  without  a  contest. 
Schotield  now  returned  to  8i)ring  Hill,  reaching  the  village 
at  midnight,  and  meeting  there  the  head  of  Cox's  division 
which  had  moved  from  Duck  liiver  in  accordance  with  his 
orders. 

It  is  necessary,  to  a  complete  understanding  of  the  situa- 
tion, that  we  should  go  back  a  little  and  notice  the  efforts 
which  Lee  made  to  carry  out  Hood's  orders,  and  force  the 
crossing  of  Duck  Eiver  in  the  afternoon.  He  had  kept  up, 
at  intervals,  an  annoying  plunging  fire  upon  Cox's  trocjps  in 
the  bend  of  the  river,  but  our  rifled  cannon,  by  greater  range 
and  better  practice,  had  prevented  the  enemy's  artillery  from 
maintaining  its  })ositions  or  doing  much  damage.  A  line  of 
skirmishers'  pits  on  the  very  end  of  the  tongue  of  land  hud 
been  made  untenable,  but  a  fringe  of  wood,  a  little  further 
back,  alibrded  a  cover  which  gave  complete  command  of  the 
oi)en  ground  to  the  edge  of  the  river  bank.  About  four 
o'clock  the  efforts  of  Lee  to  effect  a  crossing  became  more 
energetic.  Some  pontoons  were  brought  to  the  south  bank 
of  the  river,  and,  under  cover  of  a  rapid  artillery  fire,  a  few 
boats  were  run  down  to  the  water.  Some  trooi)s  were  fer- 
ried over  in  these,  and  so  long  as  they  remained  under  i)ro- 
tectiou  of  the  river  bank,  they  could  not  be  reached  by  our 
fire.  As  soon,  however,  as  they  ajipeared  above  its  edge, 
and  attempted  to  advance  against  the  fringe  of  woods  held 
by  the  Twelfth  and  Sixteenth  Kentucky  (part  of  Eeilly's 
brigade)  they  were  met  by  the  most  determined  resistance. 
The  Sixty-third  Indiana  and  One  Hundred  and  Twelfth  Illi- 
nois, of  Henderson's  brigade  (temporarily  commanded  by 
Colonel  Stiles),  w^ero  sent  forward  to  support  the  right  of 


MiniJLlO  TENNK8.SKI':.  7J) 

Iloilly's  men,  iiuil  the  onemy  was  driven  from  tho  ojum 
j^Tcmud  to  tho  cover  of  tho  river  bank  aj^uin,  and  made  no 
further  ett'ort  to  croHS  tho  river  dnrinj,'  tho  (iveuing. 

Soon  after  nij^htfall  the  line  of  pickets  near  tho  river  was 
stronfjjthened,  the  two  Kcnitncky  regiments,  nndcu-  <'onnnand 
of  Colonel  White,  were  left  as  their  sui)i)ort,  tho  Division 
Inspector-General,  Major  Dow,  being  with  them,  and  having 
(H'ders  to  bring  them  otF  at  midnight.  Tho  division  then 
marched  to  Spring  Hill,  where  it  was  directed  by  General 
Schotield  to  take  tho  advance  and  proceed  at  once  to  Frank- 
lin, twelve  miles  fnrtluu-.  The  other  divisions  followed  in 
the  appointed  manner  and  without  serious  interrnjjtion. 
The  pickets  at  the  river  were  withdrawn,  as  directed,  and 
overtook  the  rear  of  Wood's  division  a  littlo  beyond  Hjjring 
Hill,  and,  under  orders  from  that  oflicor,  protected  tho  ilank 
of  the  trains  from  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy  on  tho  remainder 
of  the  march  to  Franklin. 

Wagner's  division  was  kept  in  position  at  Spring  Hill  till 
the  tmins  and  all  the  other  troops  were  in  movement,  and 
Opdycke's  brigade,  which  was  the  rear  guard  of  the  whole, 
did  not  march  until  six  o'clock  in  tho  morning.  About  mid- 
night Hood  was  informed  that  trooj^s  were  passing  on  the 
Columbia  road,  and  sent  Johnson's  division  of  Lee's  corps  to 
extend  Bate's  line  and  stoj)  the  movement;  but  the  night 
was  dark  and  the  country  unfamiliar,  and  nothing  came  of 
it  but  a  slight  occasional  skirmish,  while  our  columns 
marched  by  in  full  view  of  the  enemy's  camp-fires,  which 
were  burning  less  than  half  a  mile  away. 

Here,  as  at  Atlanta,  Hood  sought  to  shift  the  responsibil- 
ity for  his  failure  upon  a  subordinate,  and  Cheatham  was  now 
selected  to  bear  the  burden.  Hood  charged  him  with  tardi- 
ness and  weakness  in  the  attack  upon  Stanley,  and  asked 
to  have  him  relieved  from  his  command.     This  request  was 


80  I  RANKLIX  AND  NASHVILLIi 

withdrawn  after  the  battlo  of  Franklin,  though  without  re- 
tracting the  chai'ge.  But  a  commander  who  is  personally 
with  the  head  of  column  in  such  a  n\ovement  and  upon  tho 
field,  has  the  means  of  enforcing  lus  orders  by  direct  com- 
mands to  tho  divisions.  Had  his  own  confidence  not  wav- 
ered, and  had  he  not  begun  to  yield  to  the  belief  tluit  much 
more  than  one  division  was  before  him,  his  own  energy 
would  have  carried  his  subordinates  with  him,  and  would 
have  made  the  assault  as  desi)erate,  if  need  be,  as  it  was 
next  day.  But  he  seems  to  have  lacked  the  gi-asp  of  mind 
which  enables  a  general  to  judge  and  to  act  with  vigor  in 
the  pre^f^nce  of  circumstances  which  tlu'ow  doubt  upon  his 
plan,  ,4.  he  proved  inferior  to  his  opponent  in  a  strategic 
contest,  which  has  been  generally  regarded  as  one  of  the 
most  ciitical  and  instructive  conjunctures  of  the  war.  The 
circumstances,  as  narrated  by  the  leading  Confederate  of- 
ficers who  were  present,  show  that  Hood  had  an  access  of 
hesitation  at  the  very  moment  when  the  success  of  his  move- 
ment demanded  that  all  doubts  should  bo  thrown  to  the 
winds  and  everything  risked  upon  a  desperate  stroke.' 

'  A  popcr  read  in  ■December,  1881,  bi-fore  a  society  of  8f)Uthern  officers  at  L<»ai«- 
vjlle,  Ky.,  by  (ieneral  Clieatliam,  coutoius  u  very  full  array  of  the  evidence  which 
BOKtuius  the  above  view. 


CHAPTEK  V. 

BATTLE  OP  FRANKLIN. 

The  march  of  the  National  army  from  Spring  Hill  to 
Franklin  was  not  seriously  internipted.  Forrest's  troopers 
made  an  occasional  dash  at  the  long  wagon  train,  but  only 
in  one  or  two  instances  did  they  succeed  in  reaching  it,  and 
very  few  wagons  were  lost.  After  seeing  his  columns  fairly 
started,  Schofield  rode  forward  and  ovei-took  General  Cox 
with  the  advanced  division  just  before  the  village  of  Frank- 
lin was  reached.  He  had,  about  noon,  urgently  renewed  his 
request  to  Thomas  to  send  a  pontoon  bridge  to  the  crossing 
of  the  Harpeth  liive- ,  but  having  received  no  answer,  he 
spurred  forward  with  his  staff  to  see  if  it  had  arrived.  It 
was  not  yet  daybreak,  and  the  division  was  ordered  to  mass 
by  the  roadside  to  allow  the  trains  to  pass  into  the  town. 
The  division  commander  and  his  staff  had  halted  at  the 
house  of  a  Mr.  Carter,  at  the  edge  of  the  village  (a  house 
soon  to  become  the  key-point  of  a  fierce  battle)  and  were 
trying  to  catch  a  few  minutes'  sleep  upon  the  floor,  when 
General  Schofield  returned,  much  disturbed  at  finding  that 
no  pontoons  had  come.'     He  ordered  General  Cox  to  as- 

*  In  the  correHpondcnce  on  file  in  the  War  Heoords  office,  no  response  to  the 
second  re-quest  for  pontoons  if>  fount',  and  General  Schofield  informs  the  author 
that  he  received  none.  The  same  files  do  not  contain  any  explanation  of  the  de- 
struction of  the  boats  at  Columbia,  and  it  would  therefore  Rcein  that  General 
Thomas  must  have  continued  to  assume  that  they  were  available,  notwithstandini; 
the  strong  imi)licati((ti  of  Schofleld'a  despatches.    See  Apiiendix  D. 

4* 


82  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

sume  command  of  l)oth  divisions  of  the  Twenty-third  Coi-ps, 
and,  as  soon  as  day  should  dawn,  intrench  them  upon  the 
best  line  which  could  be  made  right  and  left  of  the  knoll  on 
which  the  Carter  house  stood,  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the 
trains  and  the  rest  of  the  army.  He  himself,  with  Major 
Twining,  his  Chief  Engineer,  began  immediately  to  plan 
such  improvements  of  the  river  crossings  as  should  enable 
him  to  get  the  trains  and  the  artillery  upon  the  north  side 
of  the  Harpeth  at  the  earliest  possible  hour. 

The  village  of  Franklin  is  upon  the  south  side  of  the  river, 
which  partly  encloses  it  in  a  deep  curve  to  the  northeast. 
The  northern  bank  is  hero  considerably  higher  than  the 
other,  and,  upon  a  hill  commanding  the  railway  and  wagon- 
road  bridges,  an  earthwork  called  Fort  Granger  had  been 
built  more  than  a  year  before.  The  railway  approaches  the 
town  from  the  south,  parallel  to  the  Columbia  turnpike,  and 
about  five  hundred  yards  east  of  it.  For  a  thousand  yards 
it  runs  close  to  the  bank  of  the  river  and  on  the  eastern 
edge  of  the  village,  then  crosses  without  change  of  direction, 
for  the  liver  here  makes  a  turn  to  the  west,  nearly  at  right 
angles  to  its  former  course.  Through  a  part  of  the  distance 
last  traversed  the  railway  is  in  a  considerable  cut,  and  this 
as  well  as  the  bridges  and  the  reach  of  the  river,  is  com- 
pletely under  the  tiro  of  the  fort.  The  Carter's  Creek  turn- 
pike runs  southwest  from  the  centre  of  the  town. 

The  line  selected  for  defence  was  a  curve  which  would  be 
very  nearly  that  struck  with  a  radius  of  a  thousand  yards 
from  the  junction  of  the  two  turnpikes  in  the  village.  Its 
centre  was  a  few  rods  in  front  of  the  Carter  house  on  the 
Columbia  road,  and  was  upon  a  gentle  rise  of  ground.  Its 
left  was  at  the  railway  cut  close  to  the  river,  where  was  an- 
other knoll.  Upon  this  line  the  Carter's  Creek  turnpike  is 
about  the  same  distance  from  the  Columbia  turnpike  as  the 


IJATTLK  OF   FRANKLIN. 


83 


railway,  and  this  constituted  the  proper  front  facing  Coluni- 
Ina  and  Spring  Hill,  whence  Hood  was  advancing.  The 
third  division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  (Cieneral  lieilly  in 


-^     _  untw  __™  "  ^^      ^^^      ^a"  ^^  ^^  ^^    ^^  ^^  at'ft 


Battle-Field  of  Frunklin. 


Hi  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

temporary  command)  was  i)laced  on  the  left,  Reilly's  own 
brif^ado  resting  its  flank  on  the  i)iko,  with  Casement's  and 
Henderson's  brigades  (Colonel  Stiles  in  temporary  com- 
mand of  tlio  latter)  continuing  the  line  to  the  railway  and 
river.  The  front  of  Reilly's  own  brigade  was  shorter  than 
the  others,  for  the  two  regiments  which  were  left  behind 
as  i)ickets  at  Duck  River  belonged  to  it,  and  these  did  not 
arrive  till  the  line  was  occupied.  They  were  then  placed 
in  second  line,  supporting  the  first  and  less  than  a  hundred 
yards  in  rear  of  it.  Ruger's  division  was  between  the  Col- 
umbia and  Carter's  Creek  turnpikes,  Strickland's  brigade  on 
the  left,  and  Moore's  on  the  right.  Along  the  whole  front 
the  ground  sloped  very  gently  from  the  line,  and  was  only 
obstructed  by  a  small  grove  of  locust  trees  a  short  distance 
in  front  of  Ruger,  and  by  farm  buildings,  with  orchards  here 
and  there  in  the  distance.  A  range  of  high  hills  bounded 
this  plain  on  the  south,  through  a  gap  in  which  the  Columbia 
road  runs.  The  Twenty-third  Corps  immediately  began  the 
building  of  breastworks,  and  by  noon  a  strong  intrenchment 
had  been  completed,  the  lack  of  timber  for  revetment  being 
the  only  thing  which  jirevented  it  from  being  equal  to  those 
usually  made  during  the  campaign.  An  old  cotton  gin  in 
Reilly's  line  furnished  timber  for  head  logs,  and  upon  the 
knoll  near  the  railway,  at  the  Carter  house,  and  in  one  or 
two  other  places,  where  the  slope  was  sufficient,  strong 
epaulements  for  artillery  Avero  constructed  inside  of  and 
somewhat  higher  than  the  infantry  parrpet.  At  the  Colum- 
bia turnjiike  the  full  width  of  the  road  was  left  open,  for  it 
was  all  needed  to  enable  the  doubled  lines  of  wagons  and 
artillery  to  pass,  and  a  retrenchment  crossing  the  road  a  few 
rods  in  rear  was  built  to  command  the  opening  and  its  ap- 
proach. 

At  the  river  it  had  been  found  that  by  scarping  the  banks, 


BATTLE  OP  FRANKLIN.  85 

the  ford,  though  a  very  bad  one,  could  be  used  to  some  ex- 
tent. Some  wooden  buildings  were  dismantled  to  furnish 
planking  for  the  railway  bridge,  and  a  wagon  approach  to 
this  was  made.  The  lower  part  of  the  posts  of  the  county 
bridge  were  found  to  be  good,  and  these  were  sawn  off 
nearly  level  with  the  water,  crossbeams  and  planking  were 
laid  upon  them,  and  by  noon  the  army  was  j^rovided  with 
two  passable  bridges.  The  artillery  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  passed  over  first  of  all  at  the  ford,  to  gain  time,  and 
part  of  it  was  placed  on  the  fort  on  the  north  bank.  General 
Stanley  being  directed  to  send  several  batteries  of  the 
Fourth  Corps  to  report  to  the  commandant  upon  the  lino 
when  they  should  arrive.  The  trench  on  the  left,  in  front  of 
Stiles,  was  placed  close  behind  a  thick-set  hedge  of  osago 
orange,  which  was  thinned  out  so  as  to  make  an  impassable 
thorny  palisade,  and  the  material  was  used  to  make  a  slight 
obstruction  in  front  of  Keilly's  brigades.  In  front  of  Ruger 
the  locust  grove  was  cut  down  for  the  same  use,  though  the 
trees  were  much  too  small  for  the  purpose.  At  General 
Cox's  request  for  troops  to  cover  the  right  flank,  since  his 
force  was  not  sufficient  to  reacli  the  river  on  that  side,  Kim- 
ball's division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  was  ordered  to  report  to 
him  as  it  came  in,  and  was  placed  there,' 

Wood's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corj^s  arrived  and  crossed 
to  the  north  bank,  Kimball  had  taken  his  place  in  the  line, 
Wilson's  cavalry  was  ujion  Wood's  left,  opjiosing  the  eflbrts 
of  FoiTest  to  cross  the  river  in  that  direction,  the  town  was 
full  of  wagons  waiting  their  turn  at  the  bridges,  and  some 
of  them  struggling  through  the  ford.  The  wearied  troops, 
which  had  fought  and  marched  since  daybreak  of  the 
preceding   day,  dropped  to  sleep  as  soon  as  their  breast- 

'  See  Appendix  D. 


86  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

works  were  l)uilt,  and  caught  such  rest  as  tlioy  could  pre- 
paratory to  a  more  temble  struggle  and  another  night  of 
marching. 

On  the  Confederate  side,  Lee  had  sent  forward  the  artil- 
lery from  Columbia,  as  soon  as  it  could  be  crossed  over 
Duck  liiver  in  the  morning,  and  with  it  went  ammunition 
for  Forrest's  men,  who  were  getting  short  of  it.  The  march 
in  pursuit  does  not  seem  to  have  been  hurried,  and  the  sin- 
gle brigade,  which  was  rear-guard,  had  no  difliculty  in  hold- 
ing back  the  enemy.  A  more  annoying  task  was  to  drive 
forward  the  stragglers.  A  number  of  new  regiments  had 
joined  the  army  at  Columbia,  and  in  these  were  many  inex- 
l)erienced  recruits,  who  were  not  hardened  to  their  work, 
and  who  had  overloaded  their  knapsacks.  It  required  the 
utmost  exertion  to  prevent  these  men  from  falling  into  the 
enemy's  hands,  footsore  and  dispirited  from  fatigue  as  they 
were.  To  keep  them  up,  Colonel  Opdycke  was  obliged  to 
order  their  knapsack  straps  to  bo  cut,  and  to  detail  a  pro- 
vost guard  to  hurry  them  on. 

About  noon  the  rear-guard  reached  the  hills  at  the  border 
of  the  Haii)eth  Valley,  from  which  the  heavy  columns  of 
Hood's  army  could  now  be  seen  advancing  rajjidly.  Op- 
dycke checked  them  for  a  time  by  opening  upon  them  with 
artillery,  but  was  then  withdrawn  and  brought  within  the 
lines,  where  he  was  placed  in  reserve  upon  the  west  of  the 
Columbia  road,  two  or  three  hundred  yards  from  the  Carter 
house.  Wagner  placed  the  rest  of  his  division  (Lane's  and 
Conrad's  brigades)  astride  the  Columbia  turnpike,  about  half 
a  mile  in  front  of  the  principal  line.  The  commandant 
upon  the  line  was  notified  by  General  Schofield  that  "Wag- 
ner's orders  directed  him  to  remain  in  observation  only  till 
Hood  should  show  a  disposition  to  advance  in  force,  and 
then  to  retire  within  the  lines  to  Opdycke's  position  and  act 


BATTLE  OP  FRANKLIN.  87 

as  a  general  reserve.  Wagner,  on  being  shown  the  note 
conveying  this  notice,  said  that  such  were  his  orders. 

By  three  o'clock  the  trains  were  nearly  all  over  the  river, 
and  Schofield  had  issued  orders  that  the  troops  should  also 
pass  over  at  six  o'clock  if  the  enemy  should  not  attack  be- 
fore sunset.  But  the  period  of  depression  and  recrimina- 
tion in  Hood's  army  in  the  morning  seems  to  have  been  fol- 
lowed by  fierce  excitement.  Cleburne  talked  with  Brown, 
as  they  rode  along,  complaining  bitterly  that  Hood  had  cen- 
sured him,  and  telling  of  his  dotoruiination  to  demand  an 
investigation.'  Evidently  all  were  keyed  to  a  high  moral 
tension,  and  were  determined  that  at  the  next  opportunity, 
their  commander  should  not  have  it  to  say  that  his  plans 
had  failed  from  any  lack  of  energy  or  courage  on  their  part. 
Hood,  himself,  had  resolved  upon  a  desperate  effort  to 
destroy  Schofield's  army  before  any  further  concentration  of 
Thomas's  forces  could  be  made. 

About  three  o'clock  word  was  sent  from  Wagner's  brigades 
in  front  that  the  enemy  was  forming  at  the  foot  of  the  hills 
in  heavy  force,  and  reiterating  to  General  Wagner  the  direc- 
tions already  given  him,  the  commandant  upon  the  line 
went  to  the  knoll  in  Stiles's  brigade,  which  afforded  a 
better  view  of  the  whole  field.  General  Schofield  had 
moved  his  headquarters  to  the  north  side  of  the  river,  and 
was  personally  at  the  fort  on  the  hill,  which  not  only  com- 
manded a  view  of  the  field,  but  was  nearest  the  bridges  by 
which  communication  was  kept  up,  and  where  alone  he 
could  see  the  cavalry  demonstrations  on  the  left  where  For- 
rest and  Wilson  were  already  engaged.  The  v-illage  itself  is 
on  a  plateau  lower  than  the  line  intrenched,  and  from  it 


•  statement  of  General  Brown  in  General  Cheatham's  paper  before  referrcfl  to. 
Hood,  however,  in  his  Advance  and  Iletreat,  p.  294,  tpeaks  of  a  cordial  under- 
standing with  Cleburne  before  he  entered  the  battle. 


83  KIIANKLIN   AND   NASIIVII  LE. 

nothing  whatever  conhl  be  seen.  General  Stanley,  who  had 
been  ill  dnring  the  morning,  had  also  his  quartera  on  the 
north  of  the  Harpeth,  with  Wood's  division. 

A  depression  in  front  of  Wagner's  brigades  and  some  scat- 
tered trees  shut  out  Hood's  lines  from  view  at  the  Carter  house, 
but  from  Btiles's  position  they  wore  plainly  seen,  formed  ap- 
parently in  double  and  triple  lines  of  brigades,  with  artillery 
in  the  intervals  between  the  columns.  Hood  had  i)laced 
Cheatham's  corps  ujjon  the  Columbia  turnpike  with  Cle- 
burne's division  on  the  east  of  the  road,  Brown's  on  the 
west  of  it,  and  Bate's  in  C;chelon  on  Brown's  flank.  Stewart's 
corps  was  on  the  right  (east)  of  Cheatham,  the  order  of  his 
divisions  from  Cleburne's  flank  being  French,  Walthall,  and 
Loring.  Johnson's  division  was  the  only  one  of  S.  D.  Lee's 
corps  which  had  yet  come  up,  and  it  was  kept  in  reserve. 

Very  few  battlefields  of  the  war  were  so  free  from  obstruc- 
tion to  the  view.  Here,  along  a  mile  and  a  half  of  front,  the 
imposing  array  of  the  Confederate  army  could  be  seen  ad- 
vancing at  quick  step  with  trailed  arms,  the  artillery  in  the 
intervals  galloping  forward,  unlimbering  and  firing  as  soon 
as  they  were  within  range.'  A  section  of  artilleiy  with  Wag- 
ner's brigades  first  opened  on  the  advancing  enemy,  but  as 
they  approached  it  limbered  up  and  deliberately  trotted 
within  the  principal  line,  in  accordance  with  orders  sent  it 
by  the  Chief  of  Artillery.  It  was  now  four  o'clock,  and  to 
the  amazement  of  the  thousands  who  were  watching  them, 
Wagner's  infantry  opened  fire.  There  was  a  rattling  fusillade 
for  a  few  moments,  Cleburne  and  Brown  were  checked  for 
an  instant,  but  the  Confederate  forces  passed  the  flanks  of 
Lane  and  Conrad,  to  right  and  left,  a  rush  and  a  yell  fol- 


'  HockI  pays  he  did  not  use  artillery.  That  he  is  in  error  of  recollection  is 
alniiidaiitly  shown  by  rept)rts  and  jirintcd  statements  on  both  sides.  The  writer 
speaks  from  his  personal  observation. 


BATTLE  OF  FUANKLIN.  89 

lowed,  and  the  two  hapless  bripvdes  crtiiio  stroaming  to  the 
rear  iu  a  disorf^auizod  crowd,  ninuiuf?  rapidly  to  reach  the 
parajjets  btdiiud  them.  Orders  were  (piickly  sent  down  the 
line  to  withhold  the  fire  at  the  centre  till  our  own  men 
should  be  iu,  but  to  make  the  utmost  use  of  the  artillei-y 
and  small  arms  on  the  flanks.  Opdycke  was  warned  to  bo 
ready  for  a  rush  to  the  centre  if  the  line  sliould  f?ive  way 
there,  and  the  second  lino  along  the  whole  front  was  simi- 
larly prepared.  A  few  moments  later,  the  head  of  the  flying 
mass  was  seen  swarming  over  the  works  at  the  tiirnpike,  and 
orders  were  sent  for  all  reserves  to  charge.  Tin?  men  in  the 
trenches,  confused  by  the  crowd  tram})ling  over  them,  and 
hearing  Wagner's  oflicers  calling  upon  their  men  to  rally  at 
the  rear,  were  carried  away  by  the  surging  mass,  and  for  the 
length  of  a  regiment  on  the  left,  and  more  than  that  on  the 
right,  they  fell  away  from  the  works.  Neither  Colonel 
White,  commanding  Reilly's  second  line,  nor  Colonel  Op- 
dycke  waited  for  the  word  to  charge,  but  were  in  motion 
before  the  order  could  reach  them.  White  was  nearest  the 
parapet  and  reached  it  soonest,  but  his  line  did  not  reach 
quite  to  the  turnpike.  The  Carter  house  and  out-buildings 
on  the  right  of  the  road  obstnicted  the  movement  to  tho 
front,  and  Opdycke  made  part  of  his  brigade  oblique  to  tho 
left  till  clear  of  the  obstacles,  and  they  then  charged  head- 
long upon  the  enemy.  Part  also  went  forward  on  the  west 
of  the  houses,  and  Strickland's  brigade  rallying  with  them, 
the  Confederates  were  driven  back  here  also  ;  but  that  the 
gap  was  open  longer  here  than  on  the  left,  was  proven  by 
the  enemy's  dead  who  were  found  fifty  yards  within  the 
lines. 

Stanley,  forgetting  his  illness,  had  mounted  his  horse  at 
the  first  sound  of  the  cannonade,  and  the  commandants  of 
the  two  corps  met  on  the  turnpike  just  as  Oi)dycke  and  his 


90  KIIANKLIN    ANI>   NASHVILLR 

men  \V(!ro  rushinp  to  the  front.  Four  guns,  w  Inch  had  boon 
l)lut'0(l  u  few  yards  to  tlio  left  of  tlio  road,  were  in  the  enemy'H 
hands,  and  were  loaded  with  canister.  Those  were  turned 
upon  the  flank  of  licilly's  line,  but  the  frightened  horses  had 
run  off  with  the  ammunition  chests  which  contained  the 
primers,  and  while  the  captors  were  unsuceessfuLy  trying 
to  tire  the  piec(;s,  the  reserve  was  ujwn  them.  Four  other 
gims  on  the  right  of  the  road  were  also  in  the  enemy's 
hands.  There  was  a  few  minutes'  fierce  mOlCe,  but  the  guns 
were  retaken  and  all  of  the  men  in  gray  who  were  inside  the 
parapet  were  dead  or  prisoners.  Yet  the  successive  lines  of 
assailants  charging  the  works  allowed  no  resi)ite.  Colonel 
White  received  a  severe  wound  in  the  face,  but  refused  to 
leave  the  line  till  after  nightfall,  and  Opdycke  had  joiiied 
personally  in  the  thickest  of  the  deadly  tussle  on  the  turn- 
pike. Our  men,  who  had  been  driven  back  from  the  line, 
rallied  by  officers  of  all  grades,  returned  to  their  posts,  min- 
gling with  those  who  were  there,  making  a  wall  three  or  four 
deep,  those  in  rear  loading  the  muskets  for  those  who  were 
firing.  While  rallying  those  men  Stanley  was  wounded, 
his  horse  was  shot  under  him,  and  he  was  reluctantly  per- 
suaded to  return  to  his  quarters  for  surgical  help. 

Farther  to  tlie  right,  and  in  part  of  what  had  been  Strick- 
land's brigade  line,  the  Confederates  of  Brown's  division 
held  the  outside  of  our  jiarapet,  so  that  when  their  com- 
rades were  driven  back  they  were  able  to  prevent  our  men 
from  reaching  it  again.  These,  seizing  upon  fences  and 
such  material  as  came  to  hand,  made  a  new  barricade  within 
about  twenty-five  yards  of  the  first,  and  across  the  narrow 
interval  the  battle  raged  with  most  persistent  fierceness.  It 
was  hard  to  tell  where  either  brigade  line  ended,  for  Op- 
dycke's  men  mingled  with  Reilly's  on  the  one  side,  and  with 
Strickland's  on  the  other,  and  the  three  crowded  the  space 


BATTLE  OF  FUANKLIN.  91 

where  two  had  been.  OfHeerH  and  nion  had  be<>n  coiiHcious 
that  with  the  centre  broken,  n<tthinf<  l>ut  sui)erhiiman  exer- 
tions couhl  keep  one  winpf,  at  least,  of  the  litthi  army  from 
being  driven  into  the  river.  They  were  equal  to  the  occa- 
sion and  thev  Haved  the  dav. 

But  though  the  crisis  of  the  engagement  was  at  the 
centre,  the  tight  was  by  no  means  all  there.  In  other  parts 
the  veterans  of  the  Atlanta  campaign  held  their  lines  with- 
out flinching,  though  the  assaults  of  Stewart's  divisions 
rivalled  those  of  Cheatham  in  their  gallantry,  and  they 
made  the  most  dai'ing  efforts  to  reach  the  bridges  which 
were  on  that  flank.  Loring's  men  came  upon  the  hedge  in 
front  of  Stiles,  and  attempted  in  vain  to  tear  it  away,  or  to 
pass  it.  Henderson,  who  had  been  for  some  days  ill,  re- 
joined his  brigade,  and  both  he  and  Stiles  directed  the  fir- 
ing, which,  sweeping  along  the  gi'ound,  mowed  down  all 
before  it.  The  Confederate  officers  urged  their  men  to  the 
right,  hoping  to  pass  through  the  railway  cut,  but  here  they 
were  met  by  the  shrapnel  and  canister  of  the  guns  in  the  fort 
north  of  the  river.  The  batteries  in  Stiles's  line  were  also 
admirably  handled,  and  the  attack  here  had  never  a  chance. 

On  Casement's  line,  Walthall's  and  part  of  Loring's  divi- 
sions made  the  assault,  and  as  there  was  here  no  obstruc- 
tion in  front  of  the  trench  worth  naming,  the  possibility  of 
carrying  such  a  line  when  projjcrly  held  was  fully  tested. 
General  John  Adams  led  his  brigade,  riding  straight  at  the 
ditch,  leaping  it,  and  mounting  the  parapet,  where  his  horse 
was  killed  astride  of  it,  and  he  himself  pitched  hef\dlong 
among  Casement's  men,  mortally  wounded.  Scc<tt,  com- 
manding another  of  Loring's  brigades,  was  wounded.  In 
Walthall's  division  not  only  had  Quarles  fallen  in  leading 
his  brigade  to  the  assault,  but  the  loss  of  officers  was  so 
great  that,  at  the  close  of  the  battle,  a  captain  was  the  rank- 


92  I'ltANKIilN    AM)   NASIIVII.LK 

mg  oflii'or  in  tliat  brigado.'  Tt  was  only  wlu^n  tho  last  of 
Stowai't's  ros(!rv<'s  had  triod  all  that  (rouniK'^  ''■'id  dash  coiih? 
af<'om}>liHh,  that  they  rcdaxod  th<ur  (iH'orts.  Homo  a.skcd 
for  (juartor  in  tho  dit(^h,  aud  <'aint!  in  a.s  ))riHonom;  Honu;  lay 
down  in  front  of  llio  IkmI^^c,  and  wait(!d  for  darknoss  to 
enable!  thoni  to  crawl  away  TindiHi*ov(!r(ul.  Tho  roniaindea* 
foil  back  to  a  position  uoar  tho  oxt«;nHiou  of  tho  lino  Wag- 
ner's brigades  had  oc(!npiod. 

(!lobnrn(i  had  led  his  division  forwaid,  on  tho  oast  of  <ho 
central  tnrnpik(!,  with  a  desperation  that  was  born  nf  tlu? 
Mounded  feelinj^s  h<i  had  shown  in  tlu;  morning?,  and  h(!  fell 
among  tho  first  who  wore  at  tho  dit(di  wlum  tho  rush  of  our 
roservoH  roston'd  tho  lino  between  tho  cotton-gin  and  t\w 
road.  His  three;  su(;(u  ssivo  linos  jmjssed  forward  to  av(ingo 
his  death,  but  only  to  leave  a  thousand  gallant  ofIie<!rs  and 
inon  besid('  him.  On  the  otlu'r  Hank  Bate;  had  moved  for- 
ward his  division  at  tho  same  time  with  lirown,  d<^))loying  an 
ho  W(!nt.  His  left  reached  beyond  th(!  Cartcsr's  Crcu^k  road 
as  he  neanul  tlu;  intrenehments,  but  tlui  shape  of  our  lines, 
which  th(!ro  bent  \nu-,k  to  tho  rivesr,  mad((  him  trav(d  on  a 
large  curve,  and  his  assault  was  consid((ral)ly  later  than 
Brown's.  It  struck  th(5  right  of  Kug(U*'s  division,  and  tho 
left  of  Kimball's,  but  finding  tho  works  before  lam  stoutly 
lield,  and  tliat  tho  (cavalry  whicdi  ho  oxjjecited  to  advan(!o 
upon  his  flank  we^ro  not  doing  so,  his  attack  was  not  pressed 
as  detormin<!dly  as  that  of  Brown.  Tho  success  which  this 
division  Koomod  to  have  at  the  first,  and  tho  fact  that  for 
some  distance  they  continued  to  hold  tin;  outside  of  the 
works,  encouraged  thoni  to  tho  most  desperate  and  persis- 
tent (^fi'orts  there.  Goneml  Stmhl  was  with  his  brigade  in 
tho  ditch,  jx^rsonally  directing  the  fire  of  his  men  who  got 

'  WalthuU's  ofllclal  ruport. 


HATTLI-:  OK    KUAN  KLIN.  93 

a  foothold  in  tho  outHido  of  tlio  wlopo,  and  nmkinj^  tlioHd  in 
rear  supply  tln(  front  riink  with  loud<'(l  {<un.s.  Ah  darkness 
(■anu!  on,  and  it  came  (iui(;kly  on  that  short  winter  day,  tho 
two  breastworks,  so  little;  apart,  were  lines  of  continuous 
ilanjo,  as  tlu?  liien  tired  at  tlie  Hash  of  each  other's  f.(niis. 
On  other  parts  of  the  tifdd,  then?  were,  after  dark,  fre(|U(>nt 
volli(fs,  as  th(!  (Jonfederate  ^((MKirals  strove  to  assist  tho 
central  attack  })y  stronj^  dtunonstrations  ;  but  heni  the  roar 
was  for  a  lon^  time  incessant  and  dc^afenin^.  Otliers  suf^- 
^esti^d  to  Htrahl  to  withdraw,  or  to  surrenchsr,  but  h(!st<»adily 
repeat(;d  tho  connnatid,  "  k(!(!p  thin^"  till  lio  was  hiniscdf 
struck  down.  He;  calhid  for  Coh)n('l  Stallbrd,  to  turn  over 
the  conunand,  and  they  tiicnl  to  carry  him  to  the  nsar,  but 
on  tho  way  a  seuiond  and  a  third  ball  Htnurk  him,  killinf>; 
him  instantly.'  Colonel  Stallbrd  continucid  tlu;  contest  with 
the  same  dettM'niination.  Mcjssen^^ers  were  seait  to  (ien(!ral 
IJrown  to  tcdl  him  of  Strahl's  deatli  and  ask  for  orders,  but 
th(!y  found  that  he  was  already  disabhid  l)y  a  wound,  and 
the  stair  sujjpostid  Strahl  to  bi;  in  command  of  tlu;  division. 
Ch(uitham  had  stMit  in  all  of  lirown's  l>rit^ades,  but  Gt^idon 
had  l)e(;n  cai)turi!d  in  thci  first  melf-e,  (Jist,  as  well  as  Stnihl, 
was  dead,  and  Cart(U'  was  wounded.  Hood  was  called  ui)on 
for  assistance,  and  he  scuit  forward  Johnson's  division  (jf 
Lee's  corps,  but  this,  too,  was  driv(>n  back  l)y  tliat  terrible 
lire,  h^avinf,'  (ireneral  INIanif^ault  woundetl  on  th;!  licdd. 

On  the  National  side  the  One  llundrcid  and  Twelfth  Illi- 
nois was  brought  over  from  SLiki.s's  l)ri<,'a(l(',  and  i)ut  in  to 
assist  Strickland.  An  elFort  was  made  to  get  this  regiment 
forward  over  the  little  interval  between  the  two  bn^ast- 
works,  but  it  was  not  successful.     The  obliiiuo  fire  from  cur 

>  The  dotiillH  of  tho  Rituatinn  on  tho  Oonfeilorat*?  Kiilr- nt  this  point  un^  chiefly 
(Iriiwii  from  a  iwiniphUit  l)y  S.  A.  Ouiiiiiiitfliuiii,  Scri^nunt  Major,  uiiliUtMl  Ituinl- 
iiiHCfiiwH  of  thr  I'ortylirnt  IViiuchhoc  lU'giuiciit, 


94  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

troops,  on  right  and  left,  whon  thoy  were  not  hotly  engaged 
in  front,  was  turned  upon  Cheatham's  men,  but  it  was  nine 
o'clock  before  they  gave  up  the  contest,  and  those  that  were 
left  were  reformed  on  the  line  occupied  by  Stewart  and 
Lee,  though  for  more  than  an  hour  occasional  volleys  were 
exchanged.  At  eleven  o'clock,  the  whole  front  being  quiet, 
F  ^hofleld  ordered  the  withdrawal  of  our  troops  to  the  north 
side  of  the  river,  but  an  accidental  fire  broke  out  in  the  vil- 
lage, making  a  bright  background  on  which  our  lines 
could  be  too  plainly  seen  by  the  enemy,  and  it  was  neces- 
sary to  wait  an  liour  till  the  fire  was  extinguished.  Kim- 
ball's division  then  marc^hcd  by  the  rear  to  the  wagon 
bridge,  liuger's  passed  behind  the  lines  to  the  railroad 
})ridge,  Opdycke's  brigade  was  sent  to  follow  Kimball,  and 
Reilly's  division  crossed  behind  Euger,  a  lino  of  sku-mishers, 
under  command  of  Major  Dow,  Inspector  General,  remain- 
ing in  the  trenches  till  all  the  rest  were  over  and  the  plank 
taken  from  the  wagon  bridge,  when  these  also  crossed  at 
the  railwav.  The  dead  could  not  be  removed,  but  the  well 
disciplined  ambulance  corps,  under  Surgeon  Frink,  had 
taken  off  all  the  wounded  who  could  endure  transportation, 
except  some  who  had  crawled  away  into  buildings  and  sheds 
and  were  not  found  in  the  darkness.  Reilly'tj  division  car- 
ried off  as  trophies  twenty-two  battle  flags  of  the  enemy, 
and  Opdycke's  brigade  ten.' 

The  battle  had  been  j^eculiar,  partly  by  reason  of  the  late 
hour  in  the  day  at  which  it  began,  which  prolonged  the 
hard  fighting  far  into  the  night,  and  partly  from  the  char- 
acter of  the  weather.  A  day  or  two  of  sunshine  had  fol- 
lowed  the   continuous  storms  of  the  j^receding  fortnight, 

I  Hood  says  that  thii-tccn  was  the  number  of  Hags  he  lost,  tout  the  number 
stati'M.l  above  was  ofllcially  reported  by  our  division  and  brigade  cotumauderti  aitd 
\  ei'ifiud  at  the  time. 


BATTLE   OF  FRANKLIN.  96 

and  the  air  had  been  still  and  hazy.  The  smoke  of  the 
battle  did  not  rise  or  drift  awav,  but  settled  on  the  field  in 
a  thick  cloud,  obscuring  the  vision  far  more  than  common. 
It  was  said  that  this  had  led  to  the  mistake,  on  Hood's 
l)art,  of  supposing  that  his  lirst  advantage  at  the  centre  was 
much  greater  than  in  fact  it  was,  and  resulted  in  greater  de- 
stJTiction  to  the  Confederate  trooi:)s,  by  repeated  assaults 
after  all  real  chance  of  success  was  gone. 

The  Confederate  accounts  of  the  condition  of  the  field  next 
morning  are  full  of  tragic  interest.  Before  daybreak  it  was 
learned  that  the  National  lines  were  empty,  and  the  plain  was 
covered  with  torchbearers  seeking  their  comrades  and  friends. 
Colonel  Stafford  was  found  in  the  ditch  General  Strahl  and 
he  had  so  stubbornly  held.  The  dead  lay  literally  in  a  pile 
about  him.  They  had  fallen  about  his  logs  and  behind  him, 
till  when  he  at  last  received  a  fatal  shot,  he  did  not  wholly 
fall,  but  was  found  stiifencd  in  death  and  partly  tipright, 
seeming  still  to  command  the  ghustly  line  of  his  comrades 
lying  beneath  the  parapet.  The  color-bearer  of  the  Forty- 
first  Tennessee  had  fallen  between  the  two  lines  of  breast- 
works, but  neither  friend  nor  foe  had  been  able  to  reach  the 
flag  till  it  was  hidden  by  the  night,  and  in  the  morning  it 
was  found  where  it  dropped.' 

But  even  civil  war  rarely  furnishes  so  sad  a  stoiy  as  that 
which  the  Carter  family  have  to  tell.  The  house  was  occu- 
pied by  an  elderly  man  and  his  two  daughters.  Their 
presence  during  the  day  had  been  respected  and  had  kept 
their  property  from  unnecessary  disturbance,  and  the  day 
vvas  so  far  gone  that  they  thought  there  was  no  need  to  leave 
their  home.  The  battle,  when  it  came,  broke  upon  them  so 
suddenly  that  they  did  not  dare  to  leave,  and  they  took 


'  Seiyeunt-AIajor  Cuniungham'H  pamphlet. 


9G  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

refuge  in  the  collar.  The  house  was  in  the  focus  of  the 
storm  which  raged  about  it  for  hours.  They  said  that  while 
the  horrid  din  lasted,  it  seemed  that  they  muat  die  of  tenor 
if  it  did  not.  cease;  hut  when  there  was  a  lull,  the  suspense 
of  fearful  expectation  seemed  worse  than  the  din,  and  ib 
was  almost  a  rc^lief  when  the  combat  was  renewed.  The 
long  night  ended  at  last,  and  with  the  first  light  the  young 
women  found  relief  in  ministering  to  the  wounded  who  had 
crept  into  the  house  and  outbuildings,  and  in  carrying 
water  to  those  on  the  field.  But,  as  they  climbed  the  para- 
pet at  the  rear  of  the  house,  among  the  first  they  found  was 
a  young  staff  officer,  their  own  brother,  mortally  wounded, 
lying,  as  ho  had  fallen  at  sunset,  almost  at  the  door  of  his 
home. 

The  withdrawal  of  Schofield's  forces  in  the  night  left  no  op- 
jiortunity  to  reckon  the  Confederate  losses.  Hood  says  that 
his  casualties,  comj)uted  ten  days  after  the  battle  by  means  of 
the  returns  cf  "  eifective  strength,"  were  found  to  be  7,547 
since  the  opening  of  this  campaign,  and  including  the  losses 
about  Columbia  and  Spring  Hill.  This,  however,  excludes 
all  the  slightly  wounded  who  had  returned  to  duty,  and  all 
officers,  and  makes  no  account  of  the  accessions  he  had  by  the 
return  of  absentees  and  the  joining  of  recruits.  It  still 
acknowledges  a  loss  of  6,300  in  this  battle,  of  which  700 
were  prisoners  in  our  hands.  It  is  very  certain  that  the 
whole  Confederacy  was  deeply  impressed  with  the  fright- 
ful carnage  of  their  troops,  and  their  writers,  with  common 
accord,  spoke  of  the  desperate  fighting  as  remarkable  even 
in  this  war  of  desperate  combats.  The  jmrtial  returns  acces- 
sible seem  to  show  clearly  that  no  one  of  the  divisions  en- 
gaged (except  Bate's),  lost  less  than  eight  hundred,  and  that 
Brown's  and  Cleburne's,  at  the  centre,  and  Loring's,  on  our 
left,  lost  much  more  heavily.     The  long  list  of  general 


BATTLE  OP  FRANKLIN.  97 

officers  killed  and  wounded  gives  terrible  significance  to  the 
recriminations  which  the  affair  at  Spring  Hill  had  excited. 
W(;  have  seen  that  Brown  and  all  fonr  of  his  brigadiers  were 
disabled  or  killed.  In  Cleburne's  division,  Granberry  })e- 
sides  himself  fell.  In  Loring's  division  they  lost  Gcmeials 
John  Adams  and  Scott.  In  French's,  Cockrell ;  in  Walt- 
hall's, Qnarles  ;  and  in  Johnson's,  Manigault ;  twelve  gen- 
erals in  all,  besides  Stafford,  and  a  long  list  of  colonels  and 
field  officers  who  succeeded  to  brigade  commands. 

On  the  National  side  the  losses  were  2,826,  of  which  more 
than  one  thousand  were  in  the  two  brigades  of  Wagner, 
which  wore  so  unnecessarily  compromised  at  the  front.  Near 
the  centre,  wIkh'o  the  line  was  temporarily  broken,  the  losses 
were  naturally  much  heavier  than  on  the  flanks,  where  our 
men  stoutly  held  the  breastworks  and  fought  under  good 
cover.  The  result  well  illustrates  the  fearful  odds  at  which 
the  bravest  troops  assault  a  line  of  earthworks  over  open 
ground,  even  when  a  grave  fault  of  a  subordinate  has  given 
them  an  exceptional  and  unlooked-for  advantages  Ocnieral 
Wagner's  ])lace  of  duty  was  with  the  two  brigades  of  his 
division  which  were  exposed  in  front,  and  the  order  to  bring 
them  in  without  fighting  had  been  sent  through  the  Fourth 
Corps'  head-quarters,  and  had  been  received  by  hini.  He  was 
at  the  Carter  house  when  the  message  canu;  from  the  front 
that  Hood  was  forming  in  lino  of  battle,  and,  in  a  moment  of 
excitement,  forgetting  himself  and  his  orders,  he  sent  back  a 
command  to  fight.'  The  overwhelming  of  the  two  brigades 
and  the  })oril  to  the  whole  line  were  the  neciessary  (ionsc;- 
quence.  He  rallied  the  disorganized  brigades  at  the  river, 
but  thev  were  not  again  carried  into  action. 

During  the  battle  and  in  preparation  for  aiiy  contingency 


1  This  is  stated  to  tlie  writer  by  two  olTlccrs  who  wore  present  nnil  heard  it. 

Vol.  X.— 5 


98  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

which  might  arise,  General  Schofield  directed  General 
Wood  to  put  the  three  brigades  of  his  division  in  position  to 
cover  the  flanks  of  the  troops  in  front  of  the  town,  and  to 
protect  the  bridges  in  case  of  need.  Wood  accordingly 
placed  Post's  brigade  opposite  Kimball's  flank,  below  tho 
town,  Strcight's  near  the  bridges,  and  Beatty's  above  Fort 
Granger,  all  on  the  liigh  ground  of  the  north  bank  of  tho 
Haii^eth ;  and  these  brigades  maintained  their  position  in 
the  night  till  the  rest  of  the  infantry  had  passed  through 
their  lines  and  marched  to  Brentwood.  General  Wilson, 
with  tho  cavalry,  had,  during  tho  afternoon,  a  warm  skirmish 
with  Forrest,  who  tried  in  vain  to  cross  the  Harpeth  beyond 
the  left  of  Schofield's  forces.  Thomas  sent  a  warm  con- 
gratulatory despatch  when  the  result  of  the  engagement  was 
announced  to  him  ;  bat,  as  he  thought  three  days  would  still 
bo  needed  to  prei)ari:i  his  concentrated  army  for  aggressive 
operations,  and  as  this  tvas  a  longer  time  than  Schotield 
could  engage  to  hold  t]»  line  of  the  Hai'peth  without  rein- 
forcements, he  directed  the  lattvv  to  retire  uj^on  Brentwood, 
and  thence  to  Nashville.'  Despatches  had  been  sent  to 
General  Cooper,  who,  it  will  b^^  remembered,  had  been 
stationed  at  Centreville,  on  Duck  River,  with  n  brigade  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  directing  him  to  fnii  bock  on  Franklin. 
But  unavoidable  delays  occurred,  and  when  he  approached 
Franklin,  the  enemy  was  in  possession.  He  was  similarly 
anticipated  at  Brentwood,  but  by  coolness  and  good  conduct 
brought  in  his  command  safely  to  Nashville. 


•  For  corrc8i»ondence  between  these  oiBccrs  on  November  149th  and  30th,  rca 
Ai)pLndix  D, 


CHAPTER  \1. 

BATTLE  OP  NASHVILLE. 

Schofield's  little  army  reached  Nashville  in  the  morning 
of  December  1st,  and  was  merged  in  the  forces  which  Gen- 
eral Thomas  was  assembling  there.  General  A.  J.  Smith,  after 
many  unforeseen  delays,  had  arrived  with  his  d«>tachmenta 
from  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  consisting  of  three  divi- 
sions, aggregating  nearly  twelve  thousand  men.  Of  these, 
something  over  nine  thousand  men  reached  Nashville  early 
in  the  morning  of  November  30tli,  and  the  rest  on  the  next 
day.  The  first  intention  of  General  Thomas  had  been  to 
meet  Schofield  at  Brentwood,  ten  miles  in  front  of  Nash- 
ville, with  these  troops,  while  Schofield  marched  the  ten 
miles  from  Franklin  to  the  same  point ;  but  he  concluded 
later  to  make  the  union  at  Nashville.  When  he  i-cceived 
from  Schofield  and  from  Wilson  the  reports  of  Hood's  move- 
ment of  the  28th  and  29th,  by  which  the  cavalry  had  been 
sejjarated  from  Schofield,  and  Forrest  was  reported  pushing 
eastward,  he  ordered  Steedman  to  leave  a  garrison  in  Chatta- 
nooga and  take  his  other  available  forces  to  Cowan,  a 
station  near  Elk  River,  on  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga 
Railway.  Steedman  reached  there  on  the  morning  of  the 
80th  and  put  his  troops  in  position  ;  but  in  the  evening, 
Thomas,  having  learned  of  Hood's  attack  in  force  upon 
Schofield  at  Franklin,  ordered  Steedman  to  hasten  to  Nash- 
ville.    The  troops  were  accordingly  put  upon  the  railway 


100  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

trains  again,  and  most  of  them  reaclicl  their  destination 
safely  on  the  evening  of  December  1st.  One  train,  l)eing 
delayed  bv  an  accident,  did  not  arrive  till  the  2d,  and  was 
attacked  by  Forrest  five  miles  south  of  Nashville,  but  the 
troops  made  their  way  through  without  serious  loss,  though 
the  train  was  captured  and  destroyed.  Of  the  8,000  men 
who  had  l)een  at  Chattanooga  on  the  30th,  Steedman 
brought  with  him  5,200,  consisting  of  two  brigades  of  colored 
troops,  and  a  provisional  division  made  up  of  soldiers  be- 
longing to  the  army  with  Sherman,  but  who  had  arrived  at 
the  front  too  late  to  rejoin  their  own  regiments. 

Most  of  the  troops  under  General  R.  S.  Granger,  in  North 
Alabama,  and  of  those  under  General  Milroy,  at  Tullahoma, 
were  ordered  to  Murfreesboro,  where  the  whole,  amounting 
to  about  eight  thousand  men,  were  placed  under  command  of 
General  Rousseau,  and  remained  until  after  Hood's  defeat 
on  December  15tli  and  IGth.  The  block-house  garrison,  at 
the  important  railroad  bridge  on  the  Elk  River,  was  the 
only  considerable  detachment  left  along  the  line  of  the 
Chattanooga  Road,  between  Murfreesboro  and  Stevenson. 

In  Nashville,  on  November  30th,  besides  Smith's  forces, 
Thomas  had  about  six  thousand  infantry  and  artillery,  and 
three  thousand  cavalry,  mostly  dismounted.'  The  Chief 
Quartermaster,  General  Donaldson,  had  also  armed  and 
organized  into  a  division  the  employes  of  his  and  the  com- 
missary department,  and  these  were  prepared  to  serve  as  an 
addition  to  the  garrison  when  needed.  The  new  regiments 
which  arrived  were  gradually  assigned  to  the  old  divisions, 


'  By  the  table  in  Appendix  A,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  cavalry  "  present  for 
duty'  were  10,884,  of  which  2,272  were  not  "c<jiiippeil,"  i.e.,  were  dismounted.  I 
have  not  been  able  to  procure  the  exact  flgures  showing  how  many  were  with 
Wilson  in  the  field,  and  what  other  small  detachments  there  might  be.  The  in- 
fantry would  !)(>  the  difference  between  14,000  and  the  number  at  Murfreesboro. 
See  Appendix  A. 


BATTLI3  OF  NASHVILLE.  IM 

and  the  additions  to  the  list  of  Sherman's  convalescents  and 
returning  men  were  united  to  those  who  had  come  with 
Steedman,  making,  by  December  14tli,  a  division  of  over  tlvo 
thousand  men,  under  command  of  General  Cruft. 

Accepting  Hood's  statements  of  his  losses  thus  far  in  the 
camiiaign,  the  army  which  he  led  against  Nashville  con- 
sisted of  about  forty-four  thousand  men  of  all  arms.'  His 
means  of  information  were  such  that  he  had  pretty  full 
knowledge  of  the  concentration  Thomas  was  now  effecting, 
and  the  motives  which  induced  a  march  to  Nashville  aro 
matters  of  interesting  inquiry.  Beauregard,  in  his  prelimin- 
ary report  to  the  Confederate  War  Department,  said :  *'  It  ia 
clear  to  my  mind  that  after  the  great  loss  of  life  at  Franklin, 
the  army  was  no  longer  in  a  condition  to  make  a  successful 
attack  on  Nashville."  Hood's  own  statement,  which  would 
be  entitled  to  the  greatest  weight  if  his  subsequent  writing  j 
were  not  so  full  of  evidence  that  they  are  labored  apologies 
for  his  misfortunes,  is  that  he  expected  reinforcements  from 
Texas,  and  that  he  hoped  by  intrenching  near  Nashville  ho 
could  maintain  himself  in  a  defensive  attitude  till  these 
should  arrive ;  or  that  he  might  even  take  advantage  of  a 
reverse  to  Thomas,  if  the  latter  should  be  beaten  in  an  attack 
upon  his  fortified  line.  The  hope  of  aid  from  Texas  was  a 
forlorn  one,  for  no  organized  body  of  Confederates  had  for 
a  long  time  succeeded  in  j)assing  the  Mississippi  Kiver. 
From  other  sources,  however,  we  learn  that  the  show  of 
confidence  and  of  success  was  relied  upon  to  induce  recruit- 
ing in  Tennessee,  and  that  the  pretended  Governor,  Harris, 
was  with  Hood,  endeavoring  to  enforce  the  conscription  in 
that  State.  This,  and  the  collection  of  supplies,  give  an  in- 
telligible reason  for  occupying  as  much  territory  as  possible, 

•  Seo  Appendix  A. 


102  FUANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

and  for  an  appearauco  of  bmvado  which  could  hardly  be 
justilied  on  military  grounds.  Doubtless,  too,  Hood  be- 
lieved that  while  his  veterans  might  be  forced  to  retreat, 
they  could  not  be  routed  ;  and  he  underestimated  the  dis- 
couragement that  began  to  pervade  them  when  they  were 
taught,  by  the  terrible  lesson  of  Franklin,  how  hopeless  was 
that  dream  of  conipiest  with  which  their  loaders  had  tried 
to  inspire  them  when  they  crossed  the  Tennessee.  Hood 
also  says  he  learned  that  Schofield  retreated  in  alarm  ;  but 
never  -was  a  greater  mistake.  Schotield's  officers  on  the 
line  had  rejjorted  their  perfect  confidence  in  their  ability  to 
hold  it,  and  the  withdrawal  from  the  Harpeth  had  been 
based  solely  on  the  probability  of  the  position  being  turned 
before  reinforcements  could  be  sure  to  arrive. 

In  truth.  Hood's  situation  was  a  very  difficult  one,  and  to 
go  forward  or  to  go  back  was  almost  equally  unpromising. 
He  followed  his  natural  bent,  therefore,  which  always 
favored  the  appearance,  at  least,  of  aggression,  and  he 
marched  after  Schofield  to  Nashville.  Ou  approaching  the 
town,  he  put  Lee's  corps  in  the  centre,  aci'oss  the  Franklin 
turnpike,  for  it  had  suffered  least  in  the  campaign,  and  was 
now  his  strongest  corps.  Cheatham  took  the  right,  and 
Stewart  the  left  of  the  line,  while  Forrest,  with  the  cavalry, 
occupied  the  country  between  Stewart  and  the  river  below 
Nashville.  Attempts  were  made  to  repair  the  railway  from 
Corinth  to  Decatur,  and  thence  by  Pulaski  to  Hood's  rear. 
Hood  tells  us  that  he  gained  possession  of  two  locomotives 
and  several  cars  (perhaps  at  Spring  Hill),  and  that  these 
were  used  to  help  transport  supplies. 

Thomas  put  his  troops  in  position  upon  the  heights  sur- 
rounding Nashville,  General  Smith's  divisions  on  the  right, 
the  Fourth  Corps  (General  Wood  temporarily  commanding) 
in  the  centre,  and   Schofield's  Twenty-third  Corps  ou  the 


DATTLK  OP   NASHVILLE.  10.3 

left.  Steedman,  who  amved  lat<?r,  wfts  first  jmt  on  tin 
Noliinsvillo  piko,  about  a  milo  in  front  of  SiihofioId'H  loft, 
but  was  placod  on  tlio  extension  of  StrhofioM's  lino  a  day  or 
two  later,  when  Wilson,  with  tho  cavalry,  wero  sent  ovt>r 
the  river  to  Edgefield,  on  the  north  bank. 

On  December  2d,  Hood  sent  Bate's  division  of  Cheatham's 
cordis  to  destroy  tho  railroad  between  Nashville  and  Mur- 
freesboro.  Bate  reached  Overall's  Creek,  ten  miles  from 
Murfreesboro,  and  attackcid  the  block-house  protecting  the 
railway  bridge  there ;  but  the  little  garrison  h«dd  out 
against  a  severe  cannonade  till  General  Milroy  arrived  with 
reinforcements  from  Murfreesboro,  and  drove  tho  enemy  off. 
Bate  now  tof>k  tho  road  toward  Nashville,  and  at  Stewart's 
Crook  and  two  other  places  in  that  neighborliood,  found 
the  block-houses  evacuated,  and  burned  them  with  tho 
bridges  they  were  built  to  protect.  Ho  also  reported  that 
he  had  torn  ui>  several  miles  of  track.  Forrest,  mean- 
while, who  had  been  directed  to  co-operate  with  Bate,  had 
sent  Buford's  division  against  tho  I'iock-houses  nearest 
Nashville,  and  succeeded  in  reducing  three  of  them  near 
Mill  Creek,  beginning  with  one  five  miles  from  the  city. 
On  tho  5th  he  united  Jackson's  division  with  Buford's, 
and  moving  toward  Lavergne  took  two  more  block-houses. 
He  now  met  Bate,  who  was  moNang  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion, and  turned  tho  united  forces  upon  Murfreesboro. 
Here,  on  the  evening  of  tho  6th,  ho  was  further  rtiinforced 
by  Sears's  brigade  of  French's  division,  and  Palmer's  brigade 
of  Stevenson's,  and  on  next  morning  apy)roached  the  town, 
reconnoitring  the  fovtificaMons  in  person.  Rousseau  now 
sent  Milroy  against  the  enemy,  with  seven  regiments,  and 
these  attacked  vigorously  tho  left  flank  of  Forrest's  infantry, 
while  they  were  moving  by  his  orders  in  the  same  direc- 
tion for  the  puri^oso  of  taking  ground  farther  to  the  left. 


104  I'llANKLl.V   AND    NASIIVILIiK. 

Milroy's  attack  foil  obliciiidy  upon  tlio  oxtrcMiiity  of  liaic'.H 
lino,  which  was  quickly  ntlUfd  up  ami  put  to  rout,  lf)siu^  two 
pioc(!s  of  artillery.  TJato  admits  2i:i  casualtioH  in  th((  in- 
fantry, hut  those  of  tho  cavalry  aro  not  pfivcui.  Milroy  took 
207  prisonc^rs,  and  hin  own  losses  in  tho  atTair  woro  'M) 
killed,  and  175  wounded.  Meanwhile,  Buford's  division 
attenipttfd  to  ontor  tho  town  hy  another  road,  but  was  also 
defeated  and  di'ivcMi  otf. 

Bato'H  division  was  now  recalled  to  Nashville,  and  re- 
placed by  a  brifjfade  und<n'  C!olonol  Ohnstead  (formerly 
Mercer's)  so  that  F<m'est  retained  three  brigades  of  infantry 
ft.s  a  support  for  his  cavalry.  Ho  contiinied  till  the?  15th  to 
operate  on  tho  east  of  Nashvill<%  and  along  tho  south  bank 
of  the  Cund)erland,  ])art  of  his  duty  l)oing  to  "drain  tho 
countiy  of  ])orsons  liable  to  militaiy  sei'vico,  animals  suita- 
ble for  army  purjmses,  and  subsistence  8upi)lies."  '  On  tho 
15th  Jackson's  division  cai)tured  a  railway  train  of  su])i)lies 
going  from  Stevenson  to  ISIurfreosboro,  for  the  garrison 
there,  who,  it  would  seem,  must  have  been  in  danger  of 
running  short  of  rations,  since  tho  breaking  of  their  com- 
municati(ms  with  Nashville. 

At  Thomas's  r(>quest,  liieutenant-Commander  Fitch  pa- 
trolled tho  Cumberland  with  gunboats  al)ove  and  below 
Nashville,  to  prevent  the  crossing  of  that  stream  by  the 
enemy,  and  Wilson  sent  Hammond's  brigade  of  cavalry  to 
Gallatin  to  watch  the  north  bank  of  the  river  as  far  as 
Carthage. 

From  tho  time  of  Hood's  arrival  in  front  of  Nashville,  the 
President  and  Secretary  of  War  became  very  urgent  in  their 
desire  that  Thomas  should  at  once  assume  the  aggressive. 


'  CampaiRns  of  Porrcft,  p.  fi-'J-l.  Thomas's  report  puts  the  affair  at  Murfrpps- 
boro  on  the  8tb,  but  both  Bate's  report  and  Forrest's  biographers  say  it  was  tho 
7th. 


BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  105 

At  their  suRRostion,  Oon<»ral  Gmnt  tologmplied  on  Decom- 
bor  2,  lulvisiii^  Thomas  to  k'uvo  tlio  dcfouct'S  of  NashviUo  to 
Gcnoial  Doiuildson'H  or^jfaiiizoil  i'lnployes,  and  attack  Hood 
at  oiico.  Grant's  lan^ua^o  was  si-arcoly  k>ss  ini])erative 
than  an  order,  but  Thomas  was  so  desirous  of  increasing 
his  force  of  nu)unted  nwn  that  he  <letermined  to  wait  a  few 
days.  On  the  8th,  the  weather,  which  had  been  good  for 
more  than  a  week,  suddenly  changed.  A  freezing  storm  of 
snow  and  sleet  covered  the  ground,  and  for  two  or  three 
days  the  alternations  of  rain  and  frost  made  the  hills  about 
Nashville  slopes  of  slippery  ice,  on  which  movemt»nt  was 
impracticable.  As  Hood's  i)ositions  could  only  bo  reached 
by  deployed  lines  advancing  over  these  hills  and  hollows, 
evel•vbod^•  in  Thomas's  armv  felt  the  absolute  necessitv  of 
now  waiting  a  little  longer,  till  the  ice  should  thaw.  This 
was  not  fully  ai)preciated  by  the  autliorities  at  Washington, 
who  connected  it  too  closely  with  Thomas's  previous  wish 
for  more  time,  and  a  rapid  corn^spondence  by  telegraph  took 
place,  in  which  Thomas  was  ordered  to  attack  at  onco  or  to 
turn  over  his  command  to  General  Schotield.  He  assembled 
his  corps  commanders  and  asked  their  advice,  saying  that  he 
was  ordoi'ed  to  givo  Hood  battle  immediately  oi  surrender 
his  command.  To  whom  the  army  would  be  transferred 
was  not  stated,  but  it  was  matter  of  inference,  and  ho  de- 
clined to  submit  the  despatch  itself  to  the  council  of  war, 
though  one  of  the  junior  otUcers  intimated  a  wish  to  know 
its  terms.  By  the  custom  of  such  councils  the  o})inion  of 
officers  is  given  in  the  inverse  order  of  their  grade ;  but 
General  Schotield,  feeling  the  delicacy  of  his  position  as 
senior  subordinate,  volunteered  his  own  opinion  hrst,  that 
till  the  ice  should  melt  it  was  not  now  practicable  to  move.' 


'  In  the  account  of  this  meeting,  the  author  follows  a  written  statement  of 
General  Schofleld. 

5* 


106  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

All  concurred  in  this,  and  Thomas  telegraphed  Grant  that 
ho  felt  compelled  to  wait  till  the  storm  should  break,  but 
would  sul)mit  without  a  murmur  if  it  was  thought  necessary 
to  relievo  him.  On  the  13th,  General  Logan,  who,  it  will 
bo  remembered,  was  temporarily  absent  from  the  I'ifteentli 
Corjis,  was  ordered  to  Nashville  for  the  puri)oso  of  sui^er- 
seding  Thomas  in  command  of  the  Department  and  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  and  Grant  himself  was  on  the  way  there 
also,  when  the  result  of  the  first  day  of  the  battle  of  Nash- 
ville (December  15th)  stopped  further  action  in  that  direc- 
tion. 

As  early  as  December  Gth,  the  troops  had  been  ordered  to 
be  ready  to  move  against  the  enemy,  and  the  plan  of  battle 
afterward  adopted  had  been  in  substance  determined.  From 
day  to  day  Hood  appeared  to  be  taking  ground  to  the  east, 
so  as  to  bring  himself  more  closely  into  support  of  Forrest's 
operations.  I'his  led  to  a  suggestion  to  Thomas  from  hia 
corps  commanders  to  modify  his  plan  which  had  looked  to 
the  use  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  demonstrate  on  the 
left,  and  give  more  weight  to  an  attack  by  the  right.  From 
the  8th  to  the  14:th,  it  was  definitely  understood  in  camp 
that  an  attack  would  be  made  the  moment  the  ice*mel*^,;a, 
and  on  the  date  last  mentioned  a  warm  rain  made  it  certain 
the  ground  would  be  bare  next  day.  The  i)osition  of  Hood 
had  not  materially  changed  for  a  week.  Chalmers  was 
operating  with  a  division  of  cavalry  along  the  Cumberland, 
for  some  miles  below  Nashville,  as  Buford  was  above  ;  but, 
while  ordinary  steamboat  transportation  was  thus  inter- 
rupted, the  navy  patrolled  the  river  and  prevented  the  enemy 
from  crossing.  Hood  had  sent  a  detachment  of  cavalry  also, 
supported  by  Cockrell's  brigade  of  infantry  to  the  mouth  of 
Duck  River,  on  the  Tennessee,  to  blockade  that  stream  also, 
if  possible.     In  his  anxiety  to  cover  so  large  a  territory,  the 


BATTLE  OP  NASHVILLE.  107 

Confederate  general  was  too  much  extended,  and  in  front  of 
Thomas's  right  his  flank  was  only  covered  by  C^halmers's  divi- 
sion of  horse.  To  make  some  connection  with  the  river  on 
this  side,  he  had  built  a  number  of  detaduMl  works,  but 
these  were  not  completed,  though  ho  had  put  artillery  in 
them,  sui)ported  by  detachnionts  of  infantry  from  Walthall's 
division.  Reports  brought  .in  by  deserters  indicated  that  he 
was  intending  to  withdraw  from  his  advanced  lines  since 
the  10th,  but  the  same  causes  whic]ii)reventcd  Thomas  from 
moving,  affected  him  also,  and  a  change  of  quarters,  to  his 
ill-clad  and  poorly  shod  troops,  would  have  been  the  cause 
of  much  suffering,  if  it  were  made  during  the  severe  weather 
of  that  week. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th  a  hea\'y  fog  obscured  the 
dawn  and  hid  the  early  movements  of  Thomas's  army.  The 
ice  had  given  place  to  mud,  and  the  mancEUvres,  like  those 
of  all  winter  campaigns,  were  slow.  The  modified  order  of 
the  day  directed  a  strong  demonstration  by  Steedman  on  the 
extreme  left,  with  two  brigades  ;  one  commanded  by  Colonel 
Grosvenor,  Eighteenth  Ohio,  and  the  other  (colored  troops) 
commanded  l)v  Colonel  Morgan,  Fourteenth  United  States 
Colored.  General  AVood,  with  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  Gen- 
eral Smith,  with  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  were  ordered  to  form 
upon  a  position  nearly  continuous  with  the  eastern  line  of 
the  city  defences,  extending  from  a  salient  on  the  A'-klen 
place  across  the  Hillsborough  turnpike  toward  the  Hardin 
turnpike  in  a  southwest  direction.  Advancing  toward  the 
southeast  these  corps  would  make  the  principal  attack 
obli(piely  upon  the  left  of  Hood's  line.  General  Wilson, 
with  three  div*-'*ons  of  cavalry,  was  ordered  to  clear  the 
Hardin  and  Charlotte  turnpikt^s  of  the  enemy  (still  farther 
to  the  west)  and  movT  forward  on  the  right  of  Smith's 
corps.     General   Schotield,  with   the   Twenty-third   Corps, 


108  FRANKLIN  AND   NASHVILLE. 

constituted  the  reserve,  and  was  placed  in  rear  of  Wood, 
to  strengthen  and  extend  th(^  attack  on  the  right.  As 
Smith  had  occupied  the  fortitications  on  the  right  of  tlie 
line  about  the  city,  these  orders  would  l)e  executed  by  wheel- 
ing the  whole  of  both  corps  forward  to  the  left,  upon  the 
salient  at  the  Acklen  place  as  a  pivot,  after  Wood  had  taken 
ground  to  the  right  by  the  distance  of  say  half  a  mile,  so  as 
to  bring  his  left  flank  at  the  point  named.  Schofield,  who 
had  been  in  the  fortifications  still  to  the  left  of  Wood, 
marched  from  his  lines  at  daybreak,  and  i^assing  through  the 
works  at  the  Hillsl)orough  pike  moved  to  the  east  into  the 
position  assigned  him,  as  soon  as  the  wheel  of  the  right 
wing  made  room  for  him.  The  interior  lines  at  the  city 
were  held  by  General  Donaldson's  men,  while  General 
Crnft,  with  his  division,  occupied  those  from  which  Schofield 
and  Steedman  moved. 

Standing  in  the  salient  in  Wood's  line,  which  has  been 
mentioned,  the  topography  of  the  country  about  Nashville 
is  clearly  seen.  Gn  the  left,  toward  the  east,  is  a  valley  in 
which  Brown's  Creek  flows  north  into  the  Cumbei-laud.  It 
rises  in  the  high  Brentwood  Hills,  which  shut  out  the  view 
toward  the  south  a  little  more  than  four  miles  away,  and  its 
course  is  nearly  parallel  to  the  eastern  line  of  Thomas's  in- 
trenchments.  Gn  the  right,  but  a  little  farther  off,  is  Kicli- 
land  Creek,  flowing  northwest  into  the  Cumberland.  It  rises 
also  in  the  Brentwood  Hills,  not  more  than  a  mile  W'est  of 
Brown's  Creek,  and  runs  nearly  parallel  with  it  toward  the 
city  for  some  distance,  when  the  two  curve  away  to  riglit 
and  left,  encircling  the  place,  and  marking  its  strong  and 
natural  line  of  defence.  On  the  high  ridge  between  the 
creeks  is  the  Granny  White  turnpike.  A  mile  eastward  is 
the  Franklin  turnpikes  diverging  about  thirty  degrees.  At 
nearly  equal   distances,   on  that  sule,   the  Nolensville   and 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLH 


109 


MurfreesboTo  tumpikos  leave  the  city  successively.  Turn- 
ing toward  the  west  from  our  station,  the  Hillsboro,  the 
Hardin,  and  the  Charlotte  turnpikes  successively  go  out  at 


CAVALRT    PUPtu.Nt 
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Mup  of  baillo-Field  of  Nabhviiltd. 


110  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

similar  angles,  all  radiating  from  tlio  centre  of  the  town. 
The  ground  is  hilly,  ri.siug  into  knobs  and  eminences  two  or 
three  hundred  feet  above  the  Cumberland,  but  mostly  ojjen, 
with  groves  of  timber  here  and  there. 

Hood's  line  was  over  Brown's  Creek,  on  the  high  ground 
from  the  Nolensville  turnpike  and  the  Chattanooga  railway 
to  the  Franklin  turnpike,  then  crossing  the  creek  and 
mounting  a  high  hill  west  of  it,  it  extended  to  the  Hillsboro 
road,  where  it  turned  back  along  a  stone  wall  on  the  side  of 
the  turnpike.  The  detached  works,  of  which  mention  has 
been  made,  were  still  to  the  southwest  of  this,  and  across 
Kichland  Creek.  The  relative  places  of  his  several  corps 
were  the  same  as  when  he  first  came  before  the  town.  His 
main  line  at  his  left,  where  it  reached  the  Hillsboro  pike,  was 
about  a  milo  in  front  of  "Wood,  but  he  also  occupied  an  ad- 
vanced line  with  skirmishers,  only  half  that  distanc»j  away, 
and  terminating  in  a  strong  outpost  on  Montgomery  Hill,  at 
the  Hillsboro  road. 

Before  six  o'clock  in  the  morning  Steedman  was  moving 
forward  under  cover  of  the  fog  by  the  Murfreesboro  road,  on 
the  extreme  left,  and  about  eight  ho  attacked  Hood's  right 
between  the  turnpike  and  the  railway.  The  vigor  of  the  as- 
sault made  it  something  more  than  a  demonstration,  and  tlu; 
rapid  lire  of  both  artillery  and  small  arms  attracted  the  at- 
tention of  the  enemy  in  that  direction.  The  distance  Smith's 
right  wing  had  to  move  was  found  to  be  greater  than  had 
been  reckoned  on,  and  it  was  ten  o'clock  before  McArthur's 
division  had  moved  sufViciently  to  the  left  to  open  the  way 
for  Wilson's  cavaliy  to  advance  upon  the  Hardin  road. 
Johnson's  division  moved  focward  on  the  Charlotte  turn- 
pike, looking  also  after  the  enemy's  battery  at  Bell's  Land- 
ing, on  the  Cumberland ;  Croxton's  i)rigade  took  the  interval 
to  the  Hardin  turnpike,  Hatch's  division  contiiuied  the  lino 


BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE.  Ill 

to  the  flank  of  Smith's  infantry,  and  Knipe's  division  was  in 
reserve.  Smith  formed  the  Sixteenth  Corps  with  Garrard's 
division  on  his  left,  connecting  with  the  Fourth  Corps,  and 
Me  Arthur's  division  on  the  right.  The  division  of  Moore 
was  in  reserve.  On  the  other  side  Chahners  did  v\l'at  h;i 
couhl  to  oppose  them,  supported  by  Coleman's  (formerly 
Ector's)  brigade  of  infantry,'  but  the  odds  was  too  great, 
and  they  were  driven  steadily  bat'k.  Half  a  mile  southeast 
of  the  Hardin  road  the  first  of  Hood's  detached  works,  con- 
taining four  guns,  was  foiind.  The  batteries  of  McArthur 
and  Hatch  were  brought  to  bear  upon  it  from  all  sides,  and, 
after  a  severe  cannonade,  McMillan's  and  Hubbard's  bri- 
gades of  infantry  and  Coon's  of  cavalry  (dismounted)  at- 
tacked and  carried  the  redoubt.-  Stewart  now  recalled 
Coleman  and  directed  him  to  report  to  Walthall,  whoso 
division  occupied  the  s'one  wall  bordering  the  Hillsboro 
turni)ike.  AValthall  placed  him  on  the  extension  of  his  line 
southward,  upon  some  high  points  covering  the  Granny 
White  road.  This  left  the  other  redoubts  to  their  fate,  as 
Chalmers  was  far  too  much  over-matched  to  make  much  re- 
sistance with  his  cavalry.  He  had  been  driven  back  so  fast 
that  his  train,  with  his  hcadcpiarters  baggage  and  i)apors, 
had  been  cui>tured.  The  next  redoubt,  about  four  hundred 
yards  to  the  right,  was  carried  by  the  same  troops,  and  two 
guns  in  it  were  taken.  Another  four-gun  battery,  intrenched 
on  a  detached  hill,  was  stormed  and  captured  by  the  cavalry, 
and  a  two-gun  battery  by  Hill's  brigade  of  McArthur's  divi- 
sion, though  with  the  loss  of  Colonel  Hill,  who  fell  in  the 


•  This  was  of  French's  division,  but  French  seems  to  have  been  absent,  and  his 
brigades  were  separately  used  as  oceasiou  reciiiired.  Sears's  had  been  recalled 
from  Forrest,  and  was  temporarily  rejiorting  to  Walthall. 

2  Smith  and  Wilson  each  claim  for  their  men  the  honors  in  the  attack  of  all 
thiwe  works,  but  in  such  acomi)incd  movement  it  is  vniii  to  discriminate  minutely 
as  to  the  exact  credit  due  each  brigade. 


112  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

moment  of  success.  Smith's  corps  now  bore  somewhat  to 
the  left,  strikinj?  the  extreme  flank  of  the  stone  wall  held  by 
Wulthali'i,  division,  driving  Reynolds's  brigade  fronx  it  in  con- 
fusion. At  the  same  time,  Schoiield,  who  had  followed  the 
movement  closely  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  in  accord- 
ance with  Thomas's  order,  pushed  Couch's  division  (formerly 
Cooper's)  past  Smith's  flank,  and  beyond  the  last  redoul)t 
which  had  been  captured.  Now  advancing  on  the  line  from 
the  Hillsboro  road,  eastward,  across  an  open  valley  half  a 
mile  wide,  Couch  assaulted  and  carried  the  left  of  a  series 
of  hills  parallel  to  the  Granny  White  turnpike.  The  as- 
sault was  made  by  Cooper's  brigade,  and  the  rest  of  the 
division  was  quickly  brought  up  in  snjjport,  while  Cox's 
division  marched  still  farther  to  the  riglit  and  occupied  the 
continuation  of  the  line  of  hills  nlong  Pdchland  Creek  with 
two  brigades,  keeping  the  third  (Stiles's)  on  the  heights  west 
of  the  creek  to  cover  the  flank. 

These  last  movements  had  occurred  just  as  darkness  was 
falling,  and  completed  the  day's  work  on  the  extreme  right. 
It  is  now  necesaary  to  go  back  and  traco  the  jjrogress  of  the 
Fourth  Corps.  General  Wood  had  formed  the  corps  with 
Elliott's  division  (formerly  Wagner's)  on  the  right,  connect- 
ing with  Smith's  corps,  while  Kimball's  and  Beatty's  extend- 
ed the  line  to  the  left.  The  time  occupied  in  the  deployed 
movement  of  the  right  of  the  army  made  it  one  o'clock  be- 
fore it  was  time  for  the  extreme  left  to  move.  Wood  then 
ordered  forward  Post's  l)rigade  of  Beatty's  division  to  attack 
Montgomery  Hill,  the  high  point  half  a  mile  in  front  of  the 
salient  of  our  line,  on  which  was  Hood's  advanced  guard. 
The  assault  v-as  preceded  by  ra]nd  artillery  fire  and  was 
gallantly  executed.  The  general  advance  of  the  line  was 
now  progressing,  and  Schotield's  corps  was  ordered  away  by 
General  Thomas  to  support  the  movement  of  the  right  liauk. 


BATTLE  OP   NASHVILLE.  113 

Wood  met  with  a  strong  skirmishing  resistance,  but  the 
lines  went  forward  steadily,  keeping  pace  with  tlie  troops  on 
the  right,  till  Smith's  attack  upon  the  south  end  of  the 
stone  wall  along  the  Hillsboro  road,  which  was  held  by 
Walthall.  Kimball's  division  was  opposite  the  angle  in 
Hood's  line  where  Walthall  joined  ui)ou  Loring,  having 
Hears's  brigade  of  French's  division  between  them.  Kimball 
pushed  straight  at  the  angle,  ami  the  right  of  the  stone  wall 
having  already  been  carried,  Walthall's  brigades,  under 
Johnston  (formerly  Quarles's)  and  Shelley,  successively  gave 
way.  Elliott's  division  of  Wood's  corjxs  lapped  upon  Gar- 
rard's of  the  Sixteenth,  and  the  whole  went  forward  with 
enthusiasm,  capturing  several  guns  and  many  prisoners. 

Hood's  left  was  now  hopelessly  broken,  and  he  made  haste 
to  draw  back  his  shattered  divisions  iipon  a  new  line.  Scho- 
fi(dd's  advan(!e  had  separated  Coleman's  brigade  from  Walt- 
hall, but  it  occui)icd  a  commanding  hill  (afterward  known 
as  Shy's  Hill),'  and  held  on  with  tenacity  till  Walthall, 
helped  by  the  gathering  darkness,  could  form  along  its  right 
across  the  Granny  Wliite  road.  At  the  tirst  news  of  the  loss 
of  the  redoubts.  Hood  ordered  Cheatham's  corps  (except 
Smith's,  formerly  Cleburne's  division)  from  the  right  to  the 
left,  and  his  divisions,  hurrying  by  the  Franklin  pike  toward 
Overton's  Hill,  passed  great  numbers  of  stragglers  streaming 
to  the  rear.  Bate  was  ordered  to  relieve  part  of  Walthall's 
division,  so  as  to  make  a  stronger  lino  between  Shy's  Hill 
and  the  Granny  White  road,  and  Walthall  closed  to  the  right 
ui)on  Loriug.  South  of  Shy's  Hill,  Lowry's  (formerly 
Brown's)  division  extended  the  Confederate  left  in  front  of 
Schofield,  and  the  whole  worked  diligently  to  intrench 
themselves.     Lee's  corps  was  drawn  back  till  his  right  eu- 


'  This  namo  Ih  given  the  hill  by  General  Bate,  whose  troops  held  it,  in  hono." 
of  Colonel  Sliy  who  fell  there.     It  seems  to  have  had  no  special  name  before. 


114  FRANKLIN    AND  I^ASHVILLB. 

circled  Ovorton'.s  Hill,  on  which  Clayton's  division  was 
placed,  supported  by  Brantley's  brigade,  while  Stevenson's 
and  Johnson's  divisions  extended  the  line  to  the  west  till  it 
united  with  Loring's  division  of  Stewart's  corps. 

On  our  left  Steedman  had  kept  his  men  active.  He  had 
attacked  and  earned  an  earthwork  near  the  Haines  house 
early  in  the  day,  and  had  followed  up  the  progressive  move- 
ment of  the  army,  harassing  the  enemy's  right  as  it  drew 
back. 

About  nightfall  there  was  a  strong  appearance  of  a  pre- 
cipitate retreat  of  the  enemy,  and  Thomas  ordered  Wood 
to  move  his  corps  farther  to  the  left,  reaching  the  Franklin 
turnpike,  if  possible,  and  to  push  southward  upon  it.  This 
direction  was  a  wise  one  if  the  enemy  continued  his  retreat, 
for  it  prevented  the  crowding  of  the  army  upon  a  single 
road  ;  but  had  Thomas  been  sure  that  Hood  would  reform 
upon  the  new  line,  he  would,  no  doubt,  have  continued  the 
general  movement  of  the  day  by  extending  his  forces  to  the 
right.  The  darkness  stopped  Wood  before  he  had  reached 
the  Franklin  road,  and  he  bivouacked  whore  night  overtook 
him,  ready  to  continue  the  march  in  the  morning.  His 
right  was  near  Smith's  left,  and  his  own  left  was  diagonally 
toward  the  rear,  in  the  works  which  Lee's  corps  had  aban- 
doned on  the  hither  side  of  Brown's  Creek. 

For  the  results  obtained,  the  losses  had  been  astonishingly 
light.  Wood  reports  only  three  hundred  and  fifty  casualties 
in  his  corps,  Smith's  were  about  the  same,  and  Schofield's 
not  over  one  hundred  and  fifty.  Those  of  Steedman  and  of 
Wilson  were  proportionately  small,  though  the  exact  figures 
cannot  be  given,  as  the  losses  of  the  first  and  second  days 
are  not  discriminated  in  any  report  but  Wood's.  Sixteen 
pieces  of  artillery  and  twelve  hundred  prisoners  had  been 
taken,  and  Hood's  whole  line  had  been  di'iveu  back  fully 


BATTLE  OF   NASHVILLE.  115 

two  miles.  The  work  was  not  completed,  b'lt  should  the 
enemy  maintain  his  position,  the  promise  for  the  morrow 
was  good. 

Hood  now  realized  the  mistake  his  over-confidence  had 
led  him  into,  by  inducing  him  not  only  to  extend  his  lines 
beyond  what  was  prudent,  but,  worst  of  all,  to  allow  Forrest 
to  become  so  far  detached  that  he  could  not  bo  recalled  in 
time  for  the  battle.  Sears's  brigade  had  been  brought  back 
to  the  lines  before  the  15th,  but  two  others  were  still  with 
Forrest,  and  Cockrell's  was  at  Duck  Rivor.  The  Confede- 
rate commander  set  to  work  in  earnest,  however,  to  repair 
his  mistake.  The  cavalry  was  too  far  away  to  join  him  in 
twenty-four  hours,  but  orders  were  despatched  recalling 
Forrest,  and  preparations  were  made  to  hold  the  new  line 
another  day.  As  his  left  still  seemed  his  weak  point,  Hood 
ordered  the  whole  of  Cheatham's  corps  to  that  flank.  Shy's 
Hill,  which  was  held  by  Coleman's  brigade,  made  the  angle 
in  the  line,  from  which  the  sharply  refused  flank  continued 
southward,  Lowry's  division  and  Smith's  (formerly  Cle- 
burne's) extending  it  to  the  Brentwood  Hills.  Bate's  divi- 
sion was  placed,  as  we  have  already  seen,  between  Shy's 
Hill  and  the  flank  of  Stewart's  corps,  facing  north.  Chal- 
mers's division  of  cavalry  was  close  upon  the  left  of  the  in- 
fantry, bending  the  line  back,  somewhat,  toward  the  Granny 
White  road. 

The  Confederate  line  now  rested  upon  high  hills,  Over- 
ton's and  Shy's,  between  which  the  ground  was  lower, 
though  rolling,  and  was  broken  by  the  upi)er  branches  of 
Brown's  Creek,  which  ran  in  nearly  straight  courses  north- 
ward, crossing  Hood's  position  at  right  angles.  Overton's 
hill  was  a  broad,  rounded  elevation,  and  the  works,  in  curv- 
ing southward  around  its  summit,  did  not  present  any  sharp 
angle  to  weaken  their  strength.    Shy's  Hill,  however,  though 


110  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

lii^li,  was  of  leas  extent,  and  the  lines  of  Bate  and  Lowiy 
nuul(!  a  rif^ht  anf^lo  there.  Bate  complained  of  the  position, 
but  Hood's  engineers  had  established  it,  and  Cheatham  did 
not  feel  at  liberty  to  change  it.  Indeed,  it  could  not  have 
been  changed  much,  unless  the  whole  Conffuleratc!  army 
were  to  retreat.  Coleman  had  been  driven  to  Shy's  Hill  by 
Schofield's  advance  at  dusk,  and  had  all  he  could  do  to  hold 
on  to  it  at  all.  The  extension  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
along  the  east  side  of  Richland  Creek  left  oidv  the  hills 
directly  south  of  Shy's  unoccupied,  and  it  was  thoYo.  alone 
tiiat  the  advance  of  Thomas's  right  wing  could  be  checked. 
The  National  skirmish  lines  were  so  close  that  the  digging  had 
to  be  done  on  the  inside  of  the  parapet  chiefly,  getting  cover 
for  the  men  as  soon  as  possible.  The  hill  on  our  side,  held 
by  C!ouch's  division,  was  only  three  hundred  yards  from 
Shy's,  and  the  work  on  the  latter,  built  under  fire,  was  weak. 
Farther  south,  the  confronting  hills,  held  by  the  rest  of 
Cheatham's  corps  on  the  one  side,  and  Schofield's  on  the 
other,  were  farther  apart,  and  that  in  the  Confederate  line 
was  considerably  higher  and  well  wooded  on  the  toji.  A 
strong  work  was  made  upon  it,  revetted  with  timber,  with 
embrasures  for  cannon,  and  a  parapet  high  enough  to  defi- 
lade the  interior ;  but  the  fire  of  our  sharpshooters  prevented 
any  abatis  being  made. 

General  Thomas  held  a  council  with  his  corps  commanders 
in  the  evening,  but  no  new  orders  seem  to  have  been  issued, 
except  some  directions  as  to  movements  in  the  event  of  a 
retreat  of  Hood  during  the  night.  If  he  remained  in  posi- 
tion, the  movements  progressing  at  the  close  of  the  day 
Avould  be  continued.  During  the  night  the  lines  on  the 
National  side  also  were  adjusted.  In  Schofield's  corps, 
Couch's  division,  in  making  connection  with  Smith,  opened 
a  gap  between  it  and  Cox's  division,  which,  after  extending 


BATTLE  OP  NASHVILLE.  117 

the  two  biigadfis,  which  were  over  Kichland  Creek,  in  single 
line,  without  reserves,  was  still  unable  to  join  Crouch's  left 
by  as  miTch  as  three  hundred  yards.  The  disadvantage  of 
drawing  in  and  contracting  the  extension  of  the  right  flank 
was  so  manifest,  that,  upon  the  rejwrt  of  the  fact,  Schofltdd 
applied  to  Smith  for  some  of  his  reserves  to  complete  the 
line,  and  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  Colonel  Moore  re- 
ported with  five  regiments  and  a  battery,  and  was  placed 
there.'  Three  of  the  regiments  were  put  in  the  trenches 
already  there,  and  two  in  supjiort  of  the  artillery  in  rear. 

At  the  same  hour,  Wood  resumed  the  movement  of  the 
Fourth  Corps,  which  had  been  interrupted  in  the  evening, 
and  Steedman  advanced  upon  the  Nolensville  pike  to  the 
abandoned  line  of  the  Confederate  works,  where  he  half 
wheeled  to  the  right  and  came  up  on  Wood's  left.  The  lat- 
ter first  formed  his  corps  with  Beatty's  division  on  the  left 
of  the  Franklin  road,  and  Kimball's  on  the  right,  with  Elliott 
m  reserve  ;  but  finding  a  large  space  vacant  between  himself 
and  the  centre  of  the  armv,  he  moved  Elliott's  division  for- 
ward  into  line  continuous  with  Smith's  corps.  The  left  of 
the  Fourth  Corps,  where  it  now  connected  with  Steedman, 
remained  across  the  Franklin  road,  and  opposite  Overton's 
Hill,  where  Hood's  line  bent  back  to  the  south.  The  Na- 
tional line,  therefore,  instead  of  being  oblique  to  the  enemy, 
and  far  outreaching  it  on  the  right,  as  on  the  previous  day, 
was  parallel  and  exterior  to  it  from  flank  to  flank,  nowhere 
reaching  beyond  it,  except  where  Wilson's  cavalry  was  oper- 
ating beyond  Schofield  on  the  Hillsboro  road. 

About  noon,  Steedman's  troops  formed  a  connection  with 
Wood's,  and  the  latter,  by  order  of  General  Thomas,  took 
direction  of  both.     Along  the  whole  line  the   skirmishers 


'  In  Smith's  report  this  is  spoken  of  by  mistalio  as  Moore's  division,  but  it  was, 
ill  fact,  only  part  of  his  division. 


118  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

woi'o  advanced  closo  to  tlio  enemy's  works,  and  various 
points  were  niconnoitred  to  determine  the  fea.sihility  of  an 
assault.  Thomas  did  not  order  an  attack  upon  the  intreneh- 
ments,  but  loft  the  corps  commanders  to  their  own  discre- 
tion in  this  n^spect.  Wood  concientrated  his  artillery  tire 
ui)on  Overton's  Hill,  Smith  and  Schotield  maintained  a  se- 
vere cross-firo  upon  the  angle  at  Shy's  Hill,  and  at  other 
points  on  the  line  the  opposing  batteries  were  warmly  en- 
gaged. 

Finding  that  the  enemy  was  strongly  intrenched  in 
Wood's  front,  (leneial  Thomas  rode  to  Smith,  and  learned 
the  results  of  the  reeonnoissanco  there,  and,  after  examining 
for  himself  tlie  position,  continued  on  to  Schofield's  lines 
on  the  right.  Schofiold  had  ordered  Stiles's  brigade  of 
Cox's  division  to  leave  its  position  in  rear  of  the  extreme 
right  and  march  farther  south,  then,  turning  to  the  east, 
to  push  forward  upon  a  wooded  hill  on  the  extension  of 
the  line  of  the  division.  Thence  he  was  to  keep  pace  with 
the  advance  of  Wilson's  dismoiinted  cavalry,  and  attack  with 
the  rest  of  the  lino  when  it  shoiild  go  forward.  The  termi- 
nation of  the  Confederate  continuous  works  in  Cheatham's 
line,  was  the  embrasured  earthwork  already  referred  to, 
with  a  recurved  flank  facing  the  south.  A  four-gun  battery, 
of  smooth  twelve-pound  guns,  was  in  this  fort,  with  four 
more  in  the  curtain  connecting  it  with  Shy's  Hill.  The 
rifled  gnus  of  Cockerell's  battery,  on  the  west  side  of  Rich- 
land Creek,  were  able  to  reach  the  embrasures  of  the  work  in 
front,  while  the  shells  of  the  smooth  guns  fell  short  in  the 
efforts  at  reply,  and  the  superiority  of  the  National  artillery 
was  such  that  the  Confederate  gunners  were  forced  to  re- 
load their  pieces,  by  drawing  them  aside  with  the  prolonye^ 
to  the  protection  of  the  parapet. 

On  learning  the  nature  of  the  works  in  front  of  Schofield, 


BATTLE  OP  NASHVILLE.  119 

and  tho  oxfont  of  tho  onomy'a  lino,  Tliomaa  ordorod  Smith 
to  Hond  ono  of  his  divisions  to  oxtoud  that  Hank,  l)ut  on 
repiosentations  as  to  tho  condition  of  allairs  in  Smith's  front, 
tho  onU;r  was  withdrawn. 

Wilson,  howovor,  was  maltinj?  good  pro{?voss  with  his 
c.ivalry,  which  must  now  ho  traced.  Johnson's  division  had 
not  felt  strong  enough  to  attack  tho  position  of  C!halmcrs, 
near  Boll's  Landing,  on  tho  loth,  and  Wilson's  movements 
had  heen  made  with  tho  rest  of  tho  c()ri)S.  The  conctMitra- 
tion  of  Chalmers's  division  in  tho  night,  enabled  W^ilson  to 
bring  Johnson  up  in  tho  morning,  and  ho  now  had  all  threo 
of  his  divisions  in  hand.  Hammond's  had  pickets  toward 
the  Granny  White  turni)iko,  in  rear  of  Hood's  left,  Hatch's 
division  was  ordered  to  move  from  his  bivouac  on  tho  Hills- 
boro  road,  on  tho  loft  of  Hammond,  and  upon  tho  enemy's 
rear.  Johnson  was  moving  across  tho  country  from  near 
Bell's  Landing.  By  noon,  or  shortly  after,  W^ilson'a  skir- 
mishers formed  a  continuous  curved  line  from  Schofield's 
right  around  the  enemy's  flank  across  tho  Granny  White 
road.  It  was  at  this  timo  that  Schofield  ordered  the  move- 
ment of  Stiles's  brigade,  which  has  been  mentioned,  and  had 
suggested  the  desirability  of  sending  a  full  division  of  in- 
fantiy  beyond  Hold's  flank,  if  one  could  bo  spared  from  tho 
lino.  He  did  not  think  it  wise  to  assault  tho  lieaN-y  work  in 
front  of  Cox's  division,  excei)t  in  connection  with  a  general 
advance. 

The  situation  at  the  angle  on  Shy's  Hill,  however,  was 
opening  tho  prospect  of  a  successful  attack  there.  Tho  ad- 
vance of  Wilson's  dismounted  cavalry  from  one  wooded  hill 
to  another  on  the  south,  was  making  Hood  uneasy,  and  his 
vehement  exhortation  to  Chalmers,  to  hold  his  own,  not 
being  enough  to  overcome  the  odds  against  that  ofhcer,  ho 
was  forced  to  withdraw  Govau's  brigade  from  Cheatham's 


120  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

line,  and  send  it  to  Chalmers's  support.  Bate  was  ordered 
to  extend  his  left,  and  occupy  Shy's  Hill,  while  Coleman, 
who  had  been  there,  was  sent  to  fill  Govan's  place.  Bate's 
line  was  now  a  good  deal  stretched,  and  he  found  also  that 
the  earthworks  built  in  the  night  were  too  far  back  from 
the  brow  of  the  hill,  so  that  they  did  not  command  its  slope. 
The  fire  upon  it  was  too  hot  to  change  it,  he  could  get  no 
reinforcements,  and  he  could  onlv  hold  on  to  the  last. 
Bate's  own  words  best  describe  his  situaticm  in  the  afhu'noon  : 
"  The  enemy,  he  says,  opened  a  most  teirific  fii'e  of  artillery, 
and  kept  it  up  during  the  day.  In  the  afternoon,  he  planted 
a  battery  in  the  woods,  in  the  rear  of  Mrs.  Bradford's  house 
(this  was  in  McArthur's  line),  fired  directly  across  both  lines 
composing  the  angle,  and  threw  shells  directly  in  the  back 
of  my  left  brigade ;  also  placed  a  battery  on  a  hill  diag- 
onally to  my  left,  which  took  my  first  brigade  in  reverse. 
(This  was  in  Cox's  line.)  The  batteries  on  the  hill,  in  its 
front,  not  more  than  three  hundred  yards  distant  (in  Couch's 
line)  had  borne  the  concentrated  fire  of  my  Whitworth 
rifles  all  day,  and  must  have  sufferei^I  iieavilv,  but  were  not 
silenced.  These  rifled  guns  of  the  (  vtimy  being  so  close, 
razed  the  works  on  the  left  of  the  angle  for  fifty  or  sixty 
yards,"  ' 

General  McArthur,  from  his  position,  was  able  to  see 
something  of  the  mischief  done  to  Bate's  line,  and  reported 
that  an  assault  upon  the  angle  was  practicable.  He  pro- 
posed to  move  McMillan's  brigade  to  the  right,  in  front  of 
the  hill  held  by  Couch,  and  to  charge  under  the  cover  of 
Couch's  guns,  where  the  hillside  gave  most  i)rotection  to  an 
advance.  Thonias  ai)proved  the  plan,  and  Smith  sent  to 
Schofield  for  directions  to  Couch  to  co-operate.     Schofield 

•  General  Bate's  official  report. 


BATTLE  OP  NASHVILLE.  121 

acceded  to  this,  and  directed  Cox  also  to  attack  the  hill  in 
his  front  simultanoouslv,  while  Stik^s  shonld  advance  be- 
vond  the  flank  with  the  cavalrv.  It  was  now  near  four 
o'clock,  and  Thomas  was  in  person  at  Schofield's  j)osition, 
from  which  Shy's  Hill,  and  the  whole  range  south,  to  the 
Brentwood  Hills,  were  iu  full  view. 

The  whole  connection  of  events  will  be  best  understood 
if  we  now  return  to  the  left  flank,  where  Wood  had  been 
making  anxious  examination  of  the  enemy's  position  ou 
Overton's  Hill,  and  upon  the  report  of  a  reconnoissan(;^e  by 
Colonel  Post,  had  determined  to  try  the  chances  of  an  at- 
tack there.  The  assault  from  the  Fourth  Corps'  position 
was  assigned  to  Post's  Ijrigade  of  Beatty's  division,  sup- 
ported by  Streight's.  Thompson  s  colored  brigade,  of  Steed- 
man's  command,  supported  by  Grosveuor's  brigade,  were  to 
attack  at  the  same  time  from  the  east.  A  concentrated 
artillery  fire  upon  the  hill  preceded  the  assault,  and  at 
three  o'clock  the  order  to  advance  was  given.  A  cloud  of 
skirmishers  ran  forward  to  draw  the  enemy's  fire  and  to 
annoy  the  artillerists  in  the  works,  and  the  brigades  in  lino 
followed  them.  Nearing  the  intrenchmcnts,  they  rushed 
forward,  some  of  the  men  gaining  the  parapet,  but  they 
were  received  with  so  hot  a  fire,  that  they  could  not  endure 
it,  and  after  a  sh(U-t,  sharp  struggle  they  recoiled.  Their  re- 
treat was  covered  by  the  rest  of  Beatty's  division  and  Steed- 
man's  reserves,  and  by  the  artillery.  These  were  so  handled 
that  the  enemy  did  not  venture  from  his  works,  and  our 
wounded  were  brought  safely  off;  but  the  casualties  were 
probably  half  of  all  that  occurred  in  the  l)attle,  adding  an- 
other to  the  many  proofs  of  the  terrible  disadvantage  at  which 
a  direct  assault  of  a  well  intrenched  line  is  usually  made. 
Colonel  Post  was  killed,  and  the  loss  in  officers  was  heavy, 
for  they  exposed  themselves  fearlessly  in  loading  their  men. 
Vol.  X.— G 


tkife 


122  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLR 

At  the  angle  in  the  Confederate  works  hold  by  Bate,  at 
Shy's  Hill,  the  circumstances  were  ditierent.  His  lines,  as 
we  have  seen,  were  enfiladed  and  taken  in  reverse ;  his  para- 
pet was  levelled  for  yome  distance ;  the  closeness  of  Ck)uch's 
batteries,  the  near  approac:h  of  onr  skirmishers,  the  attenua- 
tion of  Bate's  troops,  the  cover  for  the  approach  of  the  as- 
sailing force  under  the  hill-slope,  all  combined  to  neutralize 
the  advantage  of  modern  weapons,  and  to  give  the  assault 
the  preponderance  of  chances  which  justify  it.  While  the 
fire  upon  the  angle  was  kejit  up  with  increasing  severity, 
McAi'tlmr  ordered  Colonel  McMillan  to  form  his  brigade 
in  the  hollow  before  Couch's  works,  and  when  they  should 
be  half-way  up  the  hill,  the  brigades  to  the  left  were  to  ad- 
vance in  echelon^  attacldng  the  lower  line  before  them. 

Wilson's  dismounted  cavalry  had  been  advancing  from  the 
south,  gaining  position  after  position,  and  increasing  their 
ardor  as  thev  advanced.  Their  immbers  enabled  them  to 
outflank  Govan's  brigade,  which  Hood  had  sent  to  assist 
Chalmers  in  holding  them  back,  and  as  they  approached 
Schofield's  position  Stiles's  brigade  of  infantry  came  in 
close  support."  The  balls  from  this  attacking  force  were 
now  falling  in  rear  of  Bate  and  Lowry,  and  the  men  of  Cle- 
burne's old  division  were  vainly  trying  to  form  a  line  long 
or  strong  enough  to  match  that  which  was  coming  from  the 
south.  Wilson  had  gone  in  j^erson  to  Thomas,  at  Schofield's 
position,  to  reix>rt  what  his  men  were  doing,  and  reached 
him  just  as  McMillan's  brig-ade  was  seen  to  rush  forward 
upon  the  slope  of  Shy's  Hill.  At  a  sign  from  Schofiold, 
Cox's  division  started  also  on  the  run,  Doolittle's  brigade  in 


•  In  his  report  General  Schofleld  expressed  some  disappointment  that  th's  bri- 
gade hatl  not  been  able  to  get  forward  faster ;  but  Colonel  Stiles's  account  of  the 
mutter  and  of  the  nature  of  tlio  ground  sliow  that  ho  accomplished  all  that  could 
be  expected  of  so  Knmll  a  force  moving  over  rough,  detached  hilla. 


BATTLE  OF  ;NASHV1LLE.  123 

advanco.  Wilson  turned  to  gallop  back  to  his  command, 
but  before  he  could  get  half-way  there,  the  whole  Confede- 
rate left  was  crushed  in  like  an  egg-shell. 

McMillan  swept  unchecked  over  Bates's  mined  line  at  Shy's 
Hill.  The  gallant  Colonel  of  the  Thirty-seventh  Georgia  did 
all  that  man  could  do  to  hold  it,  and  dying  at  his  post,  gave 
to  the  height  the  name  it  bears.  The  arch  was  broken ; 
there  were  no  resei-ves  to  restore  it,  and  from  right  and  left 
the  Confederate  troops  peeled  away  from  the  works  in  wild 
confusion.  From  the  heavy  earthwork  in  front  of  Dooli+'' 
one  volley  of  cannon  and  small  arms  was  fired,  but  in  the 
excitement  it  was  aimed  so  high  as  to  do  no  mischief,  and 
Cox's  whole  division  was  over  the  works  before  they  could 
reload.  At  the  same  time  Hatch  and  Knipe,  with  their  divi- 
sions of  dismounted  men,  rushed  in  from  the  right,  and, 
abandoning  their  artillery,  the  Confederates  west  of  the 
Granny  White  road  crowded  eastward,  running  for  life. 
Some  were  killed,  many  were  captured,  and  Smith's  and 
Schofield's  men  met  uj)on  the  turnpike  at  right  angles,  and 
were  halted  to  prevent  their  organizations  from  being  con- 
fused together. 

Hubbard's  brigade,  of  McArthnr's  division,  which  followed 
McMillan's  movement,  met  with  more  resistance,  and  suf- 
fered more  severely ;  but  though  some  of  the  Confederate 
regiments  held  tenaciously  to  their  works,  and  surrendered 
in  form,  most  of  the  troops  broke  their  organizations  entirely 
when  the  advance  was  taken  up  from  centre  to  wings,  and 
Wood's  divisions  now  charged,  with  hardly  a  show  of  opposi- 
tion, over  Overton's  Hill,  from  which  they  had  been  driven 
back  an  hour  before. 


CHAPTER  Vn. 

THE  PURSUIT  AFTER   THE    BATTLE— RESULTS  OP  THE 

CAMPAIGN. 

Nmirr  was  falling  when  the  victory  was  complete,  and  a 
drenching  rain  had  set  in  to  add  to  the  darkness  and  confu- 
sion. Thomas  ordered  "Wood  to  pursue  by  the  Franklin 
road,  and  the  cavalry  by  the  Granny  White  road,  to  the  in- 
tersection with  that  to  Franklin,  when  Wilson  was  to  take 
the  advance.  Smith  and  Schofield  were  ordered  to  follow 
Wilson  on  the  next  day.  But  few,  if  any,  of  the  Confederates 
fled  by  the  Granny  White  turnpike,  for  it  was  commanded 
by  Wilson's  cavaliy,  and  the  masses  streamed  through  the 
Brentwood  Hills,  making  the  best  of  their  way  to  the  Frank- 
lin road.  There  was  hardly  the  semblance  of  organization 
among  them  till  they  passed  the  Harpeth  River.  Forrest 
was  ordered  to  retreat  on  Shelbyville  and  Pulaski,  but  he 
hurried  Armstrong's  brigade  of  cavalry  across  country  to 
get  in  rear  of  Hood's  routed  forces  and  cover  their  retreat. 
Reynolds's  and  Coleman's  brigades  had  been  taken  from  the 
line,  at  the  last  moment,  to  cover  the  passes  through  the 
Brentwood  Hills  from  the  Granny  White  road,  and  had  pre- 
served their  organization.  By  delaying  the  advance  of  Wil- 
son's horsemen  toward  the  Franklin  turnpike,  these  brigades 
had  saved  the  larger  part  of  Hood's  army  from  capture. 
The  hospitals  at  Franklin  were  abandoned,  containing  over 
two  thouaaud  wounded.    Wilson,  with  his  cavalry,  had  como 


TLE.  125 

up  with  the  rear  guard  four  uiiles  north  of  Franklin,  at  Hol- 
low Tree  Gajj,  and  Knipe'.s  division,  chargiuf?  it  in  front  and 
flank,  carried  the  position,  capturing  over  four  Imndi'ed 
prisoners  and  their  colors.  At  the  Harpeth,  Johnson's  divi- 
sion crossed  some  distance  below,  and  compelled  Hood  to 
abandon  the  defence  of  the  river  at  Franklin.  At  Ruther- 
ford Creek,  on  the  18  th,  the  water  was  up,  the  stream  was  a 
torrent,  and  some  delay  in  getting  a  jiontoon  train  forward 
gave  the  enemy  a  little  respite.  At  Columbia,  Forrest  re- 
joined Hood,  and  his  cavalry,  with  an  infantry  rear  guard 
under  command  of  "Walthall,  covered  the  retreat  to  the  Ten- 
nessee. General  Walthall's  force  was  made  up  of  the  two 
brigades  which  had  been  detached  with  Forrest,  and  of  three 
others  besides  his  own  division.'  This  force  was  able  to 
present  so  strong  a  front  that,  aided  by  the  condition  of  the 
roads  and  streams,  which  retarded  pursuit,  our  advance 
guard  was  not  able  to  break  through  again,  and  Hood 
reached  the  Tennessee,  at  Baixibridge,  by  way  of  Pulaski,  on 
the  2Gtli.  Here  he  was  favored  by  a  gleam  of  good  fortune 
in  the  arrival  of  pontoons,  which  had  been  floated  down 
from  Decatur,  where,  by  some  blunder,  they  had  been  left  by 
our  forces  when  General  Granger  had  evacuated  that  post  in 
Novembei*.*  Their  own  pontoon  train  was  delayed  by  the 
condition  of  the  roads,  and  part  of  the  defeated  army  passed 
the  Tennessee  before  it  arrived;  but  when  it  came  it  was 
laid,  and  Hood  had  his  shattered  forces  on  the  southern 
bank  by  the  evening  of  the  27th.     A  Confederate  account 


'  Feathcrston's  brigade  of  Loring'fi  division,  Ileiskcll's  and  Field's  of  Lowry'a 
division,  were  the  three  others.  Coleman's  was  now  part  of  Walthall's  own  divi- 
Bion.    See  Appendix  B,  II. 

"  The  author  learns  from  olflcers  who  were  at  Decatur  that  the  pontoon  bridgo 
had  been  cut  loose,  with  the  expectation  that  it  would  be  taken  in  tow  by  gun- 
boats ;  but  he  is  unable  to  trace  the  responsibility  for  the  failure  either  to  take  it 
up  or  to  destroy  it. 


12G  FRANKLIN  AND   NASHVILLE. 

states  that  soon  after  tlio  first  bridge  was  down,  two  Na- 
tional gunboats  appeared  in  the  direction  of  Florence  and 
steamed  toward  it ;  but  General  Stewart  opened  upon  them 
with  a  battery  of  smooth  field  guns,  which  was  all  he  then 
had,  and  the  boats  desisted  from  the  attempt  to  break 
through  the  pontoons.' 

From  Franklin,  on  the  17th,  Thomas  had  ordered  Steetl- 
man  to  march  to  Murfreesboro,  and  thence  to  proceed 
by  rail  to  Decatur,  occiipying  the  jjosts  in  Northern 
Alabama  which  had  been  abandoned  earlier  in  the  cam- 
paign. At  the  close  of  the  month  Steedman  was  at  Decatur, 
Wood  was  near  Lexington,  in  North  Alabama,  thirty  miles 
southwest  of  Pulaski,  Smith  was  at  Pulaski,  and  Schofield 
at  Columbia.  Thomas  issued  his  orders  announcing  the 
close  of  the  campaign,  assigning  winter  quarters  to  the 
various  corps ;  but  directions  were  received  from  Washing- 
ton to  continue  operations.  The  expected  march  of  Sher- 
man northward,  from  Savannah,  made  it  important  that  no 
rest  or  time  for  concentration  should  be  given  the  enemy  in 
the  Gulf  States,  and  Thomas  prepared  for  a  new  campaign.. 

Among  the  results  of  the  two  days'  battle  at  Nashville 
had  been  the  capture  of  about  four  thousand  five  hundred 
piisoners,  and  fifty-three  pieces  of  artillery,  besides  small 
arms  in  great  number.  Among  the  prisoners  were  Generals 
Johnson,  Smith,  Jackson,  and  Kucker,  and  a  number  of 
regimental  ofiicers  commanding  brigades.  The  losses  in 
killed  and  wounded  on  both  sides  were  small,  compared 
with  the  material  results,  though  the  demoralization  of 
Hood's  army,  followed  so  soon  by  the  close  of  the  war, 
leaves   us  without  the  full  returns  which  are  necessary  to 


'  SergeantTtfajor  Cunningham's  pamphlet.  The  author  has  found  the  Btate- 
nient8  of  Mr,  Cunningham  so  accurate  when  he  has  the  means  of  verifying  them, 
that  he  does  not  feel  at  liberty  to  ignore  tliem  in  this  case. 


THE  PURSUIT   AFTER  THE  BATTLE,  127 

determine  the  casualties  on  the  Confederate  side.  Hood 
assembled  the  remnant  of  his  army  at  Tupelo,  Mississipjii, 
and  then  gave  furloughs  to  part  of  his  men  (particularly 
the  Teunesseeans),  and  asked  to  bo  relieved  from  the  com- 
mand of  the  army.  He  does  not  admit  a  loss  from  all 
causes,  from  December  15th  to  30tli,  as  groat  as  the  num- 
ber of  prisoners  taken  by  Thomas's  army  on  the  15th  and 
16th,  and  claims  that  he  reassembled  at  Tupelo  on  army  of 
18,500  effective  muskets.  These;  figures  are  nearly  worth- 
less for  any  historical  purpose.  General  Thomas's  return 
of  lu'isoners  captured,  and  deserters  received  during  No- 
vember and  December,  show  the  number  to  be  over  thir- 
teen thousand ;  besides  these  he  reports  the  capture  of  72 
cannon  and  3,000  muskets.  "We  shall  meet  with  some  of 
the  veterans  of  Hood's  army  again  in  the  Carolina^,  main- 
taining their  old  corps  organization ;  but,  for  the  time,  they 
were  scattered  and  demoralized,  and  seemed  almost  to  lose 
the  character  of  a  disciplined  amiy. 

Thomas's  losses  in  the  battle  of  Nashville  were  3,057,  of 
which  less  than  four  hundred  were  killed.  The  analysis  of 
these  figures  shows  that  the  Fourth  Corjis  suffered  a  little 
less  than  a  thousand  casualties,  of  which  two-thirds  were 
in  the  unsuccessful  attack  upon  Overton's  Hill.  Steedman's 
losses  were  over  eight  hundred,  and  nearly  all  of  them  seem 
to  have  occun'ed  in  the  same  assault,  those  of  his  second 
colored  brigade  (Colonel  Thomi)son's)  being  fifty  per  cent, 
heavier  than  in  any  other  on  the  field.  The  Sixteenth 
Corps  lost  750,  which  appear  to  have  been  pretty  evenly 
divided  between  the  two  days.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the 
attack  upon  the  angle  at  Shy's  Hill  was  not  a  costly  one, 
for  the  preceding  preparation  by  the  enfilading  artillery 
fire,  and  the  shape  of  the  ground,  which  enabled  McMillan 
to  approach  closely  before  exposing  his   men,  show  that 


128  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

Ruccoss  in  stieh  cases  (when  success  is  possible),  follows  tho 
use  of  projier  means.  Tho  total  nnmber  of  casualties  in 
McMillan's  brigade  was  118,  of  which  not  more  than  two- 
thirds  occuiTed  in  tho  final  assault,  and  they  were  less  than 
half  of  those  which  occurred  in  IIubl)ard's  brigade,  which 
went  forward  on  its  left  against  the  works  in  the  lower 
gi'ound,  and  where  Bate's  centre  and  right,  holding  on  with 
better  cover,  were  able  to  inflict  considerable  loss  beforo 
the  crushing  of  the  whole  of  Hood's  left  made  their  posi- 
tion untenable.  The  Twenty -third  Coiiis  was  in  reserve 
nearly  all  of  tho  first  day,  and  its  only  losses  worth  men- 
tioning were  in  Couch's  division,  when  carrying  the  hill 
close  to  Shy's  in  the  evening.  The  position  was  of  inestima- 
ble importance  for  one  so  cheaply  gained,  for  the  casualties 
were  only  150.  Those  of  the  other  division  in  the  final 
assault  were  less  than  twenty.'  As  nearly  always  happens  in 
a  panic,  the  break  of  the  enemy's  lino  was  so  sudden  and 
comidete  that  the  loss  was  almost  wholly  on  one  side.  Tho 
loss  in  the  cavalry  corps  was  329,  and  when  distributed 
among  the  three  divisions,  it  must  also  be  regarded  as 
trifling,  and  the  larger  part,  even  of  this,  undoubtedly  oc- 
curred in  carrying  the  redoubts  on  the  15th. 

These  considerations  show  that  the  success  was  due  chiefly 
to  the  tactical  combination  of  a  superior  force,  and  that 
moral  causes,  growing  out  of  the  preceding  part  of  tho 
campaign,  must  have  had  a  great  etiect  in  producing  dis- 
couragement among  Hood's  men,  and  j^redisposing  them  to 
panic  when  the  break  in  the  line  occurred.  Hood  was  evi- 
dently in  fault,  as  a  tactician,  on  the  15th,  when  he  allowed 
Thomas  to  array  his  whole  force  diagonally  beyond  his  left 
flank,  and  awaited  an  attack  in  such  a  position.  His  only 
hope  was  to  have  drawn  back  to  tho  Brent  svood  Hills  at 
once,  without  allowing  his  troops  to  become  engaged.     Ho 


THE  PUllSUIT  AFTER  THE  BATTLE.  129 

would  thus  have  saved  them  from  the  domoralizing  effect  of 
being  driven  from  position  after  position  on  the  first  day, 
and  from  the  conviction  (which  was  partly  the  cause  of  its 
own  fnltilnient),  that  they  were  wholly  unable  to  cojjc  with 
the  National  army.  On  the  morning  of  the  10th  he  issued 
orders  to  his  subordinates  to  ])repare  for  a  reti'cat  in  the 
(evening ;  but  he  could  not  withdraw  laider  fire,  and  the  de- 
cision was  reached  too  late  to  be  of  successful  accomi)lish- 
jnent.  The  evening  found  his  routed  army  a  disorganized 
crowd  flying  from  the  lost  battle-field. 

Hood's  retreat  from  Nashville  to  the  Tennessee  and 
Thomas's  pursuit  were  almost  equally  laborious  for  thcnr 
armies,  though  very  diflferent  in  their  effect  upon  the  spirits 
of  the  troops.  The  roads  were  in  horiible  condition,  even 
those  which  had  been  macadamized  being  almost  impass- 
able. The  ordinary  countr;f  roads  were  much  worse,  and, 
after  passing  Pulaski,  till  the  Tennessee  was  reached,  the 
wrecks  of  wagons  and  the  carcasses  of  animals  filled  the 
way.  Hood  had  been  forced  to  destroy  ammunition  to  get 
teams  to  take  forward  his  pontoons,  and  Wilson  and  Wood 
in  pursuit  had  been  obliged  to  leave  most  of  their  cannon, 
and  double  the  teams  of  the  rest.  On  getting  orders  from 
Washington  to  resume  the  campaign,  Thomas  ordered  Wood 
to  assemble  the  Fourth  Corps  at  Huntsville,  Ala,,  Hchofield, 
Smith,  and  Wilson  to  concentrate  at  Eastport,  Mississippi. 
Schofield  marched  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  Clifton  on  the 
Tennessee,  preparatory  to  taking  boats  up  the  river,  but 
other  orders  met  him  there,  transferring  him  to  a  distant 
field  upon  the  sea-coast. 

The  completeness  of  the  victory  at  Nashville  caused  a  joy- 
ful revulsion  of  feeling  throughout  the  Northern  States. 
The  impatience  of  the  President  and  of  General  Grant  had 
only  been  the  expression  of  a  feeling  which  all  the  country 
G* 


130  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

had  shared.  The  conviction  was  general  that  Hood  ought 
to  have  been  mot  much  nearer  the  Tennessee  River,  and  the 
fear  that  ho  woukl  be  allowed  to  march  to  the  Ohio  was  all 
but  universal.  Now,  however,  all  vied  in  giving  honor  to 
the  successful  general,  and  not  a  few  were  ready  to  blame 
the  authorities  at  Washington  for  having  doubted,  even  for 
a  day,  the  wisdom  of  Thomas's  management  of  the  early 
campaign.  The  President,  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  Gen- 
eral Grant  were  not  slow  or  stinting  in  their  congratulations, 
and  between  the  chief  actors  in  the  scene  a  coidial  good 
understanding  was  at  once  established.  On  the  one  hand, 
it  was  ungrudgingly  conceded  that  the  final  battle  had  been 
skilfully  delivered  and  crowned  with  the  most  satisfactory 
results;  on  the  other,  it  was  felt  that  the  anxiety  of  the 
early  December  days  was  reasonable,  and  that  the  demand 
for  prompt  action  was  such  a  stimulus  to  great  exertion  as 
the  resioonsible  authorities  of  a  government  may  apply  to  its 
most  trusted  officers  in  such  a  crisis,  without  giving  cause  for 
lasting  chagrin.  In  such  a  time,  the  reward  for  success  and 
the  responsibility  for  ill-fortune  may  neither  of  them  be  quite 
justly  proportioned  to  real  desert,  and  both  are  apt  to  be  ex- 
aggerated. In  war,  more  than  in  anything  else,  the  proverb 
*'  all's  well  that  ends  well "  is  the  jjopular  one,  and  the  popular 
sympathy  was  evidently  with  the  hero  of  the  great  victory. 

Few  men  have  the  qualities  which  deserve  public  confi- 
dence in  greater  measure  than  General  Thomas.  He  was  a 
patriot  whose  love  of  his  country  was  greater  than  his  at- 
tachment to  a  province ;  a  Virginian  who  refused  to  follow 
the  example  of  Lee  in  taking  a^  s  against  the  National 
Government  which  Washington  had  founded.  He  was  a 
man  of  large  mould  in  body  and  mind,  of  a  quiet,  modest 
dignity,  who  hated  pretence,  and  avoided  notoriety.  He 
was  transparently  true  to  his  superiors,  and  kindly  consid- 


THE  PURSUIT  AFTEH  THE  BATTLE.  131 

crate  to  liis  suborcliuates.  He  had  the  personal  courage 
which  wouhl  bo  ashamed  of  its  own  display  as  innoh  as  of  a 
cowardice,  but  which  seemed  simply  oblivious  of  danger 
when  duty  recjuired  a  risk  to  bo  taken.  Those  qualities 
made  him  always  a  trusted  lieutenant  to  his  chief,  and  wore 
the  basis  of  an  affectionate  and  respectful  attachment  in  his 
own  army  which  was  })eculiar.  His  real  and  unaffected 
aversion  to  taking  tlio  chief  responsibility  of  command  had 
kei)t  him  in  secondary  positions  when  his  rank  in  both  the 
regular  and  volunteer*  armies  would  have  made  him  the 
head  of  a  separate  army  in  the  field.  In  this  respect  he  was 
not  unlike  Hardee,  in  the  Confederate  Army,  who  also 
steadily  refused  a  supremo  command.  The  duties  of  the 
soldier,  and  the  exhibition  of  courage  and  skill  in  making 
the  details  of  a  cami)aign  successful,  were  easy  to  him  ;  but 
to  become  the  theme  of  discussion  in  Congress  and  in  the 
newsiiapers,  to  be  the  butt  of  ten  thousand  public  critics, 
and  to  carry  the  burden  of  plans  w'hose  failure  might  be 
ruin  to  the  country — this  he  hated  so  heartily  and  shrunk 
from  so  naturally,  that,  after  all  his  long  experience,  we 
have  seen  him  protesting  that  the  position  assigned  him  in 
this  last  campaign  was  "the  one  thing  he  did  not  want." 
That  these  qualities  in  some  degi'ee  unfitted  him  for  an  in- 
dependent command  cannoi  be  questioned.  The  veiy  anx- 
iety to  be  right,  if  it  is  excessive,  j^roduces  hesitation  in 
action  and  timidity  in  plan.  Under  such  conditions  the 
stimulus  from  without,  coming  in  the  form  of  urgency  from 
the  Government  and  command  from  the  General-in-Chief, 
may  not  have  been  wholly  unwelcome,  and  unquestionably 
added  vigor  to  the  final  movements. 

It  is,  however,  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  campaign  that  the 
steps  taken  were  most  open  to  question,  though  very  few  of 
the  oflOicers  and  men  who  served  there  had  any  exact  kuowl- 


132  FJIANKUN  AND  NA.SIIVILLK. 

0(1^0  of  tlio  moans  wliicli  wore  at  Oonoral  Thomas's  disposal, 
or  of  tho  mamior  in  which  thoy  woro  vised.  Tho  ma^'iiitiido  of 
tho  final  success  was  so  sjilcMidid,  that  it  seemod  to  i)rovt!  each 
step  toward  it  tho  l)ost  jjossiblo  ;  and  it  is  only  when  we  ex- 
amine the  oflicial  ovidenco  of  tho  nnmber  and  i)osition  of  tho 
troops  in  Ti^nnessee  that  we  are  ahlo  to  aj^ply  to  the  events 
which  followed  tho  tests  afforded  by  the  rules  of  military  art.' 

General  Thomas  tells  us  in  his  olllcial  rejjort  that,  had 
Hood  d(!layed  his  advance  from  Florence  Um  days  longer, 
ho  would  have  met  him  at  Columbia,  or  some  other  point 
south  of  tho  Duck  River.  An  early  concentration  in  front 
of  tho  enemy  is  thus  indicated  as  tho  controlling  purpose, 
and  Hood's  march  on  Nashville  is  recognized  as  the  result 
oidy  of  the  unforeseen  delays  in  tho  anival  of  General 
Smith  with  his  divisions.  Tho  military  student  of  the  cam- 
paign is  therefore  led  to  inquire  whether  a  concentration  of 
the  means  at  hand  wcmld  not  have  opposed  to  Hood  a  force 
"which  would  have  kept  him  at  least  south  of  Duck  lUver  till 
Smith  could  have  arrived. 

Communication  with  Sherman  was  broken  on  November 
12th,  and  Hood  began  liis  advance  from  Florence  on  the 
20th,  thoiTgh  it  was  not  till  the  2Gtli  that  his  infantry  was  all 
assembled  in  front  of  Columbia,  Schofield  having  aban- 
doned Pulaski  on  tho  22d.  A  fortnight  Avas  thus  unexpect- 
edly given  for  concentration,  and  the  resources  of  the  rail- 
ways were  at  Thomas's  disposal.  His  tri-monthly  return  of 
November  2()th  shows  a  force  in  Tennessee  of  59,534  olll- 
cers  and  men  "present  for  duty  equiiiped."  To  determine 
the  deductions  necessary  for  smaller  garrisons  and  bridge 

'  The  author  has  been  led  by  this  examination  to  conclusions  quite  different 
from  his  own  predilections.  lie  had  ussuniod,  in  common  with  moKt  of  hit?  com- 
rades in  that  campaign,  that  tho  Fourth  and  Twenty-third  Corps  were  the  only 
forces  available  to  oppose  Hood  until  tho  arrival  of  Major-General  A.  J.  Smith 
with  the  SLvtecnth  Corps. 


THI<:   I'UUSUIT   AFTER   TIIK   HATrLIO.  13J 

pnards,  no  better  niotliod  can  ho  used  than  to  make  tlioni 
the  samo  as  was  artnivUy  done  wlion  the  battle  of  NashviUo 
was  imminent.  AcUl  to  tl»(\se  a  ^yarrison  of  '2,500  for  Nash- 
ville and  Chattanooga  each,  and  we  shall  tind  still  remain- 
ing a  force  of  47,000  infantry  and  artilleiy,  and  abont  six 
thousand  eavaliy,  which  there  could  have  been  no  ditliculty 
in  assend)ling  at  Columl)ia  before  Hood  reached  there. 
After  Sherman  started  from  Home,  it  was  known  that 
Wheeler's  cavalry  had  hastened  after  him.  The  raid  of 
Breckenridge  into  East  Tennessee  was  a  feeble  diversion 
which  the  troops  in  that  part  of  Schofield's  department  were 
quite  able  to  meet.  Iloddey's  division  of  cavaliy  was  the 
only  Confederate  force  in  North  Alabama,  and  gave  no  trou- 
ble during  the  campaign.  Eveiything  combined,  therefore, 
to  point  to  an  immediate  concentration  in  front  of  Hood,  as 
the  true  policy  on  our  side.  General  R.  S.  Granger  was  at 
Decatur  on  November  1st  with  over  five  thousand  men. 
Steedman  could  have  Joined  him  there  with  the  live  thou- 
sand which  he  subsequently  took  to  Nashville.  The  bridge 
and  trestle  between  Pulaski  and  Athens  could  have  been  re- 
built, and  if  demonstrations  on  the  south  of  the  Tennessee 
did  not  keep  Hood  from  committing  himself  to  a  campaign 
north  of  the  river,  the  divisions  of  Steedman  and  Granger 
could  have,  joined  Schofield  at  Pulaski.  If  Thomas  had 
joined  them  there  or  at  Columbia  with  the  remainder  of  his 
available  force,  he  would  liave  been  superior  to  Hood  in 
everything  but  cavalry  from  the  beginning,  and  would  have 
been  able  himself  to  dictate  whether  a  battle  should  bo 
fought  before  the  arrival  of  Smith's  corps.'  From  the 
knowledge  of  the  facts  we  now  have,  it  would  seem  that 
Thomas  gave  undue  importance  to  the  necessity  of  having 

1  See  tables  in  Appendix  A. 


1,34  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.     . 

tho  Sixteenth  Corps  present  before  decisive  operations 
against  Hood.  When  the  battle  of  Nashville  was  fought, 
liousseau's  eight  thousand  or  more  at  Murfreesboro  were  as 
wholly  out  of  the  account  as  if  they  had  been  north  of  the 
Ohio,  and  nearly  five  thousand  of  Craft's  division,  besides 
the  post  garrison,  were  kept  in  the  works  at  the  city  with 
General  Donaldson's  employes,  and  were  not  brought  into 
the  action.  The  battle  was  fought,  therefore,  with  a  force 
numerically  less  than  it  would  have  been  if  Smith's  corps 
had  been  entirely  absent,  and  Eoussi  and  Cruft  had  been 
in  line  instead.  It  is  trae  that  a  good  many  new  regiments 
had  taken  the  place  of  old  ones ;  but  these  were  not  what 
is  commonly  meant  by  raw  recniits.  They  were  always  of- 
fleered  by  men  of  experience,  and  many  veterans  were  in 
the  ranks.  Four  thousand  of  them  swelled  the  old  divisions 
of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  there  was  no  complaint  that  they 
did  not  fight  well.  As  to  the  provisional  organization  of 
convalescents  and  furloughed  men  of  the  diflerent  corps 
with  Sherman,  their  conduct  in  Grosvenor's  brigade  in  this 
action,  and  subsecpientlj  '^n  the  North  Carolina  coast,  proved 
they  were  scarcely  distinguishable  from  veteran  troops 
under  their  accustomed  flags.  But  if  the  troops  had  not 
been  rf  the  best  quality,  there  would  be  no  less  need  of 
handling  them  according  to  the  principles  which  military 
experience  has  established,  and  a  rapid  concentration  would 
still  be  proper. 

When  Hood  began  the  campaign  in  earnest,  the  first 
movements  of  our  forces  w>  i'e  the  reverse  of  concentric. 
Gmnger,  instead  of  joining  Schofield,  was  sent  a  hundred 
miles  to  the  east,  and  the  garrison  at  Johnsonville  was 
taken  to  the  rear  of  Nashville.  This  would  seem  to  have 
been  with  the  idea  that  it  was  necessary  to  protect  the  rail- 
ways against  expected  raids.     If  so,  it  was  an  error,  for  had 


THE  PURSUIT  AFTER  THE  BATTLE.      135 

Hood  been  unwise  enough  to  have  detached  Forrest  for  such 
a  purpose,  ho  would  have  been  at  the  same  disadvantage  he 
subsequently  was  at  Nashville,  where  the  absence  of  the  hos- 
tile cavalry  made  the  opportunity  which  resulted  so  glori- 
ously for  ouv  arms.  No  raid  of  Forrest's  could  have  done 
more  damage  to  the  Chattanooga  Railroad  than  the  forced 
retreat  from  Pulaski  did  to  an  equally  important  line,  to 
say  nothing  of  the  damage  actually  done  to  the  former  while 
Hood  lay  in  front  of  Nashville. 

The  delay  in  concentration  was  also  fraught  with  the 
very  gravest  perils  to  the  portion  of  the  army  under  Scho- 
field.  It  was  Hood's  jjolicy  to  foi'ce  the  lighting  with  this, 
in  the  hope  of  destroying  or  capturing  it  before  it  could  be 
aided,  yet  nothing  was  farther  from  Thomas's  wish  than  that 
it  should  make  a  precipitate  retreat.  Had  it  reached  Nash- 
ville a  single  day  sooner,  Thomas  would  have  been  wholly 
unprepared  to  meet  his  adversary,  and  Steodman's  rein- 
forcements would  have  been  cut  oflf.  To  save  time,  Scho- 
field  took  the  gravest  risks  ;  bxit  as  he  well  said,  the  slight- 
est mistake  on  his  part,  or  the  failure  of  a  subordinate,  might 
have  proved  disastrous.  The  misconduct  of  Wagner  at 
Franklin  woiild  certainly  have  proved  so,  but  for  the  hero- 
ism of  Opdycke  and  "White  and  the  brave  men  of  their 
commands. 

A  consideration  of  all  the  facts  therefore,  seems  to  show 
that  Thomas  should  have  concentrated  everv  available  man 
in  front  of  Hood  before  the  latter  moved ;  and  that  the 
great  success  of  the  closing  part  of  the  campaign  was  in 
spite  of  this  error  in  its  Ijeginning,  and  by  no  means  because 
of  it.  The  difficulties  had  certainly  been  very  great,  and  to 
an  ordinary  man  they  would  have  been  overwhelming. 
There  was  a  gi'oat  scarcity  of  animals  for  the  cavalry,  for  the 
artillery,  for  the  ]iontoons,  and  for  the  wagon  trains,  while 


136  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

the  season  was  such  as  to  use  up  the  animals  with  double 
rapidity.  The  army  was  new  to  its  organization,  and  though 
it  did  all  that  an  army  could  do,  Thomas  could  hardly  have 
full  faith  in  it  till  it  had  been  jiroven.  But  through  all 
these  difficulties  a  triumph  was  achieved  which  has  been 
rarely  ecpialled,  and  without  which  even  Sherman's  position 
in  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy  and  on  the  communications 
of  its  only  remaining  great  army  must  have  lost  half  its 
signilieauco. 


CHAPTER  Vin. 

FORT  PISHEll. 

The  subsidiary  operations  wliicli  were  intended  to  co-o})- 
erate  with  Bherman's  mareli  northward  from  Savannah  wero 
two.  First,  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher  at  the  mouth  of 
Cape  Fear  River  in  North  Carolina,  and  second,  the  transfer 
of  Bcliofiekl  from  Middle  Tennessee  to  the  Carolina  coast, 
where,  with  the  Tenth  Corps  under  Major-Gencral  A.  H. 
Terry  and  the  Twenty-third  under  Major-General  Cox,  he 
was  to  reduce  Wilmington  and  advance  upon  two  lines 
from  that  city  and  from  Newborn  to  Goldsboro,  at  which 
place  it  was  expected  a  junction  with  Sherman  would 
be  made.  The  attack  ui)on  Fort  Fisher  was  practically 
simultaneous  with  Sherman's  departure  from  Savannah 
and  with  Schofield's  from  Clifton  on  the  Tennessee  Eiver; 
and  the  result  of  all,  accomplished  two  months  later,  was 
the  reunion  at  Goldsboro  of  the  army  which  Sherman 
had  led  at  Atlanta,  except  that  the  Tenth  Corps  was 
substituted  for  the  Fourth,  which  still  remained  at  the 
West. 

The  city  of  Wilmington,  which  had  been  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal ports  of  the  Confederacy,  is  on  the  left  bank  of  Capo 
Fear  River,  about  thirty  miles  from  the  ocean.  The  river, 
near  its  mouth,  runs  parallel  to  the  sea-coast,  the  sandy 
tongue  between,  called  Federal  Point,  being  hardly  more 
than  a  mile  wide  for  the  last  live  or  six  miles  of  its  length. 


138  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

Fort  Fisher  was  upon  the  southern  point  of  this,  ami  con- 
sisted of  sand  parai)ets  sodded  with  marsh  grass  on  the  slope, 
and  revetted  with  the  same.  The  land  face  extended  across 
the  tongue,  from  the  sea  beach  to  the  river,  something  over 
a  mile  from  the  point,  and  the  parapet  was  about  five  hun- 
dred yards  in  length.  The  sea-face  was  thirteen  hundred 
yards  long  from  the  bastion  where  it  joined  the  land  front 
to  a  work  known  as  the  mound  battery  at  its  southern  end. 
On  the  extreme  point  was  a  smaller  detached  work  known 
as  Fort  Buchanan,  mounting  four  heavy  guns.  Smith  Island 
lies  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  river,  giving  two  channels 
from  the  sea  into  the  harbor.  Fort  Fisher  with  Fort  Bu- 
chanan commanded  the  northern  entrance,  called  New  Inlet, 
and  on  the  main  land  south  of  the  entrance,  two  other  forts, 
Caswell  and  Johnson,  protected  the  principal  channel.  A 
village  of  pilots  and  fishermen,  called  Smithville,  lay  under 
the  guns  of  Fort  Johnson,  a  quaint  little  place  embowered 
in  live-oaks,  where  the  daring  men  lived  who  chose  the 
stormiest  nights  and  the  foggiest  days  for  piloting  in  the 
blockade  runners  upon  which  the  South  was  dependent  for 
its  commerce. 

Fort  Fisher  not  only  commanded  New  Inlet  where  the 
turns  of  the  channel  brought  every  entering  vessel  under 
its  guns,  but  the  narrowness  of  Federal  Point  gave  it  con- 
trol of  the  river  also ;  and  when  it  should  once  be  in  our 
possession  the  port  would  be  closed.  It  had  been  con- 
structed in  accordance  with  its  situation  and  use,  with  the 
two  long  faces  described,  but  open  at  the  back  upon  the 
river  and  having  only  a  light  rifle  trench  extending  from  the 
mound  battery  to  the  river,  facing  Fort  Buchanan.  As  any 
military  force  intending  to  attack  the  place  would  neces- 
sarily land  otit  of  cannon  range  to  the  northward,  the  land 
face  of  the  fort  was  the  most  elaborately  built.     Starting 


FORT  FISHER. 


139 


JFort  Fisher  and  Wilmiiigtou,  N.  C. 


140  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

from  fi  half  bastion  on  tho  river,  a  cnrtain  ran  to  tlio  bastion 
at  the  angle  on  tlio  sea.  The  parapet  was  abont  twenty 
feet  high,  with  a  shallow  ditch,  most  of  tho  sand  for  the 
work  l^eing  taken  from  the  interior.  Midway  the  cnrtain 
was  a  small  outwork  covering  an  entrance  to  the  fort.  Two 
field-pieces  in  this  gave  a  flanking  fire  upon  the  ditch  and 
assisted  the  guns  in  the  bastions  in  sweeping  the  front.  A 
heavy  loopholed  palisade  was  before  the  ditch  and  about 
fifty  feet  from  the  foot  of  the  slope.  This  front  was  armed 
with  twenty-one  heavy  guns  and  three  mortars.  A  formida- 
ble system  of  torpedoes  had  been  planted  beyond  the  pali- 
sade, to  be  discharged  by  electricity  from  within  the  fort. 
To  protect  the  guns  from  an  enfilading  naval  fire,  very  heavy 
traverses  had  been  built,  about  a  dozen  in  number,  at  right 
angles  to  the  parapet,  from  twenty-five  to  forty  feet  long, 
and  rising  ten  feet  above  the  gunners'  heads.  These  were 
strongly  built,  as  hollow  bomb-proofs,  and  served  both  as 
magazines  and  as  shelter  for  the  garrison  when  driven  from 
the  guns  by  a  cannonade  from  the  ficet.  A  large  interior 
magazine  and  some  stores  and  quarters  were  similarly  con- 
structed. The  sea-front  was  built  in  the  same  way,  but  was 
not  so  continuously  heavy  as  the  other,  the  guns  being 
groui)ed  in  batteries  connected  by  a  lighter  parai'jet  for  in- 
fantry. Twenty-four  guns  were  on  this  face,  and  among 
them  an  Armstrong  rifled  gun  of  150  lbs.  calibre,  mounted 
upon  a  solid  mahogany  candage,  a  gift  from  English  friends 
of  the  Confederate  cause.  The  armament  was  mostly  of 
eight-  and  ten-inch  columbiads,  interspersed  with  heavy 
rifled  cannon.  The  garrison  numbered  about  twenty-five 
hundred  men  under  Colonel  Lamb,  though  Major-General 
Whiting  was  present  in  the  fort  when  it  surrendered.* 


General  Terry  rciiorta  his  prisoners  at  2,083,  but  does  not  state  the  casualties 
among  the  Confederates. 


FOllT  FISHER.  Ml 

An  attempt  to  take  the  fort  in  December  had  been  f  niit- 
loss,  but  the  strong  opinion  of  Reai'-Admiral  Porter  and  of 
some  of  the  army  officers  that  it  could  be  taken,  led  to  the 
speedy  renewal  of  the  eflort.  General  Terry  was  put  in  com- 
mand of  Ames's  division  and  Abbott's  brigade  of  the 
Twenty-fourth  Corps,  and  Paine's  division  of  the  Twenty-fifth 
Corps,  with  two  light  batteries.  A  fleet  of  transports  con- 
veyed them  and  a  siege-train  to  the  rendezvous  on  the 
North  Carolina  coast,  where  they  met  Admiral  Porter's  fleet. 
Storms  delayed  the  landing,  which  was  effected  January 
13th,  upon  the  beach  about  five  miles  north  of  the  fort 
and  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  the  fleet.  The  shore  there  is 
a  mere  key  of  sand  a  few  hundred  yards  wide,  and  sepa- 
rated from  the  mainland  by  Myrtle  Sound,  a  long  and  shallow 
bay  of  which  the  outlet  is  at  Masonboro  Inlet,  a  few  miles 
further  north.  Nearly  two  hianclred  small  boats  from  the 
na%'j',  besides  steam-tugs  were  employed  in  taking  the  trooi)s 
from  the  transports  to  the  shore,  and  the  whole  was  done  be- 
tween eight  in  the  morning  and  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 
though  a  heavy  surf  beat  continuously  upon  the  open  coast. 

After  several  reconnoissances,  it  was  determined  to  estab- 
lish a  line  of  contravallation  across  the  point  about  two 
miles  from  the  fort,  which  should  jnotect  Terry's  camp  from 
any  attack  in  rear  during  his  operations.  This  line  was  es- 
tablished and  occupied  by  Paine's  division  and  Abbott's  bri- 
gade. The  interior  of  Federal  Point  and  the  part  of  the 
peninsula  along  the  river  is  a  shallow  fresh-water  swamp, 
overgrown  with  pines,  and  with  a  thicket  of  smaller  trees 
and  shrubs.  The  first  efforts  were  aimed  at  establishing 
the  line  farther  away  from  the  fort,  with  its  flanks  resting 
upon  the  swamps ;  but  these  were  found  to  be  so  shallow  as 
to  make  no  protection,  and  the  trench  was  therefore  put 
where  it  could  reach  from  river  to  the  sea.     Under  co\'er  of 


142  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

the  firo  of  the  fleet,  Curtis'a  brigade  of  Ames's  division  was 
moved  down  along  the  river  toward  the  fort,  and  reached  a 
small  unfinished  outwork  in  front  of  the  west  end  of  the 
land  face,  while  Terry,  with  General  Curtis  and  Colonel 
Comstock  of  General  Grant's  staff  (who  accompanied  the 
exp(Hlition  as  chief  engineer),  made  a  reconnoissance  within 
six  hundred  yards  of  the  works.  Curtis  had  approached 
the  fort  at  this  place  on  the  former  expedition,  and  the  re- 
sult of  the  reconnoissance  confirmed  his  opinion  that  it  was 
the  proper  point  for  an  assault,  which  it  was  determined  to 
make  the  next  day.  Admiral  Porter  was  requested  to  main- 
tain a  steady  fire  of  the  fleet  Tipon  the  works,  and  to  destroy 
the  i)alisade  in  front  of  the  ditch,  so  as  to  prevent  delay 
when  the  attacking  force  should  move  forward.  After  con- 
sultation, the  hour  of  3  p.m.  of  the  15th  was  fixed  for  the  as- 
sault, which  General  Ames  was  ordered  to  make  with  his 
division,  and  the  Admiral  ordered  a  party  of  sailors  and 
marines,  under  Commander  Breese,  to  land  and  attack  the 
bastion  at  the  sea-angle  at  the  same  time  with  Ames's  as- 
sault ujion  the  other  end  of  the  land  front. 

Admiral  Porter  had  maintained  an  occasional  fire  on  the 
fort  during  the  night,  and  at  an  early  hour  in  the  morning 
of  the  15th,  sixty  men-of-war  and  gunboats,  arranged  in  a 
great  curve  off  the  shore,  opened  a  steady  and  systematic 
cannonade  upon  it.  The  method  adopted  was  to  fire  slowly 
and  with  great  care  to  get  the  range  accurately,  taking  the 
traverses  in  regular  order,  and  endeavoring  to  dismount  the 
guns  between  them.  A  designated  section  of  the  fleet  di- 
rected their  fire  upon  the  palisade.  A  steady  rain  of  great 
projectiles  was  thus  kept  up  upon  the  fort,  many  of  them 
eleven  and  thirteen  inch  shells,  driving  the  infantry  of  the 
garrison  to  their  bomb-proofs.  The  Confederate  artillerists 
vainly  tried  to  match  the  persistent  cannonade  of  the  ships. 


PORT  FISHKR.  143 

One  by  one  their  {?uns  were  silenced,  many  were  dismounted 
and  broken,  till,  by  the  time  fixed  for  the  assault,  hardly 
any  of  the  larger  caimon  were  in  condition  to  be  used. 

Ames  had  kept  Curtis's  brigade  in  the  advanced  work  it 
had  occupied  the  evening  befoi'o,  with  Ponnypacker's  and 
Bell's  in  supporting  distance.  At  two  o'clo(!k  a  lino  of 
sharpshooters,  provided  with  shovels,  ran  forward  and 
established  themselves  in  pits  a  hundred  and  seventy-five 
yards  from  the  fort.  The  infantry  of  the  garrison  now  be- 
gan to  man  the  parapet,  and  opened  with  their  muskets 
upon  Curtis's  line,  which  advanced  to  a  point  about  four 
hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  sharpshooters,  when  they  also 
quickly  covered  themselves  with  a  shallow  trench  in  the 
sand.  Again  Curtis  was  moved  forward  to  the  cover  of  a 
little  ridge  in  the  sands  much  nearer  the  enemy,  while 
Pennypackor's  brigade  occupied  the  trench  he  had  left,  and 
Bell's  brigade  came  to  the  advanced  work,  which  had  been 
Curtis's  first  position.  The  signal  was  now  given  to  the 
fleet  to  change  the  direction  of  its  fire,  and  Curtis's  brigade 
rushed  at  the  end  of  the  half  bastion  next  the  river.  The 
ground  along  the  river  bank  was  marshy,  and  the  i)alisades 
wore  standing  in  some  places ;  but  a  party  of  axemen  with 
the  head  of  the  column  quickly  cleared  the  way  of  obstruc- 
tions, and  there  was  no  halt  till  the  men  swarmed  over  the 
parapet,  and  took  it  in  reverse  as  far  as  the  first  traverse.  At 
the  same  time  Commander  Breese's  storming  party  from  the 
ships  charged  upon  the  bastion  at  the  sea-angle,  but  the  enemy 
ran  forward  a  light  gun  or  two  in  the  bastion,  tind  another 
in  the  outwork  at  the  middle  of  the  curtain  opened  on  them, 
while  they  were  met  with  a  steady  musketry  fire  from  the 
parapet.  Their  position  had  none  of  the  advantages  of  Ames's, 
and  they  were  soon  driven  back  with  considerable  loss. 

At  the  river  side  Pennypacker's  brigade  went  forward  to 


lU  FUANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

Curtis's  support,  and  carviotl  tho  pali.sado  reaching  from  tho 
end  of  the  eartlnvork  to  tho  water,  taking  a  nnnihor  of  ims- 
onors.  A  hand-to-hand  conflict  began,  in  which  tho  garri- 
Ron  were  shiwly  drivcui  back  from  ono  traverse  to  anothm-. 
In  carrying  tho  third  traverse,  Colonel  rennyi)acker  fell 
badly  wounded  ;  Bell's  brigade  was  ordered  up  and  formed 
along  tho  river  within  tho  fort,  but  the  interior  was  full  of 
trenches  from  which  sand  for  the  parapet  had  been  dug,  and 
the  magazines  and  tho  ruins  of  barracks  and  storehouses 
made  tenable  defences  for  tho  garrison,  so  that  the  progress 
was  slow.  By  six  o'clock  nine  traverses  had  been  carried, 
and  Terry  now  ordered  to  Ames's  assistance  Abbott's  bri- 
gade and  the  Twenty-seventh  colored  regiment  from  Paine's 
division.  Abbott  was  able  to  complete  the  occupation  of 
the  land  front,  and  Ames  directed  a  general  advance  upon 
the  reverse  of  the  sea  front,  which  cleared  the  works  and 
took  full  possession  of  the  fort.  In  the  final  effort  Curtis 
had  been  wounded  in  the  head  by  a  canister-ball,  and  Colonel 
Bell  received  a  fatal  shot  while  leading  forward  his  brigade. 
The  garrison  retreated  precipitately  to  the  shelter  of  Fort 
Buchanan,  Avhere,  upon  the  advance  <1  Al)bott's  brigade 
against  them,  they  wovo  surrendered  Lite  in  the  evening  by 
General  Whiting  and  Colonel  Lamb,  their  commanders. 
AMiile  the  attack  upon  the  fort  was  going  on.  General 
Hoke  had  made  some  demonstrations  of  attack  upon  the 
line  of  General  Paine,  and  Commander  Brocse's  sailors  and 
marines  were  sent,  after  their  repulse,  to  strengthen  that 
line ;  but  'a  slight  skirmish  was  all  that  followed,  and 
Hoke  retired,  leaving  tho  garrison  to  its  fate.  The  fight- 
ing along  the  parapet  had  been  obstinate,  and  the  losses 
were  severe  in  proportion  to  the  numbers  engaged,  espe- 
cially in  officers,  of  whom  fifty  were  killed  and  wounded. 
The  casualties  in  the  rank  and  file  were  about  six  hundred. 


FOllT  FISHKR.  146 

From  the  time  the  assault  bogau  tho  aliijis  could  pivo  no 
fui'thor  assistaueo,  and  the  advantages  for  defen<*(i  wliirh  tho 
traverses  and  the  obstructions  within  tlu!  fort  gave,  were 
such  as  to  make  the  work  of  Ames  and  his  brigade  com- 
manders hardly  less  difKcult  than  the  assault  of  a  well- 
manned  field  fortification.  The  assault  of  tho  detachment 
from  tho  ships,  though  unsuccessful,  was  of  assistance  as  a 
diversion,  and  enabled  the  infantry  to  get  forward  fast(;r  than 
they  could  otherwise  have  done.  Tho  cannonade  from  the 
ships  appc^ars  to  have  destroyed  tho  connection  between 
the  torixsdoos  which  had  been  jjlaced  in  the  ground  along  the 
front  which  was  astrailcnl  and  the  electric  battery  within  tho 
lort,  for  no  explosions  took  place  end  the  attacking  i)artie3 
did  not  suffer  from  this  cause. 

The  victory  was  in  itself  an  important  one,  and  it  was  all 
the  more  grateful  to  the  country  because  of  the  chagrin  at 
the  so  recent  failure  of  Butler's  expedition  against  the  same 
fortress.  The  other  forts  near  Smithville  were  immediately 
abandoned  by  the  enemy,  and  their  armament  also  was  cap- 
tured, making  in  all  one  hundred  and  sixty-nine  cannon,  be- 
sides small  arms  and  stores,  and  over  two  thousand  prisoners. 
The  harbor  was  now  in  our  possession  and  blockade  run- 
ning was  nearly  ended.  General  Hoke,  tho  Confederate 
commander  of  tlio  District,  intrenched  himself  with  his  own 
and  the  remainder  of  Whiting's  divisions,  on  a  lino  reaching 
from  Myrtle  Sound  to  Capo  Fear  Piiver,  a  mile  or  two  above 
the  southern  end  of  the  Sound.  Nearly  oj^posite  this  line, 
upon  a  projecting  i)oint  of  tho  right  bank  of  the  river,  was 
Fort  Anderson,  a  heavy  earthwork,  either  built  or  enlarged 
and  strengthened  at  this  time.  From  this  point  also,  the 
channel  was  planted  with  torpedoes,  and  full  uso  was  made 
of  all  the  means  for  obstructing  the  i)assage  of  tho  fleet 
which  the  ingenuity  of  the  Confederates  had  devised. 
Vol.  X.-7 


i^%l 


T\m^:^ 


CHAPTER  IX. 

CAPTURE  OF  WILMINGTON-BATTLE  OF  KINSTON. 

The  orders  which  had  beon  sent  General  Hchofleld  to 
move  the  Twenty-third  Corps  eastward  reached  him  on 
January  14th.  liivor  transports  took  the  troops  down  the 
Tennessee  and  up  the  Oiiio  to  points  where  railway  trans- 
portation could  be  got,  and  the  transfer  to  Washington  and 
Alexandria  was  then  completed  by  rail.  The  distance  trav- 
elled was  fourteen  hundred  miles,  and  the  corps  was  ready 
to  take  ship  before  February  1st ;  but  the  unusual  severity 
of  the  winter  weather  had  frozen  the  Potomac  liiver,  and  it 
was  not  till  the  4th  that  the  first  detachments  of  the  troops 
sailed.  Meanwhile  Schofield  had  joined  General  Grant  at 
Fortress  Monroe  and  had  accompanied  him  to  the  mouth  of 
Cape  Fear  River  to  hold  a  consultation  with  General  Terry 
and  Admiral  Porter  with  regard  to  future  operations  'u  the 
Department  of  North  Carolina,  as  the  new  command  was 
designated.  The  result  was  the  decision  to  make  Wilming- 
ton the  first  objective  point  of  the  campaign,  so  that  a  new 
base  might  be  secured  for  Sherman  if  circumstances  should 
oblige  him  to  concentrate  his  army  south  of  Goldsboro. 
The  first  step  accomplished,  Schofield's  task  would  be  to 
open  the  route  from  Newberne  to  Goldsboro,  rebuilding  the 
railway,  and  uniting  both  his  corjDS  there  in  time  to  meet 
Sherman  for  the  final  operations  of  the  general  campaign  when 
the  concentration  of  the  gi*and  army  should  be  complete. 

Returning  to  Washington,  Schofiold,  embarked  with  Cox's 
division  on  February  4th,  leaving  the  rest  of  the  corps  to  fol- 


148  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

low  as  fast  as  ships  coiild  be  procured.  A  gale  off  Cape 
Hattoras  delayed  the  transports  for  a  day  or  two,  but  the  di- 
vision landed  safely  at  Fort  Fisher  on  the  9th.  The  fort 
still  bore  evidence  of  the  extraordinary  bombardment  it 
had  undergone,  and  its  broad  sandy  interior  was  thickly 
strewn  with  great  shells  rasted  red  in  the  weather,  and  re- 
sembling nothing  so  much  as  a  farmer's  field  strewn  with 
pumpkins.  On  the  11th  Terry's  line  Mas  advanced  close 
enough  to  that  of  the  enemy  to  compel  him  to  hold  it  in 
force.  The  next  night  the  attempt  was  made  to  convoy 
pontoons  up  the  coast  by  the  navy,  while  Cox's  and  Ames's 
divisions  marched  along  the  beach  to  receive  the  boats,  haul 
them  over  the  sands  and  lav  a  bridge  across  Mvrtle  Sound  in 
a  narrow  place  in  rear  of  Hoke.  The  Aveatlif^r  became  so 
stormy,  however,  that  the  boats  could  not  bo  brought  to 
the  rendezvous  and  the  infantry  marched  back  to  their 
camps  before  morning.  The  night  was  dark  but  intensely 
cold,  and  the  gale  from  the  ocean  seemed  to  find  every 
button-hole  in  the  men's  clothing,  and  to  chill  them  to  the 
marrow.  A  severe  northeaster  swept  the  coast  for  several 
days,  but  on  the  night  of  the  14th  a  new  attempt  was  made 
to  move  the  jiontoons  to  the  selected  place.  This  time 
the  boats  were  put  on  their  wagons  and  all  the  scanty  supply 
of  horses  and  mules  was  used  to  haul  them  forward  along 
the  beach.  The  high  tide  and  surf  proved  too  great  a 
hindrance ;  the  sand,  Mhere  not  washed  by  the  water,  was 
too  deej)  and  soft  for  the  teams,  and  where  thu  «'aves  broke, 
the  sea  was  too  much  for  them ;  so  this  also  had  to  be  given 
up.  Before  they  reached  the  appointed  po.^ition  the  moon 
rose,  revealing  the  naval  squadron  in  the  ofHug,  and  reveal- 
ing also  the  marching  troops  to  the  enemy,  who  were  put 
upon  the  aleii  to  defeat  the  tsffort  to  cross  the  Sound. 
Scholield  uow  determined  to  try  the  right  bank  of  the 


CAPTUllK   OF   WILMINGTON.  149 

river,  whore  there  was  at  least  room  for  manoeuvre,  although 
the  country  was  very  swampy  and  filled  with  ponds  and 
lakes.  Cox's  and  Ames's  divisions  were  ferried  to  Smith- 
ville,  where  they  were  joined  by  Moore's  brigade  of  Couch's^ 
division,  just  landed,  and  the  whole,  under  command  of  Gen- 
eral Cox,  was  directed  to  advance  upon  Fort  Anderson  and 
attempt  to  turn  it.  The  vessels  of  the  fleet  had  from  time 
to  time  engaged  the  fort  at  long  range,  and  Admiral  Porter 
ordered  a  section  of  them  to  renew  the  fire  when  the  land 
forces  should  advance.  General  Schofield  made  his  head- 
quarters temporarily  upon  a  steamer,  jjassing  from  one  bank 
to  the  other  as  circumstances  required. 

The  IGth  was  used  in  getting  the  troops  over  the  bay  with 
a  few  field  pieces  and  a  small  ti'aiu  of  wagons.  Cox's  divi- 
sion marched  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  meeting  the 
enemy's  cavalry  within  two  or  three  miles  of  the  village, 
and  pressing  them  back  by  a  continuous  skirmish  till  within 
two  miles  of  the  fort,  established  a  lino  with  the  right  flank 
resting  on  the  river,  and  opened  communication  with  the 
fleet,  having  marched  ten  miles  during  the  day.  Next 
morning  the  advance  was  resumed  and  the  enemy  driven 
within  the  fortifications.  A  reconnoissance  s1iow(h1  that  be- 
sides the  principal  fort  upon  the  river,  a  lino  of  infantry 
trench  ran  at  right  angles  from  the  bank  to  the  foot  of  Orton 
Pond,  a  lake  several  miles  long,  giving  it  a  front  which  could 
not  be  turned  except  by  a  long  detour.  The  line  was  pro- 
tected by  abatis,  and  epaulements  for  field  artillery  were 
seen  in  jilaces  along  it,  from  which  a  rapid  fire  with  shrap- 
nel was  opened  as  the  National  forces  came  within  range. 
In  accordance  with  his  orders.  Cox  intrenched  two  brigades 
to  invest  the  fort  on  this  side,  and  with  two  others  marched 
for  the  head  of  Orton  Pond,  sending  directions  to  Ames's 
division  to  join  him  there.     The  detour  recjuired  a  march  of 


150  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

about  fifteen  miles,  and  it  was  almost  niglit  when  the  cause- 
way through  the  marsh  at  the  head  of  the  pond  was  reached. 
The  enemy  made  a  sharp  resistance  with  cavalry,  but  by 
sending  detachments  on  the  flanks  to  pass  the  swamps  by 
wading,  the  crossing  was  forced  and  high  ground  beyond 
was  occiipied.  During  the  day  the  fleet  had  continued  a 
cannonade  of  the  fort,  and  demonstrations  had  been  kept  up 
by  the  two  brigades  in  position.  In  the  night  the  enemy 
abandoned  the  place,  and  the  troops  hastening  forward  by 
the  west  side  of  Orton  Pond  to  complete  their  work,  were 
met  by  the  news  that  the  fort  was  in  our  possession,  with 
ten  pieces  of  heavy  ordnance  which  made  its  armament. 

On  the  right  bank  of  the  river  the  enemy  retreated  to 
Town  Creek,  destroying  bridges  and  obstructing  the  road. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  river  he  fell  back  to  a  strong  i^osi- 
tion  opposite  the  mouth  of  Town  Creek,  covered  by  swamps 
on  the  east.  General  Terry  followed  Hoke's  retreat  up  the 
left  bank,  and  it  appearing  that  the  greater  part  of  Hoke's 
force  was  in  his  front,  Ames's  division  was  taken  back  to  that 
side  on  the  19th,  while  Cox  continued  his  advance  to  Town 
Creek,  eight  miles  above  the  fort,  driving  a  rear  guard  be- 
fore him.  Town  Creek  is  a  deep,  unfordable  stream,  with 
marshy  banks,  which,  near  the  river,  had  been  dyked  and 
cultivated  as  rice-fields.  A  strong  line  of  earthworks  h^d 
been  built  on  the  north  bank  of  the  stream  before  tiit. 
evacuation  of  Fort  Anderson,  and  in  them  were  a  Whitworth 
rifled  cannon  and  two  smooth  twelve-pounder  field  pieces. 
Hagood's  brigade,  of  Hoke's  division,  strengthened  by  an- 
other Confederate  regiment,  held  the  works,  and  had  re- 
moved the  planking  from  the  bridge.  The  artillery  swept 
the  long  causeway  through  the  marsh  by  which  the  bridge 
must  be  approached. 

Henderson's  brigade  was  advanced  to  the  edge  of  the  low 


CAPTURE  OF   WILMINGTON.  151 

ground,  and  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers  worked  tlieir  way 
through  the  marsh  to  the  edge  of  the  stream.  Careful 
reoonnoissance  was  made  above  and  below,  and  during  the 
night  a  small  flat-boat,  of  the  kind  used  for  collecting  the 
rice  crop,  was  found  a  mile  or  two  down  the  creek,  and  was 
secured  and  guarded.  The  north  bank,  <jccupied  by  Hagood, 
was  a  bluff  near  the  bridge,  rising  twenty  or  thirty  feet  from 
the  water.  Farther  below  the  ground  falls  off  into  marsh 
and  rice  fields,  bordered  by  forest,  whic!h  hid  them  from 
view.  The  situation  was  rei)orted  to  General  Schotield,  with 
Cox's  purpose  to  cross  part  of  his  force  at  the  place  below 
the  bridge,  by  means  of  the  flat-boat,  in  the  morning.  The 
vessels  of  the  navy  had  ascended  the  river,  keeping  pace 
with  the  troops  on  tlie  shore,  removing  torpedoes  and  ob- 
structions as  they  advanced,  and  prepared  to  assist  the  army 
by  shelling  any  of  the  enemy's  positions  they  coi^ld  roach. 
The  Confederates  were  careful,  however,  to  select  their 
points  of  defence  out  of  range  from  the  river  after  the  evacua- 
tion of  Fort  Anderson. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  20th  Henderson's  brigade  re- 
newed active  demonstrations  on  Hagood's  front,  while  the 
slow  work  of  ferrying  the  other  brigades  Avent  on.  The  boat 
would  carrv  onlv  fiftv  men,  and  the  marshes  and  dvkes  were 
impassable  for  animals,  so  that  the  mounted  officers  left 
their  ^  rses  behind.  Casement's  and  Sterl's  brigades  were 
all  the  morning  getting  over.  Henderson's  sharpshooters 
had  succeeded  in  getting  cover  so  close  to  the  creek  as  to 
l)revent  any  of  the  enemy  from  sliowing  themselves  above 
the  parapet.  The  "SVhitworth  gun  had  also  been  disabled 
by  our  artillery  fire.  Moore  was  now  ordered  to  cross  his 
brigade,  and  about  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  Cox  assem- 
bled the  three  brigades  on  the  north  edge  of  the  swamp, 
which  they  had  succeeded  in  wading.     The  impracticability 


152  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

of  the  countiy  had  been  so  relied  npon  by  the  enemy  that 
no  pickets  were  found  posted,  and  the  division  was  marched 
rapidly  to  the  west  till  it  crossed  the  road  leading  to  Wil- 
minf^on,  about  two  miles  in  rear  of  the  Confederate  position. 
Moore  was  ordered  to  march  still  farther  westward  to  reach 
a  parallel  road,  and  prevent  escape  in  that  direction.  Case- 
ment and  Stevl  were  formed  facing  toward  the  creek,  and 
marching  rapidly  forward,  made  the  attack.  The  brigade, 
commanded  by  Colonel  Simonson  in  Hagood's  absence, 
made  a  brave  resistance,  but  was  broken  by  a  charge.  Si- 
monson  had  begun  a  line  of  breastworks  facing  to  the  rear, 
upon  hearing  of  the  presence  of  the  National  troops,  and 
leaving  a  small  force  to  hold  the  dismantled  bridge,  lie  had 
formed  here ;  but  the  charge  swept  eveiything  away,  and  he 
himself,  with  three  hundred  and  seventy-five  of  his  men  and 
both  his  cannon,  were  captured.  The  rest  of  the  brigade  fled 
by  the  "  old  public  roatl "  toward  which  Moore  had  been  sent ; 
but  the  latter  did  not  reach  it  in  time  to  intercept  them. 

The  bridge  was  repaired  during  the  night,  and  Cox  re- 
sumed his  ,march  in  the  morning.  Hoke  held  stubbornly  to 
his  position  in  front  of  Terry,  and  the  column  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river  was  therefore  directed  by  Schofield  to  pro- 
ceed cautiously  toward  Wilmington,  to  ascertain  the  condi- 
tion of  the  Wilmington  and  IManchester  Railway,  and  take 
advantage  of  any  opportunity  to  get  possession  of  the  cross- 
ing of  Brunswick  River,  which  is  the  name  given  to  the  west 
channel  of  Cape  Fear  River,  where  it  passes  around  Eagle 
Island,  in  front  of  the  citv.  About  noon  Mill  Creek  was 
reached,  six  miles  from  the  last  camp,  and  the  bridge  was 
found  to  be  burned.  This  caused  a  couple  of  hour's  delay 
till  it  could  be  repaired  so  that  the  artillery  could  i)ass. 
The  negroes  of  a  large  plantation  there  made  the  most  ex- 
travagant jubilation  over  the  advent  of  the  National  troops. 


CAPTURE  OF  WILMINGTON.  153 

The  forage  and  provisions  were,  as  nsual,  applied  to  militai*y 
use,  but  the  recent  slaves  assumed  ownership  of  the  house- 
hold goods  in  the  deserted  plantation  homestead,  and  comi- 
cal disj^utes  were  witnessed  among  the  women,  as  they 
claimed  title  to  a  bed  or  a  table  because  they  had  long  since 
mentally  appropriated  it,  and  inwardly  determined  to  make 
it  theirs  when  this  eagerly  expected  day  shoulJ  come.  This 
novel  administration  upon  an  estate  was  conducted  as  if  tlio 
world  could  never  have  another  dark  day  for  them ;  hnt  it 
was  followed,  within  twenty-four  hours,  by  a  scrioiis  revul- 
sion of  feeling,  when  they  learned  that,  in  a  country  eaten  np 
by  an  army,  it  became  a  troublesome  question  to  tell  how 
even  they  could  live. 

By  the  time  the  bridge  was  rebuilt  the  troops  had  eaten 
their  noon  meal  and  marched  more  rapidly  to  Brunswick 
ferry.  The  iniins  of  the  railway  bridge  were  still  smoking, 
for  it  had  been  burned  only  that  morning.  A  pontoon 
bridge  had  been  at  the  ferry,  and  in  the  hasty  retreat  the 
order  to  scuttle  and  destroy  the  boats  had  been  so  incom- 
pletely carried  out  that  more  than  half  of  them  were  unin- 
jured, and  many  of  the  rest  could  be  quickly  repaired. 
This  work  was  immediately  begun,  while  some  of  the  boats 
were  used  to  ferry  a  detachment  over  to  the  island,  which 
was  about  a  mile  wide,  but  an  almost  unbroken  marsh.  A 
causeway  led  to  the  city  feriy,  but  an  epaulement  had  been 
made  across  this  near  the  further  end,  and  a  cannon  or  two 
swept  the  nan'ow  road.  The  advanced  guard  was  ordered 
to  deploy  skirmishers  in  the  swamp  and  drive  off  the  gun- 
ners if  possible.  A  fitld  battery  of  rifled  guns  was  put  in 
position,  on  a  rise  of  ground  on  the  west  bank,  to  cover  the 
detachment  on  the  island,  and  the  explosion  of  some  of  its 
shells  in  the  city  helped  to  hasten  matters  by  showinr  that 
the  town  was  within  range.  Meanwhile  the  work  of  repair- 
7* 


154  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

ing  the  pontoons  was  Immed,  and  reconnoissances  made  in 
the  vicinity.  Some  railway  employes  came  into  camp  and 
from  them  was  learned  the  falsity  of  a  rumor  that  General 
Hardee  had  brought  his  Charleston  troops  to  "Wilmington. 
Great  columns  of  smoke  soon  began  to  ascend  in  the  city, 
telling  of  the  destruction  of  naval  stores,  and  of  preparation  * 
to  evacuate  the  town. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  a  despatch  was  received  from  Gen- 
eral Schofield,  stating  that  Terry  had  been  unable  to  make 
progress,  and  had  evidence,  which  seemed  reliable,  that 
Hoke  had  been  largely  reinforced.  Cox  was  therefore 
ordered  to  return  down  the  river,  and  be  ferried  over  to  the 
left  bank.  Sure  that  the  evidence  before  him  made  the  im- 
mediate evacuation  of  the  city  certain,  he  put  only  one  bri- 
gade in  motion,  and  reported  fully  the  circumstances.  The 
great  difficulty  couriers  found  in  reaching  the  points  on  the 
swamp-lined  river,  where  they  could  communicate  with  the 
fleet  and  get  a  boat  to  put  them  over,  made  it  midnight 
before  a  mutual  understanding  could  be  reached  and  differ- 
ent directions  from  Schofield  could  be  received ;  but  the 
latter  warmly  approved  his  subordinate's  exercise  of  discre- 
tion, in  remaining  with  the  greater  part  of  the  division  in 
apparent  disobedience  of  reiterated  orders.  Hoke's  appear- 
ance of  resuming  the  aggressive  proved  to  have  been  a  de- 
monstration to  cover  his  retreat  during  the  night,  and  the 
city  was  entered  without  opposition  at  daybreak  next  morn- 
ing, thus  celebrating  Washington's  birthday  by  the  comple- 
tion of  another  important  step  in  the  campaign. 

Several  things  combined  to  make  Newberne  a  more  useful 
base  of  supply  for  Sherman  than  Wilmington.  The  harbor 
at  Morehead  City  and  Fort  Macon  was  a  better  one  than 
that  at  the  mouth  of  Cape  Fear  Kiver,  and  would  admit  ves- 
sels of  deeper  draught.     The  railway,  between  the  harbor 


BATTLE  OF   KINSTON.  155 

and  Newberne,  some  forty  miles  long,  was  in  operation,  with 
some  locomotives  and  ears  already  there,  while  nothing  of 
the  kind  was  at  Wilmington,  the  enemy  having  carefully  re- 
moved all  railway  rolling  stock  on  that  line.  From  New- 
berne, much  of  the  way  to  Kinston  through  the  Dover 
Swamp,  the  iron  was  not  so  injured  that  it  might  not  be 
used  again,  and  the  reconstruction  of  the  railway  by  that 
route  would  be  both  easier  and  more  economical.  As, 
therefore,  a  safe  base  for  Hhorman  was  assured  at  Wilming- 
ton in  case  of  need,  Schofield  turned  his  attention  to  the 
work  of  preparing  a  still  better  lino  of  communication  from 
Newbern  to  Goldsboro. 

Several  thousand  convalescents  returning  to  Sherman's 
army  had  been  sent  from  Washington  to  Newbern,  and  a 
division  of  new  troops,  under  General  Ruger,  assigned  to  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  had  also  been  ordered  to  i)roceed  to 
that  place.  The  old  garrisons  of  the  district  would  fiirnish 
another  division.  On  February  26th  General  Cox  was  de- 
tached from  his  command  at  Wilmington,  and  ordered  by 
sea  to  Newbern  to  carry  out  the  purposes  described.  Col- 
onel Wright,  Sherman's  Chief  Engineer  of  Railways,  was 
ordered  to  the  same  point  to  take  charge  of  the  railway 
rebuilding.  Reaching  Newbern  on  the  last  day  of  Febru- 
ary, the  organization  of  forces  was  immediately  made.  The 
convalescents  were  formed  into  temporary  battalions,  with 
as  much  reference  to  their  former  associations  as  practica- 
ble, and  these  were  distributed  among  the  brigades  of  the 
properly  organized  troops.  In  this  way  two  divisions  were 
formed,  and  Generals  I.  N.  Palmer  and  S.  P.  Carter  were, 
respectively,  assigned  to  their  command.  Ruger's  division 
arrived  a  little  later.  On  March  1st  Classen's  brigade,  of 
Palmer's  division,  was  sent  to  Core  Creek,  sixteen  miles,  to 
be  followed  next  day  by  Carter's  division,  so  that  the  me- 


150  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

chanical  work  might  begin  at  onco.  At  that  time  only  ono 
Confoderato  brigade  (Whitford's)  was  known  to  be  iu  the 
vicinity  ;  but  the  ahnost  total  lack  of  wagons  made  it  ueees- 
sary  to  limit  operations  to  the  covering  of  the  railway  work. 
The  whole  number  of  wagon-toams  in  the  district  was  tifty, 
and  the  ntmost  these  could  do  was  to  supply  the  divisions 
at  points  near  the  end  of  the  completed  railway. 

Al)out  three  miles  below  Kinston  a  considerable  stream, 
known  as  Southwest  Creek,  crosses  the  railway  and  wagon- 
roads  leading  to  Newbern.  The  upi^er  course  of  this  stream 
is  nearly  parallel  to  the  Neuse  River,  and  almost  the  whole 
country  between  the  Neuse  and  Trent  Rivers,  thirty  miles 
long,  is  a  great  marsh,  called  the  Dover  Swamp  in  the 
lower  part,  and  Gum  Swamj)  in  the  upper.  It  was  impor- 
tant to  get  control  of  the  position  along  Southwest  Creek  as 
soon  as  possible,  for  the  slight  ridge  on  the  hither  side  of 
that  stream  was  the  only  dry  land  in  the  vicinity,  and  upon 
it  were  the  principal  roads  of  the  Neuse  Valley.  Informa- 
tion had  been  received  that  Hoke  had  reached  Kinston  with 
a  large  division,  and  rumors  of  still  further  reinforcements 
to  the  enemy  were  rife.  It  M'as  also  known  that  a  Confed- 
erate iron-clad  steamer  was  at  Kinston,  and  it  was  desirable 
to  get  positions  on  the  Neuse  where  batteries  could  be 
placed.  At  the  risk,  therefore,  of  being  short  of  rations, 
Cox  advanced  two  divisions  on  the  March  7th  to  the  upper 
margin  of  the  swamp  at  Wise's  Forks,  Palmer's  on  the  right, 
covering  the  railroad,  and  Carter's  on  the  left,  covering  tho 
Dover  Road,  with  an  interval  of  nearlv  a  mile  between  them. 
The  Twelfth  New  York  Cavalry,  the  only  mounted  men  in 
the  command,  were  used  to  patrol  the  roads  to  the  left,  and 
watch  the  crossings  of  Southwest  Creek  for  five  or  six  miles 
above,  the  stream  being  unfordable  at  this  season.  An  old 
road,  known  as  the  British  Road,  ran  parallel  to  the  creek  a 


BATTLE  OF  KINSTON. 


157 


mile  in  front  of  the  position,  and  Colonel  Upham,  of  Car- 
ter's division,  was  placed  with  two  regiments  at  its  intor- 


eCALE  OF  MILES 


Map  of  Battle  of  Kinston, 

section  with  the  Dover  Road,  to  cover  approaches  from  the 
left.     Some  artillery  fire  had  been  drawn  from  the  enemy 


158  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

on  the  other  siJo  of  Sowthwest  (!iock  in  taking  these  posi- 
tions, both  at  the  railway  crossinM:  and  at  the  Dover  lioud ; 
but  a  chain  of  pickets  was  established  along  the  stream,  and 
the  cavalry  reported  that  they  had  dismantled  all  the 
bridges  within  the  prescribed  distance  above,  and  had  out- 
l^osts  at  the  crossings.  Bnger's  division  was  marched  to 
Gum  Swamp,  the  end  of  the  next  section  of  railroad  to  bo 
rebuilt,  where  it  was  about  three  miles  from  the  lines  of 
Carter  and  Palmer,  and  could  support  either  in  case  of  need. 
General  Schofield  arrived  at  Newbevn  the  same  dav, 
coming  by  sea  from  Wilmington,  and  was  in  consultation 
with  his  subordinate  at  the  end  of  the  railwav,  on  the  morn- 
ing  of  the  8th,  when  a  rapid  artilleiy  fire  was  heard  at  the 
left  front.  linger  was  ordered  to  march  quickly  to  Carter's 
support,  and,  hastening  in  that  direction  in  advance.  Cox 
found  that  the  enemj  had  suddenly  appeared  on  the  flank 
of  Upliam,  and  attacked  him  without  warning.  The  cavalry 
had  failed  to  give  notice  of  the  advance,  and  Upham's  men, 
being  most  of  them  new  recruits,  had  been  unable  to  rally 
after  the  surprise.  He  succeeded  in  bringing  olf  his  own 
regiment — the  Fifteenth  Connecticut — in  tolerable  order, 
but  the  other  was  almost  wholly  captured.  Carter's  line  was 
partially  protected  by  a  light  intrenchment,  and  the  divi- 
sion met,  without  flinching,  the  assault  which  quickly  fol- 
lowed the  rout  of  the  advanced  post.  Palmer  was  ordered 
to  send  one  brigade  rapidly  to  the  left,  to  support  Carter, 
and  with  the  rest  of  his  division  to  make  a  vigorous  demon- 
stration of  crossing  the  creek  in  his  front.  Some  prisoners 
taken  were  found  to  belong  to  both  Stewart's  and  Lee's 
corps  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  and  it  was  learned  that 
General  Bragg  was  commanding  the  Confederate  forces  in 
person,  with  the  troops  of  the  North  Carolina  district  under 
Hoke,  strengthened  by  that  part  of  Hood's  Ai'my  of  Tennes- 


BATTLE  OF   KINSTOX.  mO 

fiee  which  had  reached  North  Carolinu,  under  Clayton  and 
D.  H.  Hill. 

The  fact  was  that  as  Sherman  was  rapidly  approaching 
from  the  South,  Johnston,  who  had  just  heen  assigned  to 
the  command  of  all  the  forces  opposing  him,  had  authorized 
Bragg  to  take  the  troops  the  latter  had  assembled  at  Golds- 
boro,  with  the  available  part  of  Hood's  army,  which  had 
reached  Smithfield,  and  with  these  strike  fiercely  at  the  Na- 
tional  column  coming  from  Newbern,  in  the  hope  of  routing 
and  driving  it  back  in  time  to  make  a  new  conc(Uitration  of 
the  whole  in  front  of  Sherman  before  he  should  reach  the 
Cape  Fear  River.  The  success,  however,  was  limited  to  the 
surprise  of  Upham's  little  command.  Carter's  division,  at 
Wise's  Forks,  aided  by  the  brigade  sent  from  Palmer,  main- 
tained the  fight  till  Ruger  arrived,  when  his  division  filled 
the  space  between  the  two  wings,  and  speedily  making  a 
barricade  with  fallen  timber  and  other  material  at  hand,  a 
connected  line  of  breastworks  soon  covered  the  whole  front. 
The  country  was  of  tangled  wood  and  swamp,  which  im- 
peded movement  and  prevented  either  side  from  seeing  far. 
The  success  of  Bragg's  first  onset  led  him  to  think  he  had 
the  whole  of  Cox's  command  broken,  though  the  principal 
line  had  not  been  reached  and  was  never  shalien.  Learning 
the  mistake,  the  Confederate  General  adjusted  his  lines 
anew  and  advanced  again,  but  was  easily  repulsed. 

As  the  information  received  from  j^risoners  showed  at 
least  three  divisions  of  the  enemy  engaged,  Schofield  di- 
rected Cox  to  maintain  a  watchful  defensive  till  the  arrival 
of  the  remainder  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  which  was 
marching  across  the  country  from  "Wilmington,  and  might 
be  expected  in  a  day  or  two.  He  himself  returned  to  New- 
berne  to  get  into  more  immediate  commiTnication  with 
other  portions  of  the  Department.     During  the  9th  lively 


ICO  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

BkirmishinR  continnod  :  Brap;^  robuilt  tlio  bridpfos  ovor  tho 
crook  boliiiul  him,  and  ondeavorod  to  i)n.sli  dotachnionts  bo- 
yond  Palinor's  li^bt  Hank,  botwoen  it  and  the  livor.  Tliis 
vfiiH  i)rovoiitod  without  much  dilliculty,  though  it  kopt  I'al- 
mor  harassotl.  On  the  morning  of  tho  lOth  a  sorions  attack 
was  mado  upon  Cartci-'s  front  and  h^ft  flank.  Antioij)atin<^ 
this,  Carter's  line  of  breastworks  had  been  oxtondod  a  long 
distance  on  the  left,  recurving  to  the  rear,  and  tlu^so  hail 
been  occupied  ))y  a  skirmish  line.  As  soon  as  tho  attack 
came  (which  proved  to  bo  by  Iloko's  division)  IMcC^uiston's 
brigade,  of  Rugcr's  division,  which  had  boon  placed  in  re- 
serve, was  ordered  at  double  quick  stop  to  Carter's  loft. 
Hoke  was  met  l)y  a  severe  fire  of  canister  and  shra2)nol  from 
the  artillery,  as  well  as  by  a  steadily  sustained  infantry  tiro, 
and  after  a  vain  but  stremious  otl'ort  to  carry  the  line  he  was 
forced  to  withdraw.  McCjuiston  was  ordered  to  charge  after 
him  from  the  flank  and  did  so,  capturing  several  hundred 
l)risoners.  But  the  advance  of  the  enemy  upon  Bugor  now 
came,  and  McCJuiston  was  not  allowed  to  follow  Hoke  far, 
but  Avas  quickly  recalled  to  supi)ort  the  centre,  whore  the 
line  was  very  thin.  Palmer  was  also  called  ui)on  for  several 
battalions  from  tho  right,  and  Buger  was  made  strong 
enough  to  repulse  HilFs  and  Clayton's  men  in  their  turn. 
During  the  progress  of  this  latter  attack.  General  Schofield 
arrived  again  from  Newborn,  and  learning  the  persistent 
character  of  Bragg's  eifort,  sent  urgent  messages  to  Couch 
to  hasten  the  marching  of  his  command.  Bragg,  however, 
had  become  convinced  that  he  could  make  no  farther  im- 
pression on  the  line  before  him,  and  retreated  in  the  night 
to  Kinston,  whore  a  small  detachment  was  left,  and  the  rest 
of  his  forces  were  moved  rapidly  through  Goldsboro,  to  join 
in  the  concentration  which  Johnston  was  making  in  front  of 
Sherman. 


HATTLK  OF   KINSTON.  U',l 

The  question  of  nunibora,  whether  of  thos<(  engaged  or  of 
the  casualties,  in  this,  as  in  all  the  later  «>n<<a^'einents  of  the 
war,  is  not  easy  to  solve.  The  best  Confederate  aiuhorities 
Kjx'ak  of  the  forces  under  Brapff?,  which  j)ro])erl_vl)elon{jfed  to 
the  North  Carolina  district,  as  about  eight  or  ten  thousand 
men.'  The  number  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  who  were 
rej)orted  as  being  with  Bragg  at  Smithlield  a  w<'ek  later,  was 
3,1)50.  It  is  probable  that  these  were  the  same  who  hud 
been  in  the  engagement  at  Kinston,  diminished  by  their 
losses  in  that  action  ;  and  as  the  well-known  method  of  the 
Confederate  oflicers,  in  reporting  their  "  etrective"  force,  al- 
ways reduced  it  ten  or  fifteen  p^T  cmt.  and  often  much  nioro 
below  our  "i)resent  for  duty,"  the  figures  given  represent  a 
total  force  of  thirteen  to  fifteen  thousand.  Certainly  Bragg 
thought  they  were  enough  to  "  enable  him  to  win  a  victory," 
as  he  wrote  Johnston,  over  the  three  divisions  advancing 
from  Newbern,  and  the  recent  experience  of  the  enemy  in 
attacking  SchofiekVs  troops,  either  at  the  west  or  east,  had 
not  warranted  him  in  hoping  much  from  an  assault  with  in- 
ferior force,  even  if  he  had  been  aware  of  tho  irregular  nature 
of  the  organizations  which  made  up  the  provisional  command. 

The  losses  on  the  National  side  were  1,257,  of  which  935 
were  captured  from  Colonel  Upham's  advanced  jiost.  The 
remaining  322  were  killed  and  wounded  in  defending  our 
breastworks  from  the  assaults  of  Bragg's  troops.  No  i)art 
of  the  principal  line  was  for  a  moment  in  his  possession, 
and  the  character  of  the  engagement  was  the  oft-repeated 
one  of  a  destitictive  repulse  from  a  stoutly  held  intrencth- 
ment.  The  prisoners  taken  by  tho  sally  from  our  left  were 
2G0,  and  the  overwhelming  i^resumption  is  that  Bragg's  total 

'  Johnston's  narrative,  p.  378,  snys  they  were  ''nuppoHcd  to  amount  to  six  cjr 
eight  thousand  men."  BcaurcRanl  put  thcr.i  at  ten  thousind,  and  the  Army  of 
Tennesseo  at  six  thuuB.ind.     See  Appendix  E,  II. 


162  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLK. 

loss  must  have  equalled  or  exceeded  that  of  Schofield's 
troops,  inclr.ling  what  resulted  from  the  surprise  of  the 
advanced  giiard,  and  wiiich  was  primarily  occasioned  by  the 
inadccjuate  performance  of  outpost  duty  by  ihe  cavalry. 

After  Bragg's  retreat,  Schotield  steadily  pressed  the  work 
of  rebuilding  the  railway.  Kinston  was  occui)iod  on  March 
14th,  and  a  large  force  was  set  at  work  to  build  a  wagon- 
bridge  over  the  Neuse  Kiver  there,  as  well  as  in  assisting 
Colonel  Wright  in  renewing  the  railway  bridge  and  complet- 
ing the  railroad  to  that  point.  The  iron-clad  steamer  which 
had  been  at  Kinston  was  burned  and  sunk  when  Bragg  re- 
treated, and  its  remains  were  among  the  last  traces  of  the 
navy  which  at  one  time  had  swarmed  in  the  Southern  bays 
and  rivers. 

On  reaching  Kinston,  Schofield  had  ordered  Terry  to 
advance  from  "Wilmington  along  the  line  of  the  railroad 
toward  Goldsboro.  This  was  done,  reaching  Faison's  Sta- 
tion, twenty  miles  south  of  the  Neuse,  on  the  20th,  and 
Terry  now  came  within  communicating  distance  of  Sher- 
man, by  whose  directions  he  marched  u})on  Cox's  bridge  on 
the  22d,  and  secured  for  the  army  that  crossing  of  the  river. 
The  obstructions  in  the  Neuse  River  below  Kinston  were 
removed,  and  steamboats  reached  Schotield's  '  'mp  on  the 
18th.  A  day  or  two  was  spent  in  the  accumUi.  ion  of  sup- 
plies, and,  during  the  lOth,  the  dull  pounding  of  a  distant 
cannonade  was  heard,  which  pi'oved  to  be  the  Battle  of 
Bentonville,  nearly  tifty  miles  away.  On  the  20th,  Scho- 
field marched  toward  Goldsboro,  which  he  entered  with 
little  opposition  on  the  21st,  and  there,  in  a  couple  of  days 
more,  was  reassembled  the  gi'and  army  under  Sherman, 
whose  march  from  Savannah  had  been  quite  as  remarkable 
as  the  former  one  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea,  and  the  outline 
of  which  we  have  now  to  trace. 


(JHiU'TEK  X. 

SAVANNAH   TO   COLUMBIA. 

The  occupation  of  Savannah  brought  with  it  many  ques- 
tions of  administration  of  a  semi-political  character,  which 
Sherman  was  glad  to  turn  over  to  the  civil  officers  of  the 
Government  as  quickly  as  possible.  Secretaiy  Stanton  vis- 
ited the  city  as  soon  as  its  capture  was  known,  and  authori- 
tatively announced  the  action  of  the  President  in  regard  to 
the  captured  cotton  and  other  stores,  the  abandoned  lands, 
and  the  refugee  negroes.  In  his  consultations  with  Sher- 
man, the  latter  learned  what  was  then  the  purpose  of  the 
Government  regarding  terms  of  peace  if  symptoms  of  a  de- 
sire to  submit  to  the  National  Constitution  should  be  shown 
by  any  of  the  States  in  rebellion.  The  General,  however, 
as  far  as  he  could,  avoided  all  aflairs  that  were  not  stiictly 
military,  and  devoted  himself  to  preparations  for  an  early 
renewal  of  the  campaign.  The  men  were  clothed  and  shod, 
the  artillery  and  wagon-trains  were  overhauled  and  repaired, 
and  supplies  were  ccllected  and  distributed.  The  experi- 
ence of  the  march  through  Georgia  was  turned  to  the  best 
account  in  determining  M'hat  stores  should  be  trken  with 
the  columns,  and  what  could  probably  be  obtained  from  the 
country, 

Sherman's  plan  of  campaign  was  fixed  early  in  January, 
and  preliminaiy  movements  were  immediately  begun.  Gen- 
eral Howard  concentrated    .-ost  of  the  right  wing  at  Beau- 


1U4  THE  MARCH  TO  TH1<:   SEA. 

fort,  S.  C'.,  l)y  mrans  of  transport  vessels,  part  of  one  corps 
being  ordered  to  inarch  from  Savannah  by  the  Union  Cause- 
way in  the  same  direction.  The  left  wing,  under  General 
Rlocnni,  was  directed  to  move  np  both  banks  of  the  Savan- 
nah abont  forty  miles,  then  to  unite  at  Bobertsville  in  South 
Carolina,  while  Howard  should  advance  from  Beaufort  to 
Pocotaligo,  driving  Hardee's  forces  over  the  Comliahee 
Kiver,  and  occui)ying  the  country  between  that  stream  and 
the  Coosawhatcliie.  Howard's  movement  to  Beaufort  would 
thus  seem  to  threaten  Charleston,  while  Slocum's  looked 
toward  Augusta ;  and  the  enemy  would  be  left  in  doubt  as 
to  Sherman's  jmrpose,  though  the  positions  of  his  troops 
would  be  the  best  possible  for  the  advance  upon  Columbia, 
which  was  the  ol)jective  for  the  first  stage  of  the  campaign. 
At  Pocotaligo,  Howard  would  be  fifty  miles  on  his  way,  yet 
he  would  still  bo  near  a  water  base  for  supplies  until  the 
moment  of  beginning  the  long  march  into  the  interior. 
The  same  would  be  true  of  Slocum,  for  Bobertsville  was 
near  Sister's  Ferry,  on  the  Savannah,  and  the  wagons  of  all 
the  columns  could  therefore  be  full  when  communication 
with  Savannah  should  bo  broken.  An  interior  line  of  de- 
fences about  the  city  was  prepared  by  Colonel  Poe,  Chief 
Engineer,  and  a  garrison  was  assigned  from  General  Foster's 
department,  so  that  the  army  in  the  field  might  not  be  dimin- 
ished. A  few  changes  were  made  in  the  organization  of  the 
corps,  Logan  returned  and  resumed  the  command  of  the 
Fifteenth ;  in  the  divisions  and  brigades  a  few  officers  were 
relieved  and  went  north  by  sea,  while  others,  who  had  been 
wound<Hl  or  ill,  rejoined  the  army. 

Sherman's  purpose  was  to  feint  on  both  Augusta  and 
Charleston,  but  to  march  directly  upon  Columbia  and 
thence  to  Goldsboro,  A\here  he  hoped  to  open  communica- 
tion with  Ncwbern  and   Beaufort,  N.  C.     The   capture  of 


SAVANNAH  TO  COLUMBIA.  165 

Fort  Fisher  just  before  he  began  the  campaign,  and  the 
transfer  of  General  Sehofiekl  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
to  the  Department  of  North  Carolina  were  steps  determined 
upon  by  General  Grant  to  facilitate  his  work,  and  gave  him 
greater  assurance  of  success.  His  plans  had  been  settled, 
however,  before  he  knew  of  either  of  these  auxiliary  move- 
ments. He  felt  sure  that  no  suflicient  force  could  be 
brought  by  the  Confederate  Government  to  oppose  him  till 
he  should  reach  the  Cape  Fear  River.  There,  the  contin- 
gency to  be  provided  for  was  that  Lee  might  break  away 
from  llichmond,  and  throw  himself  upon  his  army  before 
Grant  could  overtake  him  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
To  guard  against  this,  Grant  redoubled  his  efforts  to  extend 
his  left  to  the  westward  of  Petersburg,  so  that  no  direct 
Southern  route  could  be  open  to  Lee ;  but  the  latter,  forced 
to  move  westward  before  turning  south,  might  bo  no  nearer 
to  Sherman  than  himself.  If  this  should  not  prove  true, 
Sherman  would  still  bo  abundantly  strong  to  make  a  dila- 
tory defensive  contest  with  the  combined  Confederate  forces 
in  the  East  till  Grant  could  reach  him.  The  controlling 
policy  of  this  camijaign,  therefore,  was  activity  in  marching, 
with  great  caution  in  fighting  any  considerable  bodies  of 
the  enemy  until  a  new  base  were  established  and  rapid 
communication  opened  with  the  General-in-Chief. 

The  route  for  the  march  was  i)ractically  determined  by 
the  topography  of  the  country,  which,  like  all  the  Southern 
seaboard,  is  low  and  sandy,  with  numerous  extensive  swamps 
and  deep  rivers  widely  swami)-borde)'ed,  only  approachable 
by  long  causeways  on  which  the  narrow  head  of  a  column 
may  be  easily  and  long  resisted  by  a  small  force.  The 
rivers  of  South  Carolina  are  nearly  parallel  to  the  Savannah, 
and,  to  avoid  frequent  and  difficult  crossings,  it  would  bo 
necessary  to  march  into  the  interior  upon  the  ridges  be- 


166  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

tween  two  or  more  streams,  till  the  upper  and  narrower 
waters  were  reached,  and  then  cross  to  the  watersheds 
which  lay  most  nearly  in  the  proper  direction.  Another 
important  object  was  to  cut  the  railway  system  of  South 
Carolina  in  a  way  similar  to  the  work  done  in  Georgia,  so 
as  to  crii^ple  the  transportation  resourt^es  of  the  country 
and  prevent  the  easy  concentration  of  Confederate  troops. 
An  examination  of  the  map  will  quickly  show  that  Sher- 
man's easiest  way  to  accomplish  his  purpose  was  to  march 
northwestward  between  the  Oombaluie  (or  Salkehatchie,  as 
its  upper  course  is  called)  and  the  Savannah,  as  if  going  to 
Augusta,  till  more  than  half  that  distance  is  made,  then  pass- 
ing the  Salkehatchies,  Big  and  Little,  strike  the  Charles- 
ton and  Augusta  Railway  near  its  crossing  of  the  Edisto 
River.  After  destroying  a  section  of  this  road,  the  south 
fork  of  the  Edisto  could  be  crossed,  and  no  other  deep  river 
would  be  met  till  the  Saluda  is  reached  at  the  capital  of  the 
State.  This  was  the  route  Sherman  adopted,  making  only 
the  deviation  by  which  he  reached  the  Columbia  branch  of 
the  railway  at  Orangeburg,  and  destroyed  a  portion  of  it  for 
twenty  miles  north  of  that  place. 

The  report  which  Generals  Taylor  and  Hardee  made  to  the 
Confederate  Government  at  the  beginning  of  December  has 
already  been  mentioned,  and  shows  that  the  principal  mili- 
tary officers  in  the  theatre  of  oi)erations  made  a  good  fore- 
cast of  Sherman's  purposes  and  of  the  probable  results. 
Upon  the  news  of  the  great  disaster  to  Hood  at  Nashvil](>, 
Beauregard  asked  to  be  relieved  of  the  care  of  Sotilh 
Carolina  and  Southern  Georgia,  so  that  he  might  give  his 
exclusive  attention  to  the  Armv  of  Tennessee  and  the  Gulf 
States.  He  suggested  that  Augusta  naturally  belonged  to 
Hardee's  command,  and,  in  a  letter  of  final  instnictions  to 
the  latter,  written  on  December  31st,  he  indicated  the  prob- 


SAVANNAH    TO  (M)LUMBIA.  107 

able  neceasity,  at  an  early  day,  of  evacuating  Charleston, 
and  uniting  all  the  available  troops  in  Hardee's  department 
to  oppose  Sherman's  advance.  Ho  dii'ected  all  the  cotton  to 
be  removed,  and  if  any  remained  in  the  city  at  the  time  of 
evacuation,  it  should  be  burned.  This  was  in  accordance 
with  the  general  policy  of  the  Confederates  in  regard  to  the 
great  Southern  staple ;  that  of  the  National  armies,  in  like 
manner,  was  to  save  for  the  public  treasury  all  that  was  caj)- 
tured  in  seaports  or  in  territory  likely  to  remain  under  our 
control,  but  to  destroy  that  which,  by  the  passage  of  our 
armies,  could  fall  again  into  the  enemy's  hands.  It  often 
happened,  therefore,  that  both  armies  were  co-oi)erating  in 
the  destruction  of  cotton  when  both  were  in  doubt  whether 
their  opponents  might  not  gain  something  by  its  preserva- 
tion. In  this  way  Wheeler  had  offered  to  spare  the  cotton 
in  the  Georgia  march  if  Sherman  would  give  assurances  as 
to  other  property;  but  Sherman  had  answered:  "If  you 
don't  burn  it,  I  will." 

The  evacuation  of  Charleston  was  so  grave  a  question  of 
public  policy  for  the  Confederate  Government  that  it  could 
not  be  determined  as  a  purely  military  problem.  Beaure- 
gard had  said,  in  the  letter  just  referred  to,  "The  fall  of 
Charleston  would  necessarily  be  a  terrible  blow  to  the  Con- 
federacy, but  its  fall,  with  the  loss  of  its  brave  garrison, 
would  be  still  more  fatal  to  our  cause."  '  Knowing  the  oi)in- 
ions  of  all  the  Confederate  generals,  as  we  now  do,  we  must 
conclude  that  the  Richmond  authorities  delayed  the  aban- 
donment of  the  city  until  it  was  too  late  to  concentrate  in 
SJierman's  front.  It  is  true,  however,  that  the  National 
commander  surprised  all  of  his  opponents  by  the  speed  at 
which  he  forced  his  way  northward,  and  that  Hardee  had 


'  Joiu'N'ri  Cliulhaiii  Aftilleiy,  p.  SIO. 


1G8  THE  MAIK.'H   TO  THE  SEA. 

rei)orted  the  Salkohatcliie  swamps  to  bo  entirely  impassable 
at  the  time  Sherman's  army  was  marching  through  them  at 
the  regular  i)aee  t)f  ten  or  twelve  miles  daily,  making  oor- 
(luroy  road  for  his  trains  nearly  every  nnle  of  the  way.' 

Bhorman  had  hoi)ed  that  he  might  rely  upon  fair  weather 
after  the  middle  of  January,  and  had  i)lainied  his  march  to 
begin  at  that  time.  The  season  disappointed  him,  for  it 
proved  to  be  a  winter  of  almost  continuous  rains.  Tho 
Savannah  rose  so  that,  at  Sister's  Ferry,  forty  miles  up  the 
river,  where  Slocum  laid  his  bridge,  the  stream  was  three 
miles  wide,  and  long  trestle  bridges  had  to  be  made  to  con- 
nect the  ends  of  the  pontoon  bridge  with  the  shores.  It 
was  also  almost  impossible  to  jiroteet  the  structure  against 
the  force  of  the  current  and  of  the  drift-wood  brought  down 
by  the  freshet.  The  Union  Causeway,  on  which  one  or  two 
divisions  attemi)ted  to  march  from  Savannah  to  join  General 
Howard  at  Pocotaligo,  was  under  water,  and  tin-  whole  re- 
gion was  more  like  a  great  lake  than  a  habitable  land.  On 
the  last  day  of  January,  Howard  had  concentrated  at  Poco- 
taligo the  right  wing,  except  Corse's  division  of  Logan's 
cori)s,  which  had  been  forced  by  the  high  water  to  join  Slo- 
cum and  cross  the  Savannah  at  his  bridge,  awaiting  an  op- 
portunity to  rejoin  the  corps  some  days  later.  This  concen- 
tration had  been  effected  with  but  little  fighting,  for  Hardee 
had  evidently  determined  to  take  up  the  line  of  the  Comba- 
hee  and  Salkehatchie,  and  to  make  no  serious  defence  west 
of  it.  Force's  division,  of  Blair's  cori)s,  was  sent  to  make  a 
demonstration  as  if  to  cross  the  Combahee  ten  miles  below 
the  railroad  bridge,  and  so  t  j  create   the  impression  that 

1  At  the  time  of  paroling  the  Confederate  Army  at  Greensboro,  N.  C,  speaking 
of  this  part  of  Sherman's  mareh.  and  of  the  combination  of  physical  labor  with 
military  hardihood,  General  Johii-^ton  said,  in  the  hearing  of  the  author,  that, 
when  he  heard  of  it,  ''  ho  made  up  his  mind  tlmt  there  had  been  no  such  urmy 
since  the  days  uf  Julius  Ca3sar.''  ^ 


SAVANNAH  TO  COLUMBIA.  lOi) 

Charleston  was  aimed  at.  This  done,  tho  ordor  was  given 
to  march  northward  on  tho  ronto  ah'eady  described,  in  the 
expectation  tliat  Sh)cum  and  Kilpatrick's  cavah-y  wonhl  Ix* 
over  Sister's  Ferry,  and  ready  to  join  the  movement  by  tli«' 
time  Howard  shonld  be  opposite  that  crossing. 

It  happened  that  simnltaneonsly  with  tho  beginning  of 
tho  new  campaign  by  ShtM'iuan,  a  conference  of  Confederate 
oflicers  was  hehl  near  Angnsta  to  arrange  the  details  of  their 
own  plans.  Beauregard,  Hardee,  D.  H.  Hill,  and  G.  W. 
Smith  were  all  there,  anti  a  careful  estimate  was  made  of 
the  eftectivo  force  they  hoped  to  combine  against  Sherman. 
Of  18,000  men  under  Hardee's  command  in  South  Carolina, 
they  reckoned  14,500  as  available  for  concentration,  while 
the  heavy  artillery  and  some  other  troops  would  garrison 
Charleston  and  other  points  along  the  coast.  Beauregard 
promised  11,000  infantry  and  artillery  from  Hood's  army, 
though  only  half  of  these  were  then  present.  Wheeler's 
cavalry  was  G,700  strong,  besides  Butler's  division  which 
has  been  counted  among  Hardee's  men.  Tho  Georgia  mili- 
tia and  reserves  were  1,450.  A  total  of  33,450  was  the  force 
they  agreed  they  could  concentrate  by  February  4th  or 
5th,  though  about  three  thousand  from  tho  Army  of  Ten- 
nessee were  not  expected  to  reach  Augusta  till  the  10th  or 
11th.'  It  was  not  expected  that  tho  State  Militia  would 
serve  far  outside  their  own  States,  nor  does  there  seem  to 
have  been  any  hoiJO  that  new  reciiiits  could  be  added  to 
their  army.  The  conscription  had  exhausted  itself,  and  the 
population  not  already  in  tho  ranks  was  paralyzed  rather 
than  stimulated  to  exertion  by  the  presence  of  the  National 
army.  As  Hardee  afterward  expressed  it,  they  knew  that  it 
was  now  only  a  question  of  the  time  it  would  take  to  use  up 


•  S»'i'  Appemlix  V),  TI. 

Vol.  X-  8 


170  THK   MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

the  military   force  already  organized,   for  the  politicians 
could  not  face  the  thought  of  Hurronder.' 

Th(!  outlook  was  surc^ly  far  from  encouraging,  but  Beau- 
regard, as  the  superior  ofllcer  present,  though  sick  in  l)ody 
and  in  mind,  was  forced  to  assume  command,  and  make 
fuch  dispositions  as  he  could  to  obstruct  Sherman's  march. 
But  while  their  somewhat  tardy  consultation  was  going  on, 
the  opportunity  for  an  eflectual  concentration,  even  of  the 
little  force  at  their  disjiosal,  had  jiassed,  for  Sherman  was 
in  motion.  On  February  7th,  General  Howard  was  upon  the 
line  of  the  Charleston  and  Augusta  Kuilway  at  Midway,  and 
on  the  12th  he  had  crossed  both  forks  of  the  Edisto  and 
had  broken  the  Columbia  branch  of  the  road  at  Orangeburg. 
Butler's  division  of  cavalry,  a  light  batteiy  or  two,  and 
some  small  detachments  of  infantry  were  all  of  Hardee's 
that  succeeded  in  getting  in  front  of  Sherman.  These 
joined  Wheeler,  and  did  what  they  could  to  burn  bridges 
and  hold  the  long  causeways  through  the  swamps ;  but  the 
leading  division  of  a  column  was  usually  strong  enough  to 
outtlank  them  and  drive  them  olf  with  little  losp.,  so  that  the 
laying  of  the  corduroy  road  never  ceased,  and  Sherman's 
twenty-live  hundred  wagons  rolled  on  unchecked.  Leaving 
the  Georgia  militia  to  garrison  Augusta,  where  they  were 
useless,  Beauregard  could  only  lead  the  remnants  of  the 
Army  of  Tennessee  by  the  country  roads  and  by  a  long 
detour  through  New'beriy  and  Chester  to  Charlotte  in  North 
Carolina,  while  Hardee  at  Charleston  was  awaiting  the  in- 
evitable day  when  he  must  abandon  Sumter  and  the  cradle 
of  the  rebellion,  to  make  haste  by  his  only  remaining  rail- 
way through  Florence  to  Cheraw,  that  the  concentration 
talked  of  at  Augusta  might  be  finally  made  near  the  capital 

•  This  wafi  said  by  Ilivrdee  to  tho  author  after  tho  close  of  hostilities. 


SAVANNAH   TO  COLUMRIA.  171 

of  North  Carolina.  General  "NVado  Hampton  had  been  sent 
from  A'^irginia  to  command  tlu^  cavalry  in  South  (Carolina,  in 
the  hope  that  hi.s  groat  jjcrsonal  inliucnco  would  rouse  the 
people  from  their  desi)air,  and  do  what  jn'oclamations  and 
levies-iu-mass  had  so  signally  failed  to  do  in  Georgia;  but 
the  only  result  was  to  lay  the  foundation  of  a  somewhat  bit- 
ter dispute  whether  he  or  the  National  soldiery  caused  the 
burning  of  Columbia,  the  Ijeautiful  city  of  his  home. 

An  itinerary  of  the  march  through  South  Carolina  would 
furnish  interesting  daily  illustrations  of  the  expedients  by 
which  an  army  of  expert  woodsmen  can  overcome  difficul- 
ties in  logistics  commonly  thought  insurmountable.  In  a 
country  where  many  of  the  rivers  are  known  by  the  name  of 
swamps,  continuous  rains  so  raised  the  waters  that  scarce  a 
stream  was  passed  without  deploying  the  advanced  guard 
through  water  waist  deep,  and  sometimes  it  reached  even  to 
their  armpits,  forcing  thc^m  to  carry  the  cartridge-box  at 
the  neck  and  the  musket  on  the  head.  The  fitness  of  the 
name  swamp  for  even  the  rivers  will  be  felt  when  it  is  re- 
membered that  at  the  crossing  of  the  Salkehatchie  at  Beau- 
fort's Bridge  the  stream  had  fifteen  separate  channels,  (^acli 
of  which  had  to  be  bridged  before  Logan's  corps  could  get 
over.  "Whoever  will  consider  the  eflfect  of  dragging  the 
artillery  and  hundreds  of  loadc^d  army  Avagons  over  mud 
roads  iu  such  a  country,  and  of  the  infinite  labor  reqiiired 
to  pave  these  roads  with  logs,  levelling  the  surface  with 
finaller  poles  in  the  hollows  between,  adding  to  the  stnic- 
ture  as  the  mass  sinks  in  the  ooze,  and  continuing  this  till 
the  miles  of  train  have  pulled  through,  will  get  a  constantly 
growing  idea  of  the  work,  and  a  steadily  increasing  won- 
der that  it  was  done  at  all.  Certainly  he  will  not  wonder 
that  the  Confederate  generals  believed  they  could  count 
upon  Sherman's  remaining  at  liis  base  till  the  rains  ceased 


172  TIIK  MAIICII  TO  Till']  SKA. 

and  tho  waters  snl)si(l«Hl.  If  tho  inarch  tlironp;h  Ooorf(ia  ro- 
mainod  nicturod  in  tlio  soldit^rs'  memoricKS  as  a  bri^lit,  frol- 
icsome raid,  that  throu<,'h  South  Can^lina  was  even  more 
indi^libly  printed  as  a  stubborn  wrestle  with  the  elements, 
in  which  the  murky  and  dripping  skies  were  so  mingled 
with  the  earth  and  wat(>r  below  as  to  make  the  whole  a  lit 
tyi)e  of  "  chaos  come  again  ; "  but  where,  also,  the  indomitable 
will  of  sixty  thousimd  men,  concentrated  to  do  tlu;  inflexil)lo 
l)uri)ose  of  one,  bi'idged  this  chaos  for  hundreds  of  miles, 
and,  out-laboring  Hercules,  won  a  jdiysical  triumph  that 
must  always  remain  a  man-el.  And  mile  by  mile  as  tln^y 
advanced,  tho  General  and  his  men  Avere  equally  clear  in  the 
conviction  he  had  expressed  to  Grant  before  starting,  that 
every  stej)  they  took  was  "as  much  a  direct  attack  upon 
Lee's  army  as  though  I  were  operating  within  the  sound  of 
his  artilleiT." 

Sixteen  days'  marching,  working,  and  skirmishing  brought 
tho  army  to  the  Saluda  Riven-,  just  above  Columbia.  Tho 
Augusta  Railway  had  been  destroyed  from  the  Edisto  nearly 
to  Aiken,  some  fifty  miles,  Tho  Columbia  branch  had  been 
ruined  from  a  point  five  or  six  miles  south  of  Orangeburg 
to  the  Congaree  River,  about  thirty  miles.  These  great 
gaps  in  the  interior  lines  of  communication  effectually  sepa- 
rat(Hl  the  Confederate  forces,  and  were  by  far  too  great  to  bo 
rei)aired  during  tho  campaign.  A  few  hours  were  enough 
to  secure  the  crossings  of  the  Saluda  and  Broad  Rivers, 
which  iinite  just  above  Columbia  to  form  the  Congaree. 
This  was  easier  than  to  cross  tlu^  latter  stream,  for  it  is  bor- 
dered by  the  wide  Caw-caw  swamp,  and  the  ajjproaches 
were  very  difficult. 

On  the  api)roach  of  the  National  troops,  the  Confederate 
cavalry  burned  the  bridges,  sprinkling  them  first  with  resin 
and  tar,  so  as  to  make  a  quick  tire  :  indeed,  it  was  so  quick 


SAVANNAH  TO  COLUMBIA.  173 

that  somo  of  tho  roar  giiard  could  not  pass,  and  had  to  gallo)) 
oil"  ])y  a  h)n}^  circuit  to  cscai)o  capture.  In  C/()lunil)ia  thi^y 
Iturnod  tho  two  railway  stations  and  di'i)ot  buildings,  one  at 
the  south  and  tho  other  at  tho  north  of  tho  ])la'^'e.  Long, 
narrow  i)ilos  of  cotton  bales  wero  made  along  tho  middles  of 
tho  streets,  and  these  wero  cut  opciu  and  fired.  Some  of 
Wheeler's  cavalry,  acting  upon  the  rule  they  had  oft(Mi 
avowed,  that  it  was  not  worth  while  to  leave  what  tht>v  wanted 
for  an  enemy  to  take,  broke  open  th(5  shops  and  pillaged  them. ' 
Before  entering  tho  city,  Sherman  issued  orders  that  \m- 
vato  dwellings  and  in'oi)erty,  colleges,  librari(\s,  eharitablo 
institutions,  and  tlui  like,  should  l)o  respected,  but  that  tlui 
arsenals,  foundries,  machine-shops,  and  public  workshoi)S 
should  bo  destroved.  The  order  was  in  substance  tho  sanu^ 
as  ho  had  issutul  at  Savannah,  and  was  approin'iate  both 
because  Columbia  was  tho  first  city  of  any  considerable  size 
the  army  occui)ied  after  leaving  tho  coast,  and  because  tlu' 
long  continuance  of  a  march  in  which  the  troops  wero  livinj,' 
on  the  country  had  gradually  increased  the  number  of  strag- 
glers, and  relaxed  the  bands  of  discipline  in  portions  of  the. 
command.  General  C.  li.  Wood's  division  of  Logan's  coi-jis 
entered  tho  city,  Stone's  brigade  being  tho  advanced  guard. 
The  other  troops  passed  on  and  encamped  beyond.  A 
strong  wind  from  the  northwest  was  blowing,  scattering  tho 
loose  cotton  about,  and  Colonel  Stone  directed  his  men  to 
assist  the  citizens,  who,  with  a  wretched  hand-engine  and 
buckets,  were  trying  to  quench  the  fire  in  the  cotton,  whicli 
the  wind  was  making  dangerous.  Sherman  himself  entere<l 
the  town  soon  after  the  advanced  guard,  with  Howard  and 
Logan.  The  mayor  presented  hiniself,  and  was  informed  of 
the  orders  for  tho  protection  of  private  property.     Somo 


1  Tcgtimony  bcfure  Mixed  Cuiumibsjiuii  on  A.murican  and  Brilkh  Claims.    Sue 
also  Appendix  C. 


174  THK  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

foolish  i^crsons,  thinking  to  please  the  sohliers,  brought  ont 
whiskey  by  pailfnls,  and  before  the  superior  oflieers  were 
aware  of  it,  a  good  :nauy  men  of  Stone's  brigade  were  in- 
toxicated. V/oods  immediately  ordered  the  brigade  re- 
lieved, and  thf.t  of  W.  B.  Woods  '  was  substituted  as  provost 
guard.  All  the  whiskey  that  could  be  found  was  emi^tied 
on  the  ground,  and  the  intoxicated  men  were  put  in  arrest. 
The  wind  continued  to  rise,  and  before  night  was  blowing  a 
gale.  The  cotton  bales,  tenacious  of  fire,  wore  smoldering. 
It  would  seem  that  a  flake  from  one  of  these  set  fire  to  a 
shed  or  building  near  by,  and  the  flames  soon  spread. 
Sherman  himself  gave  prompt  orders  to  do  all  that  could  bo 
done  to  conquer  the  fire,  and  the  whole  division  was  put  at 
work  to  quench  or  to  girdle  it.  The  houses  of  the  city  were 
built  of  pine  wood,  and,  from  the  place  of  starting,  the  south- 
eastern part  of  the  town  was  soon  a  roaring,  leaping  mass  of 
flame,  utterly  beyond  control.  But  there  were  not  wanting 
intoxicated  men  among  the  soldiers,  and  others  ecjually  ex- 
cited by  the  tales  of  horror  which  the  escaped  military  pris- 
oners had  to  tell  of  their  cruel  suft'erings  in  a  jjrison  jien 
near  the  city,  where  they  had  been  exi>osed  to  the  weather 
and  forced  to  bun-ow  in  the  ground  for  their  only  shelter. 
These  seized  upon  the  idea  that  the  destruction  of  the  capi- 
tal of  South  Carolina  was  a  fit  retribution  upon  the  State  for 
its  leadership  in  the  great  rebellion,  and  carried  the  fire  to 
windward  of  its  starting-place  to  make  the  destruction  more 
complete.  Drunken  soldiers,  camp  followers,  and  escajied 
convicts  from  the  penitentiary,  made  a  dangerous  mob,  and 
the  fire  which  began  by  accident  was  becoming  the  occasion 
of  mischiefs  of  other  kinds.  Noticing  this,  Howard  ordered 
a  brigade  from  Hazen's  division  to  bo  deployed  as  skirmish- 

>  Now  Justice  of  tlie  U.  S.  Supreuio  Court. 


SAVANNAH  TO  COLUMBIA.  175 

era,  to  sweep  through  the  town,  arresting  all  disorderly  j)er- 
Kons,  citizens  and  soldiers,  white  and  black,  and  to  hold 
them  under  guard.  After  midnight  the  gale  subsided  and 
the  progress  of  the  fire  was  stopped,  but  the  greater  part  of 
the  city  was  in  ashes. 

Shenrau  was  sincerely  grieved  at  the  misfortune  of  Co- 
lumbia, and  did  what  he  could  to  lighten  the  trouble  of  the 
citizens.  He  gave  them  a  L-^rge  herd  of  cattle  and  other 
provisions  to  supply  their  immediate  wants,  and  directed 
the  issue  of  these  to  be  made  by  the  city  authorities  to  the 
destitute.  No  one  was  more  unbending  than  he  in  the 
destruction  of  whatever  could  be  of  military  assistance  to 
the  enemy ;  but  no  one  drew  more  clearly  the  line  between 
the  destruction  which  was  useful  to  a  cause  and  tliat  which 
would  merely  make  private  suffei'ing  and  irritation.  The 
Confederate  authorities  made  haste  to  proclaim  the  burning 
of  Columbia  as  a  deliberately  planned  and  ordered  piece  of 
incendiarism  ;  but  no  event  was  ever  more  fully  investigated, 
and  no  conclusion  can  well  be  more  solidly  established  by 
testimony  than  that  wliich  is  given  in  the  foregoing  narra- 
tive of  the  occurrence.  Orangeburg  had  been  partly  burned 
by  fire,  set  by  an  exasperated  resident  trader  in  revenge  for 
the  destruction  of  his  cotton  by  the  Confederate  cavalry,  and 
this  too  v/as  loudly  charged  to  the  National  army.  An  even- 
handed  justice  will,  however,  admit  that  the  stragglers  from 
the  army  wore  increasing  in  number  and  in  familiarity  with 
pillage,  through  the  natural  education  of  such  a  war,  and 
that  there  were  some  officers  among  the  infantry  who  were 
not  unwilling  to  compete  with  Kilpatrick  in  his  eflfort  to 
leave  the  route  marked  by  "  chimney-stacks  without  houses, 
and  the  country  desolate." '     Some  careless  expressions  of 


1  In  the  •'  Ninety  second  Illinois,"  commonly  nttribnted  to  Greneral  Atkinn  who 
was  one  of  Kilimtriuk'ij  brigade  oomimiudurB  (p.  211),  it  ia  said  that  on  the  cvetiiuK 


17G  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

Slierman,  in  a  letter  to  General  Halleck,  have  Ijoen  seized 
upon  as  evidence  of  his  approval  of  lawless  pillaging ;  but 
the  consistent  character  of  his  commands  to  his  subordinates 
from  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  and  the  treatment  of 
all  the  cities  on  the  line  of  his  march  from  Atlanta  to  Savan- 
nah, and  from  Savannah  to  Raleigh,  show  that  his  i)olicy 
was  one  of  mildness  to  the  individual  citizen  and  of  destruc- 
tion only  to  the  public  resources  of  the  country.  The  city 
of  Atlanta  is  to-day  proof,  to  him  who  cares  to  see,  that  the 
far-echoed  assertions  that  it  was  destroyed  are  consistent 
with  the  continued  existence  of  its  original  buildings,  except 
the  depots,  machine-shops,  and  military  factories,  with  a 
very  few  houses  that  were  immediately  contiguous  to  them. 
War  cannot  bo  other  than  a  fearful  scourge,  but  the  asser- 
tion that  the  late  civil  war  suq^assed  others  of  modern  times 
in  wanton  destruction  or  cmclty  is  the  reverse  of  tnie. 

In  Columbia  there  were  factories  of  powder  and  fixed 
ammunition,  an  arsenal,  armory  and  machine-shops,  and  an 
establishment  for  the  engraving  and  manufacture  of  Con- 
federate paper  money.  All  these  wore  destroyed  on  the  18th 
and  19th  of  Febi-uaiy,  for  their  detached  positions  about  the 
town  had  saved  them  from  the  general  conflagration.  On 
the  20th  the  army  resumed  its  march,  leaving  behind  it  a 
community  overwhelmed  with  its  losses,  almost  stupefied  by 
the  terrible  change  a  fcv/  days  had  wrought,  and  only  saved 
from  starvation  by  the  store  of  food  which  the  National  com- 
mander took  from  his  army  supplies  to  give  them. 


of  Jnnnnry  27th,  near  Savannah,  "  General  Kilpatrick  pave  a  party  to  the  offlcerH 
of  his  command,  and  in  his  Hjxjcch  said,  '  In  after  years,  when  travellers  passint; 
through  South  Carolina  shall  see  chimney- stack s  without  houses,  and  the  country 
dcm)lat«,  and  shall  ask.  Who  did  this?  some  Yankee  will  answer,  Kilpatrick's 
cavalry.'"  The  name  narrative,  pp.  212,  21fj,  iseenm  to  cliii:>>  for  the  cavalry  tho 
burning;  of  the  villii(;os  of  Oarnweil,  Luxiugtuu,  and  Muutiotillo,  beside  the  do- 
Blruutiuu  of  pluututiou  housca. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

AVERASBORO  AND  BBNTONVILLE.— REUNION  OP  THE 

GRAND  ARMY. 

The  military  operations  in  tlio  first  part  of  the  camjiaign 
had  not  cost  many  lives,  though  the  skirmishing  had  been 
incessant.  Occasionally  a  determined  stand  would  be  made, 
as  at  Rivers'  Bridge  on  the  Salkehatchio,  where,  in  a  can- 
nonade upon  our  advanced  guard.  Colonel  Wager  Swayne,  an 
esteemed  and  valuable  officer,  lost  a  leg.  More  commonly, 
the  trees  and  thickets  made  safe  cover  for  the  troops,  and 
detachments  sent  a  mile  or  two  above  or  below  would  gain 
the  farther  bank  of  the  stream  by  ferrying  men  over  in  pon- 
toons, and  the  enemy  would  retreat  as  soon  as  this  was  done. 
After  passing  Columbia  the  face  of  the  country  changed. 
It  became  more  rolling,  the  streams  were  naiTower  and  less 
difficult,  the  plantations  were  more  numerous  and  richer, 
and  the  foragers  collected  more  abundant  supplies.  The 
Fifteenth  Corps  (Logan's)  returned  upon  the  line  of  the 
Charleston  Railway  to  Cedar  Creek,  destroying  about  twenty 
miles  of  the  road  on  the  left  l)ank  of  the  Congaree,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  injury  already  done  it  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river.  Howard  then  turned  this  column  northward  to  over- 
take Blair's  (Seventeenth)  Corps,  which  had  marched  along 
the  railroad  toward  Charlotte,  and  had  torn  it  up  almost  to 
Winnsboro,  forty  miles  from  Columbia.  The  only  other 
railway  running  out  of  Columbia  was  a  branch  road  going 


178  THE  MARCH  TO  THK  SKA. 

westward  to  Abbeville,  and  this  was  committed  to  General 
Sloeum  with  the  left  winp:  and  the  cavalry,  who  mined  it  for 
a  distance  about  equal  to  that  destroyed  by  Blair  on  the 
Charlotte  road.  This  part  of  the  army  then  turned  toward 
Winnsboro,  where  they  supplemented  Blair's  work  by  tear- 
ing up  ten  or  iifteen  miles  more  of  the  Northern  line.  While 
Sherman's  chief  purpose  in  making  this  strong  demonstra- 
tion northward  was  to  make  thorough  work  of  the  iuternip- 
tion  of  the  railway  communications  between  Beauregard's 
and  Hardee's  forces,  it  also  had  the  effect  of  creating  the  im- 
pression that  he  would  continue  his  march  on  Cliarlotte,  and 
delayed  any  concentration  of  the  enemy  toward  Ealeigh. 
The  National  colujnns  were  now  turned  sharply  to  the  east, 
crossing  the  Catawba  River  and  making  for  the  Great  Pedee 
at  Cheraw,  while  the  cavalry  kept  well  out  on  the  left  Hank. 
The  extreme  right  visited  Camden,  and  while  moving  be- 
tween the  two  rivers,  the  flanks  of  the  army  were  often  forty 
miles  apart.  There  was  scarcely  any  cessation  of  rain,  and 
the  marching  was  hardly  less  laborious  than  before,  though 
the  swamps  were  not  so  continuous. 

As  soon  as  Hardee  knew  of  Sherman's  occupation  of  Co- 
lumbia, he  evacuated  Charleston,  moving  his  troops  by  rail 
to  Cheraw,  where  great  quantities  of  stores,  both  public  and 
private,  had  been  sent.  The  cotton,  which  was  stored  in 
the  city  in  large  quantities,  ho  burned  in  the  warehouses,  and 
the  tire,  spreading,  did  a  good  deal  of  mischief  to  the  city. 
A  great  store  of  powder  and  ammunition  blew  up,  killing 
two  hundred  of  the  citizens  who  were  crowding  about  the 
conflagration.'  Admiral  Dahlgren  and  General  Foster  had 
kejit  up  active  demonstrations  along  the  coast,  and  occupied 
the  city  on  February  18th,  tho   day  after  its  evacuation. 


1  FoUaid'8  Southern  Hist,  of  the  War,  Vol.  IV.,  i>p.  160,  151. 


AVEUASBOIIO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  171) 

Hardee  had  constructed  strong  works  at  the  Pedeo,  hehijid 
Cheraw,  but  tliey  met  the  usual  fate  of  fortitications  made  by 
a  very  inferior  force.  The  advance  of  Slociim  with  the  left 
wing  turned  the  position,  ami  the  riglit  wing,  under  Howard, 
entered  Cheraw  on  March  3d,  capturing  28  i^ieces  of  artillery, 
3,000  stands  of  small  arms,  antl  an  immenso  quantity  of  am- 
munition and  stores.'  Hampton,  with  the  Confedeiuto  cav- 
alry, at  first  moved  off  toward  Charlotte,  but  making  a  wide 
circuit,  he  joined  Hardee  again  before  the  latter  crossed  the 
Cape  Fear  River  at  Fayetteville,  on  the  11th,  retreating  before 
Slocum,  who  entered  that  place  with  the  Fourteenth  (Davis's) 
Corps  on  theft  day.  Hampton  appears  to  have  been  deceived 
regarding  Sherman's  intended  line  of  march,  and  to  have 
thought  he  was  aiming  at  Charlotte,  where  Hood's  Army  of 
Tennessee  was  assembling;  and  iu  the  effort  to  return  to 
his  place  in  front  of  the  National  army,  he  unexpectedly  ran 
into  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  iu  the  night  of  the  9th,  not  far 
from  a  hamlet  called  Solemn  Grove.  Kili)iitrick  had  assigned 
to  his  three  brigades  halting  places  at  the  corners  of  a  tri- 
angle, where  tlu^y  would  hold  different  cross-roads  and  mu- 
tually protect  each  other,  but  Atkins  and  his  brigade  were 
anticipated  by  the  Confederates  at  his  intended  position,  and 
notwithstanding  the  most  industrious  efforts  to  reach  Spen- 
cer's brigade  by  a  circuit  in  the  night,  he  was  unable  to  do  so 
iu  time  to  warn  it  of  an  attack  by  Hampton  from  the  side  sup- 
posed to  be  covered.  Kilpatrick  was  with  Spencer,  and 
Hampton  having,  as  he  thought,  made  dispositions  of  his 
force  to  assure  success,  charged,  with  Butler's  division,  upon 
the  camp  a  little  before  daybreak.  It  was  a  complete  sur- 
prise. A  house  iu  which  Kilpatrick  and  Spencer  were  sleep- 
ing was  surrounded ;  a  battery  near  headijuarters  was  in  the 


'  Howard's  oftlciiU  report. 


180  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

oiiomy's  hands,  and  the  brigade  was  routed,  and  fled  into 
the  swamp.  Kilpatrick  himself  managed  to  escape  from  tho 
house  in  the  darkness,  half -dressed  and  unarmed  ;  btit  tho 
liardy  troopers  were  used  to  rough-and-tumble  lighting,  and 
began  to  rally  as  soon  as  they  reached  the  protection  of  tho 
cypress  trees.  Kilpatrick  was  soon  among  them,  and,  after 
a  little  organizing  under  cover  of  the  train  guard  and  of  volun- 
teer skirmishers,  they  charged  back  upon  Hampton,  whoso 
men  were  too  eager  for  plunder,  retook  the  cannon,  with 
which  they  fired  upon  their  adversaries,  and  turned  the  rout 
into  a  victoiy.  Spencer  and  the  staff  officers  had  taken 
refuge  in  the  upper  part  of  tho  house,  where  they  had  barri  • 
caded  themselves,  and  were  released  by  the  unexpected  stic- 
cess  of  their  friends.  Atkins,  guided  by  the  sound  of  the 
combat,  came  up  as  the  affair  ended,  and  Jordan's  brigade 
arrived  soon  after,  as  did  also  a  brigade  of  infantry  mnit 
from  Hlocum\s  column  at  the  noise  of  the  tight.  With  all 
their  cool  courage,  tho  routed  camp  would  hardly  have  been 
able  to  reform  but  for  tho  fact  that  four  hundred  dismounted 
men  had  been  armed  with  rifled  muskets  and  bayonets  at 
Savannah,  and  these,  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Stough,  of  the  Ninth  Ohio  Cavahy,  were  with  the  train,  a 
little  way  from  the  general  camp.  At  the  noise  of  tho  attack 
they  formed,  making  a  lino  to  which  the  rest  rallied,  and  ad- 
vanced. When  the  gleaming  bayonets  were  seen  in  tho 
gray  light,  the  cry  was  raised  that  the  infantry  were  upon 
them,  and  the  disconcerted  Confederates  were  thrown  into 
confusion.  Then  came  the  general  rally  of  Kilpatrick's  men, 
and  the  tables  were  completely  turned.  The  affair  had  no 
special  importance,  but  is  a  fair  type  of  the  cavahy  combats 
which  enlivened  the  laborious  march.  Hampton  released 
a  number  of  prisoiiors,  and  claimed  to  have  captured  five 
hundred,  though   Kilpatrick   only   reported    two    bundled 


AVERASBORO  AND  RENTONVILLE.       181 

missing.  The  Confederates  suffered  severely,  "  especially 
iu  ollicers,"  .Johnston  says,  but  the  exact  uunil)er  of  casual- 
ties is  not  given.  Over  a  hun<lred  killed,  and  many  woundtul, 
were  left  upon  the  field,  arguing  a  loss  probably  greater  than 
that  which  was  inflicted  upon  Kilpatrick.' 

At  Fayetteville  Sherman  destroyed  the  Arsenal,  originally 
built  by  the  National  Government,  but  which  had  been 
greatly  enlarged  by  the  Confederates  and  filled  with  ma- 
chinery for  the  manufacture  of  weapons,  brought  from  Har- 
per's Ferry  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Here,  also,  he 
heard  the  whistle  of  a  steamboat  which  opened  communi- 
cation by  the  Cape  Fear  River  with  "Wilmington,  and  got 
news  of  the  progress  Schofield  was  making  on  both  his  lines. 
He  had  thought  of  the  jjossibility  that  he  might  have  to 
move  down  the  right  l)auk  of  the  river  to  make  his  intended 
junction,  and  establish  a  new  base  ;  but  the  retreat  of  Hardee 
northward,  and  the  certainty  that  Kiuston  was  soon  to  be  in 
our  possession,  now  removed  the  last  doubt  of  a  successful 
concentration  at  Goldsboro.  He  did  not  know  of  Bragg's 
effort  to  overwhelm  the  corps  operating  from  Newbern,  but 
he  believed  that  his  own  advance  must  now  bring  all  the  de- 
tachments of  the  enemy  together  to  resist  his  progress.  Ho 
determined,  therefore,  to  march  the  left  wing  up  the  river 
by  the  east  bank  for  some  distance,  as  if  aiming  at  Raleigh, 
and  then  to  move  rapidly  to  the  right  and  meet  Schofield  at 
Goldsboro. 

The  news  of  the  assignment  of  General  Johnston  to  the 
command  of  all  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  Carolinas 
reached  Sherraan  at  Cheraw  on  March  3d,  though  the  ap- 
l)ointment  had  been  made  on  Febniary  23d,  when  the  news 
of  the  presence  of  the  National  army  at  Winusboro  had  pro- 


'  (Jeueral  AlkiiiH  in  Niuety-Hecoiul  llliiiuis,  p.  '^2i^, 


182  TI£R  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

dncod  in  Hioliniond  the  belief  that  Bhorman  iiusant  to  follow 
tho  liiH?  of  th»<  railway  througli  Jharlotte.  Every  effort  hml 
been  made  l»y  the  (Confederate  Government  to  accumulate 
army  supplies  alonjif  that,  its  only  remaining  available  lino, 
and  nearly  four  months'  food  and  clothing  for  Lee's  army 
was  collected  in  its  depots.  The  Confederate  Congress  had, 
in  the  emergency,  made  Lee  General-in-Chief  of  all  their 
armies,  and  ho  had  called  Johnston  from  the  retirement  in 
which  he  had  lived  since  the  preceding  July  to  assume  the 
direction  of  the  forces  which  were  trying  to  prevent  Sher- 
man from  closing  in  upon  the  rear  of  Richmond.  Mr. 
Davis,  the  President  of  the  Confederacy,  had  openly  declared 
that  ho  would  never  give  Johnston  a  militaiy  command 
again,  but  the  rcsi)onsibility  was  now  with  Lee,  and  Mr. 
lAivis  could  only  accpiiesee. 

It  is  not  overstating  the  truth  to  say  that  the  news  of 
Johnston's  assignment  was  received  throughout  Sherman's 
army  as  a  note  of  warning  to  be  prepared  for  more  stubborn 
and  well-planned  resistance  to  their  progress.  Officers  and 
men  were  agreed  in  the  opinion  that  the  liichmond  Govern- 
ment had  at  last  taken  a  wise  step,  though  they  were  quite 
sure  it  was  too  late  for  even  Johnston  to  save  the  campaign. 
Sherman's  estimate  of  the  forces  Johnston  might  concentrate 
to  meet  him  was  about  forty-five  thousand  men  of  all  arms ; 
and  reckoning  those  under  Bragg  in  North  Carolina  at  ten 
thousand,  his  figures  will  be  found  to  be  almost  exactly  those 
which  the  Confederate  generals  had  set  down  in  their  con- 
ference near  Aiigusta  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign.' 
But  Hardee's  eighteen  thousand  had  dwindled  rapidly  since 
the  evacuation  of  Charleston,  the  militia  of  South  Carolina 
and  Georgia  had  gone  home,  the  cavalry  had  suffered  con- 


See  Appendix  E,  II. 


AVERASHOIIO  AND  IIKNTONVILLE.  183 

fiidorablo  losses,  tho  roninants  of  Hood's  army  Imd  prowu 
less  as  they  travelled  northward,  and  when  Beauref?ard  snl)- 
niitted  his  estimates  to  Johnston  at  ('harlotto  in  the  hefrin- 
ning  of  Mareh,  ahont  twenty-six  thonsand  infantry  aiul  artil- 
lery, and  abont  six  thonsand  eavalry,  was  tho  extent  of  the 
army  on  whieli  they  conld  depend. 

Johnston  soon  satisfied  himself  that  Sherman's  eonrso  lay 
toward  Fayotteville,  and  leaving  Beanregard  witli  somo 
force  at  Charlotte  to  protect  tho  railway  to  Danville,  went 
in  person  to  Fayetteville  to  meet  Har(l(>e  and  Hampton,  giv- 
ing orders  for  tho  concentration  of  other  troops  near  Smith- 
field.  It  was  at  this  time  that  he  anthori/ed  Bragg  to  tako 
tho  troops  of  Stewart's  and  Lee's  corps  to  unite  witli  Hokij's 
and  make  tho  movement  against  Schotield  near  Kiiiston, 
calcnlating  that  there  wonld  still  be  time  to  nuissemblo  in 
front  of  Sherman  before  he  eoiild  reach  the  Nens(i  River. 
It  wonld  bo  difHcult  to  better  his  i)lan,  but  his  nnmbeis 
were  not  enough  to  make  either  part  of  it  successful,  thcjugli 
he  did  everything  that  courage  and  activity  could  do. 

Sherman  had  waited  at  Favetteville  a  dav  or  two,  in  tho 
hope  of  receiving  from  Wilmington  some  shoes  and  clothing 
of  which  his  men  were  almost  destitute,  but  no  supply  of 
these  could  yet  bo  got,  and  he  pushed  forward.  Slociim'ii 
columns  with  the  cavalry  crowded  Hardee  closely  on  tho 
15th  of  March,  capturing  Colonel  Rhett,  the  commander 
of  the  brigade  acting  as  rear  guard.  They  approach(>d 
Averasboro  on  the  16th,  where  Hardee  had  intrenched  on  a 
narrow  ridgo  between  the  river  and  swamp,  and  Slocum 
ordered  Jackson's  and  Ward's  divisions  of  the  Twentieth 
(Williams')  Corps  to  be  deployed,  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  being 
on  the  right  flank.  Sherman,  being  present,  directed  a 
V)rigade  of  infantry  to  bo  sent  well  to  the  left  to  attack  the 
line  in  flank.     This  was  vigorously  done  by  Case's  brigade, 


184  THK  MAUCII  TO  THE  SEA. 

and  Tiiliivforvd'M  division  was  routed,  fulliiif?  hack  in  liusto 
upon  a  lino  about  a  third  of  a  niilo  in  roar,  whoro  Hardi'n 
had  intnrnclicd  McLaw.s'  division.  Tlio  chief  weight  of  the 
Htroko  fell  upon  llhett's  brigade,  which  had  lost  its  com- 
mander the  day  b('f(n'e,  and  it  Hod  with  a  loss  of  over  a  hun- 
drtsd  left  d(^ad  upon  the  field,  and  more  than  two  hundred  cap- 
tured. A  batteiy  o,  three  field  f?uns  was  also  amonj^  the 
trophi(>s  of  this  brilliant  affair.  Williams's  divisions  pressed 
on,  found  Hard(!(!'s  liiu's  ajjfain  intrenched,  and  a  warm  en- 
paf^ement  began;  but  darkness  jmt  an  end  to  the  day's 
oi)erations.  Hardiui  retreated  during  the  night,  and  Sh(!r- 
man's  movomonts  were  resumed  in  tho  morning.'  The  Na- 
tional loss  in  the  affair  at  Averasboro  had  been  sovonty-scven 
killed  and  nearlv  live  hundred  wounded.  Hardeo  admitted 
a  loss  of  about  tho  same  number.  Seriously  cncundjcred 
with  his  own  injured  men,  Sherman  directed  the  Cfmfederate 
wounded,  who  numbered  about  seventy,  to  bo  left  in  a  field 
hos]>ital  in  charge  of  an  oflficer  and  some  of  their  own  men, 
after  proper  surgical  attention  had  been  given  them. 

Tho  two  or  three  days  that  followed  aro  remembered  by 
the  ofHcers  and  men  of  that  army  as  among  tho  most  weari- 
some of  tho  campaign.  Incessant  rain,  deep  mud,  roads 
always  wretched  but  now  nearly  impassable,  seemed  to  caj) 
the  climax  of  tedioiis,  laborious  marching.  Sherman  had 
changed  his  order  of  movement  at  Fayettoville,  directing 
four  divisions  of  each  wing  to  march  light,  and  tho  remain- 
der to  accompany  tho  trains  and  assist  them  foi*ward.  By 
this  arrangement  he  reckoned  upon  having  a  force  ready  for 
battle  on  either  flank,  largo  enough  to  hold  at  bay  tho 
whole  of  Johnston's  aniiy  if  the  Confederate   commander 

1  IMietfs  bii;j;i\(lc,  whioh  mifTerod  kd  Hovcrcly,  wiw  an  ortrnniziitioii  of  licavy  ar- 
tiliory  at  Cliniliftnii,  and  hiul  beoii  the  Kurritiou  of  BiuiiU-r.  It  took  the  HciJ  Uo 
iufiiuti'y  whuii  Churkbtou  woi^  cviicuHl«d. 


AVEUASRORO  AND  IJENTONVILLB.  186 

should  suddenly  assail  one  wing.  In  spite  of  cvory  exer- 
tion, liowt^ver,  the  columns  were  a  good  dt'aj  drawn  out,  and 
long  intervals  separated  the  divisions.  On  the  morning  of 
the  lt)th,  two  divisions  of  Davis's  corps  (Fourteenth)  weio 
about  eight  miles  from  Bentonvillo,  a  hamlet  on  the  south- 
east side  of  Mill  Creek,  a  small  tributary  of  Neuso  Kiver, 
where  the  north  and  south  road  from  Smithtield  to  Clinton 
crosses  one  loading  from  Averasboro  to  Goldsboro.  Two 
divisions  of  Williams's  (Twentieth)  cori)s  were  eight  miles 
farther  at  the  rear.  Kilpatrick  with  his  cavalry  had  fol- 
lowed the  retreat  t)f  Hardee  to  the  north,  and  was  at  the  left 
and  rear  of  Williams,  making  his  way  back  to  the  jjriucipal 
column.  Howard  with  the  four  light  divisions  of  the  right 
wing  was  upon  parallel  roads  to  the  southward,  if  they  can 
bo  called  parallel  when  they  were  sometimes  six  miles  ajjart 
and  sometimes  ten  or  twelve.  The  trains  with  their  guards 
were  toiling  along,  somewhat  farther  back,  taking  inter- 
mediate roads  when  they  could. 

Sherman  reasoned  that  Hardee's  affair  at  Averasboro  had 
been  made  to  delay  his  approach  to  lialeigh  till  Johnston 
could  unite  his  forces  in  front  of  the  State  cai)ital,  and  the 
fact  that  battle  was  given  with  only  Hardee's  command 
seemed  to  i)rove  that  his  adversary  Avould  be  in  no  condi- 
tion to  venture  south  of  the  Neuse  liiver  before  his  own 
concentration  at  Goldsboro  could  l)e  made.  He  did  not 
know,  however,  that  Johnston  had  just  strack  fiercely  at 
the  column  advancing  from  Newbern,  and  that  Hardee's 
stand  at  Averasboro  had  been  made  to  give  time  to  get 
Bragg's  forces  back  and  deliver  him  a  blow  before  his 
junction  with  Schofield  could  bo  made.  The  Confederate 
commander,  from  his  central  position,  was  in  telegi'aphio 
communication  with  his  subordinates,  and  knew  beffer 
than  Sherman  on  the  morning  of  the  19th  what  progress 


186  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

Schofield'a  two  columns  wero  making.  Ho  could  therefore 
make  his  combinations  knowin{?ly,  while  the  National  com- 
mander was  still  left  to  conjecture.  If  Johnston  meant  to 
do  anything  more  than  make  a  purely  defensive  retreat,  it 
was  essential  to  him  to  gather  his  forces  and  strike  (luick  ; 
twenty-four  hours  later  would  have  been  too  late,  for  Slo- 
cum  and  Howard  would  have  been  together  at  Cox's  bridge, 
and  Terry  would  have  joined  with  the  two  fresh  divisions. 
Johnston  was  now  giving  good  proof  that  if  he  could  not 
be  made  to  fight  unless  he  chose,  he  could  assume  the 
moiit  active  offensive  when  it  was  necessary.  He  knew  on 
the  17th  that  Sherman  had  turned  off  from  Averasboro 
toward  Goldsboro,  and  that  Hardee  was  resting  at  Eleva- 
tion about  two-thirds  of  the  way  on  the  road  from  his  late 
battle-ground  to  Smithfield.  Bragg  had  reached  the  last- 
named  place,  and  the  infox*matiou  from  Hampton  was  that 
Slocum's  two  corps  wero  nearly  a  day's  march  apart,  and  as 
far  from  Howard's.  They  must  pass  by  the  flank  three 
miles  in  front  of  33entonville,  the  little  village  whose  posi- 
tion has  already  been  described.  He  saw  that  this  was  the 
only  opportunity  likely  to  occur  for  fighting  Sherman's 
several  corps  in  detail,  and  gave  orders  to  concentrate 
ever}4hing  at  Bentonvillo  on  the  18th. 

Sherman  had  been  loth  to  widen  the  lines  of  his  march, 
but  to  do  so  was  the  condition  of  feeding  his  men  on  tho 
country  as  ho  still  had  to  do,  and  for  the  same  reason  he 
nuist  keep  moving  till  he  should  got  upon  a  railway  line  of 
communication  with  the  base  Schofield  was  establishing. 
But  ho  frankly  tells  us,  also,  that  the  evidence  before  him 
induced  a  confident  belief  that  Johnston  would  hold  to  the 
nm-th  lino  of  the  Neuse  and  dispute  its  passage.  This 
belief  induced  him  to  leave  Slocum's  line  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  lUth,  and  make  his  way  across  to  Howaid's. 


AVERASBORO  AND  RENTONVILLE.       1H7 

In  accordanco  with  his  habit,  ho  had  remained  with  the 
(^xj^osod  flank  till  he  thought  the  point  of  danger  passed, 
and  now  went  to  tho  right  wing  because  he  would  thus  get 
quickest  into  conimunieation  with  Hchotiold,  and  bo  nearer 
to  the  point  where  ho  meant  to  cross  the  Neuse  and  reach 
Goldsboro.  His  reasoning  was  strictly  in  accord  ^vith  sound 
principles,  but  as  constantly  happens  in  war,  the  facts  which 
he  did  not  know  were  essential  to  a  right  conclusion.  It 
would,  however,  have  been  more  prudent  to  have  delayed 
Slocum's  advance  with  the  two  divisions  of  Davis's  coi-jjs  till 
Williams  with  tho  Twentieth  should  have  come  nearer,  and 
a  little  carelessness  in  this  respect  must  be  attributed  to 
over-contidence  in  the  belief  that  Johnston  would  not  now 
take  the  aggressive. 

But  Johnston  also  found  his  calculations  fail  in  some  re- 
sjiects.  He  intended  to  have  his  troops  ready  to  attack  the 
head  of  Slocum's  column  early  in  the  morning,  Imt  the  maps 
were  wrong,  as  they  uniformly  were,  and  Hardee's  road  to 
Bentonville  proved  to  be  too  long  to  be  marched  by  day- 
light after  his  orders  were  received  Consecpiently  Hamp- 
ton was  directed  to  obstruct  Slocum's  advance,  and  prevent 
his  reaching  the  cross-roads  before  Hardee.  Tho  Confed- 
erate cavalry  under  Wheeler  was  therefore  close  in  front  of 
Davis's  cori)s  when  his  march  began  on  tho  10th,  and  had 
made  breastworks  at  some  points,  behind  whi(rh  they  oft'ered 
an  luiusuallv  stubborn  resistance.'  Carlin's  division  had  tho 
lead,  and  as  his  men  went  forward  tho  foragers  were  found 
on  right  and  left  of  the  road,  having  been  unable  to  drive  oft' 


•  The  first  priKoiiors  cn))ttir(Hl  were  from  Dibroll'a  division.  Johnston  snys 
(Narriitivo,  p.  392^  timt  Butler's  i^'vision  was  in  front  of  Ifownnl.  yt-t  \w  ivlwj  Sixys 
tliat  Wlieeler'B  coinniumi  wiis  not  cnKiinctl  on  tlic  ISHh.  There  must  be  error  in 
tills,  unless  the  organization  of  WhiJeler'H  corjis  had  recently  bei.-n  ehanvced. 
Slucum  was  certainly  fighting  some  mounted  force,  whicti  ruHisteil  siubbornly  all 
day. 


"I 


188  THE  MAllCII  TO  THE  SEA. 

the  onomy  or  get  ont  beyoud  his  flanks.  This  was  an  omin- 
ous «igii,  for  where  those  enterprising  skirmishers  coukl  not 
go,  the  opposition  must  be  stronger  than  a  cavahy  rear  guard 
usually  was.  As  Carlin  pushed  on,  however,  Hampton  gave 
way  slowly,  and  it  was  seen  that  the  opposition  came  from 
horsemen  only.  On  this  report,  Sherman  started  on  his  ride 
to  the  right  wing.  About  noon,  ho  was  overtaken  by  a  mes- 
senger from  Slocum,  who  still  announced  that  they  were 
resisted  by  nothing  but  cavalry ;  but  the  firing  of  artilleiy 
now  began  to  be  more  rapid,  and  to  indicate  more  serious 
work. 

As  one  goes  southward  from  Bentonville,  a  country  road 
forks  to  the  right  from  the  Clinton  road,  about  half  a  mile  be- 
fore the  crossing  of  the  Goldsboro  road  is  reached.  This  turns 
toward  Averasboro,  and  a  triangle  of  roads  is  thus  made  hav- 
ing sides  of  half  a  mile.  Hoke's  division  of  the  Confederate 
forces  was  first  on  the  ground,  and  was  ordered  to  take  this 
route,  cross  the  Averasboro  road  and  continue  seven  or  eight 
hundred  yards  farther.  Here  he  halted  and  intrenched,  his 
line  slightly  recurved,  but  still  at  an  acute  angle  to  the  road 
on  which  Davis  was  advancing.  Stewart  with  the  troops  of 
his  own  and  Lee's  corps  of  Hood's  army,  came  next  and  in- 
trenched the  line  of  the  road  they  had  travelled,  showing  a 
front  of  four  or  five  hundred  yards.  From  this  point  the 
right  was  swung  forward  along  the  margin  of  woods  looking 
into  the  open  farm -lands  of  Cole's  farm.  Hardee,  when 
he  came  up,  found  General  Bate  with  two  divisions  of 
Cheatham's  corps  (his  own  and  Smith's,  formerly  Cleburne's) 
placed  on  the  extnune  right,  and  put  Talliafeno's  division  in 
reserve  in  support  of  Bate :  his  other  division  (McLaws')  was 
ordered  by  Johnston  to  the  left  wing.  The  centre  of  John- 
ston's position,  therefore,  was  not  on  the  Averasboro  road, 
but  at  the  corner  of  Colo's  fields,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  north. 


AVERASnORO  AND  BENTONVILLE,  189 

The  two  wings  went  forward  from  this  point,  the  left  cross- 
ing diagonally  the  road  on  which  Davis's  corps  was  advan- 
cing, and  the  right,  hidden  in  the  thicket,  reached  fonvard 
ready  to  envelop  any  force  that  might  attempt  to  pass  to  the 
west  of  the  Cole  farm.  The  country,  except  at  the  farm 
mentioned,  was  covered  with  a  dense  thicket  and  wood,,  with 
marshes  from  which  small  streams  ran  in  all  directions. 

It  was  nearlv  noon  when  General  Davis,  with  Carlin's  di- 
vision  slowly  driving  Hampton's  cavaliy  back,  came  upon 
the  breastworks  crossing  the  road.  Hobart's  brigade  had 
been  deployed  some  time  before,  and  was  in  line  across  the 
road,  on  which  was  moving  a  four-gnn  battery.  To  the  right 
of  the  road  but  little  could  be  seen ;  biit  on  the  left  tho 
enemy's  line  could  be  traced,  apparently  bending  back  along 
the  farther  side  of  Cole's  field.  Still  thinking  he  had  before 
him  only  the  cavalry  which  he  had  slowly  followed  for  five 
miles,  Davis  ordered  Buell's  brigade  to  make  a  detour  to  the 
left  around  the  open  farm  lots  and  take  the  enemy  in  flank. 
But  Hobart's  skirmishers  were  developing  a  lino  of  lire 
farther  to  tho  light,  reaching  toward  our  flank,  and  Ham- 
bright's  brigade  (Colonel  Miles  in  command)  was  deployed 
on  Hobart's  right.  Carlin  now  advanced  with  his  two  bri- 
gades to  charge  the  works  before  him,  but  soon  recoiled 
before  a  fire  which  had  another  sound  than  that  of  tho  cav- 
alry carbines.  A  few  prisoners  had  been  taken,  among  them 
one  who  had  been  a  national  soldier  and  had  been  induced 
to  enlist  to  escape  from  a  Confederate  prison.  From  him 
the  fact  that  Johnston  was  present  in  person  with  his  whole 
army  was  learned.  Slocum  had  come  up,  and  after  consulta- 
tion with  Davis,  Morgan's  division  was  ordered  to  deploy 
forward  on  the  right  of  Carlin,  with  Mitchell's  and  Vando- 
ver's  brigades  in  front  and  Fearing's  in  second  line,,  Heavy 
lines  of  skirmishers  engaged  tho  enemy,  while  the  troops  of 


190 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


the   deployed  lines  hastened  to  cover  tliemselves  with  a 
hreastwork. 

It  was  now  about  two  o'clock,  and  Sloeum  wrotea  dispatch 
to  Sherman  telling  of  the  situation,  and  sent  Colonel  Mc- 


Dattlj  of  Beutonville. 


Clurg,  of  his  staff,  to  hasten  up  the  divisions  of  Williams's 
corps.  Buell's  brigade  was  making  its  way  slowly  through 
the  marsh  and  thicket  on  the  left,  when  the  crash  of  mus- 
ketry there  gave  warning  of  an  assault.  Hardee  had  sent 
Talliaferro's  division  still  beyond  Bate's  riglu.  upon  the  flank 


AVERASBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE.  191 

of  Buell's  hrif?ade,  and  Bate,  now  attaokinf?  in  both  front 
and  flank,  tliat  sinpjlo  brigade  was  overwhelmed,  and  driven 
to  the  rear  in  confusion.  The  attack  was  taken  np  in  turn 
by  Stewart's  divisions,  sweeping  across  the  Cole  farm  diag- 
onally upon  Davis's  loft,  taking  Carlin's  brigades  successively 
in  flank  and  rear,  and  pushing  them  back.  But  this  took 
time,  for  there  was  no  panic,  and  our  men  were  not  used  to 
be  beaten.  The  enemy  sufl'ered  terribly  as  he  crossed  the 
fields,  played  Tipon  by  the  batteiy  in  the  road  near  Cole's 
house,  and  cut  down  by  Hobart's  infantiy  fire.  Step  by  step 
they  advanced,  each  regiment  of  Hobart's,  as  it  found 
itself  attacked  in  rear,  retreating  and  fighting,  forming  a 
new  line  of  its  own,  and  again  making  a  stand,  till  all  of  this 
brigade  also  had  thus  been  pushed  off  in  detachments,  and 
the  left  was  curved  a  full  mile  to  the  rear.  Now  a  rush  ui)on 
the  road  captured  the  battery.  Miles's  brigade  was  also 
driven  from  its  line,  and  all  connection  between  Carlin  and 
Morgan  was  broken.  Davis,  whose  soldierly  qualities  camo 
out  brilliantly  in  the  trial,  now  rode  rapidly  to  Morgan  and 
ordered  Fearing  to  move  his  brigade  toward  the  left,  dt^ploy- 
ing  parallel  to  the  road  as  he  went,  and  to  charge  headlong 
upon  the  flank  of  the  enemy,  who  was  following  Carlin. 
The  work  could  not  have  been  put  into  better  hands  than 
those  of  the  unfearing  descendant  of  Israel  Putnam.  He 
changed  front  upon  the  run,  swept  everything  before  him  at 
'he  point  of  the  bayonet  till  tho  road  was  reached,  and  form- 
ing there,  his  destructive  volleys  drove  the  Confederate  cen- 
tre in  confusion  upon  its  right  and  into  the  swamf . 

At  the  sound  of  fighting,  Williams  had  hunied  forward 
the  troops  of  his  corps.  Eobinson's  brigade,  of  his  own 
division,  was  the  first  to  arrive,  and  it  formed  across  the  road 
in  front  of  the  MoiTis  farmhouse,  about  a  mile  from  Cole's 
liouse.     The  ground  here  was  a  little  higher,  and  the  Twon- 


192  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

tictli  Corjis  artilloiy  was  put  in  position  as  it  oamn  up. 
Robinson  connected  with  Fearing's  left,  and  Cailin's  brigades 
were  rallied  upon  this  line,  still  farther  to  tho  left.  A 
country  road  ran  along  this  i)oint,  and  Bate  attacked  the  lino 
again  and  again,  now  advancing,  now  driven  back,  until 
Hardee  withdrew  him  some  distance  in  consequence  of  the 
rout  of  tho  troops  in  the  centre. 

The  rest  of  Morgan's  division  had  not  been  idle  while 
Fearing's  brigade  had  been  so  shaii^ly  engaged.  Their  first 
assault  upon  Hoke's  division  had  been  a  vigorous  one,  and 
Bragg,  who  commanded  that  wing,  had  called  for  reinforce- 
ments, Hardee  was  just  coming  on  tho  field,  and  Johnston 
ordered  McLaws'  division  to  tho  supjiort  of  Hoke,  while 
Talliaferro  took  the  position  in  rear  of  Bate  already  indi- 
cated.' Morgan  had  not  been  able  to  break  through  tho 
enemy's  left,  and  had  resumed  his  own  lino  and  strength- 
ened it  during  the  lull  which  followed  tho  severe  check 
given  to  Stewart's  advance  in  tho  centre. 

Coggswell's  brigade,  of  "Williams's  corjis,  came  up  about 
four  o'clock,  and  formed  on  Fearing's  right,  though  the  line 
was  stiU  too  short  to  reach  to  Mitchell,  whose  left  was  a  lit- 
tle refused,  so  as  not  to  present  an  uncovered  flank.  Soon 
after  five  a  g<Mieral  attack  on  our  lines  was  again  made,  and 
was  persistently  kept  up  till  night.  Hoke's  division  charged 
upon  Morgan  s  works,  but  was  again  repulsed,  and  Vande- 
vcr's  brigade  made  a  return  charge,  capturing  the  colors  of 
the  Fortieth  North  Carolina  Regiment.  But  the  Confeder- 
ates had  found  the  gai^  between  Morgan  and  the  rest  of  the 
line,  and  pushed  fiercely  upon  Coggswell,  who  stoutly  held 
his  ground ;  but  some  of  them,  passing  through  the  interval, 

'  Johnston  says  that  he  yielciod  "very  injudicionsly"  to  Bragg's  call  for  help. 
Till' olTcc't  of  strongthoninp  Ifanlco's  riyht  by  anothor  diviuion  might  well  havo 
lieon  fatal  to  Slocum's  ilefcnco  under  the  circumstances. 


AVERASBOIIO  AND  BBNTONVILLB.  193 

tried  to  take  Morgan  in  reverse.  Colonel  McClurg,  of  Davis's 
Biaff,  who  was  taking  a  warning  of  this  to  Morgan,  narrowly 
escaped  capture  by  tbem.  Mitchell  and  Vandever  now 
faced  to  the  rear  and  quickly  routed  these,  the  Fourteenth 
Michigan  Regiment,  the  same  which  had  taken  the  colors 
in  the  preceding  charge,  nov  capturing  those  of  the  Fifty- 
fourth  Virginia  in  the  cliarge  to  the  rear.  The  Confederate 
troops  had  exhausted  their  power  upon  Davis's  coii)S,  and 
Johnston,  knowing  well  that  by  this  time  heavy  reinforce- 
ments were  approaching,  directed  Hardee  and  Bragg  to  re- 
call their  men  as  soon  as  the  wounded  could  be  carried  from 
the  field.  Even  after  dark  a  detachment,  seeking  its  way 
back,  came  again  in  rear  of  Mitchell's  brigade,  but  was  re- 
ceived with  a  volley  which  made  them  drop  their  arms  and 
fly  precipitately.  Hardee's  wing  reoccupied  the  line  along 
the  north  of  the  Cole  farm,  but  early  next  morning  Bragg 
was  drawn  back  till  the  angle  at  the  centre  was  salient  in- 
stead of  re-entrant,  and  the  left  flank  rested  near  Mill  Creek 
facing  toward  the  East,  whence  Sherman  was  to  be  looked 
for  with  Howard's  troops. 

Slocum's  dispatch  of  two  o'clock,  which  seems  to  have 
reached  his  commander  about  five,  was  written  before  the 
battle  was  fairly  opened ;  and  Sherman,  while  determining 
to  concentrate  upon  Johnston  next  day  unless  he  retreated, 
made  no  immediate  change  in  his  dispositions,  except  to 
direct  Kilpatrick's  cavahy  to  remain  with  Slocum  instead 
of  passing  to  the  right  flank,  as  had  been  intended.  At  two 
in  the  morning  of  the  20th,  however,  Sherman  was  roused 
by  a  message  from  Slocum,  dated  at  eight  o'clock,  telling  of 
the  hard  fighting  of  the  latter  i)art  of  the  day.  A  courier 
was  at  once  sent  to  Hazen's  division  (which  was  with  How- 
ard's trains,  and  nearest  Slocum)  to  hasten  instantly  to  his 
assistance.  The  other  divisions  of  Logan's  corps  were  at 
Vol.  X.— 9 


194  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

Falling  Creek  Chnrch,  where  the  roads  the  two  wings  were 
upon  crossed,  about  three  miles  *rom  Cox's  bridge.  These 
were  directed  to  march  at  break  of  day,  and  Blair's  corps, 
which  had  gone  further  on  the  "Wilmington  road,  was  re- 
called. 

Hazen  reached  Slocum  at  dawn,  and  found  that  the  whole 
of  the  left  wing  was  up,  and  a  good  defensive  line  had  been 
made  to  connect  the  position  so  stubbornly  held  by  Morgan 
with  that  which  Carlin  reformed  upon  before  night.  By 
noon  Sherman  himself  had  come  with  the  head  of  Logan's 
column,  and  the  rest  of  the  day  was  fully  occupied  with  de- 
ployments in  the  woods  and  swamps,  and  a  sharp  skirmish- 
ing fight,  while  communication  was  made  with  Slocum  and 
the  lines  adjusted.  Hazen  had  been  jilaced  by  Slocum  on 
the  right  of  Morgan,  so  that  he  was  in  line  with  his  own 
corps  when  Logan  approached.  The  whole  of  Johnston's 
left  flank  was  covered  by  a  brook  running  through  a  very 
difficult  swamp,  and,  under  his  skilful  direction,  his  men 
had  built  intrenchments  covered  by  abatis  of  the  formid- 
able sort  with  which  he  had  made  us  familiar  in  Georgia. 
His  position  was  in  the  nature  of  a  bridge-head  covering 
Bentonville  and  the  bridge  over  Mill  Creek,  which  he  only 
intended  to  hold  till  he  could  carry  off  his  wounded  and 
prepare  a  safe  retreat  to  Smithfield. 

Sherman  found  that  Slocum's  wounded  men  were  numer- 
ous enough  to  fill  his  ambulance  train,  and  that  Johnston's 
line  was  one  to  manoeuvre  against  rather  than  to  attack  in 
front.  He  contented  himself,  therefore,  with  pushing  his 
lines  close  to  his  adversaiy's,  especially  on  the  right,  where 
Blair's  corps  extended  Logan's  deployment.  Orders  were 
Bent  by  courier  to  Schofield  to  march  at  once  from  Kinston 
upon  Goldsboro.  Teny  was  directed  to  move  from  Faison's 
Depot  to  Cox's  bridge,  and  make  a  strong  effort  to  secure  a 


AVERASBORO   AND  BENTOXVILLE.  195 

crossing  of  the  Ncnse  River  there.  Shortly  after  noon  on 
the  21st,  General  "Mower,  who  hod  the  extreme  right  of  the 
line,  managed  to  thread  the  swamp  before  him,  and  finding 
but  a  weak  force  opposing,  advanced  rapidly  with  two  bri- 
gades till  he  was  within  musket  range  of  the  bridges  behind 
Johnston.  The  movement  was  made  without  concert  with 
the  rest  of  the  corps,  and  was  not  known  to  Howard  till  the 
rapid  firing,  as  Mower  was  met  by  Johnston's  reserves,  told 
of  his  position.  It  was  one  of  peril  for  the  division  as  well 
as  of  possibilities  of  great  results  had  Mower's  movement 
been  made  by  understanding  with  his  superior  officers. 
Johnston  first  threw  Wheeler's  cavahy  against  this  division, 
following  it  with  Lowry's  (formerly  Cheatham's)  division  of 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  which  had  just  arrived.  Howard 
ordered  General  Blair  to  support  Mower,  and  directed  an 
advance  of  Logan's  line  by  way  of  a  strong  demonstration. 
A  line  of  rifle-pits  for  skirmishers  was  taken  and  Logan's 
men  intrenched  within  fifty  yards  of  Bragg's  front.  The 
topography,  however,  was  so  blind  and  unknown  that  full 
advantage  could  not  be  taken  of  Mower's  partial  success. 
He  was  recalled  by  Sherman's  order,  the  National  commander 
preferring  to  rest  for  the  present  upon  the  certainty  that 
Johnston  must  retreat,  and  that  he  himself  could  unite  his 
whole  army  in  the  open  country  north  of  the  Neuse,  rather 
than  rush  blindly  into  a  general  engagement  in  the  thickets 
and  swamps  about  him. 

He  afterward  blamed  himself  for  not  following  up  Mower's 
movement,  and  with  more  knowledge  of  the  ground  he 
would  no  doubt  have  done  so ;  but  with  his  lack  of  informa- 
tion of  the  topography  as  well  as  of  the  force  before  him,  his 
prudence  was  wiser  than  impetuosity.  His  game  was  a  per- 
fectly sure  one  with  patience,  and  unless  Johnston's  roiit  had 
been  complete,  the  sacrifice  of  life  in  a  geneml  and  des- 


106  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

perate  charge  upon  the  intrencliments  would  have  been 
frightful  and  unjuHtifiablo.  Th«^  Confederate  army  had  i)re- 
served  the  organization  of  the  troops  which  had  come  from 
Hood,  and  down  to  the  time  of  the  surrender,  a  month  later, 
Cheatham's,  Stewart's,  and  Lee's  corps  kept  their  complete 
roster  of  divisions  and  brigades,  notwithstanding  the  veiy 
great  reduction  of  their  numbers.  The  common  method  of 
judging  of  the  enemy's  force  by  the  number  of  biigades  rep- 
resented by  captured  prisoners,  is  one  of  the  most  tnist- 
worthy  ;  but  in  this  instance  it  was  misleading,  as  it  was  no 
doubt  intended  to  be.  Sherman,  therefore,  from  this  and 
other  causes  which  have  already  been  mentioned,  somewhat 
overestimated  Johnston's  army,  and  was  the  more  inclined 
to  leave  nothing  to  hazard,  but  to  hasten  the  concentiation 
which  would  give  him  an  overwhelming  force,  and  which  in 
fact  enabled  him  to  close  the  campaign  and  the  war  without 
another  sanguinary  engagement. 

Johnston  retreated  in  the  night,  and  Sherman  resumed  hia 
mai'ch  on  the  22d.  Schofield  had  entered  Goldsboro  on  the 
preceding  day,  i)lacing  Cox's  corps  on  the  north  of  the  town, 
covering  the  Smithfield  road.  Terry's  coii^s  reached  the 
Neuse  at  Cox's  bridge  at  the  same  time,  and  laid  a  pontoon 
bridge  there,  so  that,  on  the  23d,  Sherman  rode  with  the 
head  of  his  column  into  the  place,  bringing  together  his 
whole  army,  now  nearly  ninety  thousand  strong.  The  casu- 
alty lists  were  heavy  for  the  numbers  engaged.  On  the  Na- 
tional side  the  total  loss  was  1,G(M,  of  which  1,196  were  in 
Slocum's  command.  Among  them  was  General  Fearing, 
who  was  severely  wounded  in  his  charge  upon  the  Con« 
federate  centre.  Of  the  Confederates,  207  dead  and  1,625 
prisoners  fell  into  Sherman's  hands.  Johnston  states  the 
number  of  his  wounded  at  1,467,  but  puts  the  dead  and 
missing  at  only  876,  which  is  1,000  less  than  the  number  in 


AVERASBORO  AND  BENTONVILLB.  197 

our  possession.  A  sifnilar  discrepancy  is  found  in  the  state- 
ments of  numbers  engaged.  Johnston  states  Slocuni's  force 
in  the  battle  on  the  lS)th  as  35,000,  and  his  own  at  about 
14,100  infantry  and  artilleiy.  Slocuni's  troops  on  the  field 
during  the  action  of  the  19th,  were  two  out  of  three  divisions 
of  Davis's  corjw,  and  two  brigades  of  Williams's.  The  casu- 
alty lists  show  that  none  others  arrived  in  time  to  take  part 
in  the  fight.  Their  numbers  were  therefore  about  1,000 
less  than  those  of  the  whole  Fourteenth  Coi-ps,  which  num- 
bered 13,000  when  it  loft  Savannali,  infantry  and  artillery. 
Johnston's  oflScial  report  for  31st  March  shows  22,000  of 
these  arms  present,  besides  5,500  cavalry.'  As  the  army 
was  freshly  assembled,  his  sick  who  were  present  when 
this  report  was  made  up  must  represent  his  wounded 
men  ;  and  when  his  trains  were  parked,  most  of  his  "  extra- 
duty"  men  must  be  supposed  to  be  at  the  breastworks. 
Letting  the  deail  and  j^risoners  in  our  hands  offset  the  de- 
tachments which  joined  him  aftei*ward,  and  it  would  appear 
that  about  22,000  men,  besides  the  cavalry,  will  fairly  repre- 
sent the  force  with  which  he  attacked  Slocum's  12,000. 

In  Slocum's  disposition  of  his  troops  the  only  point  open 
to  criticism  is  suggested  by  the  question,  whether  it  was  wise 
to  deploy  both  of  Davis's  divisions  upon  the  line  of  the  ad- 
vanced brigade  when  it  came  in  contact  with  an  intrenched 
infantry  line,  and  when  the  best  information  showed  all  of 
Johnston's  army  present.  It  would  seem  to  be  better  to 
have  placed  Morgan's  division  and  two  of  Carlin's  brigades 
upon  the  line  near  the  Morris  house,  where  Carlin's  men 
rallied  in  the  afternoon,  and  to  have  withdrawn  Hobart's 
brigade  to  the  same  point.  Johnston  would  then  have  had 
to  move  in  line  over  a  mile  of  swamps  and  thickets,  to  be 

'  See  Appendix  E,  III. 


101  THK  MAHCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

leceiveil  at  a  l)arri(!U(lo  which  would  by  that  time  have  been 
Btronf^,  while  his  own  attack  would  be  disjointed  by  Buch  a 
march.  To  rush  against  an  unknown  line,  without  full 
reconnoissance,  is  always  full  of  risk,  and  in  such  a  marshy 
wilderness  is  much  like  falling  into  an  ambuscade.  Johnston 
had  intrenched  to  receive  an  attack,  and  would  have  been 
somewhat  slow  to  move  out  in  the  i)resence  of  an  active 
skirmishing  reconnoissance.  This  would  have  gained  time, 
both  for  intrenching  Slocum's  rear  line  and  for  Williams  to 
approach.  The  situation,  however,  was  full  of  difficulty, 
and  the  left  wing  came  off  with  honors  of  which  it  had  a 
right  to  be  proud. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

STONBMAN'S  AND  WILSON'S  CAVALRY  EXPEDITIONS. 

Before  resuming  the  nantitive  of  the  closing  events  of  the 
war  in  North  Carolina,  let  us  go  back  to  the  portion  of 
Sherman's  territorial  command  which  General  Thomas  was 
now  directing,  and  trace  briefly  the  current  of  events  there, 
so  that  the  general  relation  of  the  final  movements  may  be 
clearly  understood. 

It  had  been  part  of  the  plan,  both  of  Grant  and  of  Sher- 
man, that  the  battle  of  Nashville  should  be  followed  by  an 
active  winter  campaign  in  Mississijipi  and  Alabama,  press- 
ing the  defeated  array  of  Hood  and  giving  it  no  rest  or  time 
to  reorganize.  The  natural  plan  of  this  campaign  would 
have  been  for  Thomas  to  march  through  Alabama  as  Sher- 
man had  done  through  Georgia,  reaching  Mobile  as  Savan- 
nah had  been  reached,  and  uniting  forces  with  Canby,  who 
would  have  been  prepared  to  establish  a  new  base  of  sup- 
plies upon  the  Gulf.  The  belief  of  General  Thomas  that  his 
army  was  not  prepared  for  this  work  brought  General  Grant 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  plan  which  promised  results  most 
nearly  equal,  would  be  to  send  General  A.  J.  Smith's  corps 
with  Knipe's  division  of  cavalry  to  reinforce  General  Canby 
at  New  Orleans  for  a  decisive  campaign  against  Mobile,  to 
transfer  Schofield  to  the  seaboard,  and  to  limit  the  ag- 
gressive movements  of  Thomas's  department  to  cavalry  ex- 
peditions to  be  made  by  Generals  Stoneman  and  Wilson, 


200  THE  MAllCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

one  from  East  Tonno^^soo  into  the  Carolinas,  and  the  otlior 
from  Florence  and  Tnscnml)ia  into  Central  Alabama.  In 
any  event,  tlio  puri)Ose  was  to  maintain  such  acrtivity  in  all 
portions  of  the  theatre  of  war  as  to  allow  no  reinforcement 
of  the  Confciderate  armies  in  the  east  because  of  lack  of 
active  and  inc^sssant  occupation  for  the  troops  the  enemy 
Btill  had  in  the  Gulf  States. 

Before  the  Department  of  the  Ohio  had  been  consolidated 
with  that  of  the  Cumberland  by  Schofield's  transfer  to  North 
Carolina,  the  latter  (acting  under  Thomas),  had  directed 
General  Stoneman,  commanding  in  East  Tennessee,  to  drive 
out  the  forces  with  whi(*li  Brecktmridge  had  been  making  a 
diversion  in  favor  of  Hood.  Stoneman  startcul  from  Knox- 
vilhi  on  Dec^ember  9th  with  two  brigades  of  mounted 
men  under  Gentaals  Gillem  and  Burbridge,  and  quickly 
cleared  East  Tenn(!Rsec  of  the  enemy.  Following  up  his 
advantage  promptly,  he  penetrated  Virginia,  ascending  the 
valley  of  the  Holston  to  Abingdon,  Wytheville,  and  SaJt- 
ville.  At  the  latter  place  he  destroyed  the  salt  works, 
which  were  of  gi'eat  value  to  the  Confederacy,  and  which 
had  been  the  coveted  object  of  many  a  raid  before.  At 
Marion,  extensive  iron  works  were  bui-ncd,  and  the  lead 
works  of  Wythe  County  were  ruined.  Two  railway  trains 
were  captunul,  tlui  railway  bridges  along  many  miles  of 
road  were  Inirned,  and  large  amounts  of  military  stores 
were  also  taken.  Ten  pieces  of  field  artilleiy  and  tw'o 
hundred  prisoners  were  also  captunsd.  Brf>(?kenridge  was 
forced  to  escape  by  a  rapid  retreat  into  North  Carolina, 
and  at  the  end  of  December  Stoneman  returned  to  East 
Tennessee. 

In  accordance  with  the  policy  of  activity  already  stated, 
Cbiint  directed  Thomas  on  Febnuiry  (»th  to  send  Stone- 
man with  his  cavaliy  through  the  Great  Smoky  Mountains 


STONEMAN'S  AND  WILSON'S  EXPEDITIONS.        201 

into  South  Carolina,  to  intomipt  railway  oonimunicn- 
tion  between  Columbia  and  Charlotte,  N.  C,  and  by  oc- 
cupying tho  attention  of  part  of  the  Confederate  forces  in 
that  region,  usHint  tho  movement  of  Sherman.  Delays 
occurred  in  pn^jaration,  and  it  was  not  till  March  22d, 
when  Sherman  had  already  reached  his  new  communica- 
tions with  the  North  Carolina  coast,  that  this  column  was 
ready  to  start.  The  great  progress  of  the  Eastern  cam- 
l^aign  changed  its  ol)ject  somewhat,  and  Stoneman  was  di- 
rected toward  Lync^hburg,  Va.,with  the  purpose  of  increas- 
ing the  damage  done  by  him  to  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee 
Kailway  in  Decembei",  and  making  it  useless  as  a  line  of 
retreat  for  Lee's  army,  if  llichmond  should  bo  evacuated. 
Thomas  was  ordered  to  send  also  the  infantry  of  th<;  Fourth 
Corps  into  East  Tennessee  to  ojipose  and  delay  Lee  if  ho 
should  escape  from  Virginia  by  that  route.  Tho  troojjs  now 
at  Stone  luan's  disposal  were  Gillem's  division  of  cavalry, 
which  consisted  of  the  three  brigades  of  Brown,  PalnKn-, 
and  Miller. 

The  upper  valley  of  fho  Holston  had  been  reoccupicul  by 
a  small  C'onfederate  force  under  General  Jackson,  and  tho 
local  militia  and  reserves  were  out.  Ilailway  bridges  had 
been  rebuilt  in  anticipation  of  Lee's  pro])al)lo  necessiticjs. 
On  the  2Gth,  Stoneman  was  with  the  division  at  Jonesboro, 
in  the  extreme  northeast  corner  of  Tennessc^e.  Here  ho 
took  tho  valley  of  tho  Watauga  Kiver,  following  the  moun- 
tain gorges  through  which  it  Hows,  to  Boone,  in  North  (Caro- 
lina. He  now  crossed  the  Blue  Kidge  to  the  ui)i)er  waters  of 
the  Vadkin,  and  turning  northward  reacthed  New  Iliver  and 
Wytheville  by  a  long  dcitour,  in  which  ho  had  turned  all  tlio 
hostile  positions  of  Jackson's  forces.  At  AVytlmville  a 
dfijiot  of  supplies  for  the  Confedei'atci  army  was  destroyed, 
and   detached    i)arties    burned   tho   railway   bridges   along 


202  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

ninety  miles  of  road,  and  within  fifty  milea  of  Lynchburg. 
This  work  was  continued  on  April  6th  and  7th,  when  Lee, 
who  had  retreated  from  Petersburg  in  the  night  of  tho 
2d,  had  already  been  anticipated  by  Grant's  forces  on  the 
Danville  road  at  Burke's  Station,  had  thus  been  cut  off  from 
the  supplies  accumulated  in  depots  on  that  line,  and  was 
shut  up  to  the  Lynchburg  route  as  his  last  resource.  The 
speed  with  which  Grant's  columns  surrounded  him  at  Appo- 
mattox gave  the  coup-de-grace  to  his  valiant  army,  but  the 
knowledge  he  had  for  a  day  or  two  before,  that  Stoneman 
was  destroying  his  railway  and  stores  beyond  Lynchburg, 
must  have  added  to  his  despair.  On  the  9th,  Stoneraan  re- 
assembled his  brigades  in  the  edge  of  North  Carolina,  and 
struck  southward  for  the  Danville  and  Charlotte  road,  which 
was  the  line  by  which  Lee  would  have  united  his  forces 
with  Johnston  had  he  succeeded  in  evading  Grant  at  the 
Burkesville  Junction.  He  passed  southward  through  Ger- 
manton  toward  Salisbury,  sending  detachments  right  and 
left  to  destroy  factories  of  clothing  and  the  like.  One  of 
those  columns  nai'rowly  missed  capturing  Davis  and  his 
Cabinet  at  Greenesboro.  On  the  12th  he  captured  Salisbury, 
after  a  brisk  skirmishing  engagement,  in  which  the  local 
troops  made  but  a  feeble  resistance,  being  manifestly  dis- 
heartened by  the  surrender  of  Lee,  which  had  occurred  on 
the  9tli.  The  captures  at  Salisbury  were  enormous,  and  had 
Stoneman  been  fully  aware  of  the  situation  in  Virginia  at 
Goldsboro,  it  is  possible  they  might  have  been  preseiTed ; 
but  he  acted  wisely  according  to  the  infonnation  he  liad, 
and  destroyed  them.  The  Confederate  forces  under  Gardi- 
ner and  Pemberton  were  routed,  and  1,300  prisoners  were 
captured.  Eighteen  pieces  of  artillery,  10,000  stands  of 
small  arms,  and  vast  stores  of  ammunition,  provisions,  cloth- 
ing and  blankets  which  had  been  accumulated  as  a  reserve 


STONEMAN'S  AND   WILSON'S  EXPEDITIONS.         203 

stock  for  Lee's  army  fell  into  Stonemau's  hands.  From 
Salisbury,  after  destroying  the  railway  bridges  for  many 
miles  he  retired  toward  East  Tennessee,  learning,  on  the 
way,  of  the  armistice  which  resulted  in  Johnston's  surren- 
der. 

The  expedition  into  Alabama  was  led  by  General  Wilson, 
and  was  of  nmch  larger  proportions.  It  also  was  much  later 
in  starting  than  General  Grant  had  intended,  his  directions 
being  that  it  should  march  as  soon  after  F  bruary  20th  as 
possible.  Wilson  had  four  divisions  of  cavalry  in  canton- 
ments at  Gravelly  Sju-ings,  nine  miles  below  Florence  on  the 
Tennessee  Eiver,  where  they  had  been  refitting  and  drilling 
since  the  retreat  of  Hood  in  the  beginning  of  January.  One 
of  these.  Hatch's,  had  been  dismounted  to  furnish  horses  to 
Knijie's  division,  which  had  been  sent  to  Vicksburg  to  move 
inland  from  that  point,  in  co-o})eratiou  with  Canby  and  with 
the  movement  Wilson  hims(^lf  was  preparing.  The  other  throe 
divisions  were  commanded  by  Generals  Long,  Upton,  and 
McCook.  All  these  subordinate  campaigns  were  too  late  to 
hold  any  part  of  Hood's  infantiy  in  Ala])ama,  for  the  rem- 
nants of  the  Confederate  Army  of  Tennessee  had  already 
ftmght  with  Schofield  at  Kinston,  and  with  Sherman  at  Ben- 
tonville,  before  Wilson's  columns  moved  southward  on  March 
23d.  But  General  Eichard  Taylor  was  assembling  the  re- 
serves and  the  militia  under  the  conscription  laws  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  Forrest,  who  had  also  been  busy  in  recmit- 
ing  and  refitting  his  cavalry  corjjs,  had  four  divisions  under 
his  command,  and  was  confident  of  his  ability  to  defeat  any 
mounted  force  Wilson  could  lead  into  Alabama  or  Mississii)pi. 
Taylor  had  to  detach  some  brigades  from  these  to  watch 
Canby's  movements  and  to  assist  General  Maury  at  Mobile, 
but  this  did  not  detract  from  Forrest's  faith  that  in  the  cam- 
paign with  Wilson  he  could  "  get  there  first  with  the  most 


204  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

men,"  to  use  a  pithy  saying  of  his  own  in  which  he  embodied 
the  essence  of  the  art  of  war.' 

But  "  to  get  there  first "  it  is  necessary  that  detachments 
should  be  nearest  the  threatened  point,  and  this  was  not  now 
the  case  with  Forrest.  Selma  was  the  one  remaining  great 
manufacturing  arsenal  of  the  Confederacy.  It  is  ui)on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Alabama  River,  about  a  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  above  Mobile,  in  the  heart  of  the  richest  part  of  the 
State,  the  "  cane-brake  region."  The  river  is  navigable,  and 
it  had,  besides,  railway  connection  with  the  coast  through 
Demopolis  (on  the  Tombigbee  River),  and  with  Talladega  to 
the  northeast.  On  the  latter  railway,  about  fifty  miles  north, 
is  Montevallo,  which  was  then,  as  now,  a  centre  for  the  manu- 
lacture  of  iron  of  a  sr^erior  quality.  Forrest's  men  were  a 
good  deal  scattered  through  the  central  and  eastern  region 
of  Mississippi,  collecting  remounts,  bringing  in  deserters 
and  enforcing  the  conscription.  Jackson's  division  had 
headquarters  at  West  Point,  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Rail- 
way, and  Chalmers's  near  Columbus,  Miss.  Two  of  Roddey's 
brigades  wore  near  Mobile,  but  Roddey  himself,  with  the  re- 
maining one,  was  jncketing  North  Alabama.  Buford's  division 
had  not  been  fully  re-organized  since  the  campaign  of  Nash- 
ville, and  Crossland's  brigade  was  the  only  part  of  it  which 
seems  to  have  taken  part  in  this  campaign.  One  of  Chalmers's 
brigades  (Wirt  Adams's)  was  on  the  march  from  Jackson, 
]Miss.,  to  Columbus,  but  it  \^  as  ordered  to  remain  upon  the  line 
of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railway  os  a  guard.  Seven  or  eight 
thousand  men  would  therefore  be  all  the  cavalrv  Fon-est 
could  hope  to  have  in  hand  to  meet  Wilson's  twelve  thousand. 

The  winter  had  been  well  spent  by  Wilson  in  organizing, 
and  his  train  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  wag(ms  was  carefully 


'  Tiv^loi'V  DcslriicLiuii  iiiul  UuouiiHtriictioii.  (•.  ;illU. 


STONEMAN'S  AND  WILSON'S  EXPEDITIONS.       205 

selected  and  packed  with  a  view  to  rapid  movement.  The 
'small  rations'  and  ammunition  had  the  preference,  as  the 
country  would  be  foraged  for  meat  and  l)read.  A  pontoon 
train  of  thirty  canvas  boats  accompanied  the  column,  and 
the  wheel  vehicles  were  guarded  by  fifteen  hundred  dis- 
mounted men.  The  three  divisions  started  southward  on 
separate  roads,  but  united  at  Jasper,  about  eighty  miles 
southeast  of  Tuscumbia.  From  information  he  here  received, 
Wilson  felt  the  need  of  haste,  so  tilling  his  men's  haversacks 
he  left  the  train  behind  and  pushed  hard  for  Montevallo. 
Koddey's  brigade  began  to  make  some  oiii)osition  at  Elyton, 
but  it  hardly  amounted  to  delay.  McCook  was  ordered  to 
detach  Croxton's  brigade  and  send  it  to  Tuscaloosa  to  de- 
stroy stores  and  public  projierty  there,  incl'iding  a  militaiy 
school.  A  railway  bridge  at  Hillsboro  was  oeized  before  it 
could  be  destroyed,  and  the  column  crossed  upon  it,  flooring 
it  with  plank  from  the  covering  of  the  sides  of  the  structure. 
Montevallo  was  reached  on  the  31st,  Roddey's  brigade  and  a 
militia  force  under  General  Daniel  Adams  retreating  before 
the  advance  of  Upton's  division.  In  the  vicinity  five  iron 
furnaces  and  as  manv  collieries  were  dostrbved  ;  but  Wilson 
felt  that  hours  were  precioi;s  and  hurried  southward.  Cross- 
land's  brigade  had  joined  Roddey,  and  Forrest  was  hastening 
in  person  to  them,  but  the  heavy  National  colunnis  gave 
them  no  rest,  charging  them  without  hesitation  when  they 
formed  and  hurrying  them  back  toward  Randolph,  fourteen 
miles,  during  the  first  of  April.  Next  day  Randolph  was 
reached,  and  a  lucky  capture  of  a  courier  gave  Wilson  knowl- 
edge of  his  adversaiy's  positions  and  moves.  He  learned 
from  the  captured  despatches  that  Forrest  had  now  joined  in 
person  the  force  in  front  of  him,  but  that  Jackson's  division 
was  harassed  by  Croxton's  brigade  at  Trion,  thirty  miles 
northwest,  between  the  Cahavvba  and  Black  Warrior  Rivers. 


206  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

He  also  learnofl  that  Chalmers's  division  was  at  Marion,  about 
as  far  to  the  southwest,  and  was  marching  toward  Selma,  in- 
tending to  cross  the  Cahawba  near  his  present  position. 
Croxton  also  sent  word  that  ho  should  follow  Jackson  and 
bring  him  to  an  engagement.  Wilson  had  evidently  "  got 
there  first,"  and  with  the  most  men.  He  at  once  sent  Mc- 
Cook  with  the  rest  of  his  division  to  co-operate  with  Crox- 
ton by  attacking  Jackson  in  front,  crossing  the  Cahawba  at 
Centreville,  fifteen  miles  west  of  Randolph,  for  this  puipose. 
McCook  drove  off  a  militia  guard  from  the  Centreville  bridge 
and  advanced  toward  Trion,  but  finding  that  Croxton  was  no 
longer  fighting  Jackson,  and  that  the  latter  greatly  outnum- 
bered him,  he  retired  to  the  bridge  and  burned  it,  after  cross- 
ing to  the  east  bank.  The  river  was  unfordable,  and  as 
Jackson  must  go  nearly  to  Marion  to  get  over,  Wilson  was 
relieved  of  any  fear  of  his  joining  Forrest  north  of  Selma. 
He  accordingly  advanced  with  increased  vigor  against  For- 
rest, who  had  selected  an  excellent  defensive  position  six 
miles  north  of  Plantersville.  Fortune  here  favored  Wilson 
again,  as  she  usually  does  the  bold,  for  by  a  mistake  in  tele- 
graphing Forrest  had  supposed  that  Chalmers  was  on  the 
Selma  road  behind  him,  and  had  ordered  him  to  move  on 
Randolph.  This  dispatch  being  forwarded  to  Chalmers  from 
Selma,  that  officer,  who  was  upon  the  west  side  of  the  Ca- 
hawba, took  the  direct  road  up  the  river,  separating  himself 
from  his  commander  instead  of  going  to  his  assistance. 
This  accident  kept  Forrest's  force  down  to  the  two  brigades 
of  cavalry  and  the  militia  under  General  Adams,  besides  the 
battalion  of  his  escort ;  but  he  was  a  host  in  himself.'     Wil- 


'  Wilson's  report  says  that  Armstrong's  brigade  from  Chalmers  had  joined 
Forrest ;  but  the  authors  of  Forrchfs  Campaigns  (pp.  6()6  and  WTl)  are  so  explicit 
in  Htating  the  contrary  that,  witiiout  access  U>  Chalmers's  official  report,  I  feel 
obliged  to  yield  to  their  authority. 


STONEMAN'S  AND  WILSON'S  KXPEDITIONS.        207 

son  had,  for  ease  of  marching,  put  Upton's  and  Long's  divi- 
sions upon  sejiarate  roads  at  Randolph,  and  these  converged 
near  the  enemy's  position.  Long  was  up  first  and  allowed 
no  delay.  His  advanced  guard  pushed  forward  on  foot  and 
broke  the  first  line  of  Roddey's  brigade,  and  he  then  sent  a 
battalion  of  the  Seventeenth  Indiana  moimted,  with  drawn 
sabres,  to  charge  the  retreating  foe.  Roddey's  men  were 
thrown  into  confusion,  but  Forrest  advanced  in  person  with 
his  escort,  their  repeating  carbines  proved  too  much  for  the 
sabres,  and  Roddey  and  Adams  succeeded  in  reforming  their 
linesJ  Colonel  "White  had  ridden  with  his  Indianians  over 
the  guns,  crushing  the  wheel  of  one  of  them  by  a  blow 
w^hich  crushed  the  breast  of  a  horse  as  well,  but  turning  to 
the  left  he  cut  his  way  out.  A  gallant  man,  however.  Captain 
Taylor,  did  not  hear  the  order  in  the  melCe,  and,  followed  by 
his  company,  rode  straight  at  Forrest,  his  men  falling  at 
every  step.  Forrest  used  only  his  pistols,  w'arding  and  firing, 
but  he  received  several  sabre  cuts,  and  finallv  ,'>roke  loose  bv 
a  great  boiind  of  his  horse  in  answer  to  the  spi  r,  and  killed 
Taylor  by  a  fatal  shot  before  he  could  reach  him  again. 

Upton's  men  had  come  up  on  Long's  right  and  all  dashed 
forward  together,  when  Forrest's  lines  gave  way  and  crowded 
in  a  confused  rout  toward  Selma.  Three  guns  and  some  two 
hundred  prisoners  fell  into  Wil  on's  hands.  About  midnight 
Forrest  found  Armstrong's  brigade  and  hurrying  it  to  Selma 
sent  urgent  orders  to  Chalmers  to  march  the  rest  of  his  di- 
vision instantly  in  the  same  direction.*     Wilson's  movements 

1  It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  Forrest,  whose  experience  was  equal  to  that  of 
any  one,  hud  reached  the  conchisioii  that  reiK'nting  flre-arins  were  the  proper 
weapons  for  mounted  troops,  and  that  he  rejected  sabref>,  using  his  force,  by  pre- 
ference, as  a  mounted  infantry. 

2  Forrest's  biograpliers  suggest  (Campaigns,  p.  67)  that  the  hospitality  of  his 
reception  at  Marion  had  made  Chalmers  forget  the  need  of  haste  in  the  previous 
movements. 


208  THK  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

are  an  admirable  proof  of  the  value  of  time  in  snch  a  cam- 
paign. After  fighting  and  chasing  till  late  in  the  night  of 
April  1st,  making  twenty-four  miles  of  progress  during 
the  day,  he  marched  at  dawn  of  the  2d,  and  closed  iu  upon 
Selma  early  in  the  af.  ernoon,  in  time  to  prevent  Chalmers 
and  Jackson  from  entering  the  city.  Forrest,  covered  with 
the  hlood  and  dust  of  the  battle,  had  a  hurried  conference 
with  General  Taylor,  the  department  commander,  and  the 
latter  quickly  left  for  Demopolis  on  the  W>''sLcrn  Railway,  to 
see  what  resources  he  could  gather  to  assist  his  heroic  but 
badly  worsted  lieutenant.  The  locomotive  on  which  he  went 
had  hardly  passed  beyond  the  city  when  Wilson's  lines  ad- 
vanced, and  these  sent  a  volley  after  Taylor,  who,  however, 
sped  on  his  way  unhurt. 

Forrest  now  disposed  his  little  garrison  as  best  he  could, 
though  they  made  but  a  thin  line  in  the  long  parapet, 
and  the  militia,  corai^osed  of  old  men  and  young  boys,  were 
so  demoralized  that  he  placed  no  reliance  on  them.  The 
works  were  strong  and  carefully  built,  with  good  ditch  and 
I)alisade,  and  many  heavy  guns  were  in  position.  Steamboats 
and  trains  had  worked  hard  to  carrv  awav  the  ordnance  and 
stores  which  were  worth  their  weiglit  in  gold  to  the  Confeder- 
acy now  ;  but  these  had  all  steamed  away  and  the  city  was 
left  to  its  fate. 

Wilson  placed  Long  on  the  right  and  Ui)ton  on  the  left, 
but  despite  their  utmost  exertions,  it  was  near  evening  when 
their  lines  had  been  established  and  the  works  reconnoitred. 
The  plan  had  been  to  pick  the  way  through  swamps  on  the 
left,  where  Upton  thoiight  he  could  reach  a  less  guarded  jiart 
of  the  fortifications,  but  Long  heard  that  a  force  was  threat- 
ening his  rear  and  sending  a  regiment  to  jjrotect  his  pack 
train  and  led  horses,  he  pushed  headlong  at  the  works.  The 
noise  of  his  attack  was  the  signal  for  the  rest,  the  audacity 


STONEMAN'S  AND  WILSON'S  EXPEDITIONS.        209 

of  the  thing  eonfoiindod  the  already  demoralized  Confeder- 
ates, and  after  a  short  straggle,  the  lines  were  carried  every- 
where, and  Wilson's  men  entered  the  town  on  all  sides  amid 
a  scene  of  indescribable  confusion.  Forrest  had  again  ex- 
posed himself  like  a  trooper  in  the  line  ;  but  it  was  of  no 
use,  and  with  a  mere  handful  of  the  best  of  his  men  and 
some  of  his  principal  officers,  he  cut  his  way  out  by  the 
Montgomery  road  to  the  east.  During  the  night  he  made 
the  circuit  of  the  National  Army  by  the  north  and  reached 
Plantersville  in  the  morning,  the  scene  of  his  hasty  retreat 
the  day  before.  Resting  here  a  few  hours,  he  led  his  men 
toward  Marion,  but  was  soon  confronted  by  McCook's  divis- 
ion, marching  to  rejoin  Wilson  at  Selma.  Skirmishing  to 
gain  time,  he  again  evaded  by  the  left,  and  by  anotlier  night 
march  crossed  the  Cahawba  River  and  joined  Chalmers  and 
Jackson  at  Marion,  on  the  morning  of  the  4th. 

Wilson's  prize  was  an  enormous  one,  and  it  had  been  most 
skilfully  won.  His  rapid  movements,  his  promi>t  attacks, 
his  untiring  pursuit  had  made  his  preponderance  of  force  of 
double  value.  He  had  always  anticipated  Lis  adversary  in 
time  and  overpowered  him  in  strength,  so  that  for  once  in 
his  career  the  doughty  FoiTest  had  his  own  tactics  com- 
pletely turned  upon  him,  and  had  been  thoroughly  beaten 
in  detail.  Forty  guns,  twenty-seven  hundred  prisoners,  and 
great  stores  of  material  of  war  were  captured  ;  but  the  sever- 
est loss  to  the  Confederacy  was  the  destruction  of  their  great 
manufacturing  arsenal. 

Wilson  laid  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the  Alabama  River 
with  great  difficulty,  for  the  stream  was  deep  and  swift. 
After  destroying  the  workshoi)S  and  public  stores,  he  deter- 
mined to  move  on  Montgomery  and  thence  into  Georgia, 
Nvith  the  ultimate  purpose,  he  says,  of  using  the  discretion 
allowed  him,  to  march  through  the  Carolinas  to  the  armies  in 


210  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

the  east.  The  militia  and  reserves  made  but  feeble  resist- 
ance, the  evacuation  of  Richmond  and  sun'ender  of  Lee 
were  soon  rumored  through  the  country,  and  the  march  to 
Macon  had  none  of  the  military  significance  of  the  brilliant 
and  instructive  campaign  against  Forrest.  In  a  strategic 
point  of  view,  it  was  a  departure  from  the  sound  principles 
which  had  guided  the  preceding  part  of  the  campaign.  Two- 
thirds  of  Forrest's  corps  was  still  intact  between  the  Cuhawba 
and  Tombigbee  Rivers,  and  Mobile  was  not  yet  taken.  His 
time  objectives  were  west  and  south,  not  east  and  north. 
But  the  exhausted  Confederacy  was  collapsing  from  all  sides, 
its  President  was  fleeing  for  his  life,  as  he  thought,  and  it 
was  the  fortune  of  a  detachment  of  Wilson's  command  to 
arrest  him  in  the  far  southern  part  of  Georgia,  near  the 
Florida  line.  Mobile  soon  fell,  and  Forrest,  sore  with  his 
wounds,  but  more  sore  with  the  chagrin  of  terminating  his 
military  career  with  so  great  a  defeat,  gave  his  parole,  dis- 
banded his  hardy  troopers,  and  like  most  of  the  good  soldiers 
of  the  South,  taught  the  people  by  word  and  by  example  to 
submit  without  reserve  to  the  triumphant  National  Govern- 
ment. 


CHAPTER  Xin. 

aOLDSBOllO  TO  RALEIGH.— SURRENDER  OF  JOHNSTON'S 

ARMY. 

Upon  assembling  his  avmy  at  Goldsboro,  the  first  work 
demanding  Sherman's  attention  was  to  supply  with  clothmg 
and  shoes  the  four  corps  which  had  become  nearly  naked 
and  barefoot  in  the  march  from  Savannah.  Colonel  Wright 
had  worked  so  industriously  upon  the  Neuse  River  Railway 
that  a  train  reached  Goldsboro  the  dav  of  Shennan's  arrival 
there ;  but  the  line  was  so  j^oorly  stocked  with  locomotives 
and  cars  that  it  could  not  be  depended  upon  to  supply  the 
army.  Kinston  was  therefore  made  a  secondary  base  for  a 
time,  steamboats  carried  stores  there  from  Beaufort,  More- 
head  City,  and  Newbern,  and  the  army  trains  were  kept 
busy  between  Kinston  and  Goldsboro.  The  Wilmington 
Railway  was  not  badly  damaged,  and  a  few  days  sufficed  to 
put  its  track  in  order,  but  it  was  bare  of  equijjment.  Loco- 
motives and  cars  could  not  be  procured  and  shipped  in  a 
moment.  Some  interval  must  necessarily  elapse  before  a 
new  campaign  could  open,  and  after  establishing  his  camps, 
Sherman  left  Schofield  in  command  and  made  a  swift  jour- 
ney to  City  Point,  where  he  had  a  personal  consultation  with 
General  Grant,  and  plans  for  the  final  campaign  were  defi- 
nitely arranged.  The  position  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
about  Petersburg  was  such  that  Lee's  army  must  necessarily 
follow  the  Dauville  and  Charlotte  line  in  retreat,  or  make  its 


212  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

way  by  LynclibnrR  into  the  valley  of  East  Tonnoasoo.  To 
meot  the  latter  contingency,  General  Thomas  hail  been  or- 
tlered,  as  has  already  been  noted,  to  send  the  Fourth  (^oi^m 
(Wood's)  to  Bull's  Gap,  fifty  miles  nortluMist  of  Knoxville, 
where  it  could  hold  the  passes  through  which  the  2>iincii)al 
routes  ran,  long  enough  to  enable  Grant  to  close  upon  tho 
rear  of  Lee's  army.  To  meet  the  first  contingency,  Sheridan 
■was  already  ordered  into  position  on  the  left  flank  of  the 
Army  of  tho  Potomac,  where  ho  was  soon  to  fight  the  series 
of  bi-illiant  engagements  near  Five  Forks,  and  to  get  where 
he  could  beat  Lee  in  the  race  for  Danville  when  the  forced 
evacuation  of  Ilichmond  and  Petersburg  should  take  place. 
In  this  final  combination,  Sherman's  part  was  to  move  his 
whole  army  a  little  north  of  Raleigh  and  thence  to  Weldon 
on  tho  Roanoke  River,  unless  changes  in  the  situation  should 
induce  General  Grant  to  modify  tho  orders. 

Sherman  also  had  tho  fortune  to  meet  President  Lincoln 
at  City  Point,  and  in  an  unreserved  conversation  upon  the 
situation,  ho  learned  that  that  great  man's  heart  was  set 
njion  restoring  peace  without  more  bloodshed,  if  that  were 
possible  ;  the  only  terms  which  he  demanded  being  submis- 
sion to  the  National  Constitution,  disbanding  of  Confederate 
armies  and  governments,  acknowledgment  of  the  abolition 
of  slavery,  and  tho  speedy  resumption  of  the  relations  of  the 
States  to  the  Federal  Government,  tho  existing  State  govern- 
ments continuing  to  act  de  facto  till  necessaiy  legislation  by 
Congress  could  be  had.  A  general  amnesty  would  follow 
such  submission,  but  he  hoped  to  be  relieved  of  embarrass- 
ment as  to  the  i)olitical  chiefs,  by  the  voluntaiy  expatriation 
of  Mr.  Davis  and  a  few  of  the  most  prominent. 

Sherman  returned  to  Goldsboro  on  March  30tli,  with  au- 
thority for  some  changes  in  his  army  organization  which 
were  essential  to  its  easy  administration.    His  left  wing, 


OOLDSnORO  TO  RALKIGH.  213 

under  Hiocum,  was  formally  constituted  tho  Army  of  Georgia ; 
thu  centre  nMnainod  tho  Army  of  tho  Ohio,  under  Schotield, 
including  tho  diviisions  under  General  Terry,  whicli  were  per- 
manontly  orguni/ed  us  the  Tenth  Corps;  and  the  right  wing 
retaining  tho  organization  it  had  as  Army  of  tho  Tennessee. 
These  wore  not  merely  nominal  distinctions,  but  wore  neces- 
sary, under  tho  laws,  to  give  tho  commanders  of  these  three 
grand  divisions  tho  power  to  relievo  Sherman  of  tho  details 
of  business  administration  of  the  whole.  Tho  only  change 
in  the  commanders  of  corps  was  the  assignment  of  Major- 
Goueral  Mower  to  tho  Twentieth  Cor])s.  Tho  accumulation 
of  supplies  and  refitting  of  tho  troops  had  so  far  progressed 
that,  on  April  5th,  confidential  instructions  were  issued,  or- 
dering tho*  new  campaign  to  open  on  the  10th.  But  next 
da}  came  tho  news  that  llichmond  was  evacuated,  Leo  was 
struggling  to  reach  Danville,  and  Sherman's  lino  was  accord- 
ingly changed  to  lialeigh,  with  Greensboro  and  Charlotte  as 
his  objective  jwints  beyond. 

Tho  march  began  on  tho  10th,  and  on  tho  11th,  at  Smith- 
field,  tho  army  was  electrified  by  the  announcement  that 
Lee  had  surrendered  at  Appomattox  on  tlio  0th.  Tho  day 
was  a  warm  and  bright  Hi)ring  day  ;  the  columns  had  halted 
for  the  usual  rest  at  tho  end  of  each  hour's  march ;  tho  men 
were  sitting  or  lying  ujion  the  grass  on  either  side  the  road, 
near  Smithfield,  when  a  staff  officer  was  seen  riding  from 
the  front,  galloping  and  gesticulating  in  great  excitement, 
the  men  cheering  and  cutting  strange  antics  as  he  passed. 
When  he  came  nearer  ho  was  heard  to  shout,  "  Lee  has  sur- 
rendered ! "  Tho  soldiers  screamed  out  their  delight ;  they 
flung  their  liats  at  him  as  lie  rode;  they  shouted,  "You're 
the  man  we've  been  looking  for  those  three  years  !  "  They 
turned  somersaults  like  over-excited  children.  They  knew 
the  long  Civil  "War  was  virtually  over.      Another  phase  of 


214  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

the  universal  rejoicing  in  the  land  was  quite  as  well  illus- 
trated by  the  roadside.  A  Southern  woman  had  come  to  the 
gate  with  her  children,  to  ask  of  a  corps  commander  the 
usual  protection  for  her  family  while  the  column  was  pass- 
ing, and  as  she  caught  the  meaning  of  the  wild  shout,  she 
looked  down  uiDon  the  wondering  little  ones,  while  tears 
streamed  down  her  cheeks,  saying  to  them  only,  "  Now  father 
will  come  home." 

From  this  time  the  march  had  military  importance  only 
as  it  led  to  the  quickly  approaching  end.  The  skirmishing 
of  advance  and  rear  guards  continued,  but  Johnston  was 
only  delaying  Sherman's  movements  till  he  could  communi- 
cate with  the  Confederate  President,  who,  with  some  of 
his  Cabinet  and  the  more  important  archives  of  the  dissolv- 
ing Government,  was  upon  a  railway  train  at  Greensboro. 
Raleigh  was  occupied  on  the  13th,  and  on  the  next  day  a 
flag  of  tnice  from  General  Johnston  opened  the  final  nego- 
tiations for  surrender.  It  was  on  the  evening  of  that  day 
that  President  Lincoln  was  assassinated.  The  conjuncture  of 
events  was  one  of  the  strangest  that  the  strange  current  of 
humar.  history  has  ever  presented,  and  we  puzzle  our  brains 
in  th  V  un  effort  to  conjecture  how  the  destiny  of  the  coun- 
tiy  might  have  been  modified  if  that  horrible  murder  had 
not  been  committed. 

Sherman  met  Johnston  at  Durham  Station  in  the  spirit  of 
the  lenient  policy  Lincoln  had  indicated  to  him  a  fo)'tnight 
before,  and  an  outline  of  a  convention  was  arranged  before 
he  knew  of  the  President's  death.  Knowing  the  danger 
that  the  war  would  take  a  more  revengeful  and  destructive 
foim  if  the  campaign  were  continued,  and  deeply  impressed 
by  the  dismay  and  sorrow  with  which  General  Johnston  re- 
ceived the  tenible  news  of  the  assassination,  he  felt  that 
this  was  only  a  new  reason  for  ending  the  strife  before  it  de- 


GOLDSBORO  TO  RALEIGH.  215 

generated  into  one  of  extermination  on  the  one  side,  and 
despair  on  the  other.  Both  f^enerals  recognized  the  use- 
lessnesR  of  any  further  destruction  of  human  life,  and  agi'eed 
in  regarding  it  as  criminal.  Johnston  and  the  prominent 
men  with  him  were  explicit  in  admitting  the  abolition  of 
slavery  as  an  accomplished  fact,  but  the  negotiating  parties 
made  the  error  of  failing  to  see  that  the  embodiment  of 
such  a  statement  in  the  terms  of  the  convention  would  have 
increased  greatly  the  chances  of  its  approval  by  the  National 
Administration. 

The  history  of  the  armistice  and  of  its  disapproval  are 
part  of  the  political  history  of  the  country  rather  than  of 
the  military  campaign.  It  is  enough  to  say  here  that  the 
agreement  reached  Washington  when  the  members  of  the  Ad- 
ministration and  the  leaders  in  Congress  were  under  the 
influence  of  a  panic  resulting  from  the  belief  that  the  Con- 
federate leaders,  conscious  of  the  desperation  of  their  cause, 
had  organized  a  plot  for  the  murder  not  only  of  the  Presi- 
dent, but  of  all  his  Cabinet  and  the  principal  generals  of 
the  army.  We  now  know  that  the  leading  southern  men 
felt  Lincoln's  murder  to  be  the  most  grievous  misfortune 
that  could  then  have  befallen  them ;  and  Sherman  was  in- 
fluenced by  the  conviction  of  this,  as  he  saw  it  involuntarily 
expressed  in  the  countenances  of  General  Johnston  and  the 
men  about  him.  But  panic  is  uni'easoning,  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  whose  position  at  the  moment  was  a  dominant 
one  in  the  Goverament,  seems  to  have  rashed  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  Sherman  was  ready  to  betray  the  cause  he  had  so 
greatly  served,  and  acted  accordingly. 

No  trait  of  Sherman's  character  was  more  marked  than  his 
loyal  subordination  to  his  superiors  in  army  rank  or  in  the 
State.  Full  of  confidence  in  his  own  views,  and  vigorous  in 
urging  them,  he  never  complained  at  being  overruled,  and 


210  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

instantly  adaptpcl  liis  militaiy  conduct  to  the  orders  he  re- 
ceived when  once  debate  was  closed  by  specific  directions 
from  those  in  authority.  He  had  shown  this  in  the  Vicks- 
burg  cami^aigu.  and  at  Savannah ;  and,  hurt  and  humiliated 
as  he  now  was,  his  conduct  as  an  officer  was  the  same, 
though  he  resented  the  personal  wrong.  He  had  not  known 
that  General  Grant  had  been  directed  to  have  no  negotia- 
tions with  Lee  except  for  ^ae  military  surrender  of  his  army, 
and  he  overestimated  the  importance,  as  a  guard  against 
anarchy,  of  having  a  formal  agreement  of  submission  made 
in  the  name  of  all  the  Southern  people.  His  armistice  and 
convention  with  Johnston  was  subject  to  confirmation  or  re- 
jection. He  had  given  to  his  Government  tlic  opportunity 
of  doing  either,  or  of  taking  the  negotiation  into  the  control 
of  civil  officers  and  modifying  it.  Had  President  Johnson 
simply  said  to  him  that  the  arrangement  was  inadmissible, 
and  that  he  must  resume  the  campaign  unless  the  Confed- 
erate General  made  an  unconditional  surrender,  he  would 
have  obeyed,  not  only  without  protest,  but  without  any 
thought  of  complaint. 

Instead  of  this,  the  Secretaiy  of  War  published  the  agree- 
ment as  if  he  were  proclaiming  a  discovered  treason  and 
were  appealing  to  the  countiy  to  sustain  the  Government 
against  a  formidable  enemy  in  its  own  camp.  General 
Grant  was  hurried  to  Raleigh  to  suptirv-se  Sherman  in  the 
control  of  liis  army  and  to  take  -'"  ■■J  ^vs  responsibility, 
leaving  only  the  nominal  command.  Even  this  would  per- 
haps have  been  taken  from  him  had  not  the  same  un- 
founded fears  made  the  authorities  do  the  army  the  injustice 
of  supposing  it,  too,  might  rebel.  Grant's  practical,  cool 
judgment  made  him  turn  his  presence  at  Raleigh  into  an 
apparent  visit  of  consultation  with  Sherman,  who  had 
promptly  given  the  stipulated  notice  of  the  termination  of 


GOLDSBORO  TO  RALEIGH.  217 

the  armistice  before  Grant's  arrival,  and  soon  after  received 
the  final  suiTender  of  the  Confederate  army.  When  the  . 
panic  was  over,  the  Secretaiy  of  War  gave  public  evidence 
of  his  soiTow  for  the  oftensive  incidents  in  the  course  pni- 
sued,  but  Sherman  could  not  at  once  forgive  the  imputatiou 
upon  his  personal  loyalty  to  the  Government. 

The  duty  of  receiving  the  arms  of  the  late  Confedemtes 
and  of  issuing  the  paroles  was  committed  to  General  Scho- 
field,  and  was  performed  at  Greenesboro,  in  close  neighbor- 
hood of  the  battlefield  of  Guilford  Court  House,  where,  in 
the  War  of  the  Revolution,  General  Greene  had  won  laurels 
in  an  important  eng*^  -ment  with  Lord  Cornwallis.  Gen- 
eral Hardee  met  Schotield  and  a  small  detachment  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  on  the  railway  near  Hillsboro,  and  con- 
ducted him  to  Johnston's  headquarters  in  a  grove  in  the 
edge  of  Greenesboro.  The  Confederate  General  had  declined 
the  use  of  a  house  for  his  head(iuarters,  and  a  few  war-worn 
tents  sheltered  him  and  his  stafif.  Hampton,  still  in-econ- 
cilable,  had  refused  to  bring  in  the  cavalry  for  surrender, 
and  these  were  scattering  over  the  country,  making  their 
way  home  as  they  might.  Some  four  thousand  horsemen, 
and  nearly  or  quite  as  many  of  the  infantry,  had  deserted 
since  the  beginning  of  the  armistice,  fearing  it  might  end  in 
their  being  held  as  prisoners  of  war.'  Those  who  remained 
found  the  advantage  of  having  a  respected  and  responsible 
head  to  represent  them,  for,  after  receiving  their  paroles, 
they  were  furnished  with  transportation  on  the  railways,  and 
with  rations  from  the  National  stores.  Johnston  scrupu- 
lously distributed  to  each  officer  and  man  a  coined  dollar 
out  of  a  small  sum  of  money  he  had  received  from  the  Con- 
fedemte  treasury,  and,  with  this  token  of  the  unpaid  ser- 


'  Johnston's  Narrative. 

Vol.  X.— 10 


218  PRANKMN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

vices  they  had  given  to  the  lost  cause,  the  men  in  gray, 
scattering  on  different  routes,  took  up  the  journey  home- 
ward— to  many  of  them  a  long  and  weary  one — to  begin 
anew  the  struggle  of  life  in  an  almost  universal  impoverish- 
ment. The  National  columns  marched  northward  with 
flying  colors  and  swell  of  martial  music,  full  of  hope  and 
enthusiasm,  to  take  part  in  the  memorable  review  ut  Wash- 
ington, where  their  sorrow  that  Lincoln  could  not  have 
returned  their  salute  from  the  front  of  the  White  House 
was  a  representative  sorrow  for  all  the  comrades  who  could 
not  answer  to  that  morning's  roll-call. 


APPENDIX  A. 

FORCES  OF    THE    OPPOSING  ARMIES    IN 

TENNESSEE. 


-Forces  ^^ present  for  duty"  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Ma jok-Genekai.  Geouge  H.  Thomas,  October 'ii\,  November  2^ 
and  30,  and  December  10,  1804,  as  reported  by  the  returns  on 
file  in  the  office  of  the  Adjutatit-  General,  Washington,  D.  V. 


Oct.  31st. 

Nov.  20th. 

Nov.  30th. 

Dec.  10th. 

Commands. 

•p 

z 

"&    IC 

n 

«  ■/ 

TS 

y.  . 

0)     * 

'3  u 

S8 
is 

c  a 

.2§ 

■S6 

|8 

O    o 

710 

Pi 

11.012 

775 

13,940 

760 

10,200 

630 

P4 

Fourth  Corpp 

14,415 

Twenty-third  Corps  i 

4fil 

1(1,10:^ 

4.55 

9,903 

494 

10,033 

490 

9,781 

Cavalry 

257 

r),S<54 

2252 

5  551 

S431 

10,45;^ 

4566 

14,133 

District  of  Tennessee  ^  . . 

748 

17,918 

792 

19,141 

704 

10,911 

65;^ 

15,850 

Unassignei  Detiichments 
District  of  Etowah 

248 

7,111 

193 

0,238 

210 

0,864 

2:i7 

'7,6i2 

Reserve  Brigade,  Chatta 

nooga  

29 

891 

26 

880 

2,'j 

753 

(Jnassigned  Infantry .... 

2S 

1,047 

30 

1,122 

30 

1,060 

Artillery.... 

7 

268 

7 

202 

3 

115 

Signal  Corps,  Chattan'ga. 

11 

63 

11 

60 

12 

67 

Veteran   Keserve    Corps, 

Nashville 

3 

027 

15 

4a3 

15 

522 

Det.  Armv  ct  Tennessee  «. 

483 

8,843 

681 

11,345 

lloserve  Artillery,  Chatta 

nooga  

2,403 

52,163 

57,309 

3,176 

8 
3,312 

403 

Total  present  for  duty . . . 

2,545 

72,121 

70,100 

Present  for  duty  equipped 

2,293 

61,122 

2,509 

57,025 

3,1?,9 

68,323 

3,092 

07,180 

1  Second  and  Third  Divisions. 

"  Consisted  of  Hatch's  Division,  Croxton's  and  Capron's  Brigadct*,  and  Fourth 
U.  S.  Cavalry. 

3  Consisted  of  Hatch's  and  Johnson's  Divisions,  Croxton's  Brigade  and  Fourth 
U.  S.  Cavalrj',  and  several  independent  cavalry  commands  not  specifioally  enu- 
merated. Of  these  2,272  are  reported  '•  present  for  duty,"  but  not  "  present  for 
duty  equipped"  (dismounted). 

*  ComiJosed  of  McCook's,  Hatch's,  Johnson's,  and  Knipc's  Divisions,  and  F')Hrth 
U.  8.  Cavalry.  Of  these  r),460  are  reported  "  present  for  duty,"  and  not  "  present 
for  duty  equipped  "  (dismounted). 

6  See  abstract  in  detjiil. 

«  General  A.  J.  Smitu'e  divisions. 


220 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


II. — Forces  ''^  present  for  duty"  as  reported  to  the  Adjutant-General 
of  the  Army^  Washington,  D.  C,  hy  the  Vomniandant  of  the  Dis- 
trict of  'Tennessee,  November  30  and  30,  and  December  10, 18(54. 


- 

Stations. 

Nov.  20th. 

Nov.  30th. 

Dec.  10th. 

Commands. 

a' 

172 

Enlisted 
men. 

-a 

s| 

0  o 
O 

474 
60 
8 
3 
3 
4 

63 

■  >  ■  • 

"5 
2 

■"to 

3 

4 
1 

4 
704 

Enlisted 
men. 

IS 

Enli.*ted 
men. 

Fourth  Division  Twen- 
tieth Corps 

Nashville,  Tcnn 

Springfield,  Tenn... 
Fort  Donelson,  Tenn. 
Clarksville.  Tenn. . . . 
Galliitin,  Tenn  

Johnsonville,  Tenn.. 
Decatur,  Ala 

Larkinsville,  Ala 

Pulaski.  Tenn 

Colnmbiii,  Tciin 

Tullahoma.  Tenn. . . . 

Stevenson,  Ala 

Decherd,  Tenn 

Murfreesboro%  Tenn. 
Stevenson,  Ala 

3.016 

10.390 
2.0(10 
376 
106 
109 
144 

1,964 

•  •  •  ■ 

"83 
124 

1,361 
120 

•  •  •  • 

134 
16,911 

424 

9.210 

Post  Forces 

178    4,698 

6      380 

2,      108 

3'       60 

39       907 

1 

fl<)   2,617 

3    .... 

10()    2,285 

24,      4l« 

61     1.969 

kk 

12       5;^9 

t( 

2       109 

It 

3!      Ill 

Trooi)s  on  N.  &  N.  W. 
It.  II 

4 

145 

District  of  N.  Alabama. . 

FoBt  Forces 

It 

.... 

Troops  on  T.  &  A.  R.  R. 
Post  Forces 

1 

35 

152 

3 
32 
40 

810 

1,028 

128 

703 

1,008 

19,141 

Defences  N.  &C.  R.  R.. 
Post  Forces 

4        80 

2:      122 

»k 

kt 

65    1.348 

District  of  N.  Alabama. . 

3 

5 
1 

4 

63 

653 

Battery    F.    First  Ohio 
Artil'ery 

it          tt 
Nashville,  Tenn 

792 

117 

Troops  on  T.  &  A.  R.  R. 
Twenty  -  first     Indiana 

Volunteer  Battery 

Troops  on  N,  &  N.  W, 

R.  R 

136 
1,964 

Total  "pre 

5ent  for  duty" 

15,850 

1  Post  of  Tullahoma  included. 


III. — Forces  ^'■present  for  duty,'^  as  reported  to  the  Adjntant-Cleneral 
of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C,  by  the  Commandant  of  the  Dis- 
trict of  Etowah,  December  10,  18G4. 


Commands. 


Stations. 


F  rst  Separate  Div.  Different  Corps.  Cha'timoopa,  Tenn. 

Fourteenth  U.  S.  Colored  Troops. .  .  'Na,shville,  Tenn 

Sixteenth         '*  '•  ...   |         "  '•      ... 

Eighteenth       "  "  '  Uridgeport,  Ala 

Forty-second    "  "  'Chattanooga,  Tenn. 

Forty -fourth     "  "  Nashville,  Tenn 

Artillery IChattanooga,  Tenn. 

Total  "  present  for  duty  " 


Commiss'd 

Enlisted 

officers. 

men. 

101 

.3.9.39 

16 

594 

26 

655 

11 

353 

20 

399 

14 

198 

49 

1,474 

2:^7 


7,612 


APPENDIX  A. 


221 


IV. — Abstract  ofofflrrrfi  and  men  '■'■present,''^  taken  from  Generai,  J.  13. 
Hood's  returii  oj  December  10,  18(54. 


Present 

FOB  DaTY. 

Sick. 

EXTBA 

Duty. 

In 
Abrest. 

H  X 
M  H 

|2 

iS 

8 
6 

o 

13 

19 
2i9 
2Hi 
25s 

838 

9 
252 

88 
IttO 

509 

12 

274 

267 
191 

744 

11 

44 
197 

241 

42 
52 
39 
13 

146 

i 

1 

i 

8 

a 

0 

General  and  Staff 

13 

Zee's  Corps : 

Staff 

19 

Johnson's  Divi.sion. . . 
Stevenson's  Division  ' 
Clayton's  Division  . . . 

2,530 
2,664 
2,053 

9 

7 
3 

19 

87 
177 
127 

56 
31 
44 

181 

' ' "777 
736 
6^4 

5 

'"3 

8 

6 
8 

7 

3,6&S 
3,9(1!) 
3,175 

7,247 

391 

2,197 

20 

10,a51 

Stewarfs  Corps : 
Staff 

9 

Loring's  Division 

French's  Division  '^., . 
Walthall's  Division... 

2,625 

()02 

1,476 

'  52 

1 
21 

74 

12 
15 

36 

"is 

516 

67 

296 

26 
21 
&3 

80 

■41 

61 
46 

138 

4 

2 

43 

46 

3 
1 
2 
2 

8 

72;^ 
215 
621 

8 
""3 

6 

'"3 

3 

6 

8 
2 
8 

4,205 
1.01  (i 
2,621 

4,703 

'2^539 

2,730 
1,659 

6,928 

377 

272 
2,344 

899 

1,562 

18 

7,S51 

Cheatham's  Corps: 

Staff 

Cleburne's  Division  ^ . 

Cheatham's  Division, 

(Brown) 

"'246 

215 
216 

"*794 

751 
630 

"■'17 

10 
6 

13 
3,925 

4  04'2 

Bate's  Division 

2,66;^ 

677 

2,078 

33 

10,640 

Engineer  Battalion 

16 

76 

52 

476 

484 

- 

Escorts 

11 
6-i 

381 

Jackson's  Div,  Cavalry. 

4 
4 

1 

8 

3,15;J 

2,616 

18 

73 

528 

8 

3,533 

Artillery  : 
Lee' IS  Corps 

726 

801 
730 
247 

2,504 

15 

22 

1 

11 

122 
82 

108 
44 

90!» 

Stewart's  Corps 

95S 

Cheatham's  Corps 

8S(I 

Jackson's  Cav.  Div, . . 

1 

4 

321 

.... 

49 

356 

4 

3,06;3 

•  Palmer's  brigaile  not  included 

*  Scars's  and  Cockrell's  brigades  not  included, 
'  Mercer's  brigade  not  included. 


222 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


Humnviry : 
Gen.  Hood  and  Staff. 

Lee'H  CorpH 

Stewart's  Corps 

Cheiithiim'8  Corps 

Cavalry 

Artillery  

Engineers 


Pkesent 

G 

E.XTRA 

[N 

FOB  Duty. 

Ddty. 

Abbest.   j 

CD 

• 

E 

E 

o 

d 

S 

a 

8 

a 

1 

a 

e 

.2 

IH 

a 

Hi 

2 

P 

o 

o 

13 

838 

a 

O 

a 

o 

^ 

o 

;^ 

7.247 

1» 

391 

131 

2.197 

8 

20 

50!» 

4,703 

74 

8it() 

80 

1,502 

0 

18 

7^4 

6,!>28 

30 

6':7 

138 

2,078 

0 

3S 

241 

2.610 

18 

73 

45 

528 

4 

8 

14fi 

2.504 

.... 

4« 

8 

H50 

1 

4 

11 

2,502 

1 

377 

147 

10 

4 
406 

76 

26 

24,875 

2,105 

6,797 

83. 

1 

13 

10,851 

7,851 

10,010 

.3,533  > 

3,008 

484 

;6,440  a 


On  the  original  return  are  the  following  remarks : 

"  Palmer's  brigade  of  Lee's  corps,  French'.'!  (Mercer's)  brigade  of  Cheatham's 
corps,  and  Scars'a  and  Cockrell's  brigades  of  Stewart's  corps,  are  on  detached 
service  and  not  herein  included." 

"  A  return  of  the  cavalry  under  Mnjor-Gencral  Forrest  has  not  been  furnished, 
and  consequently  not  included.  The  last  field  return  of  the  division  of  cavalry 
commanded  by  Brig.-Genoral  Jackson  (of  November  0,  1804),  is  included." 

The  numbers  of  the  cavalry  corps  of  General  Forrest,  given  in  the  text,  page 
12,  are  taken,  as  there  stated,  from  his  official  return  made  just  before  entering 
upon  this  campaign,  and  are  the  only  ones  accessible.  While,  therefore,  the 
foregoing  table  should  be  increased  by  the  numbers  of  Scare's  brigade  to  give  the 
aggregate  force  of  Hood  in  the  battle  of  Nashville,  Forrest's  cavalry  must  also  bo 
added,  and  the  three  other  infantry  brigades,  to  show  the  whole  of  his  army  in 
Tennessee. 

The  abstract  of  Hood's  forces  at  the  oi>ening  of  the  campaign  (November  20th), 
as  given  in  the  text,  is  also  made  up  from  official  returns  in  the  War  Ileoorda 
Office,  and  need  not  be  repeated  here. 


'  Error  in  original,  which  reads  3.532. 

9  Original  return  erroneously  footed  34, 439, 


APPENDIX  B. 

ORGANIZATION   OF    OPPOSING    ARMIES 
IN  TENNESSEE. 

I. — Organization  of  U.  S.  forces  commanded  by  Ma.jor-General. 
Georoe  H.  Thomas  at  the  Battle  of  Nashville^  Te«n.,  December 
15andlQ,  1864.' 

FOURTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
Brioadier-General  THOMAS  J.  WOOD. 


First  Brigade. 

Col.  ISAAO  M.  KiRBT. 

21 8t  Illinois. 
38th  lllinoiP, 
81st  Indiana. 
81  st  Indiana. 
90th  Ohio. 
101st  Ohio. 


FIRST  DIVISION. 

BRiaADiEB-OENERAL  NATHAN  KIMBALL, 

Second  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gon.  Walteb  O, 

WUITAKER. 

9(ith  Illinois. 
115th  Illinois. 
S5th  Indiana. 
21st  Kentucky. 
23d  Kentucky. 
45th  Ohio. 
5l8t  Ohio. 


TMrd  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gcn.  Wh.  Grosr. 

75th  lUinoisL 

80th  Illinois. 

84th  Illinois. 

flth  Indiana. 

30th  Indiana. 

36th  Indiana  (detaoh't). 

84th  Indiana. 

77th  Pennsylvania. 


SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRiaADIRH-GBNKBAl-  WASHINGTON  L.  ELLIOTT. 


First  Brigade. 

Col.  Emerson  Opoxckb. 
30th  Illinois. 
44th  lilinoie. 
73d  Illinois. 
74th  Illinois. 
88th  Illinois. 
125th  Ohio. 
24th  Wisconsin. 


Second  Brigade. 

Col.  John  Q.  Lanb. 
100th  Illinois. 
40th  Indiana. 
57th  Indiana. 
2Hth  Kentucky. 
2t>th  Ohio. 
97th  Ohio. 


Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Joseph  Conrad. 
42(1  Illinois. 
51.st  Illinois. 
79th  Illinois. 
15th  Mi.ssonrL 
64th  Ohio. 
C5th  Ohio. 


>  Compiled  from  the  Records  of  the  Adjutaut-Geucrars  Offlce. 


224  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
Bbiqadier-Gbnkrai,  SAMUEL  BEATTY. 

f^H  liiHgade.  Second  Uriyade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  AiiEi.  I).  Strkioht.   (l)Col.  P.  Sidney  Poht.'  Col.  Fred.  Knevleb. 
8!»th  Illinois.             (2)  Lt-Col.  Host.  L.  KlMHKBLY.      7i>tl)  Inilinna. 

5lHt  IiKliana.                         5*.>th  Illinois.  86th  Indiana. 

Kih  Kansas.                            4l8t  Ohio.  i:^th  Ohio. 

15th  Ohio.                              llHtOhio.  19th  Ohio. 
4Uth  Ohio.                              U;^d  (Jhio. 

ia4th  Ohio, 

ARTILLERY   BRIGADE. 

Major  WILBER  P.  OOODSPEED. 

Indiana  LJRht  Artillery.  25th  Battery.  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  fith  Battery. 

Kentucky  Light  .*  rtillery,  lat  Battery.  Ponnuylviinia  Light  Artillery,  Buttery  B. 

Ist  Michigan  Lignt  Artillery,  Bntt'y  E.  4th  U.  8.  Artillery,  Battery  M. 
lat  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  Battery  O. 


TWENTY-THIRD  ARMY  CORPS. 
Majou-Genkkal  JOHN  M.  SCHOFIELD. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
Majob-Gkneral  DARIUS  N.  COUCH. 

Firtt  Brigade.  Secoiui  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Jok.  A.Coopkb.  Col.  Orimkdo  H.  Moobb.     Col.  John  Mebrinuer. 

180th  Indiana.  107th  Illinois.  illst  Indiana 

2fith  Kentncky.  80th  Indiana.  123d  Indiana. 

25th  Michigan.  12".>th  Indiana.  5()th  Ohio. 

99th  Ohio.  a-'M  Michigan.  183d  Ohio. 

3d  Tennessee.  111th  Ohio. 

Cth  Tennessee.  118th  Ohio. 

ARTILLERY. 
Indiana  Light  Artillery,  15th  Battery.         Ohio  Light  Artillery,  19th  Battery. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
Bbioadibr  General  JACOB  D.  COX. 

First  Brigade.  /Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Cha8.  C.  Doolivtle.  CoL  John  S.  Casement.  Col.  Ihrael  N.  Stiles. 
18lh  Kentncky.                       (i'nh  Illinois.  112th  Hhnoia. 

Kith  Kentucky.  (j5th  Indiana.  (iSd  Indiana. 

100th  Ohio.  124th  Indiana.  120th  Indiana. 

104th  Ohio.  10:W  Ohio.  128th  Indiana. 

8th  Tennessee.  5th  Tennessee. 

ARTILLERY. 
Indiana  Light  Artillery,  23d  Battery.  Ist  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  Battery  D. 


1  Wounded. 


APPENDIX  H.  225 

DETACHMENT  OF  ARMY  OK  THE  TENNESSEE. 
Majok-Oeneual  ANDIIEW  J.  SMITH. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
Brioadikr-Qeneral  JOHN  McARTHXJR. 

Fir»t  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Wm.  L.  McMillek.  Col.  LnciDS  F.  Hubbard.  (l)Col.  s.  o.  HiLL(killed). 

Illinois  Lt.  Artillery,  Cogs-  Iowa   Li^ht  Artillery,  2d  (2)  CoI.Wm.  R.  Marhhall. 

weH'H  Buttery.                        Battery.  12th  Iowa. 

114th  Illinois.  6th  Minnesota.  85th  Iowa. 

U3i{  Indiana.  Hth  Minnesota.  7th  Minnenota. 

lOth  Minnesota.  11th  Missouri.  Slid  Missouri. 

72d  Ohio.  8th  Wisconsin.  2d  Missouri  Light  Artillery, 

95th  Ohio.  Battery  I. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 

BniaADlER-GENERAL  KENNER  GARRARD. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Jiriumtc.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  David  Mooae.         Col.  James  I.  Gilbkrt.     Col.  Edward  H.  Wolfe. 

llftth  Illinois.  58th  Illinoie.  4!>th  Illinois. 

1-22(1  Illinois.  Indiana  Lt.  Art.,  3d  Bat.  117th  Illinois. 

8!)t,h  Indiana.  27th  Iowa.  2d  Illinois  Lt.  Art.,  Bat.  G. 

Indiana  Lt.  Art.,  Oth  Bat.  82d  lowii.  fi2d  Indiana. 

2l8t  Missouri.  10th  Kansas.  178th  New  York. 

TillllD  DIVISION. 

Colonel  JONATHAN  B.  MOORE. 

First  Brigade,  Second  Brigalc.  Artillery. 

Col.  Lyman  M.  Ward.  Col.  Leander  Blanden. 

72d  Illinois.  81st  Illinois.                Indiana  Lt.  Art.,  14th  Bat. 

40th  Missouri.  ft5th  Illinois.               2d  Miascjuri  Lifht  Artillery, 

14th  VVi.-consin.  44th  Missouri.                Battery  A. 
3ad  Wisconsin. 


PROVISIONAL  DETACHMENT  (District  of  the  Etowah). 
Major-Geneiial  JAMES  B.  STEEDMAN. 

PROVISIONAL  DIVISION.! 

Brioadikk  Geserai-  CHARLES  CRUPT. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Benjamin  Harrison.    Col.  John  G.  Mitchell.  Lt.-Col.  C.  H.  Grosvenor. 

Artillery. 
Second  Brigade  {Army  Tenii.)  68th  Indiana  Infantry.^       20th  Indiana  Battery. 
Col.  Adam  G.  MALLor.  18th  Ohio  Infantry,*  18th  Ohio  Battery. 


'  Composed  mainly  of  detachments  belonging  to  the  Fourteenth,  Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth,  and  Twentieth  Army  Ccjrps.  which  had  been  unable  to  rejoin  their 
proper  commands  serving  with  General  Sherman's  army,  ou  the  march  through 
Georgia. 

^  Attached  to  Third  Brigade. 

10* 


226  tiil:  march  to  the  sea. 

Flmt  Colored  flrtf/nde.  Second  Colored  Uriyitde. 

Col.  TllOMAM  J.  MdKUiN.  f'ol.  ClIARLKS  U.  TlIOMHHClN. 

Mth  U.  H.  Colored  Trooim.  12th  U.  H.  Colored  TriKtpH. 

1«th  U.  H.  (Colored  'J'rooi  h.«  i:^th  U.  H.  Colored  Trooim. 

17th  U.  H.  Colored  Troofw.  100th  U.  B.  Colurcd  Troops. 
IHth  U,  8.  Colored  Troopn  (battalion). 
4-lth  U,  8.  ColoroU  Troojm. 


rOST  OF  NASHVILLE. 
Buigadieu-Genehal  JOHN  F.  MILLER 

SECOND  DlUaADE,  FOURTH  DIVISION.  TWENTIETH  ARMY  CORPH. 
COLONKL  EDWIN  C.  MASON. 
1.12d  Indiana.  17(U,h  Ohio.  ISad  Ohio. 

45th  New  York.  17i)th  Ohio. 

Unattached. 
3d  Kentucky.  173d  Ohio.  Veteran  Roservo  Corps. 

28th  Michigan.  78th  I'ennsylvania.    44th  Wisconsin. 

4r)th  Wisconsin. 

,  GARRISON  ARTILLERY. 

Major  JOHN  J.  ELY. 

Indiana  Lipht  Artillery,  2d  Battery.  1st  Michigan  Light  Artillery,  Battery  P. 

Indiana  Li^ht  Artillery,  4th  Battery.  Ist  Ohio  Li^{ht  Artillery,  Buttery  E. 

Indiana  Li^'ht  infantry,  12th  Battery.  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  2()th  BalU-ry. 

Indiana  Light  Artillery,  2lHt  Battery.  1st  Tennessee  Light  Artillery,  Battery  C 

Indiana  Jiight  Artilh^ry,  22d  Battery.  Ist  Tennessee  Light  Artillery,  Battery  D. 

ludianii  Light  Artillery,  24tli  Battery.  2d  U.  S.  Colored  Lt.  Artillery,  Battery  A. 

QUARTERMASTER'S  DIVISION,  a 
CoiX)NEL  JAMES  L.  DONALDSON. 


CAVALRY  CORPS. 
BuEVET  Majou-Genbual  JAMES  H.  WILSON. 

ESOOHT. 

4th  United  States. 

FIRST   DIVI8ION.3 

First  Drloade. 

Brigadlor-General  John  T.  Croxton. 

IllinoisLt.  Art,,  Board  of  Trade  Bat.        «th  Iowa.         2d  Michigan. 

4lh  Kentucky  (mounted  infantry).  Ist  Tennessee. 

FIFTH   DIVISION. 
Brioabier  General  EDWARD  HATCH. 
Firbt  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Artillery. 

Col.  Robert  R.  Stewart.      Col.  Datus  E.  Coon.      Ist  Illinois,  Battery  I. 
8d  Illinois.  »ith  Illinois. 

11th  Indiana.  7th  Illinois. 

12th  Missouri.  9th  Illinois. 

10th  Tennessee.  2d  Iowa. 

12th  Tennessee. 

1  Detached  with  pontoon  train. 

2  Composed  of  <|uartermaster'8  employes. 

3  The  Second  and  Third  Brigades  of  this  division,  under  the  division  com- 
mander, Brigadier-Ueneial  E.  M.  McCuuk,  were  ubseiit  on  au  expedition  intu 
Western  Kentucky, 


AITENDIX  U. 


997 


aixTir  DIVISION. 

DRiaADIEB-OEMKIlAL   IllCHAUI)   W. 


First  Urif/iule. 

Col.  TlIOMAH  ./.  Kauiuson. 
Kith  IllinuiH. 
Rth  Iowa. 
7tU  Ohio. 


Second  Jirigattf. 
Col.  Jamks  JSiodlk. 
14th  IlliiioiH. 
TMh  Iiiitiitnn. 
Kth  Miohi^in. 
ikl  Teniicusco. 


JOHNSON. 

ArUltfry. 
4th  United  Staton,  Bat'y  1. 


SEVENTH  DIVISION. 
Buioadiek-Oknehal  JOSEPH  P.  KNIFE. 


Second  liiiuade. 

Col.  a.  M.  L.  JOIINBON. 

I'ilh  Iiiiliaim. 
l')t)i  Iiidiiina. 
tith  TuiincHaeo. 


ArtHlery. 
Ohio  Lt,  Art.,  14th  Battery. 


First  Brigade. 
Col.  J.  H.  Hammond. 
l(th  Indiana. 
10th  Indiana. 
ll>th  Pennsylvania. 
8(1  TcnncHHCO. 
4tli  TenneoHce. 

The  forccR  under  Major-Goncral  L.  H.  Ronseeau  at  Murfroesboro  aro  not  In- 
cluded in  the  forcgoint^. 


II. — Orgaiiization  of  the  Army  of  Tetmesscc  (Confederate),  enui- 
uiundcd  by  Genkkal  John  M.  Hood,  for  the  2><'*'io<^i  ending 
December  10,  1804. 

LEE'S  ARMY  CORPS. 
Lieut. -Geneual  S.  D.  LEE  Commanding. 

DIVISION. 

Major  Genkkal  ED.  JOHNSON. 

Dean's  lirigade.  ManigauWn  Itrigade. 

P.riK.  Gen.  Z.  (!.  Deas  GoinmandinB.     Licut.-Gol.  W.  L.  15otli;k  (loninmnding. 
lUth,  !Wd,  ;i6th,  3»th,  and  50th  Alabama.  10th  and  lltth  South  Carolina. 

24th,  2Hth,  and  ;i4th  Alabama. 

Sharp^s  Brigade.  Brantleipn  Ihigade. 

7th,  nth,  Kith,  4l8t,  and  44th  MisslsHippi.    24th.  34th,  27th,  2!)th,  and  30th  MiHBirt- 
miarpahootcrp,  MissisMippi.  sippi  and  dismounted  Cavalry. 

DIVISION. 
Majoh-General  C.  L.  STEVENSON. 
Cumming^H  Brigade.  PHtus's  Brigade. 

Colonel  E.  V.  Watkins  Commanding.   20th,  23d,  30t.i,  Slst,  and  4(ith  Alabama. 
34th,  36th,  3<Jth,  and  56th  Georgia. 

Brown  and  Reynolds's  Brigade. 

Colonel  J.  B.  Palmer  C(miiniuiding. 

8d,  18th,  23d,  2«th,  32d,  and  45th  Tennossce,  51th  and  63d  Virginia, 

60th  North  Carolina. 

DIVISION. 
Major-General  II.  D.  CLAYTON. 


StovalVs  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  M.  A.  Stovall  Comd'g. 
40th,  4l8t,  42d,  43d,  and  52d  Georgia. 

Holtxclaw^s  Brii/ade. 
l»th,  3tith,  3Uth,  32d,  and  5»th  Alabaum. 


GibsoiVs  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gcn.  R.  L.  Gibbon  Commanding. 
Inl,  tth,  13th,  Kith,  lyth,  20th,  and  3Cth 

LoiiiKJana. 
Auslitr.s  biitulion  and  25th  LouiBiana. 
4Ui  battalion,  Luiutiiana. 


228  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

.STEWAlirS  ARMY  CORPS. 
Lieut. -Geneual  A.  P.  STEWART  Commanding. 

DIVISION. 

Majob  Oenkkal  W.  W.  LOIIING. 

Fe<UheTiiton''H  Jlriynde.  AiUtmti'H  FMfintte. 

('it\.  I.  I).  Talmku  (^iiiitrmiidiriK-  C'ol.  \i.  I.owKY  (>'<)iiiiiiiiii(liti);. 

l«t,  ;{(l,  aad,  ;n«f,  .'{;j<l.  lOth  MisbiKhippi.        r.th,  14th,  l&th,  «Oth,  ZUl,  4.'i(l  MIks. 

lUt  MiHHiHHi))|)i  liiiliHlion. 

ScuWh  Jlrionila. 

(Jul.  John  Hnooouahs  Coininandint;;. 
12th  Louimiiuii,  56tb,  &7t)i,  and  ConHulidHUul  Alabama. 

DIVISION. 

Major-Oknkkal  S.  U.  FUENCII. 

Ector^D  Iirl(/aUe.  CochrelVn  Jiridode, 

Col.  I).  (."oi.KMAN  (JdnimandliiK.  f!oI.  Flouknov  (jDmmandinK. 

*».,<«  iVfXftH  Infiiiitry.  iKt,  Sid,   IM.  -Itli,   5lli,  and  (itli   MiKHOiiri 

10th,  I'Uh,  '•V'M  TexiiH  l>iHiir(l  C'avnlry.  Infantry. 

J5'.>th  and  :iOLh  North  (Jarolinu.  Ist  una  'M  iliHniountod  MisBouri  Cttv'ry. 

Settrn'H  liriyadK, 
4th,  tinth,  3<)th,  ai>th,  and  4r)th  MIhb.         7th  Battalion,  MisslBHlppi. 

DIVISION. 

Major-Oknekal  E.  C.  WALTHALL. 

(ji.wtrlnsi'it  Jiiifi'Kli'.  C'utUy'a  ISrlffarte. 

Urijr.-Oon.  (Jko.  D.  ./ownhon  ConuVj^.         Ilritr.-Ocn.  (J.  M.  Siiklley  (!oind'>?. 

4iJd,  4(ith,  4Hl,h,  4!ttli,  .VJd,  Sntti  TcnnoH-     17tli,  anth,  a»Lh  Aluhamu,  and  Wth  Mis- 

Hce,  and  iHt  Alubamu.  KiHHippi. 

liet/nohlH'H  lirifidde. 
IhI,  Sid,  4th,  Uth,  and  ;^5th  ArkanKiiH. 


CHEATHAM'S  ARMY   CORPS. 
MAJOK-GKNKnAL  R  F.  (JHEATHAM  Commandinq. 

CHEATHAM'S  DIVISION. 

Bbio.-Oenkkai.  M.  p.  LOWUY  Commanding. 

OinCa  llrii.ifKlo.  Aftinty'H  llrigade. 

Lieut.  Col.  H.  L.  Watp'.hs  Coind'^?.  Colonel  H.  U.  Fiki.d  Commanding. 

lOth  and  a4th  South  (hirolina.  It^t.  »)tti,  Kth,  !tth,    16th,   27th,  'Mth,  and 

iid,  fith,  and  Hth  (JuorKia  Ilattaliont*.  ftOth  TiMinoHsw-. 

4tith  Ueorgiu.  4th  ConfcMlcrateH, 

fitrahtH  Jh  l</aile.  VnuuhrCii  IJrif/ntie. 

(!olonr'l  A.  J.  Kki.i.kr  Commanding.  Colonel  Waikinh  Commandinp;. 

4th,  5th,  l!)th,  2'lth,  :jIhI,  y;jd,  y«th,  4lHt,  11th,  lUth,  l.'Jth,  aillh,   17th,  61st,  52d, 

and  44th  Tuunuuueu.  and  15-ltli  TcnnuHMio. 

CLEIJUUNK'S  DIVISION. 

BRiOAmKu  Genera  I.  J.  IL  SMITH,  CuMMANDiNn. 

Nmft/i'N  Jlrii/title.  Lomri/'ii  Hrii/dtle. 

Colonel  C.  H.  Olmmtead  Coiiid'g.  ."M  Battalion,  6th,  Kth,  anil  ''M  Mifii. 

iHt,  54th,  57th,  and  (Kkt  Ueurgia.  Ibtb,  (iikl,  aad  4&tU  Alabama. 


APPENDIX   B.  22J> 

Oovnfi'n  lirianUf..  flrnnherrv^H  nrUindP.. 

Brij?.-«on.  I),  v..  (Jovan  VmxwV^.  Capttiin  M.  T.  Urodohton  (Vimd'R. 

Ist,  5J(I,  6t,h,  i:Jth   15th,  and  Aijih  Ark.    filh,  7lh,  lOth,  IBtli,  17th,  18th,  a4th,  and 
6th,  ?th,  8th,  and  19th  ArkauHaH.  SSth  Tex«H. 

6th   (.'orifedorate,  .'Jfith    'IVnneBKec.    and 
Niitt'H  Cavalry  cunipany. 

BATE'S   DIVISION. 
MAJon-OENERAL  WILLIAM  B.  BATE  Commandino. 
Tyler^H  /Irluwle.  Finlnifx  llrifidde. 

Brip.-Ocn.  T.  D.  Hmitii  OommandinK.  Major  J.  A.  Lush  Commandln«. 

2d,  lOth.  aoth.  and  ;j7th  TeniuiUKeo.  Ist,  3d,  4th,  «th,  and  7th  Florida. 

37th  OeorKia  and  4th  Ga.  Shai  pshooterB. 

JackiKm'a  lirigade. 
Ist  Confederate.    25th,  2«th,  30th,  an.l  «lfith  Georgia,  and  Ist  Oa.  SharpshooterH. 


ARTILLERY. 

LEE'S  COnrS. -Commanded  by  Majo«  J.  W.  JOHNSTON. 
DouKlaKH'H  Battery.  Pcdiier  ^  Battery.  Rowan'H  Battory. 

Kent's  "  I'Uifaula  «'  Corput's 

(Jarrity's  "  Stanford's       "  MarHhall's     " 

STKWAIIT'S  nORPS.~Comiiiand<(l  by  Lieut.  Colone.",  S.  C.  WILLIAMS. 
SeldcMi'H  Battery.  Bonnncbord'H  Battery.  Hiiskin'H  Buttery. 

Tarrunt'H        "  Cowairn  Battery.  Guibor'H         " 

Limisden'H     "  Darden'H      •'  Kalk'a  " 

CHEATHAM'S  COUPS.— (;<)mniandcd  by  CoLONBi,  M.  SMITH. 
Turner's  Battery.  Ble<i8(M0fi  Battery.  Sloeiniib's  Battery. 

J'liiliin's  "  Key's  •'  l''ert,'iiH()n'H 

I'erry'u  "  (.loldthwaite's  Battery.        rhilUps's  " 


CAVALRY   CORPS. 

Majou-Cenkual  N.  B.  FORREST  Commandino. 

DIVISION. 
BninAiiiKR-GKNEHAL  JAMES  R.  (.'HAL.VIRItS. 
Rurker'H  nrlyiKie.  MlChVihICh  lirtodile. 

Col.  E.  W.  RUCKEK  Commanding.        Col.  Rout.  MoCui.looh  Communding. 

Neely^H  liriunilp. 
Col.  J.  J.  Neely  Commanding. 

DIVI.SION. 
Brioadibr-Genkhal  a.  BUFORD. 
BeWa  liriaaile.  C'nmHlnnd'H  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  T.  H.  Bell  Commanding.     Col.  Edward  Cromsland  Commanding. 

DIVISION. 
BKiQADiEn-GENEiiAL  WILLIAM  H.  JACKSON. 
lionn's  Jh-i(/<ide.  ArmHlnmo'H  Jirigude. 

Brig.-Gon.  Kobh  Commanding.  Brlg.-Gen.  F.  C.  Armhtrong  ('omd'g. 

DIVISKJN. 
Bbio.-Ukn£RAL  r.  D.  KODDEY. 


APPENDIX  C. 

CONFEDERATE  STRAGGLERS. 

T^v  assertion  has  been  so  often  and  so  porsistencly  made  in  the  South,  since 
the  war,  that  devastation  of  property  was  only  practised  by  the  National  troops, 
that  it  is  well  to  preserve  for  reference  snch  extracts  from  their  newspaper  press 
ns  the  following ; 

Extracts  from  a  letter  to  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War,  published  in  the 
Charleston  Courier  of  January  10,  1865,  and  in  the  Charleston  Mercury  (tri- 
weekly) of  January  lltli ; 

"  I  cannot  forbear  appealing  to  you,  in  behalf  of  the  producing  population  of 
the  States  of  Georgia  and  South  Carolina,  for  protection  against  the  destructive 
lawlessness  of  members  of  General  Wheeler's  command.  From  Augusta  to  Har- 
deeville,  the  road  is  now  strewn  with  corn  left  on  the  ground  unconsumed. 
Beeves  have  been  shot  down  in  the  fields,  one  (luarter  taken  off,  and  the  balance 
left  for  buzzards.     Horses  arc  stolen  out  of  wagons  on  the  road,  and  by  wholesale 

out  of  stables  at  night Within  a  few  miles  of  this  neighborhood, 

Wheeler's  men  tried  to  rob  a  yonng  lady  of  a  hoi'se  while  she  was  on  a  visit  to  a 
neighbor's,  but  for  the  timely  arrival  of  a  citizen,  who  prevented  tlic  outrage 
being  perpetrated.  It  is  no  unusual  sight  to  see  these  men  ride  late  into  camp 
with  all  sorts  of  plunder.  Private  houses  are  visited ;  carpets,  blankets,  and 
other  furniture  they  can  lay  their  hands  on  are  taken  by  force  in  the  presence  of 
the  owners,"  etc. 

In  an  editorial  of  a  column  in  length  apropos  to  the  above,  the  editor  of  the 
3rercu7'}/  na.ys:  "There  must  be  radical  reform.  It  is  folly  to  talk  of  red-tape 
now.  We  want  tfie  thing;  we  must  have  it:  reform— shooting — cashiering— 
order— subordination — soldiers — not  runaways,  ragamuffins,  ruffians." 

The  following  is  from  the  Savannah  Republican  of  October  1,  1801:  "It  is 
notorious  that  our  own  army,  while  fulling  back  from  Dal  ton,  was  even  more 
dreaded  by  the  inhabitants  than  was  the  army  of  Sherman.  The  soldiers,  and 
even  the  officers,  took  everything  that  came  in  their  way,  giving  the  excu.se  that 
if  they  did  not,  the  enemy  would.  Sul)soquently,  stragglers  from  our  own  army 
almost  sacked  the  stores  in  Atlanta.  Now,  complaints  loud  and  deep  come  up 
from  that  portion  of  Georgia  in  the  neighborhcxKl  of  our  army,  telling  of  outrages 
oomiriitlfd  liy  Ktrat^^lin;^  sipiads  of  cavalry,  and  uf  insulla  offered  to  tliu  fuuiilies 
uf  the  bubl  and  uiout  patriotic  vitizeus." 


APPENDIX  C.  231 

The  following  is  from  the  Richmond  "nTiig,  being  part  of  n  letter  of  a  oorre- 
siwndent  of  that  paper,  soon  after  Sherman  marched  north  from  Columbia.  Re- 
published in  Aiiny  and  Navy  Journal^  March  18,  18H5.  Speaking  of  the  Con- 
federate evacuation  of  Columbia,  S.  C,  the  writer  says;  "The  worst  feature  of 
the  entire  scene  occurred  on  tli(3  day  of  which  I  write.  A  party  of  Wheeler's 
cavalry,  accompanied  by  their  officers,  dashed  into  town,  tied  their  horses,  and  as 
systematically  as  if  they  had  been  bred  to  the  business,  proceeded  to  break  into 
the  stores  along  Main  Street,  and  rob  them  of  their  contents.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances, you  may  well  imagine  that  our  peojile  would  rather  see  the  Yankees, 
or  old  Satan  himself,  than  a  party  of  the  aforesaid  Wheeler's  cavalry.  The  bar- 
barities comniitted  by  some  of  them  are  represented  to  be  frightful." 

The  Richmond  Enquirer  of  October  <i,  1864,  contained  the  following,  with 
reference  to  Early's  command  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia.  After  speaking  of  the 
drunkenness  habitnal  among  them,  from  the  chief  downward,  its  correspondent 
says :  "  The  cavalry  forces  that  had  been  operating  in  the  Valley,  and  flitting 
hither  and  thither  along  the  Potomac  and  Shenandoah  were  already  demoralized, 
and  since  their  last  visit  to  Maryland,  they  have  been  utterly  worthless.  They 
were  in  the  habit  of  robbing  friend  and  foe  alike.  They  have  been  known  to 
strip  Virginia  women  of  all  they  had — widows  whose  sons  were  in  our  army— and 
then  to  burn  their  houses.  At  Hancock,  in  Western  Maryland,  they  stopped  a 
minister  of  the  Gosixil  in  the  street  on  the  Sabbath  day,  and  made  him  stand  and 
deliver  his  money.  These  monstrous  truths  are  stat<;d  in  the  official  report  of  the 
officer  commanding  a  part  of  theao  cuvalry  forces,  and  which  1  have  read." 


APPENDIX  D. 
BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN. 

The  following  are  copios  of  the  orders  referred  tx)  in  the  text,  taken  from  the 
files  in  the  Adjutant-General's  office,  viz. : 

HEADQCAUTEBa    ARMY  OF    THE   OHIO, 

Franklin,  Tknn.,  November  SO,  1864. 
General  Kimball : 

The  Commanding  General  directs  that  you  report  with  your  command  to  Brig.- 

Gen.  J,  D.  Cox  for  position  on  the  line  to-day. 

Very  respectfully, 

J.  A.  CAMPBELL, 

Major  and  A.  A.  G. 


HEADQUAUTESa   ARMY    OF   THE   OHIO, 

Franklin,  Tenn.,  November  30,  1864. 
Capt.  Bbidges  : 

The  Conimanding  General  directs  that  you  report  four  (4)  batteries  from  your 
command  to  Brig.-Geu.  J.  D.  Cox,  for  position  on  the  line. 

Very  rceipectf  ully, 

J.  A.  CAMPBELL, 

Major  and  A.  A.  O. 


The  order  to  General  Wagner  does  not  appear  to  be  preserved  in  the  Adjutant- 
General's  flies ;  but  General  Schofleld  and  General  Stanley  are  both  perfectly  in 
accord  with  the  writer  aa  to  its  tenor. 


The  interest  attaching  to  the  subject  makes  it  desirable  to  give  in  full  the  cor- 
respondence between  cteneials  Thomas  and  Schofleld  on  the  2Sth,  29th  and  30th 
November,  fo  far  as  the  same  has  been  preserved  in  the  Adjutant-Generars  office. 
It  is  as  follows : 

(Telegram.)  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Ohio, 

Neab  Columbia,  Tenn.,  November  28, 18(54—8.45  a.m. 
Major  General  Thomas,  Nashville: 

General — My  troops  and  material  arc  nil  on  the  north  side  of  Duck  River. 
The  withdrawal  was  completed  at  daylight  this  morning  without  serious  difficulty. 
Cox  holds  the  ford  in  front  of  Columbia,  and  linger  the  R.  R.  bridge,  which  I 
partially  destroyed.  Stanley  is  going  into  position  a  short  distance  in  rear  of 
Cox.  I  think  I  can  now  stop  Hood's  advance  by  any  line  near  this,  and  meet  in 
time  any  distant  movement  to  turn  my  position .  I  regret  extremely  the  necessity 
of  withdrawing  from  Columbia,  but  believe  it  was  absolute.  I  will  explain  fully 
in  time.    Reinforcements  will  have  to  march  from  Spring  Hill  or  Thompson's 

Station. 

(Signed)  J.  M,  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-Oetieral, 


APPENDIX  D.  233 

(Telegram.)  Headquarters  Armt  of  the  Ohio, 

Near  Columbia,  Tknn.,  November  28,  1S(»4— 9  a.m. 
Major-Oeneral  Thomas,  NaKhville: 

General — I  am  in  doubt  whether  it  is  advisable,  with  reference  to  fntiiro 
operations,  to  hold  this  ]>osition,  or  to  retire  to  Home  point  from  whioh  we  can 
move  offensively.  Of  courwe  wo  cannot  secure  the  river  here.  I  could  eatsily 
have  held  the  bridpro-head  at  the  11.  B..,  but  it  would  have  been  useless,  as  we 
could  not  possibly  advance  from  that  point.  Please  give  me  your  views  and 
wishes. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOPIELD, 

Major-  General. 


(Telegi-am.)'  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Ohio, 

Neah  Columbia,  Tenn.,  November  28,  1864 — 9.10  a.m. 
Major  General  Thomas,  Nashville: 

General — I  have  all  the  fords  above  and  below  this  place  well  watched,  and 
guardetl  as  far  as  iwssible.  Wils(m  is  operating  with  his  main  force  on  my  left. 
The  enemy  does  not  appear  to  have  moved  in  that  direction  yet  to  any  consider- 
able distance.  I  will  probably  be  able  to  give  you  pretty  full  information  this 
evoning.  Do  you  not  think  the  infantry  at  the  distant  crossings  below  hero 
should  now  be  withdrawn,  and  cavalry  substituted  ?  I  do  not  think  we  can  pre- 
vent the  crossing  of  even  the  enemy's  cavalry,  because  the  places  are  so  numerous. 
I  think  the  best  we  can  do  is  to  hold  the  crossings  near  us  and  watch  the  distant 
ones. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELu, 

Major- General. 


(Telegram.)  Nashvuxe,  November  28,  1864—10  a.m. 

Major-Genebal  Schofield,  Columbia  via  Franklin  : 

The  following  just  received  from  Lieut. -General  Grant:  "City  Point,  Nov.  27, 
9  P.M.— Savannah  papers  just  received  state  that  Forrest  is  expected  in  the  rear 
of  General  Sherman,  and  that  Breckeni'idge  is  already  on  his  way  to  Georgia  from 
East  Tennessee."  If  this  proves  true.  General  Grant  wishes  me  to  t.ike  the  offen- 
sive against  Hood,  and  destroy  the  railroad  into  Virginia  with  Stonemnn's  force 
now  beyond  Knoxville.  General  Smith  will  certainly  be  here  in  three  days,  when 
I  think  we  will  be  able  to  commence  moving  on  Hood,  whetner  Forrest  goes  to 
Georgia  or  remains  with  Hood. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  S.  Vols.,  Co7mVa. 


(Telegram.)  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Ohio 

Near  Columbia,  Tk.nn.,  November  28,  1864. 
Major-Genebal  Thomas,  Nashville : 

The  enemy  was  crossing  in  force  a  short  distance  this  side  of  the  Lewisburg  Pike 
at  noon  to-day,  and  had  driven  our  cavalry  back  across  the  river  and  the  Pike  at 
the  same  time.  The  force  is  reputed  to  be  infantry,  but  I  do  not  regard  it  as 
very  ijrobable.  Wilson  has  gone  with  his  main  force  to  learn  the  fact,  and  drivo 
the  tnemy  back,  if  practicable. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOPIELD, 

Mojor-Geiieral. 


234:  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

(Telegram.)  Headquarters  Army  op  the  Ohio, 

Near  Columbia,  Tenn.,  November  28,  1864—4  p.m. 
Major-General  Thomas: 

If  Hood  advances  on  the  Lewisburg  and  Franklin  Pike,  where  do  you  propose 
to  flight  him  ?    I  have  nil  the  force  that  is  necessary  here,  and  A.  J.  Smith's 
troops  should  be  placed  with  reference  to  the  iiroposcd  point  of  concentration. 
(Signed)  J.  M.  SGHOFIELD, 

Major- General, 


(Telegram.)  Nashville,  November  28,  1864. 

Major-General  Sohofield,  near  Columbia : 

Your  despatch  of  3.30  is  just  received.  If  General  Wilson  cannot  succeed  in 
driving  back  the  enemy,  should  it  prove  true  that  he  has  crossed  the  river,  you 
will  necessarily  have  to  make  preparations  to  take  up  a  new  position  at  Franklin, 
behind  Harpeth,  immediately,  if  it  becomes  necessary  to  fall  back. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  Vols.,  ConuSg, 


(Telegram.)  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Ohio, 

Fra  -iki.in  Pike,  Tenn.,  November  28,  1864, 
Major-Genekal  George  H.  Thomas,  Nashville,  Tenn. 

General — I  am  iuformcil  the  wagon  bridge  at  Franklin  has  been  carried  away. 
Would  it  not  be  well  to  replace  it  by  pontoon  bridge  during  the  rainy  season  ? 
(Signe«l)  J.  M.  SGHOFIELD, 

Major-General, 

(Telegram.)  Nashville,  November  28, 1864. 

Majok-General  Schofield  : 

You  can  send  some  of  the  pontoons  you  used  at  Columbia  to  Franklin,  to  lay  a 
bridge  there.     I  will  answer  your  other  telegrams  in  a  few  monienta. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-Geiieral  U.  S.  Volt.,  ComdCg. 


(Telegram.)  Near  Columbia,  November  28, 1864—6  p.m. 

Major-General  Thomas,  Nashville : 

The  enemy's  cavalry  in  force  has  crossed  the  river  on  thoLewisburg  Pike,  and 
is  now  in  possession  of  Rally  Hill.  Wilson  is  trying  to  get  on  the  Franklin  Pike 
ahead  of  them.  He  thinks  the  enemy  may  swing  in  I)etween  him  and  me  and 
strike  Spring  Hill,  and  wants  Hammond's  brigade  to  halt  there.  Please  give  it 
orders  if  you  know  where  it  is.  Also,  I  think,  it  would  be  well  to  send  A.  J, 
Smith's  force  to  that  place. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major- General. 


(Telegram.)  Nashvillb,  November  28, 1864—8  P.M. 

Major-General  Schofield  : 

If  you  are  confident  you  can  hold  your  present  iwsition  I  wish  you  to  do  so  un- 
til I  can  get  General  Smith  here.  After  his  arrival  we  can  withdraw  gradually, 
and  invite  Hood  across  Duck  River  and  fall  upon  him  with  our  whole  force,  or 
wait  until  Wilson  can  organize  bis  entire  cavalry  force,  and  then  withdraw  from 


APPENDIX  D.  235 

yonr  present  position.  Should  Hood  then  cross  tho  river  wc  surely  can  ruin  him. 
You  iiiny  have  the  fords  at  Ccntrcville,  Beard's  Ferry,  Gordon's  Ferry,  and  Wil- 
liamsport  thoroughly  obstructed  by  filling  up  all  the  roads  lending  from  them  with 
trees,  and  then  replace  your  infantry  by  cavalry.  Send  ah  intelligent  staff  offlcer 
to  see  that  the  worlc  is  projwrly  done.  As  soon  as  relieved  concentrate  your  in- 
fantry. The  cavalry  will  be  able  to  retard  if  not  prevent  Hood  from  crossing  after 
the  roads  are  thoroughly  obBtnictcd,  if  they  do  their  duty.  The  road  loading 
from  Centre villo  to  Nashville  should  be  thoroughly  obstructed.  I  am  not  sure 
but  it  would  be  a  good  plan  to  invite  Hood  across  Duck  River  if  wo  can  get  him 
to  move  toward  Clarksville.  Is  there  no  convenience  for  unloading  beyond 
Thompson's  Station  ? 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  H.  Vols.,  Comd^g. 

(Telegram.)  Nashviixk,  November  29, 1864—3.30  a.m. 

Major-Genebal  Schofield,  near  Columbia : 

Your  despatches  of  B  p.m.  and  9  p.m.  yesterday  are  received.  I  have  directed 
General  Hammond  to  halt  his  command  at  Spring  Hill  and  report  to  you  for 
orders,  if  ho  cannot  communicate  with  General  Wilson,  and  also  instructing  him 
to  kcHjp  you  well  advised  of  the  enemy's  movements.  I  desire  you  to  fall  back 
from  Columbia  and  to  take  up  your  position  at  Franklin,  leaving  a  sufficient  force 
at  Spring  Hill  ^  contest  the  enemy's  progress  until  you  are  securely  posted  at 
Franklin.  The  troops  at  the  fords  below  Will iamsport,  etc.,  will  be  withdrawn 
and  take  up  a  position  behind  Franklin.  General  A.  J.  Smith's  command  has  not 
yet  reached  Nashville ;  as  soon  as  he  arrives  I  will  make  immediate  disposition  of 
his  troops  and  notify  you  of  the  same.  Tlease  send  me  a  report  as  to  how  matters 
stand  upon  your  receipt  of  this. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

•  Major- General  U.  S.  Vola.,  ComcCg. 


(Telegram.)  Nashville,  November  IJO,  1864. 

JIajor-Geneual  Schofield,  near  Columbia  via  Franklin: 

I  have  a  report  from  the  N.  W.  R.  R.  that  four  regiments  of  Forrest's  cavalry 
have  crossed  Duck  Iliver  below  ^Villiams^)o^t.    Have  yon  any  such  information  ? 
(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Ifajor- General  U,  S.  Vols.,  Comd'a. 


(Telegram.)  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Ohio, 

Fkankmn  Pike,  Tenn.,  November  29, 18(34—8.20  a.m. 
Major-General  Thomas,  Nashville : 

The  enemy's  cavalry  has  crossed  in  force  on  the  Lcwisburg  Pike,  and  General 
Wilson  reports  the  infantry  crossing  alwve  Huey's  Mill,  about  five  miles  from  this 
place.  I  have  sent  an  infantry  reconnoissancc  to  learn  tho  fact.  It  it  proves  true 
I  will  act  according  to  your  instructions  received  this  morning.  I'lease  send 
(.rdcrs  to  Ceneral  Coo|)er  at  Centreville.  It  may  be  doubtful  whether  any  mes- 
senger from  here  will  roach  him. 

(Si/iCned)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General, 


236  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

(TcleKTiiin.)  Fkanklin  Pike,  Tenn.,  November  20,  1864—1  p.m. 

Majob-General  Thomas,  Nanhvillo: 
rieaHC  have  pontoons  put  down  at  Franklin  at  once. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-Oenetal. 


(Telegram.)  Nashville,  November  20,  1864—2,30  p.m. 

Major-General  Schofikld,  Franklin: 

Your  ilespiitch  of  8  a.m.  received.  I  huve  sent  orders  to  General  Cooper  aa  ^ou 
reciuested,  but  think  it  would  bo  well  for  you  to  send  a  second  mesKenger  to  him 
to  make  Bure  that  he  rcceiveH  hi.s  orders. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  Vols.,  Corrutg, 


(Telegram.)  Nashville,  November  29,  1864—11  p.m. 

MajorGeneral  Schofield,  Franklin: 

Genend  Wilson  telegniphed  me  very  fully  the  movempnts  of  the  enemy  yester- 
day and  this  morning.  Ho  believes  Forrest  is  aiming  to  strike  this  plaiie,  whilst 
the  infantry  will  move  ugain^t  you  and  iiLtcmpt  to  get  on  your  flank.  If  you  dis- 
cover such  to  be  his  movement  you  had  better  cross  Harpeth  at  Franklin,  and 
then  retire  along  the  Franklin  Pike  to  this  place,  covering  yoxir  wagon  train  i»nd 
the  railroad.  I  directed  General  Cooper  in  accordance  with  your  wishes  yester- 
day, to  withdraw  from  Centrevilie  by  the  Niishvillo  road,  crossing  Harpeth  at 
Widow  IJean's,  and  report  to  you  from  that  place  for  further  orders.  You  had 
better  send  orders  to  meet  him. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  S.  Vols.,  ComcCg. 


(Telegram.)  Franklin,  November  .30,  1884—5.30  a.m. 

Majou-General  Thomas,  Nashville: 

I  hope  to  get  my  troops  and  material  safely  across  the  Harpeth  this  morning. 
We  have  suffered  no  material  loss  so  far.  I  shall  try  to  get  Wilson  on  my  flank 
this  morning.  Forrest  was  all  around  us  yesterday,  but  we  brushed  him  away 
during  the  evening,  and  came  through,  llood  attacked  in  front  and  flank,  but 
did  not  hurt  us. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


(Telegram.)  Franklin,  November  .30,  1864—9.50  a.m. 

Major-Geneual  Thomas,  Nashville : 

My  trains  are  coming  in  all  right.  Half  the  troops  are  here,  and  the  other  half 
about  Ave  miles  out,  coming  on  in  good  order,  witii  light  skirmishing.  I  will 
have  all  across  the  river  this  evening.  Wilson  is  here,  and  his  cavalry  on  my 
flank.  I  do  not  know  where  Forrest  is.  He  may  have  gone  east,  but  no  doubt 
will  strike  our  flank  and  rear  again  soon.  Wilson  is  entirely  unable  to  cope  with 
him.  Of  course,  I  cannot  prevent  Hood  from  crossing  the  Har|)eth  whenever  he 
may  attempt  it.  Do  you  desire  me  to  hold  on  here  until  compelled  to  fall  back  ? 
(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-Oeneral. 


APPENDIX  D.  287 

(Teleprram.)  NAsnviLLK,  November  30,  ISO  I. 

MAJOK-dENERAf.  RcHOFiELD.  Franklin: 

Your  (leKpatches  of  B.^W,  5.50,  and  Wilson's  rte-'patch,  forwarded  to  you,  havo 
been  rcoelveil.  It  will  take  Smith  quite  all  da}'  to  disembark,  but  if  1  find  there 
Is  no  immediate  necessity  to  retain  him  here,  will  send  him  to  Franklin  or  Brent 
wood,  according  to  (;ircuinstancefi.  If  you  can  prevent  Hood  from  turning  yor.r 
positi(m  at  Franklin,  it  Khould  be  held  ;  but  I  do  not  wish  you  to  risk  too  much. 
I  send  you  a  map  of  the  environs  of  Franklin. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H,  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  S.  Vol».,  CoirKTg. 


(Telcpram.)  Franklin,  November  30,  1861—12  m. 

Major-General  Thomas,  Nashville : 

Your  despatch  of  10.25  a.m.  is  received.  I  am  satisfied  that  I  have  heretofore 
run  too  much  riHk  in  trying  to  hold  Hood  in  check,  while  so  far  inferior  to  him  in 
both  infantry  and  cavalry.  The  slightest  mistake  on  my  part,  or  failure  of  n 
subordinate,  during  the  la'^t  three  days,  might  have  proved  disastrous.  T  don't 
want  to  get  into  so  tight  a  place  again.  Yet  I  will  cheerfully  act  in  nceordanco 
with  your  views  of  expeciiency.  if  you  think  it  impoitant  to  hold  Hood  back  as 
long  as  possible.  When  you  get  all  your  troops  together,  and  the  cavalry  in  effec- 
tive condition,  wo  can  whip  Hood  easily,  and,  I  believe,  make  the  eami)aign  a 
decisive  one.  Before  that,  the  most  we  can  do  la  to  husband  our  strength  and 
increiise  it  as  much  as  possible.  I  fear  the  troops  which  were  stationed  on  the 
river  below  Columbia  will  be  lost.  I  will  get  my  trains  out  of  the  way  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  watch  Hood  carefully.  Possibly  I  may  be  able  to  hold  him  hero, 
but  do  not  expect  to  be  able  to  do  so  long. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-General, 


(Telegram.)  Nashville,  November  30,  lS(i4. 

Major  Gkneral  Sohofield,  Franklin: 

General  Smith  reported  to  me  this  morning  that  one  division  of  his  troops  is 
still  behind.  We  must  therefore  try  to  hold  Hood  where  he  now  is  until  those 
troops  can  get  np  and  the  steamers  return.  After  that  we  will  concentrate  here, 
reorganize  our  cavalry,  and  try  Hood  again.  Do  you  think  you  can  hold  Hood 
at  Franklin  for  three  days  longer  ?  Answer,  giving  your  views ;  and  I  should 
like  to  know  what  Wilson  thinks  he  can  do  to  aid  you  in  holding  Hood. 
(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U,  S.  Vols.,  ComdCg. 

(Telegram.)  Franklin,  November  30, 1864 — 3  p.m. 

Major-General  Thomas,  Nashville  : 

I  have  just  received  your  despatch  asking  whether  I  can  hold  Hofjd  here  three 
days.  I  do  not  believe  I  can.  I  can  doubtless  hold  him  one  day,  but  will  hazard 
something  in  doing  that.  He  now  has  a  large  forc^-,  nrobably  two  corps,  in  my 
front,  and  seems  ))repared  to  cross  the  river  above  and  below.  I  think  he  can 
effect  a  crossing  to-morrow  in  spite  of  all  my  efforts,  and  probably  to-night,  if  he 
attempts  it.  A  worse  position  than  this  for  an  inferior  force  could  hardly  be 
found.  I  will  refer  your  question  to  General  Wilson  this  evening.  I  think  h« 
can  do  very  little.  I  have  no  doubt  Forrest  ivill  be  in  my  rear  to-morrow,  or 
doing  some  greater  mischief.    It  appears  to  me  that  I  ought  to  take  position  aft 


238  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.. 

Brontwood  ftt  onro.  If  A.  J.  Smith's  division  and  thn  Mnrfrocshoio'  gnrrldon  join 
mc  Ihcro,  I  oiiKht  to  Ik)  nblo  to  hold  Hood  in  check  for  some  tiriio.  I  iinvo  juBt 
Icnrncd  tlint  the  cnemy'n  cavalry  in  already  crowiing  three  niilcH  below.  I  will 
hove  lively  times  with  my  trnliiH  again. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFEELn, 

JUaJor-Otneral. 

(Telpgram.)  Nashville,  November  30,  1864. 

MAJOK-fiKNEHAL  BcnOFlKLl),  Franklin: 

Your  dcKpiitch  of  3  p.m.  is  rccfived.  Send  back  your  trnins  to  this  place  at  once, 
and  hold  your  troopH  in  ruadincps  to  march  to  Brcntwcxxl,  and  thence  to  this 
place  as  soon  a«  your  troiiiM  are  fairly  on  the  way,  8o  diKponing  your  forco  as  to 
cover  the  wagon  train.  Have  all  11.  U.  truins  sent  back  immediately.  Notify 
General  Wilson  of  my  instructions.  He  wiil  govern  himself  accordingly.  Ilclievo 
all  garrisons  in  blockhouses,  and  send  back  by  railroatl  trains  last  over  the  road. 
Acknowledge  reccii)t. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

3Ic0or- General  U.  S.  >'o/».,  ConiiVg, 


(Telegram.)  HKADQUARTF.ns  Army  of  the  Ohio, 

Franklin,  Tenn.,  November  30,  1864. 
Major-general  Geo.  IT.  TnoMAS,  Nasln  "Me,  Tenn. : 

General— ricaso  send  A.  J.  Smith's  division  to  Bicntwood  early  to-morrow 
morning.  Also  jjleaso  send  to  Brentwood  to-morrow  morning  one  million  rounds 
of  infantry  ammunition,  2,000  rounds  three-inch  ond  1.000  rounds  light  twelve 
artillery, 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


(Tologmm.)  Franklin,  November  30th— 7.10  p.m. 

MAjou-GENF.nAL  Thomas,  Nashville : 

The  enemy  made  a  heavy  and  persistent  attack  with  about  two  corps,  com- 
mencing at  4  P.M.  and  lasting  until  after  dark.  He  was  repulsed  at  all  points, 
with  very  heavy  lost;— probably  5,000  or  6,000  men.  Our  loss  is  not  probably 
more  than  one-fourth  that  number.  We  have  captured  about  1,000  prisoners,  in- 
cluding one  brigadier-general.  Your  despatch  of  this  p.m.  is  received.  I  had 
olready  given  tlie  orders  you  direct,  and  am  now  executing  them. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Jfajor-  General. 


(Telegram.)  Nashville,  November  30,  1864. 

Major-General  SCHOFIELD,  Franklin : 

Your  telegram  is  just  received.    It  is  glorious  news,  and  I  congratulate  you 

and  the  brave  men  of  your  command.    But  yon  must  look  out  that  the  enemy 

dot!s  not  still  persist.    The  courier  you  sent  to  General  Cooper  at  Widow  Dean's 

could  not  reach  there,  and  rcjwrts  that  he  was  chased  by  rebel  cavalry  on  the 

whole  route,  and  finally  came  into  this  place.    Major-General  Stcedman,  with  five 

thousand  men,  should  be  hero  in  the  morning.     When  he  arrives,  I  will  .'^tart 

General  A.  J.  Smith's  command  and  General  Steedman's  troops  to  your  assistance 

at  Brentwood. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  Vols.,  ComiVo, 


APPENDIX  E. 


STRENGTH  OF  OPPOSING  ARMIES  IN  THE 

CAROLINAS. 

I. — National  Army  under  General  W.  T.  Sherman  on  entering  the 
Campaign,  February  1,  1805. 


Commands. 

Infantry. 

15.358 
11,060 

Cavalry. 

Artillery. 

Total. 

Fifteenth  Army  Corps 

Seventeenth      •'          

10 

47 

381 
2()4 

15.765 
11,'.K)7 

lUght  Wing 

27,044 

13,008 
12,!»11 

26,879 

03 

646 

27,752 

Fourteenth  Army  Corps 

Twentieth             ''          

452 
623 

14,420 
13,434 

Left  Wing 

075 

27,854 

Cavalry  Division 

•     •• 

4,375 

98 

4,473 

AcrirreErato 

53,923 

4,438 

1,718 

00,079 

The  Same,  April  10,  18C5. 
Hioht  Wing — AniiT  op  the  Tennessee— MAJoii-GENEnAL  O.  O.  IIowabd. 


Commands. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Artillery. 

Total. 

Fifteenth  Army  Corps 

Seventeenth      "          

15.244 
12,673 

23 

3U 

403 
2(il 

15,070 
13,104 

Aggregate 

28,117 

53 

004 

.  28,&34 

Left  Wing — Army  op  Georgia— MAjoB-GENEBAii  H.  W.  Slocum. 


Fourteenth  Army  Corps 

Twentieth            "           

14,053 
12,471 

445 
4M 

].5.0'.>8 
12,Wa 

Aggregate. 

27,12^1 

939 

28,003 

240 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


Centre— AnMT  of  thk  Ohio— MAJOB-GF.NBnAt  J.  M.  ScRomcLD. 


COHMANDH. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Artillery. 

Total. 

Tenth  Army  Oorpn 

Twenty-tliird  Army  Corps.. 

11,727 
14,(X)0 

25,787 



372 

2u;i 

12.0(19 
M.2<.);j 

Asinretratc 

666 

26,393 

CaVALBT— BnEVET  MAJOn-OENEEAL  J. 

KtLPATHICK. 

Cavalry  Division 

8(),»68 

6,484 
5,537 

175 

2,443 

5,U6» 

CtrniKi  aMtrreptntc 

Total  nuiabcr  of  guns. . 

S8,tt48 

yi 

II. — Confederate  forces  available  to  resist  iShermaii's  inarcfi  through 

the  Uarolinas. 

Although  exact  data  are  not  easily  to  be  got,  we  are  not  wholly  without  pvI- 
dcnce  as  to  the  means  which  General  Beauregard  had  at  his  command  when 
Sh<!rman'H  movement  began.  In  the  "  Historical  Sketch  of  the  Chatham  Artil- 
lery," Colonel  C.  C  Jones,  Jr.,  who  was  Hardee's  Chief  of  Artillery,  gives  the 
following  as  u  foot-note  to  p.  HWk  His  authority  is  certainly  concluBive  us  to  the 
ctmt'creiice  and  the  estimates  made  at  it : 

"At  a  C(mference  held  on  the  second  day  of  February,  18(i5,  at  Oreen's  Cut 
Station,  on  the  Augusta  and  Waynesljoro  Railroad,  in  IJnrke  County,  Georgia,  at 
which  General  Bennregard,  Lieut. -General  Hardee,  Miijor-(Jeneral  D.  H.  Hill,  and 
Major-ficneral  O.  W.  Smith  were  present,  the  following  was  the  estimated  strength 
of  the  forces  in  and  about  Augusta  and  in  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  which  it 
was  th<night  could  be  relied  on  as  effective  to  resist  the  advance  uf  General 
Sherman  • 


General  Hardee's  Regular  Infanti-y,  P.  A.  C.  S. 
"  Militia  and  Reserves 


8,000 
3,000 


"  Light  Artillery  2,000 

Butler's  division,  half  only  now  available 1,500 


Total  under  command  of  General  Hardee  in  S.  Carolina. 

Major-General  Smith's  Georgia  Militia 

Colonel  Browne's  Georgia  Reserves 


Lieut.-General  Lee's  corps I  Only  ulwut  half  of  which 

Lieut. -General  Cheatham's  corps  .  <      were  reported  for  ac- 
Lient.-General  Stewart's  corps (     tive  duty. 


1,200 
250 

4,000 
3,000 
3,000 


Artillery,  Army  of  Tennessee. 
General  Wheeler's  Cavalry  . . . 


11,000 

3,50.t 
14,500 

1,450 


10,000 

800 

C,700 


APPKNDIX  E.  241 

Reoapitulatiom. 

Total  Infantry  22,460 

I-iKht  Artilh-ry 2,800 

Cavalry,  mounted  and  diiituountod  8,200 

Grand  Total 38,160 

"  Cheatham'' B  cor  pH  had  not  arrived.  The  head  of  Cheatham'H  coriis  was  ex- 
pected to  arrive  in  AuguBtit  un  the  4th  or  5th  iuRt.,  and  the  head  ot  Stowart'ii  on 
the  10th  or  11th." 

In  the  text  to  which  the  above  l«  a  foot-note,  the  same  writer  says :  "  (General 
Hiirdee,  with  his  eiyfueeu  t/wunatul  Confederate  troops  at  <ietache<l  points  alon^ 
the  Carolina  coast  uml  «'lsewherc,  compom-d  in  large  meat<itru  of  reserves  and 
Btate  forces  recently  brought  into  and  unaccustumed  to  the  liardHhipx  of  actnal 
service,  and  of  artillerists  drawn  from  fixed  batteries,  who  for  the  flrsL  time  were 
taking  the  field  as  infantry,  was  incapable  of  offering  effoctnid  resistance,"  etc 

On  March  1,  IWiS,  General  Beauregard,  then  at  Charlotte,  N.  0.,  submitted  to 
General  J.  E.  Johnston,  at  the  same  place,  a  plan  nf  u|>erutions  against  Sherman, 
ill  which  he  estimated  their  ellectivo  force  of  infantry  and  artillery  then  available 
at  20,0(0,  as  follows: 

*'  Hardee's  corps  (mfnnlry  and  artillery) 10,000 

Army  of  Tennessee 0,0(tO 

Bragg's  forces 10,000 

Infantry  and  Artillery 26,000  " 

The  full  plan  is  published  in  "  The  Land  we  Love."  a  monthly  mngaisino, 
Charlotte,  N.  C,  Vol.  I.,  p.  188  (18(16).  In  it  Beauregard  distinctly  RtatfH  that 
the  0,000  are  then  at  Char'otte.  Detachments  from  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
continued  to  arrive  nmch  later,  Cheatham  himself  reaching  Johnston  with  part 
of  his  corps  after  the  battle  of  Bentonville,  March  10th  and  20th  (see  Johnston's 
'•  Narrative,"  p.  893).    A  reinforcement  of  about  2,000  joined  on  the  20th  and  21st. 

Jefferson  Davis,  in  his  '"  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  ("onfederate  (Jovenmient,"  Vol. 
II.,  p.  R32,  says,  on  this  sv.bject:  "Genera!  Johnston's  force,  according  to  his 
estimate,  when  ho  took  command,  amonntod  to  about  10,000  infantry  anil  artil- 
lery and  4.000  cavalry  ;  if  to  this  be  added  the  portion  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee, 
about  2,500  men,  under  command  of  General  Stephen  D.  Lee,  which  afterward 
joined  the  Army  at  Smithfield,  N.  C,  and  that  of  General  Bragg's  command  at 
Goldsboro,  which  amounted  to  about  8,000,  the  aggregate  would  be  about  30,500 
men  of  all  arms." 

As  bearing  upon  this  question,  see  also  the  tablo  of  paroles  issued  to  Johnston's 
army  upon  its  surrender,  p.  243,  infra. 

Vol.  X.— 11 


242 


THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SKA, 


III. — Abstract  from  return  of  the  Army,  General  J.  E.  Johnston, 
Vornintindimj,  for  period  ending  March  ol,  lb05,  Headquarters, 
Smitt)Jield,  Iv.  C. 


Present 
FOB  Duty. 

:         Effective  total 
:               present. 

!   pres- 

present 
cnt. 

Prisoners 
OF  War. 

Command. 

1 

i 

N 

15 

Aggregate 
and  abs 

2 
0 

1 

General  Sti\ff 

15; 

2!  592 
1,556 
4,217 

8,365 

15 
14 

JfarUee'H  Army  Corps :  • 
Staff 

11 

274 

93 

409 

2,533 
1.5:34 
4,091 

8,158 

3.589 

2,273 

883 

6,745 

14,903 

697 
96 

793 

318 
16,014 

11 

MoLaw's  division 

3,(iH5  10.145 
1,907     4.^57 
5,267  1(),6';2 

10,890  31.088 

Tiiliaferro's   '"          

Hoke's  •■»         "         

179 



179 

3.353 

Total 

7S7 

1 

5 

503 
300 
129, 

937 

1,739  1 

36 
3 

1 

3,353 

5 

Army  of  Tennessee  : 
Staff 

3,779 

2,386 
951 

7,116 

15,481 

11 

371 
410 
100 

881 

1,060 

Lee's  corps 

Cheatham's  corps 

5,201  24,711 
3  266  24  1'iJ 

6.6f!6 
5  390 

Stewart's  corps 

Total 

Total  Infantry 

1,644 
10,016 
20,921 

10,139 



58,985 
90,088 

].0?5 

1,027 
13,083 
16,430 

Artillery : » 
Hardee's  corps 

716 

9S 

814 

847 

1,060 

Army  of  the  Tennessee 

112       152 

i 

959    1,187 

1 

1 
398       621 

22,278  91,896 

4 

Total  Artillery 

39 

25j 

1,803  ] 

4 

Pioneer      Regiment      (Tucker's 
Confederate)  » 

Grand  total,  without  cavalry.  6 

326 
16,621 

16,440 

1  The  return  of  Hardee's  troops,  from  which  this  is  prepared,  is  dated  March 
27th,  thitt  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee  April  1st. 

^  The  Sixty-eighth  and  Sixty-seventh  llegiments.  North  CaroJinn  (State)  troops, 
and  the  .''irst  North  Carolina  Battalion  (State),  operating  on  the  enemy's  com- 
nuinicati->ns  with  Newberne  are  not  reported. 

"  The  artil.ery  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee  has  not  yet  /rived  from  Mississippi. 
The  larger  portion  of  the  artillery  of  the  Departments  of  Nf)rth  Carolina  and 
South  Carolina,  Georgia  and  Ploridi,  has  been  sent  to  the  rear  for  reorganization, 
and  no  report  has  been  received. 

*  and  *.     Sec  next  page. 


APPENDIX   E. 


243 


IV. — Army  of  Tennessee,  and  other  forces  under  Geneual  Johnston's 
command,  paroled  at  Greensboro\  N.  CI,  May  1  arnl  2,  1865. 


Commands,  etc. 


Geneiftls  Johnston  and  Beauregard  and  staffs . . 

Stewart's  corps , 

Lee's  corps , 

Hardee's  corps 

Reserve  Artillery 

Cavalry  corps 

Detachments 

Naval  Mrisade 

Medical  orticers,  attendants,  and  patients  in  hospital 
General  CoojKir  and  Brig. -Gen.  Cohiuitt  and  stalf . . . 


Total . 


Paroled  at  Salisbury . 
"         Charlotte. 


Total 

Grand  Total , 


Offlcera. 

275 

Men. 

533 

73<> 

8,145  i 

550 

4,126 

<.)t)l 

iS.lOl 

t.l 

1.1 '.)1 

175 

2..S31 

212 

i,o;w 

106 

iw 

i;35 

867 

7 

3,221 

26,824 

2,708 

279 

.366 

y,6-J9 

665 

6,337 

3,8Ffi 

33,161 

Aggregate. 


808 
8,884 

4.  in  6 

9,(162 
1,2.^)2 
2.506 
1,246 
3U3 
1,002 
7 


30,045 

2,ns7 

4,015 


General  Johnston,  in  his  "Narrative,"  p.  410,  eays  the  apprehension  of  being 
made  prisoners  or  war  "  caused  a  great  number  of  desertions  between  the  19th 
and  24th  of  April — not  less  than  four  thousand  in  the  infantry  and  artillery,  and 
almost  as  many  from  the  cavalry  ;  many  of  them  rode  off  artillery  horses  and 
mules  belonging  to  the  baggage  trains."  If  this  estimate  of  eight  thousand  bo 
added  to  those  paroled  at  Greensboro',  the  number  of  his  troops  will  be  raised  to 
about  45,000. 


«  Companies  A  ..nd  D,  Engineer  Regiment,  are  on  detached  sei-vice  and  not  in- 
cluded, as  no  report  has  been  received  from  them.     Effective  total  (about)  80. 

6  A  formal  retum  of  the  cavalry  has  not  yet  been  furnished.  Effective  total, 
April  1,  5,105.    Total  present,  6,587.    Aggregate  present,  7,042. 

At  the  time  of  the  above  report  nearly  all  Johnston's  artillery  was  at  Ilillsboro, 
N.  C,  refitting.  Colonel  Jones  says  ("Chatham  Artillery,"  p.  216):  "Of 
thirty  light  batteries  there  concentrated — the  most  of  them  being  unfit  for  field 
service— ten  were  to  be  chosen  and  furnished  at  the  expense  of  the  othei-s,  with 
the  best  battery  animals  and  equipmentb."  Thirty  butteries  would  make,  say 
2,600  men.— J.  D.  C. 


APPENDIX  F. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  OPPOSING  ARMIES 
IN  THE  CAROLINAS. 

I. — Organization  of  the  Armies  under  the  Command  of  Major-Gen, 
W.  T.  SiiEKMAN,  April,  1865. 

AKIVIY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE. 
Major- General  O.  O  HOWAKD,  CoMsiANDiNa. 

FIFTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
Major-Geneual  JOHN  A.  LOGAN  Commanding. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 


Breve-* 

Major-Genekal  C.  R. 

WOODS, 

/Vr«<  Brigade. 

Second  Brloade. 

Third  Brigade. 

Brevpt  l?rig  Gen.  W. 

B, 

Col.  R.  P.  Cattekbon. 

Col.  G.  A.  Stone, 

Woods. 

4(lth  Ilhnois. 

•1th  Iowa. 

27th  Missouri. 

46th  Ohio. 

9th       " 

12th  Indiana. 

](J3d  Illinois. 

25th     " 

7«th  Ohio. 

6th  Iowa. 

3(lth     " 

2(ith  Iowa. 

9~th  Indiana. 

3l8t       " 

31t*t  Minfioiiri. 

S6rh  Illinois. 

32d  Mii^souri. 

lOOth  Indiana. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 

Ma<K)r_Genebal  WILLIAM  B.  HAZEN. 

First  Brigade.                    Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade, 

Colonel  T.  .Jonks.              Colonel  W,  S.  JoNEB.  Brig.-Geu.  J.  M.  Oliveb. 

6th  MiHKonri.                         37th  Ohio.  15th  Michigan. 

S.'ith  Illinois.                          47th     "  70th  Ohio. 

IKith     "                              M.l      "  -JSth  Illinois. 

127th     "                               fi4th     "  90th      " 

30th  Ohio,                              ma  Indiana.  99th  Indiana. 
&Tth     "                               111th  lUinoiB. 


APPENDIX  P.  246 

THIRD   DIVISION. 

Beevbt  Major-Gemerai.  J.  E.  SMITH. 

First  lirigatle.  Second  Brigade. 

Brip.-Gen.  W.  T.  Clabk.  Colonel  J.  E.  Tourteixotte. 

l&th  WiscoiiPin.  Bfith  Illinois. 

6!»tli  Indiana.  10th  Iowa. 

«i3(l  IlliiioiH.  80th  Ohio. 

48th  Indiana.  ITth  If>wi\. 

93d  Illinois.  Battalion  2f)th  MisBonri. 

Battalion  10th        '* 
4th  Minnesota. 

FOURTH  DIVISION. 

BRiaADIER-CrENKRAL  E.    W.    BICE. 

First  Brigade.                    Second  Brigade.  Third  DiHgade. 

Col.  N.  15.  HowABD.  Col.  R.  N.  Adams.  Col.  F.  J.  Hurlbut. 

2(1  Iowa.                                 12th  Illinois.  7th  Illinois 

7th     "                                    «)6th       "  ;i9th  Iowa, 

fifith  Indiana.                        81st  Ohio.  50th  lllinoia 

52d  Illinois.  57th     " 

110th  U.  S.  colored. 

DETACHMENTS. 

Artillery  Brigade. 
Lieut.Col.  William  II.  Ross. 
II,  1st  Illinois.  H,  1st  Missouri.  29th  Missouri  Infantry. 

12th  Wisconsin  Battery.  B,  1st  Michigan.  Signal  Detachment. 


SEVENTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
Major-Geneual  p.  p.  BLAIR,  Commanding. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
Infantry. 
Brigadier-Genkral  M.  F.  FORCE. 
First  Brigade.  Secmul  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  W.  Fuller.  Brig.-Gen.  J.  W.  Sphague.     Lt.-Co).  J.  S.  Wbight. 
18th  Missouri.  25th  Wisconsin.  10th  Illinois. 

27th  Ohio.  35th  New  Jersey.  25th  Indiana. 

39th    "  43d  Ohio.  88d  Wisconsin. 

64th  Illinois.  6;W    " 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
Brevet  Major  Genebal  M.  D.  LEGGETT. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Charles  Ewing.  Brig.-Gen.  R.  K.  Scott. 

Kith  Wisconsin.  20th  Ohio. 

45th  Illinois.  fiSfh     " 

31st       "  78th     " 

Sflth      '•  19th  Wisconsin. 
30th     " 
12th  Wisconsin. 


246 


THE  MARCH   TO  THE  SEA. 


FOURTH   DIVISION. 
Brevet  Ma.tor-General  G.  A.  SMITH. 


First  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  B.  F.  Potts. 
%iA  Indiana. 
32(1  Ohio. 
53d  Indiana. 
14th  Illinois. 
53d 
15th       " 


T?iird  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  W.  W.  Belknap. 
llth  Iowa. 
13th     " 
15th     " 
Ifith     " 
.32(1  Illinois 


DETACHMENTS. 

Artiilery  Brigade. 

Major  Frederick  Welker. 


D,  Ist  Michigan  Artillery. 
li!t  Miiinesotii  Battery. 
I'jth  Ohio  Battery. 


9th  Illinois  Mounted  Infantry. 
G  Company,  llth  Illinois  Cavalry. 
Signal  Detachment. 


ARMY  OF  GEORGIA. 

Major-Geneeal  H.  W.  SLOCUM,  Commanding. 

FOURTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
BuEYET  Majok-Geneual  J.  C.  DAVIS  Commanding. 


FIRST   DIVISION. 

Infantry. 

Bhigadier-Generai.  C.  C.  WALCUTT. 


First  Brigade. 

Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  Hobart, 
21st  Wisconsin. 
33d  Ohio. 
94th     •' 
42d  Indiana. 
88th      " 
104th  Illinois. 


Second  Brigade. 

Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  Buell. 
21st  Michij-an. 
13th 
eyth  Ohio. 


Third  Brigade. 

Colonel  Hambright. 
21  St  Ohio. 
74th     " 

38th  Pennsylvania. 
79th 


SECOND  DIVISION. 
Bbiqadieb-General  J.  D.  MORGAN. 

Third  Brigade. 

Lt.-Colonel  Langlet. 
86th  Illinois. 
S«th       " 
110th    " 
125th     •' 
52d  Ohio. 
S2il  Indiana. 
37th        "      (det.) 


First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Wm.Vandeveb.  Brig.-Gen.  J.G.  Mitchell, 
10th  Michigan.  12l8t  Ohio. 

14th        "  11.3th    " 

Kith  Illinois.  108th     " 

60th        *'  98th      " 

17th  New  York.  78th  Illinola. 

84th      " 


APPENDIX  P. 


247 


THIRD   DIVISION. 
Bbevet  Major-Grneral  a.  BAIRD. 


First  Brigade. 

Colonel  M.  C.  Hunter. 

17th  Ohio. 

•AUt      "■ 

8!»th      " 

92(1       " 

ii'id  Indiana. 

23(1  Missouri  (det). 

11th  Ohi(j. 


Secotid  Brigade. 
Lt.-Colonel  Doan. 
2(1  Minnesota. 
105th  Ohio. 
75th  Indiana. 
8Tth 
lOlst       " 


DETACHMENTS. 


TMrd  Brigade. 
Brig. -Gen.  Geo.  S.  Greene. 
14th  Ohio. 
Jifcth      '* 
10th  Kentucky. 
18th 
74th  Indiana. 


Artillery  Brigade. 
Major  Charles  Houohtaling. 

iaiterv  ?,  2d  Illinois.  5th  Wisconsin  Battery. 

"    ■  C,  1st      *' 


l!)th  Indiana 


TWENTIETH  ABMY  CORPS. 
Major-Geneual  J.  A.  MOWER  Commanding. 


FIRST  DIVISION. 
Infantry. 


Brevet  Major-Gen  ekai.  A.  S. 


Fimt  Brigade 
Colonel  J.  L.  Sklfridoe. 
4th  Pennsylvania. 
5th  Connecticut. 
123d  New  jfork. 

14lBt 


Second  Brigade. 
Colonel  \Vm.  Hawley. 
2d  Massachusetts. 
3d  Wist^onsin. 
1.3th  New  Jersey. 
lOTth  New  York. 
150th 

SECOND   DIVISION. 


WILLIAMS. 

Tliird  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gcti.  J.  S.  liOBiNSON, 


31st  Wisconsin. 
61st  Ohio. 
82d       '• 
82d  Illinois. 
101st    " 
l-m.  New  York. 


Brevet  Major-Genebai,  JOHN  W.  GEARY. 


First  Brigade. 
Bvt.  Bg.-Gen.  N.  Pardee,  Jr. 
5th  Ohio. 
2«th    " 
6Bth    " 

2JSth  Pennsylvania. 
147th 
Detachment  K.  P.  B. 


Second  Brigade. 
Col.  P.  H.  Jones. 
.33d  New  Jersey. 
73d  Pennsylvania. 
10(»th 

1  l!)th  New  York. 
134th         " 
154ih        '* 


Third  Brigade. 
Bvt.  Brig.-Oen.  Barndm. 
29th  Pennsylvania, 
nith 

60th  New  York. 
l()2d 

137th      " 
149th      " 


THIRD   DIVISION. 
Brevet  Major-General  W.  T.  WARD. 


First  Brigade. 

Col.  H.  Case. 
70th  Indiana. 
79th  Ohio. 
102tl  Illinois. 
105th       " 
129tli      " 


Second  Brigade. 

Col.  Daniei.  Dustin. 
19th  Michigan. 
22(1  Wisconsin. 
33d  Indiana. 
85th      " 


Third  Brigade, 

Bvt.  Brig.-Uen.  CouQsWEiiL. 
20t.h  Connecticut. 
2<tth  Wisconsin. 
3Jid  Massachusetts. 
65th  Ohio. 
73d      " 
136th  New  York. 


248 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


DETACHMENTS. 
ArlUlery  lirigade. 
Captain  C.  E.  Winegab. 
Battery   I,  let  New  York.         Battery  C,  Ut  Ohio. 

M,  1st       "  '•      E,  Independent  Pennsylvania. 

I'ontoinerp,  58th  Indiana  Veterans. 
Mechanics  and  Enginnrs,  1st  Michigan. 


ARIVTY  OF  THE  OHIO. 

Majob-Genebal  JOHN  M.  SCHOFIELD  CoMMANnisa. 

TENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
Majou-Geneuai.  a  H.  TERRY  Commandinq. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

Infantry. 

BnEV£T  Majou  Oenkkal  H.  W.  BIEGE. 


First  Brigade. 

Col.  H.  D.  Washbubn. 
8th  Indiana, 
18th     " 

9th  Connecticut. 
14th  New  Hanipshire. 
12th  Maine. 
J4th     " 
TCth  New  York. 


Second  biiyaUe. 

Col.  Habvey  Graham. 

15»th  New  York. 
13th  Connecticut. 
22d  Iowa. 
18lKt  New  York. 
Sbth  Iowa. 


SECOND  DIVISION. 
Bhevet  Major-Genebal  a. 


First  Brigade. 

Col.  R.  Daggett. 
3d  New  York. 
liath    " 
117th    " 
142d      " 


Second  Brigade, 

Col.  J.  S.   LiTTELL. 

47tl)  New  York. 

4«th 

203d  Pennsylvania. 

OTth 

7bth 


Third  Brigade. 

C..I.  N.  W.  Day. 
38th  Massacliusetti. 
l.Wth  New  York, 
lasth 

176th         " 
17(ith 
24th  Iowa. 


AMES. 

Third  Brigade. 
Col.  O.  F.  Ghanoeh. 
4th  New  ilauipshiie. 
9th  Maine. 
13th  Indiana, 
lloth  New  York. 
IG'Jth 


THIRD  DIVISION. 
Brioadieb-Genebal  C.  J.  PAINE. 

First  Brigade.                    Second  Brigade.  T?iird  Brigade. 

Bvt.  Brip.-Gen.  D.  Bates.  Bvt.  Bri}?.-Gen.  S.  Duncan.  Col.  J.  H.  Holman. 

Ist  U.  S.  Colored  Troops.     4th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops.  5th  U.  S.  Colored  Troopa 

30th     "               "                  6th     •'                "  27th    '• 

107th  "              "                 39th  "                "  37th   "               " 

DETACHMENTS. 
Brigade  (not  numbered). 
Brevet  Brigadier-General  J.  C.  Abbott. 
3d  New  Hampshire  Infantry.  fith  Connecticut  Infantry. 

■jth  "  "  7th 

16th  New  York  Heavy  Artilleiy  (six  companies). 

Kith        •'  Independent  Battery. 

22d  Indiana  Battery. 

Light  Company  E,  .'Id  TJ.  S.  Artillery. 

Co.  A.  2d  I'ennsylvania  Heavy  Artillery. 

Cos.  E  and  K.  I'ith  New  York  Cavalry. 

Detachment  Signal  Corps. 


APPENDIX  P. 


249 


TWENTY-TraRD  ARMY  CORPS. 
Majoh-General  J.  D.  COX  Commanding. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

Infantry. 

Beioadibr-General  THOMAS  II.  HTJGEII. 


First  Brigade. 

Bvt.  Bp.  Oen.  I.  N.  Stiles. 
120th  Indiana. 
12-lth 
128th       " 
180th  Ohio. 


Second  Brigade. 

Col.  J.  C.  McQdiston. 
123(1  Indiana, 
12(»th      " 
130th      " 
28th  Michigan. 


Third  Brigade. 
Col.  M.  T.  Thomas. 
bth  Minnesota. 
171th  Ohio. 
178th     " 


Battery  Elgin,  Illinois  Artillery. 


SECOND  DIVISION. 
Major-General  D.  N.  COUCH. 


First  Brigade. 

Col.  O.  H.  Moore. 
25th  Michigan. 
26th  Kentucky. 


Second  Brigade. 

Col.  J.  Mehringeb. 
23d  Mic-hipan. 
80th  Indiana. 
118th  Ohio. 
107th  Illinois. 
111th  Ohio. 

19th  Ohio  Battory. 


Third  Brigade. 

Col.  S.  A.  Btrickland. 
9lBt  Indiana, 
la^it  Ohio. 
181  at     " 
50th      " 


THIRD   DIVISION. 
Brigadier-General  S.  P.  CARTER. 


First  Brigade. 

Col.  O.  W.  Sterl. 
8th  Tennessee. 
12th  Kentucky. 
Ifith 

lOOth  Ohio. 
104th     " 


Second  Brigade. 

Brevet  Brig. -Gen.  J.  S. 
Casement. 
103d  Ohio. 
177th     " 
65th  Indiana. 
65th  Illinois. 


Third  Brigade. 

Brevet  Briar.  Gon.  T.  J. 
Henderson. 
112th  Illinois. 
63d  Indiana. 
140th      " 


Battery  D,  1st  Ohio  Light  Artillery. 


CAVALRY  DIVISION,  M.  D.  M. 
Bbevet  Majob-Genebal  J  LTDSON  KILPATRICK. 


First  Brigade. 

Brevet  Brig. -Gen.  Thos.  J. 
Jordan. 
9th  Pennsylvania. 
2d  Kentucky. 
8(i 

M  Indiana. 
8th      " 


IV 


Second  Brigade, 

Brevet  Brig.-Gen.  S.  D. 

Atkins. 
92d  Illinois  Mounted  Inf. 
10th  Ohio. 
9th       " 

1st  Ohio  Squadron. 
9th  Michigan. 

10th  Wisconsin  Battery. 


Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Geo.  E.  Spenobb. 
5th  Kentucky. 
5th  Ohio. 
1st  Alabama. 


250  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


II. — Organization  of  the  Army  iirar  Smithjleld,,  N.  6'.,  (knnmniided  hg 
Gen.  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  March  31,  18(55. 

HARDEE'S  ARMY  CORPS. 
Lieut. -GeneuaIj  WILLIAM  J.   HARDEE  Commanding. 

MAJOR-aENKiiAi,  L.  McLAWS'S  DIVISION. 
Briffodea — Blanchabd'b,  Hakbison's,  Kennedy's,  FizkrV. 

Bbioadikr  General  W.  B.  TALIAFERRO'S  DIVISION. 
/i>'/£/arfes— Elliott's,  Rhett's. 

Major-general  R.  F.  HOKE'S  DIVISION. 

^r<£rad«s— Clinqman'b,  Hagood's,  Colquitt's,  Kibkland's,  Nethebcdtt's 

Junior  Reserves. 


ARINIY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE. 

STEWART'S,  LEE'S,  and  CHEATHAM'S  CORPS. 

(These  corps  are  reported  as  having  the  same  organiziition  as  when  with  Hood, 
both  as  to  divisions  and  brigades,  except  that  Anderson's  Division  of  Lee's  Corpa 
was  under  command  of  Major-General  D,  H.  Hill,  and  the  whole  of  Stewart's 
Corps  was  under  the  command  of  Major-General  E.  C.  Walthall.) 

ARTILLERY  ATTACHED  TO  HARDEE'S  CORFS. 

Batteries — Abelle's,  Anderson's,  Brooks's,  Maxwell's  (section),  Atkins's, 
Parvis's,  Detachment  10th  North  Carolina  Battalion,  Lb  Gabden's, 
Stuabt's. 

ARTILLERY  ATTACHED   TO  ARMY   OF  TENNESSEE. 

^<<ery— Kanapacx's.  For  memorandum  as  to  other  artillery  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  see  Appendix  E,  III. 

CAVALRY  CORPS. 

Lieut.-General  WADE  HAMPTON  Commanding. 

Wheeler's  Cavalry.    Butler's  Cavalry.    Divisions  and  brigades  not  given,  i 

1  It  is  regretted  that  it  has  not  been  practicable  to  procure  the  list  of  regiments 
in  Hardee's  Corps,  or  the  Cavalry. 


IN  J)  EX. 


'SotK—Regiments,  batteries,  etc.,  are  indexed  under  the  nnmett  of 
their  States,  excepting  batteries  called  by  their  captain's  or  by  some 
other  special  name.     These  are  indexed  under  Batteries. 


Abbeville,  S.  C,  178 

Abbott,  brigade  of,  141,  144 

Abingdon,  Va.,  200 

Aoklen  Place,  107  et  seq. 

Adams,  Brigadier-General  Daniel, 
205  et  seq. 

Adams,  Brigadier-General  John, 
mortally  wounded,  91,  97 

Adams,  Brigadier-General  Wirt, 
cavalry  brigade  of,  204 

Aiken,  S.  C,  173 

Alatoona,  Ga.,  ;.'3 

Albany,  Ga.,  31 

Alexandria,  Va.,  147 

Ames,  Brevet  Major-General  Adal- 
bert, division  of,  141  et  seq., 
145;  at  Fort  Fisher,  148;  be- 
fore Fort  Anderson,  149 

Anderson,  Colonel  E.  C. ,  50 

Anderson,  Brigadier-General  R. 
H.,  cavalry  division  of,  33 

Anderson,  Fort,  145,  149  et  seq. 

Anderson,  Major  George  W.,  51 

Appomatto..,  Va.,  203,  2.3 

Argyle  Island,  44,  56,  59  et  seq. 


Armstrong,  Brigadier-General  F. 
C,  cavalry  brigade  of,  134,  306 
(note)  et  seq. 

Athens,  Ala.,  133 

Athens,  Ga.,  17,  67 

Atkins,  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
Smith  D.,  cavalry  brigade  of, 
24,  33  ;  his  "Ninety-second  Il- 
linois Volunteers,"  42  (note), 
175  (note),  179  et  seq. 

Atlanta,  Ga.,  Set  seq.,  7  et  seq., 
16 ;  map  of,  20,  21, 23  et  seq. ,  36 
etseq.,  36,40,03,  79,  9".,  137, 
163,  176 

Augusta,  Ga.,  10,  23,  25,  27 etseq., 
33,  34,  49,  59,  61,  104,  166,  169 
et  seq.,  183 

Averasboro,  N.  C,  183  et  seq. 

Badeau,  Brigadier-General  Adam, 

3,  8  (note) 
Bainbridge,  Ala.,  125 
Baird,  General  Absalom,  division 

of  (Fourteenth  Corps),  24,  34 
Barnwell,  S.  C,  176  (note) 


252 


INDEX. 


Bate,  Major-Ocneral  Wm.  B.,  di- 
viBion  of,  73,  7(5,  71),  S8,  {)2,  W, 
103etBeq.,  113, 115et8eq.,  1^>0, 
ISaetseq.,  128,  188,  l<.K)et  seq. 

Batteries:  CockereU's,  IIH;  De 
Gres's,  53;  Wiiiegar's,  5(5 

Beatty,  Brigadier-CJeueral  Samuel, 
division  of,  98,  113,  117,  131 

Beaufort,  S.  C,  46,  48,  103  etseq., 
171,  311 

Beauregard,  General  G.  T.,  in  mili- 
tary command  between  middle 
Georgia  and  the  Mississippi, 
3  ;  put  over  Hood  and  Taylor, 
10  et  seq. ;  hastens  after  Hood, 
13;  repairs  railroad,  15;  his 
earnest  despatches  to  Hood,  17; 
despatches  of ,  37  et  seq.,  40,  59, 
64;  reports  of,  101,  IGl  (note); 
suggestions  of,  106  et  seq. ;  at 
a  conference  at  Augusta,  169 
etseq.,  178,  183 

Bell,  Colonel  L.,  brigade  of,  143  et 
seq. 

Bell's  Landing,  Tcnn.,  110,  119 

Bentonville,  N.  C,  103,  185  et  seq., 
303 

Biffle,  Colonel  J.  B.,  demi-brigade 
of  cavalry,  71 

Blair,  Major-General  F.  P.,  corps 
of,  33 ;  constructs  a  flying 
bridge,  31 ;  at  Millen,  34  et 
.seq.,  53,  168,  177  et  seq.,  194 

Boone,  N.  C,  301 

Boonevillo,  Mo.,  6 

Boyd's  Neck,  S.  C,  48  et  seq. 

Bradley,  Colonel  Luther  P.,  bri- 
gade of,  75  et  seq. 

Bragg,  General  Braxton,  8  ;  at  Au- 
gusta, 49,  158  et  seq.  ;  retreats 
to  Kingston,  160  et  seq.,  181 
etseq.,  185,  193,  195 


Brantley,  Brigadier-General  W. 
F.,  brigade  of,  114 

Breckenridge,  Major-Geucral  John 
C,  i'ii,  i:53,  300 

Breese,  Commander  K.  R,  142  ct 
seq. 

Brentwood,  Tenn.,  98  ct  seq.,  108, 
115,  131,  134,  138 

Briar  Creek,  Ga.,  33,  34 

Bridges,  Captain  Lyman,  Chief 
of  Artillery,  Fourth  Cori)8, 
75 

Brown,  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
S.  B.,  cavalry  brigade  of,  301 

Brown,  Major-GeneralJolmC,  di- 
vision of,  73,  76,  87  et  seq. ,  90, 
93  et  seq.,  90  et  seq.,  113 

Brown,  Governor  Joseph  E.,  of 
Georgia,  8, 11,  38  et  seq.  ;  army 
of,  47 

Buchanan,  Fort,  N.  C,  138,  144 

Buell,  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
G.  P.,  brigade  of,  1^9  et  seq. 

Buford,     Brigadier -General     A., 

cavalry  division  of,  12  (note), 

I         71  et  seq.,  103  et  seq.,  106,  304 

Bull's  Gap,  Tenn.,  212 

Burbridge,  Brigadier- General  S. 
;         G.,  300 

Burke's  Station,  Va.,  303 

Butler,  Major-General  M.  C,  divi- 
sion of  cavalry,  109, 170,  179, 
187 

Butler,  General  B.  F.,  145 

Camden,  S.  C,  178 

Canby,  General  E.  R.  S.,  4,  199, 

303 
Capron,  Colonel  Horace,   brigade 

of,  05,  73  et  seq. 
Carlin,  Brigadier-General  W.   P., 

division  of  (Fourteenth  Corps), 


INDEX. 


253 


24,  187  ct  ficq.  ;  recoiled,  180, 
lyictscq.,  1«.)4,  V.Y7 

Carman,  Colonel  E.  A.,  brigade  of, 
57,  <K) 

Carter,  Brigadier-General  S.  P., 
division  of,  155  et  seq.,  158  et 
Bcq. 

Carter's  house  (battle  of  Franklin), 
81  et  seq.,  84,  80,  88  et  seq.,  <»7 

Carter,  Brigadier-General  J.  C, 
wounded,  {Yd 

Carthage,  Tenn.,  104 

Case,  Colonel  H.,  brigade  of,  183 

Casement,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral John  S.,  brigade  of,  84, 
91,  151  et  seq. 

Caswell,  Fort,  N.  C,  LIS 

Catterson,  Colonel  R.  F.,  30 

Cave  Spring,  Ga. ,  1 1 

Centrcvillc,  Ala.,  2(K5 

Centreville,  Tenn.,  06,  98 

Chalmers,  Brigadier-GeneralJames 
R.,  cavalry  division  of,  13 
(note),  71  et  seq.,  106  et  seq.. 
Ill,  11.5,  119  et  seq.,  133,  304, 
200  et  seq.,  309 

Charleston,  S.  C,  33,  28,  44,  40  et 
seq.,  55,  59,  01,  154,  104,  107, 
109  et  seq.,  178,  183, 184  (note) 

Charlotte,  N.  C,  170,  177  et  seq., 
183  et  seq. ,  301  et  seq.,  311,  313 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  3,  13,  17,  19, 
33,  99,  133,  135 

Cheathem,  Major-General  B.  P.,  13 
(note),  14,  71,  73  et  seq.,  77, 79 
et  seq.,  87  (note)  et  seq.,  91,  93 
et  seq.,  103  et  seq.,  113,  115  et 
seq.,  118  et  seq.,  188, 195 et  seq. 

Cheraw,  S.  C,  170,  178,  181 

Cherokee  Station,  Ala.,  13,  15  et 
seq.,  03 

Chester,  N.  C,  170 


Choves  plantation,  51 ,  53  et  seq. 

City  Point,  Va.,  313  et  seq. 

Clarksville,  Tenn.,  07 

Clayton,  Major-General  H.  D., 
division  of,  114,  158,  100 

Classen,  Colonel  P.  P.,  brigade  of, 
155 

Cleburne,  Major-General  Patrick 
R.,  division  of,  13  et  seq.,  87 
ctsoq. ;  deatli  of,  93,  90 et  seq., 
113,  115,  133,  188 

Clifton,  Tenn.,  139,  137 

Clinton,  Ga.,  27 

Clinton,  N.  C,  185,  188 

Cobb,  General  Kowell,  9,  11,38; 
at  Macon,  30 

Cockerell,  Captain  Giles  J.,  battery 
of,  118 

Cockrell,  Brigadier-General  P.  M., 
wounded,  97 ;  brigade  of,  100, 
115 

Coggswell,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gene- 
ral William,  brigade  of,  193 

Colbert  Shoals,  Ala.,  14 

Cole's  farm,  188  et  seq.,  191 

Coleman,  Colonel  D.,  brigade  of, 
111,  113,  115  et  seq.,  130,  134, 
135  (note) 

Columbia,  S.  C,  31  etseq.,58, 164, 
100,  170  et  seq.,  201 

Columbia,  Tenn.,  18,  64  et  seq.; 
map  of,  08  et  seq.,  71  et  seq., 
96,  13.5,  133  et  seq, 

Columbus,  Miss.,  204 

Comstock,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gene- 
ral C.  B.,  143 

Connecticut,  Fifteenth  Regiment, 
1.58  • 

Conrad,  Colonel  Joseph,  brigade 
of,  86,  88 

Coon,  Colonel  D.  E.,  cavalry  bri- 
gade of,  73,  111 


254 


INDEX. 


Cooper,  Brigadinr-Oeneral  J.  A., 
diviRion  of  (Twenty-third 
Corps),  17  et  seq.,  tJ6,  98,  112 

CooHawhatchee,  S.  C,  55 

Corinth,  Miss.,  11,  15,  'J8,  103 

Cornwallis,  Lord,  317 

Corse,  Brevet  Major-General  John 
M.,  division  of,  3;{,  l«i8 

Couch,  Majoi-deneral Darius,  divi- 
sion of,  113,  IIH  et  seq.,  120, 
133,  138,  149,  100 

Cowan,  Tenn.,  99 

Cox,  Major-General  Jacob  D.,  divi- 
sion of,  17;  at  Columbia,  18; 
sent  to  Lynnville,  04 ;  sent  to 
Hurricane,  (55 ;  position  of.  07, 
74,  77  et  seq.  ;  at  Franklin.  81, 
85;  at  Nashville,  112,  110,  118 
et  Bcq.  ;  before  Wilmington, 
1137;  at  Fort  Fisher,  147  et 
seq.  ;  before  Fort  Anderson, 
149  et  seq.  ;  ordered  to  Nevv- 
bem,  185  et  seq. ;  at  Golds- 
boro,  196 

Crossland,  Colonel  Edward,  caval- 
ry brigade  of,  204  et  seq. 

Croxton,  Brigadier-Guncral  John 
T.,  cavalry  brigade  of,  14,  73 
et  seq.  ;  110,  305  et  seq. 

Cruft,  Brigadier-General  Charles, 
division  of,  101,  108,  1.'54 

Cunningham,  Sergeant-Ma j or  S. 
A.,  126  (note) 

Curtis,  Brigadier-General  N.  M., 
brigade  of,  143  et  seq. 

Dahloren,  Rear  Admiral  J.  A., 

46.  .%,  .5.5,  178 
Dalton,  Ga.,7,  17 
Daly,  plantation  of,  44 
Danville,  Va.,  183,  203,  311  et  seq., 

213 


Davisboro,  Ga.,  HI 

Davis,  Brevet  Major-General  Jeff. 
C.  (of  Fourteenth  Corps),  23, 
27,  31 ,  34  ;  leaves  negro  refu- 
gees behind,  37,  52,  185,  189 
etseq.,  191,  193 

Davis,  President  JeflFerson,  3,  8  ; 
at  Hood's  headquarters,  9 ;  at 
Augusta.  10,  183,  303;  ar- 
rested by  Wilson,  310,  212, 
214 

Decatur,  Ala.,  1,  6,  12  et  seq.,  15, 
17,  00  et  seq.,  102,  125  et  seq., 
183 

DeGres,  Captain  J.  C,  battery  of, 
53 

Demopolis,  Ala.,  204,  308 

Dibrell,  Brigadier-General  G.  G., 
division  of  cavalry,  33,  187 
(note) 

Donaldson,  Brigadier-General  Jas. 
L.,100,  105,  108,  134 

Doolittle,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gene- 
ral C.  C,  brigade  of,  14,  133 
et  seq. 

Dow,  Major  T.  T.,  79,  94 

Duncan,  Captain  William,  scout, 
53  et  seq. 

Duncan  farm,  Ga.,  30 

Durham  Station,  N.  C,  214 

Eagle   Island,    N.    C,   153   et 

seq. 
Eastport,  Miss.,  129 
Ector,  Brigadier-General,  brigade 

of.  111 
Edgefield,  Tenn.,  103 
Elevation,  N.  C,  186 
Elliott,  Brigadier-General  W.  L., 

division  of,  113  et  seq.,  117 
Elyton,  Ala.,  205 
Ezra  Church,  Ga.,  9 


INDEX. 


255 


FAiBnuuN,  Oa.,  30 

Fayettcville,  N.  C,  17'.»,  181,  183 
et  He«i. 

Fearing,  Brevet  Brigadier-(}ciieral 
B.  D.,  brigado  of,  18S>,  lUl  et 
seq. 

Feutheiston,  Brigadier  -  General 
W.  S.,  brigade  of,  135 

Field,  Colonel  H.  11.,  brigade  of, 
1^5  (note) 

Fisher,  Fort,  N.  C,  137  et  seq., 
147,  165 

Fitch,  Lieutenant-Commander  Le- 
roy,  104 

Florence,  Ala.,  11,  14  et  seq.,  17 
et  seq.,  63  et  seq.,  12(J,  132, 
170,  20^),  ^03 

Force,  Brigadier-General  M.  F., 
division  of,  168 

Forrest,  Lieutenant-General  N.  B. , 
cavalry  corps  of,  11  ;  starts 
on  a  raid,  i;3  et  seq.,  15  et  acq.; 
joins  Hood,  63,  05  et  seq.,  71  et 
seq.,  81,  85et8e(i.;  his  skirmish 
with  Wilson,  *,)8  et  seq.,  10^  et 
seq.,  10(),  111  (note),  115  ;  re- 
treat, 124  ;  rejoins  Hood,  l;i5, 
.  135,  a03  et  seq. ;  rout  of,  207  et 
seq. 

Forsyth,  Ga.,  26 

Fort  Anderson  (see  Anderson, 
Fort) 

Fort  Buchanan  (see  Buchanan, 
Fort) 

Fort  Caswell  (see  Caswell,  Fort) 

Fort  Fisher  (see  Fisher,  Fort) 

Fort  Granger  (see  (iranger,  Fort) 

Fort  Henry  (see  Henry,  Fort) 

Fort  Jackson  (see  Jackson,  Fort) 

Fort  Johnson  (see  Johnson,  Fort) 

Fort  McAllister  (see  McAllister, 
Fort) 


I  Fort  Macon  (flco  Macon,  Fort) 
I  Fort  Puiuski  (hcc  Pulaski,  Fort) 

Fortress  Monroe  (see  Monroe,  Fort- 
ress) 

Foster,  Major  (Joneral  J.  (J.,  40,  48, 
55  ct  seq.,  51)  et  seq.,  104,  178 

Franklin,  Tenn.,  6'.>  et  bh[.;  battle 
of,  81  et  seq.,  101  et  soq.,  I ^'4 
et  secj.,   135 

French,  Major-General  S.  ( J. ,  divi- 
sion of,  88,  U7,  103,  111  (note), 
113 

Friuk,  Surgeon  C.  S.,  94 

Gadsden,  Ala.,  1,  lOetseq.,  21) 

Gallatin,  Tenn.,  104 

Gallup,  Colonel  G.  W.,  brigade  of, 

18 
Gardiner,     Brigadier-General   W. 

M.,  202 
Garrard,   Brigadier-General   Ken- 

ner,  division  of,  HI,  113 
Geary,  Brigadier-General  John  W., 

division  of,  23,  00 
Genesis  Point,  Ga.,  50 
Georgia,    regiment    of  :     Thirty- 
seventh,  123 
Germauton,  N.  C,  202 
Gillcm,  Brigadier-General  A.   C, 

cavalry  division  of,  63,  SiOO  et 

seq. 
Gillem's  Station,  Tenn.,  18 
Gist,     Brigadier-General     S.    R., 

killed,  93 
Goldsboro,   N.  C,    137,  147,   155, 

159  et  soq.,  103,  104,  181,  185  et 

seq.,  194,  190,  202,  211  et  seq. 
Gordon,  Brigadier-General  G.  W., 

93 
Gordon,  Ga.,  27,  3D,  36 
Govan,    Brigadier-General  D.    C, 

brigade  of,  119  et  seq.,  123 


INDEX. 


Graham ville,  S.  C,  48 

Cranberry,  IJrigadier-General  H. 
B.,  death  of,  97 

Granger,  Fort,  Tenn.,  83,  98 

Granger,  Brigadier-General  R.  S., 
1  ;  at  Decatur,  14,  17,  ^56.  100, 
135,  133 

Granny  White  Turnpike,  108,  111 
et  seq.,  115,  ]  19,  1.3  et  seq. 

Grant,  Lieutenant-General  U.  S., 
assents  to  Sherman's  plan,  2  et 
Bcq  ,  31,  55,  58  et  soq.  ;  chafes 
under  Thomas's  delay,  105  et 
seq.,  139  etseq.,  143,  140,  165, 
173,  199  et  seq.,  303  et  seq., 
311  et  seq.,  310  et  seq. 

Gravelly  Springs,  Ala.,  303 

Greene,  General  Nathaniel,  317  '. 

Greenesboro,  N.  C.,  108  (note),  303, 
313  etseq.,  317 

Griswold ville,  Ga.,  37,  30  et  seq. 

Grosvenor,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral, brigade  of,  107,  131,  134 

Gun tcrs ville,  Ala.,  1,  9, 11  et  seq. 

Hagood,  Brigadier-General  John- 
son, brig.ado  of,  1 50  et  seq. 

Halleck,  Major-General  H.  W.,  6, 
58,  176 

Hambright,  Col  '1  H.  A.,  brigade 
of,  189 

Hammond,  Colonel  J.  H.,  brigade 
of,  at  Spring  Hill,  70,  104 

H?.r  ipton,  Licutenant-G  e  n  e  r  a  1 
,  Wade,  171,  179  et  seq.;  meets 

Hardee  and  Johnston  at  Fay- 
ette viUc,  183,  180  et  seq.;  re- 
fuses to  bring  in  the  cavalry 
for  surrender,  317 

Hardee,  Lieutenant-General  W.  J., 
Hood's  unjust  charges  against, 
9  etseq.;  hastens  back  to  Sa- 


vannah, 38,  30 ;  his  orders  to 
Wheeler,  31,40et  seq.;  advised 
to   abandon  Savannah,  49    et 
seq.;  refuses  to  surrender,  59; 
begins  the  evacuation,  00,  131 ; 
at  Wilmington,  154,  164;  re- 
port of,  100  et  seq.;  at  a  con- 
ference  near  Augusta,  109  et 
seq.;  evacuates  Charleston,  178 
et    seq.,    181    et    seq.;    meets 
Johnston    and     Hampton    at 
Fayetteville,    183   et  seq.;    at 
Benton  ville,  180  et  seq.;  meets 
Schofield,  317 
Hardeeville,  S.  C,  47,56 
Harper's  Ferry,  Va.,  181 
Harri.s,  Governor  Isham  G. ,  101 
Hatch,  Brigadier-General  Edward, 
cavalry  under,  18,  04,  73,  110 
et  seq.,  119,  133,  303 
Hatch,  Brigadier-General  John  P., 
affair  at  Honey  Hill,  48  et  seq,, 
60 
Hawley,  Colonel  William,  57 
Hazen,   Major-General  W.  B.,  di- 
vision of,  33  ;  capture  of  Fort 
McAllister,  53  etseq.,  174,  193 
et  seq. 
Heath,  Cok  nei  Thomas  T.,  33 
Heiskell,  Co?.onel,   brigade  of,  135 

(note) 
j  Henderson,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Thomas  J.,  brigade  of,  78, 
84,  91,  150  etseq. 
Henry,  Fort,  15 

Hill,  Colonel  S.  G.,  death  of.  111 
Hill,  General  D.   H.,  159  et  seq.; 
at  a  conference  at  Augusta, 
109 
Hillsboro   Turnpike,   107  et  seq., 

305,  317 
Hilton  Head,  S.  C,  60 


INDEX. 


257 


Hobart,  brigade  of,  189,  191, 
197 

Hoke,  Major -General  R.  F.,  144 
et  seq. ,  148  ;  retreat  of,  150, 
15:i,  154, 15G,  158, 100, 18^,  188, 
192 

Honey  Hill,  S.  C,  48 

Hood,  General  John  B. ,  1  ;  enbor- 
dinato  to  General  Beauregard, 
2  ;  his  design  to  carry  the  war 
back  to  Tennessee,  4  et  seq.; 
demands  Hardee's  removal,  9  ; 
force  of,  11  et  seq.;  views  of 
his  subordination  to  Beaure- 
gard, 13  ;  marches  to  Tuscum- 
bia,  Hetseq. ;  delays,  17;  force 
of,  18  et  seq.;  Beauregard's 
orders  to,  29  ;  joined  by  For- 
rest, 63 ;  near  Lawrenceburg, 
64  et  seq.;  moves  upon  Spring 
Hill,  73  ;  asks  to  have  Cheat- 
hem  relieved,  29  et  seq.;  ad- 
vances toward  Franklin,  84  et 
seq.;  losses  of,  ItGetseq. ;  apolo- 
gies of,  101  et  seq.;  before 
Nashville,  106;  position  of,  110 
et  seq. ;  forms  a  new  line,  113  et 
seq.;  rout  of,  1.26;  at  Tupelo, 
127  et  seq.,  1.33  et  seq.,  159, 
106  109,  179,  183,  190,  199  et 
seq.,  203 

Howard,  Major  -  General  O.  O. 
(commanding  Army  of  the 
Tennessee),  with  Sherman,  23  ; 
march  of,  26  et  seq.;  crosses 
the  Oconee,  31  et  seq.;  pro- 
gress of,  34,  47  ;  orders  King's 
Bridge  rebuilt,  52 ;  at  tak- 
ing of  Fort  McAllister,  53 
et  seq.;  preparations  before 
Savannah,  55  et  seq. ;  at  Beau- 
fort, 163  et  eeq.,  108  et  seq.; 


-fcers  Columbia,  173  et  seq., 
177  ;  enters  Cheraw,  179,  185 
et  seq.,  193,  195 

Hubl)ard,  Colonel  Lucius  F.,  bri- 
gade of,  111,  123,  128 

Huey's  Mill,  Tenn.,  09  et  seq. 

Hume,  Brigadier-General  W.  Y.  C, 
cavalry  division  of,  33 

Hunt's  Corners,  Tenn.,  72 

Hunts ville,  Ala.,  17,  67,  129 

Hurricane,  Tenn.,  05 

Hutchinson  Island,  Ga.,  44,  47,  59 

Illinois,  regiments  of  :  Ninety- 
second,  175,  181 ;  One  Hundred 
and  Eleventh,  55 ;  One  Hun- 
dred and  Twelfth,  78,  93 

Indiana,  regiments  of  :  Eighth,  32 ; 
Seventeenth,  207 ;  Sixty-third, 
78 

Indian  Spring,  Ga.,  26 

Iowa,  regiment  ut :  Fifth,  72 

Izard's  Mill,  Ga.,  GO 

Jackson,  Brigadier-Goneral  Win. 
H.,  cavalry  division  of,  11 
et  seq.,  71  et  seq.,  77;  with- 
draw.s,  78  et  seq.,  103  etseq., 
205  et  seq.,  208  et  seq. 

Jackson,  Brigadier-General  H.  R. 
(commanding  brigade  in  Bate's 
division),  taken  prisoner,  120 

Jackson,  Brigadier-General,  com- 
manding forces  in  S.  W.  Vir- 
ginia, 201,  203 

Jackson,  Brigadier-General  N.  J., 
division  of  (Twentieth  Corps), 
23,  27,  52,  183 

Jackson,  Fort,  46 

Jackson,  Miss.,  204 

Jackson,  Tenn.,  13,  15 

Jasper,  Ala.,  205 


258 


INDEX. 


Johnson,  Major-Oenoral  Ed.,  divi- 
sion of,  74,  17,  '.)3,  97,  114; 
prisoner,  I'Jfi 

Johnson,  Brigadier-General  Geo. 
D.,  brigade  of,  113 

Johnson,  General  R.  W. ,  cavalry 
division  of,  73,  110,  110;  pur- 
sues Hood,  ri5 

Johnson,  Fort.  N.  C,  138 

Johnson,  President  Andrew,  21(5 

Johnsonville,  Tenn.,  10,  18,  GO  et 
seq.,  135 

Johnston,  General  Joseph  E.,  o, 
23;  at  Newbern,  159  eb  seq., 
108  (note),  180  et  seq.  ;  meets 
Hardee  and  Hampton  at  Fay- 
etteville,  183  et  seq.  ;  concen- 
trates at  Benton ville,  180  et 
seq.  ;  retreat  of,  190  et  seq., 
^03,  303 ;  opens  negotiations 
for  surrender,  314  et  seq. 

Jonesboro,  Ga.,  30 

Jonesboro,  Tenn.,  301 

Jones,  Jr.,  Colonel  C.  C,  his 
"  Siege  of  Savannah,"  29,  4(5, 
48  (note),  50,  51  (note),  107 
(note) 

Jones,  Colonel  Theodore,  Ijrigade 
of,  53  et  seq. 

Jones,  Colonel  Wells  S.,  brigade  of, 
58 ;  severely  wounded,  54 

Jone.s,  General  S.,in  command  at 
Charleston,  S.  C,  59 

Jordan  and  Prior's  "  Campaigns  of 
P'orrest,"  13  (note),  71  (note) 

Jordan,  Brevet  Brigadier-Cioneral 
Thomas  J.,  cavalry  brigade  of, 
180 

Kentt^cky,  regiments  of :  Sec- 
ond, 32;  Twelfth,  78;  Six- 
teenth, 78 


Kilpatrick, Brigadier-General  Jnd- 
son,  commands  cavalry,  24 ; 
charges  the  artillery  at  Lovejoy 
on  foot,  30 ;  makes  a  feint  upon 
Macon,  27,  31  et  seq.;  rapa- 
city of,  40,  53,  169,  175  ;  sur- 
prised, 179  et  seq.,  183,  185, 
193 

Kimball,  Brigadier- General  Na- 
than, division  of,  71,  74,  77 ; 
at  Franklin,  85,  92,  94,  98, 
113  et  seq.,  117 

King's  Bridge,  (ia.,  52  et  seq.,  57 

Kingston,  (4a.,  3,  10 

Kinston,  N.  C,  155  et  seq.,  100 
etseq.,  181,  183,  194,  203,  211 

Knipe,  Brigadier-General  Joseph 
F.,  cavalry  division  of.  111, 
123,  135,  199,  203 

Knoxville,  Tenn.,  200,  313 

Lamb,  Colonel  William,  139,  144 

Lane,  Colonel  John  Q.,  brigade 
of,  75  et  seq.,  8(5,  88 

Lavergne,  Tenn.,  103 

Lawrenceburg,  Tenn.,  03  et  seq. 

Lawton,  plantation  of,  44,  53 

Lee,  General  Robert  E.,  4,  31  et 
seq.,  60,  130,  105,  172,  182, 
301  et  seq.;  surrender  of,  210 
etseq.,  213,  216 

Lee,  Lieutenant-General  S.  D.,  13 
(note)  ;  corps  of,  04,  71,  74; 
tries  to  force  a  cros.sing  of 
Duck  River,  78  et  seq.,  86, 
88,  93  et  seq.,  103,  113  et 
seq.,  158,  183,  188,  196 

Leggett,  Brevet  Major-General  M. 
D. ,  division  of,  23 

Lewisburg,  Tenn.,  66,  69,  71  et 
seq. 

Lexington,  Ala.,  186,  176  (note) 


INDEX. 


25J) 


Lincoln,  President  Abraham,  5, 37, 
6U,  104,  13U  et  seq.,  103,  aiJi ; 
assassination  of,  214  et  seq.,  218 

Logan,  Major-Cleneral  John  A.  ,2;5 ; 
ordered  to  Nashville,  106,  104, 
170,  173,  177,  103  et  seq. 

Long,  Brigadier-General  Eli,  cav- 
alry division  of,  203,  .207  et  seq. 

Loring,  Major-General  W.  W., 
division  of,  88,  01,  04,  103,  113 
et  seq.,  125  (note) 

Louisville,  Ga.,  31,  33  et  seq.,  50 

Lovejoy  Station,  11  (note),  26,  3*» 

Lowry,  Brigadier-General  M.  P., 
division  of,  7.5,  113,  115  et  seq., 
122,  125  (note),  105 

Lynchburg,  Va.,  301  et  seq.,  212 

Lynnville,  Tenn.,  04  et  seq. 

I 

McAllisteu,    Fort,   46,    50,    53 ; 

fall  of,  54  et  seq.,  50  j 

Mc  Arthur,  Brigadier-General  John, 

division    of,  110  et   seq.,  120, 

132  et  seq. 
McClurg,  Colonel  A.  C,  190,  193 
McCook,     Brigadier-General     Ed. 

M.,  cavalry   division  of,   303, 

205  et  seq.,  200 
McDonoiigh.  Ga.,  26 
MeLavvs,    Major-General    L.,    50, 

184,  188,  102 
McMillan  Brevet  Brigadier-General 

W.   L.,   brigade  of.   111,   120, 

122  et  seq.,  127  et  seq. 
McQuiston,  Colonel  J.  C,  brigade 

of,  160 
Macon,  Fort,  N.  C,  154 
Macon,  Ga.,  23,  25  et  setj.,  63,  310 
Madison,  Ga. ,  27,  3(5 
Manigault,    Brigadier-General   A. 

M.,  03,  97 
Maps  :   Atlanta  to  Savannah,  20 ; 


Savannah  and  Vicinity,  45 ; 
Middle  Tennessee,  62;  Vicinity 
of  Columbia,  08  ;  Battle-lield 
of  Franklin,  83;  Battle-field 
of  Nashville,  10",);  Fort  Fisher 
and  Wilmington,  130;  North 
Carolina,  14();  Kinston.  157; 
Battle  of  Bentonville,  180 

Marion,  Ala.,  200,  206,  207  (note), 
200 

Martin,  Colonel  J.  S.,  55 

Maury,  Miijor-(  Jeneral  Dabnoy  K., 
303 

Mercer,  Brigadier  General  Hugh 
W.,  brigade  of,  104 

Michigan,  regiments  of  :  Ninth, 
33 ;  Fourteentli,  l03 

Midway,  S.  C,  170 

Miles,  Colonel  David,  180,  101 

Milledgeville,  (ia.,  33,  25,  27,  20, 
ol  et  seq.,  36 

Millen,  CJa.,  2:!,  31  et  seq.,  36 

Miller,  Colonel  J.  K. ,  cavalry  bri- 
gade of,  201 

Milroy,  Major-General  R.  S.,  100, 
103  et  seq. 

Mitchell,  Brigadier-General  J.  G., 
brigade  of,  180,  102  et  seq. 

MobUe,  Ala.,  3,  33, 109,  303  et  seq., 
210 

Monroe,  Fortress,  Va. ,  1 46 

Montevallo,  Ala.,  204  et  seq. 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  209 

Mcmticello,  176  (note) 

Moore,  Colonel  O.  H.,  brigade  of, 
18,  84,  111,  117,  148,  151  et 
seq. 

More liead  City,  N.  C.,211 

Morgan,  Brigadier-General  J.  D., 
divisionof  (Fourteenth  Corps), 
24,  107,  189,  191  et  seq.,  194, 
197 


260 


INDEX. 


Morris  Island,  S.C.,  23 
Mount  Pleasant,  Tenn.,  05 
Mower,   Major-General  J.   A.,  di- 
vision of,  2;{,  ll»5,  313 
Murfreesboro,    Term.,  73   et  seq., 
100,   103   et  seq.,  109  et  seq, 
r,'6,  134 
Murray,  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
"Eli  H.,  cavalry  brigade  of,  84, 
3;3  et  seq. 
Muscle  Shoals,  Ala.,  14 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  3,  0  et  seq., 
12  et  seq. ,  1 7  et  seq. ,  (57  et  seq., 
98;  battle  of,  90  et  seq.,  13U 
et  seq.,  133  et  seq.,  199 

Newborn,  N.  C,  137,  147,  154  et 
seq.,  1(54,  181,  185,  311 

Newberry,  S.  C,  170 

New  Orleans,  La.,  199 

New  York,  regiment  of  :  Twelfth, 
156 

Nichols,  Colonel  G.  VV.,  his  "  Story 
of  the  Great  March,"  43  (note), 
58  (note) 

Nohmsville  Turnpike,  103, 108, 110, 
117 

North  Carolina,  regiment  of :  For- 
tieth, 193 

Onio,  regiments  of :  Fifth,  33 ; 
Ninth,  180  ;  Eighteenth,  107 

Oliver,  Colonel  John  M.,  53 

Olmstcad,  Colonel  C.  H.,  104 

Onslow  Island,  Ga.,  44 

Opdycke,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Emer.s(>n,  brigade  of,  75 
et  seq.,  79,  86,  89  et  seq.,  94, 
155 

Orangeburg,  S.  C,  106,  170,  173, 
175 

Ossabaw  Sound,  Ga.,  33 


Ofiterhaus,  Brevet  Major-General 
P.  J.,  commands  Logan's cori)8, 
33,  34etBeq.,  53 

Paducaii,  Ky.,  6 

Paine,   Brigadier-General   Charles 

J.,  division  of.  141,  144 
Palmer,  ColonelJ.  B.,  brigade  of, 

103 
Palmer,    Colonel    W.    J.,    cavalry 

brigade  of  (Gillem's  division), 

301 
Palmer,  General  I.  N.,  155  et  seq., 

158  et  seq. 
Palmetto,  Ga.,  9 
Pemberton,  Lieutenant-General  J. 

C,  3(3 
Pennj'packer,    Brevet    Brigadier- 
General  G.  A.,  brigade  of,  143 

et  seq. 
Pensacola,  Fla.,  23 
Perry ville,  Tenn.,  16 
Petersburg,  Va.,  32,  105,  203,  311 

et  seq. 
Phillips,  Brigadier-General  P.  J., 

division  of  (Georgia  Militia), 

30  et  seq. 
Planter's  Factory,  Ga.,  3»>,  28 
Plantersville,  Ala.,  30(5,  209 
Pocotaligo,  S.  C,  59,  1(54,  108 
Poe,   Colonel  O.    M.,    Chief    En- 
gineer, 24,  59,  164 
Porter,  Vice- Admiral  D.  D.,  141 

etseq.,  146,  149 
Port  Royal,  S.  C,  46,  53,  55,  57 
Post,  Colonel  P.  Sidney,   brigade 

of,  70,  74,  97,  112,  131 
Pulaski,  Fort,  45 
Pulaski,  Tenn.,  14,  17  et  seq.,  64 

et  seq.,   103,  134  et  seq.,  129, 

133  et  seq. 
Putnam,  Israel,  191 


INDEX. 


2G1 


QuART.ES,  Brigadier-General  Wm. 
A.,  brigade  of,  91,  97,  113 

Raines,  house  of,  lU 

Raluigh,  N.C.,  170,  178,  181,  185, 

313  ct  seq.- 
Rally  Hill,  'IVnn.,  73  et  seq. 
Randolph,  Ala.,  20.5  et  .seq. 
Reese,  Captain  O.  B.,  Chief  En- 
gineer, 53 
Reilly,  Brigadier-General  J.   W., 

brigade  of,  78  et  seq.,    83  et 

seq.,  89  et  seq.,  94 
Resaca,  Ga.,  7 

Resolute,  the,  driven  ashore,  57 
Reynolds,  plantation  of,  iiii 
Reynolds,     Brigadier-General    D. 

H.,  brigade  of,  113,  134 
Rliett,  Colonel  Albert,  183  et  seq. 
Richmond,  Va.,  9,   31  et  seq.,  38, 

35,  49,  58,  165,  167,  183,  201, 

210,  313  et  seq. 
Robertsville,  S.  C,  104 
Robinson,  Brigadier-General  J,  S., 

brigade  of,  191  et  seq. 
Roddey,   Brigadier-General  P.  D., 

cavalry  divi.sion  of,  13  (note), 

67,  133,  304  et  seq.,  307 
Rome,  Ga.,  3,  11,  10,  31,  33,  133 
Rosecrans,  Major-General  W.  S.,  6 
Rousseau,    Major-General   L.    H., 

100,  103,  134 
Rucker.  Brigadier-General  E.  W., 

brigade  of,  16,  130 
Ruger,   Brigadier-General  T.   H., 

66,  71,  74,  77  et  seq.,  84,  93, 

94, 155, 158  et  seq. 

St.  Loui3,  Mo.,  6 
Salisbury,  N.  C,  303  et  seq. 
Saltville,  Va.,  300 
Sanders ville,  Ga.,  31 


Savannah,  Ga.,  1,  2\  33,  35,  37  et 
seq., 43  et  seq. ;  fall  of,  00,  139, 
102  et  seq.,  168,  173,  176,  180, 
197,  199,  310 
Schoiield,  Major-General  Johii  M. 
(Army  of  the  Ohio).  0  et  seq  ; 
Hood's  movement  again.st,  11  ; 
at  Nashville,  17  et  seq.  ; 
against  Hood,  03  ct  se(i.  ;  at 
Spring  Hill,  69  et  seq. ;  battle 
of  Franklin,  79  ct  seq. ;  losses 
of,  97;  at  Nashville,  99  et 
seq.  ;  advises  further  delay 
before  Nashville,  105 ;  prepa- 
rations for  battle,  100  et  seq.  ; 
losses  of,  114  ;  second  day  at 
Nashville,  117  et  seq.  ;  pursues 
Hood,  134  et  seq. ;  concentrates 
at  Corinth,  Miss.,  139  et  seq., 
137;  joins  Grant  at  Fortress 
Monroe,  147;  at  Fort  P'isher, 
147  et  seq.  ;  enters  Wilming- 
ton, 1.54  et  seq.  ;  at  Newborn, 
158  et  seq.  ;  at  Kinston,  100 
et  seq.,  108  (note),  181,  183, 1^5 
et  seq.  ;  ordered  to  Goldsboro, 
194  et  seq.,  300,  303;  left  in 
command,  311,  213;  receives 
the  arms  of  Confederates,  217 

Scott,  Brigadier-General  Th.  M., 
brigade  of,  91,  97 

Sea  Island,  S.  C,  33 

Sears,  Brigadier-General  C.  W., 
brigade  of,  103,  111  (note), 
113,  115 

Selma,  Ala.,  204,  20^  H  seq. 

Shelby  ville,  Te-  65  et  seq.,  73, 
134 

Shelley,  Brigadier-General  C.  M., 
brigade  of,  113 

Sheridan,  Major-General  P.  H., 
813 


262 


INDEX. 


Sherman,  Major-Ge?neral  W.  T., 
plans  of,  1  et  seq.;  moral 
courage  of,  4  ct  seq.;  his 
confidence  in  Thoniaa,  '6 ;  en- 
emy's plans  agamst,  9  et 
seq.  ;  letter  to  Thomas,  11>; 
views  of  his  march  througli 
Georgia,  131  et  seq.  ;  force  of, 
2;5  et  Boq.  ;  line  of  march,  20  ot 
seq.  ;  his  orders  to  Kilpatrick, 
3;-  ;  at  Millen,  ol ;  his  destruc- 
tion ot  railways,  3.5  et  seq.;  his 
plan  of  foraging,  .'IS  ct  seq.  ; 
before  Savannah,  4t)  et  seq.  ; 
opens  communication  with 
fleet,  .52  ;  at  siege  of  Fort  Mc- 
Allister, .5:!  et  seq.  ;  prepara- 
tions before  Savannah,  55  et 
seq.  ;  demands  surrender  of 
Hardee,  59,  100  et  .seq.,  1:.'6, 
lo2  et  seq.;  at  Goldsboro,  i;')7, 
147,  154  et  seq.,  159 ;  his  plan 
of  campaign,  lG3etseq. ;  route 
of,  105  et  seq.  ;  enters  Colum- 
bia, ITo  ct  seq.,  178  et  seq.  ; 
destroys  arsenal  at  Fayette- 
ville,  ISl  et  seq.  ;  at  Averas- 
boro,  183  et  seq, ;  at  Benton- 
ville,  186  et  seq. ;  resumes  his 
march,  190  et  seq.,  201,  203; 
at  Goldsboro,  21 1 ;  meets  Grant 
and  Lincoln  at  City  Point,  212  ; 
meets  Johnston,  214  et  seq. 
Shy,  Colonel  T.  M.,  113  (note),  123 
Shy's  Hill,  113,  115  et  seq.,  118  et 

seq.,  127  et  seq. 
Silk  Hope  plantation,  Ga.,  44 
Simonton,  Colonel  C.  H.,  152 
Slocum,     Major-General     H.     W. 
(commanding  Army  of  Geor- 
gia),   with   Sherman,    23,    27 
et     se(j|.  ;      before     Savannah, 


52;  arranging  earthworks,  57, 
59;  commands  left  wing,  104, 
108  ot  seq.,  178  et  seq.  ;  at 
Averasboro,  183;  at  Benton- 
ville,  180  etseq.  ;  losses  of,  190 
et  seq.,  213 

Smith,  Captain  11.  D.,  09  (note) 

Smithfield,  N.  C,  159,  101,  183  et 
seq.,  ISO,  194,  190.  213 

Smith,  Major-General  A.  J.,  or- 
dered to  join  Thomas,  0.  18  et 
seq.,  05 ;  at  Nashville,  99  ct 
seq.,  107  etseq.  ;  losses  of,  114, 
110  et  seq.;  ordered  to  pursue 
Hood,  124  et  seq.;  concen- 
trates at  Eastport,  129  et  seq., 
l;«  ot  seq.,  199 

Smith,  Brigadier-General  Giles  A., 
division  of  (in  Blair's  corps), 
23 

Smith,  Major-General  G.  W.,  20, 
28,  30  et  .seq.,  48,  .50;  at  a  con- 
ference near  Augusta,  109 

Smith,  (General  J.  E.,  division  of, 
joins  Sherman,  23 

Smith,  Brigadier-General  J.  H., 
divi-sion  of,  113,  115;  taken 
prisoner,  120,  188 

Smith  Island,  N.  C,  138 

SmithviUe,  N.  C.,138,  145 

Solemn  (^rove,  N.  C,  179 

Spencer,  Colonel  George  E.,  cavalry 
l)rigade  of,  l'<9  et  seq. 

Spring  Hill,  Tenn.,  69  et  seq.,  90 
et  seq.,  102 

Stafford,  Colonel  F.  E  P.,  93,  95, 
97 

Stanley.  Major-General  D.  S. 
(B'ourlli  Corps),  0,  17;  at 
Lynnville,  05  ;  at  Spring  Hill, 
70  et  seq.,  77,  79;  at  Frank- 
lin, S.5,  88  et  seq. 


INDKX. 


268 


Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  Secretary  of 
War,  Un,  m\  UY.i,  '215  et  seq. 

Steedman,  Major-General  J.  B.,  18 
(note)  ;  at  Chattanootja,  90 ;  at 
Nashville,  100  et  se(i.,  107  et 
seq.,  lU,  117,  l;.'l  ;  in  Ala- 
bama, ISfietseq.,  loiJ,  135 

Sterl,  Colonel  O.  W.,  brigade  of, 
151  et  seq. 

Stevenson,  Ala.,  1,  17,  67,  100,  104 

Stevenson,  Major-General  C.  L., 
division  of,  114 

Stewart,  Colonel  R.  R.,  cavalry 
brigade  of,  at  Spring  Hill,  70 

Stewart,  Lientenant  -  General  A. 
P.,  12  (note),  13,  71,  73  et  seq., 
77,  88,  01  etseq.,  103,  111,  114 
et  seq.,  120,  156,  183,  188,  101 
et  seq.,  19(5 

Stilea,  Brevet  Brigadier  -  General 
I.  N.,  brigade  of,  78.  84  et 
seq.,  87  et  seq.,  91,  93,  112, 
118  et  seq. 

Stone,  Colonel  George  A.,  brigade 
of,  173  et  seq. 

Stoneman,  Major-General  George, 
cavalry  expedition  of,  199  et 
seq. 

Stone's  River,  battle  of,  13 

Stougli,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wil- 
liam, 180 

Strahl,  Brigadier-General  O.  F., 
92  et  seq.,  95 

Streight,  Colonel  A.  D.,  brigade 
of,  98,  121 

Strickland,  Colonel  S.  A. ,  brigade 
of,  18,  64,  84,  89  etseq.,  93 

Sumter,  Fort,  170,  184  (note) 

Swayne,  Colonel  Wager,  177 

TALlAFEUKO,Brigadier-G(  tieralW. 
B.,di vision  of,  1S4,  l,s8,190,  102 


Talladega.  Ala..  204 

Taylor,  Captain  J.  D.  M.,  Seven- 
teenth Indiana,  207 

Taylor,  Lleutenant-General  Rich- 
ard, 9  et  seq.  ;  puts  railroad  in 
repair,  15 ;  ordered  to  Macon, 
28,  30  et  seq.;  at  Savaimah, 
47  et  seq.,  59  ;  report  ot,  166  ; 
203,  208 

Tennessee,  regiments  of :  Elev- 
enth, 16  (note) ;  Forty-tirst,  '.t5 

Tennille,  Ga.,  31 

Terry,  Major-General  A.  H.  (Tenth 
Corps),  137,  140  (note),  141 
et  seq.,  144,  147,  148,  150, 
152,  154,  102,  186,  194,  106, 
313 

Thomas,  Major-General  George  H., 
4  et  seq.;  Sherman's  confidence 
in,  6  et  seq.,  12  ;  Forrest's  ex- 
-pedition  against,  15  et  seq.; 
receives  news  of  disaster  at 
Johnsonville,  18  et  seq.  ;  his 
despatches  to  Schofield,  65  et 
seq.,  81 ;  sends  congratulations 
to  Schofield,  08  ;  at  Nashville, 
99  et  seq.  ;  urged  to  assume 
the  aggressive,  104  et  seq.  ; 
preparations  for  battle,  106  et 
seq. ;  holds  council  of  com- 
manders, 116;  second  day  at 
Nashville,  1 17  et  seq. ;  pursues 
Hood,  134  et  seq.  ;  prepares 
for  a  new  campaign,  12ii  et 
seq.,  199  et  seq.,  312 

Thomasville,  Ga.,  31 

Thompson,  Colonel  C  R..  of 
Twelfth  U.  S.  Colored,  1(5 
(note),  121,  127 

Thompson's  Station,  Tenn.,  77  et 
seq. 

Toombs,    Hriga(lier-(«enerul    Rob- 


264 


INDEX. 


ert,  28,  30,  et  scq.,  42  (note), 

47  et  seq. 
Town  Creek,  N.  C,  150 
Trion,  Ala.,  21)5  et  seq. 
Tiilliihoina,  Tenn.,100 
Tupelo,  Miss.,  137 
Tuscaloosa,  Ala.,  205 
Tuscnmbiu,  Ala.,  2,  11,  13  et  seq., 

17,  19,  O:},  200,  205 
Twining,  Major  William  J.,  Chief 

Engineer,  82 

Undine,  the,  burned,  15 

United  States.  Colored  regiments 
of  :  Twelfth,  10  (note)  ;  Four- 
teenth. 107 

Upham,  Colonel  S.  C,  150,  158  et 
seq. 

Upton,  Brevet  Major-General  E., 
303,  205,  207  ct  seq. 

Vandeveu,   Brigadier-General 
William,  brigade  of,  189.  192 
et  seq. 
Vicksburg,  Tenn.,  203,  210 
"Virginia,     regiment     of :    Fifty- 
fourth,  193 

Wagner,  Brigadier-General  G.  D  , 
division  of  (Fourth  Corps),  04, 
71,  75,  77,  79,  80  et  seq.,  92, 
97,  112;  at  Franklin,  1:55 

Walcutt,  Brigadier-General  C.  C, 
brigade  of,  30  et  seq. 

Walthall,  Major-General  E.  C, 
division  of,  88,  91  et  seq.,  97, 
107,  111  et  seq.;  retards  our 
pursuit,  125 

Ward,  Brevet  Major-General  W. 
T.,  division  of  (in  Twentieth 
Corps),  23,  183 

Warreuaburg,  Ala.,  U 


Warrenton,  Ga.,  33 

Washington,  D.  C,  0  et  seq.,  13, 
10.5,  120,  129  et  seq.,  140  et 
seq.,  1.55,  31.5,  218 

Washington,  General  George,  130, 
1.54 

Waynesboro,  Ga.,  33  et  seq. 

Waynesboro,  Tenn. ,  18,  03  et  seq. 

Wcldon,  N.  C,  212 

West  Point,  Miss.,  04,  204 

Wheeler,  Major-General  Joseph, 
cavalry  corps  of,  11,  26,  28, 
30  et  seq.,  39  et  seq.;  concen- 
trates on  Carolina  shore,  57, 
133,  167,  109  et  suq.,  173,  187, 
195 

Whitford,  Colonel  J.  N.,  brigade 
of,  150 

White,  Colonel  Samuel,  Sixteenth 
Kentucky,  79,  89  et  seq. ,  135 

White,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Frank, 
Seventeenth  Indiana,  207 

Whiting,  Major-General  W.  H.  C, 
140,  144  et  seq. 

Whittakcr,  Brigadier-General  W. 
C,  brigade  of,  77 

Williams,  Brevet  Major-General 
A.  S.,  under  Slocura,  23,  27, 
31,  35,  52,  50,  183  et  seq.,  187, 
l<)0ctseq.,197et  seq. 

Williamson,  plantation  of,  Ga.,  44, 
50 

Wilmington,  N.  C,  137,  147,  153; 
evacuation  of,  154  et  seq.,  181, 
183,  194,  211 

Wilson,  Brevet  Major-General 
James H.  (cavalry  corps),  joins 
Schofield.  0(5  et  seq. ,  72  ct  seq. ; 
at  Franklin,  8.5,  87 ;  skirmish 
with  Forrest,  98  et  seq.,  103  et 
seq.,  107,  110,  114,  117,  119, 
133   et  seq.;    concentrates  at 


INDEX. 


265 


Eastporfc,  129  efc  seq.,  190; 
cavalry  exj)eUition  into  Ala- 
bama, 'Mi  et  seq. ;  eaters  Sei- 
nia,  2U9  et  seq. 

Winegar,  Captain  Charles  E. ,  bat- 
tery of,  50 

Wiimsboro,  S.  C,  177  et  seq., 
181 

Wisconsin,  regiments  of  :  Third, 
5(5 ;  Forty-third,  10  (note) 

Wright,  Colonel  W.  W.,  Chief 
Engineer,  155,  102,  211 

Wright,  Major-Ueneral  A.  R. 
(Lieutoniint-(Movernor  of  Geor- 
gia), 29,  50 

Wood,  Brigadier-C.enoral  Thomas 


J.,  division  of,  70  et  seq.,  77, 
79;  at  Franklin,  85,  88,  98; 
at  Nashville,  102,  107  et  seq., 
112et8eq.;  losses  of,  114,  117 
etscq.;  pursnes  Hood,  12'1  et 
seq.;  ordered  to  assemble  the 
Fourth  Corps  at  Huntsville, 
129,  212 

Woods,  Brevet  Major-General  C. 
R.,  division  of,  17,  28,  27,  '.'>0 

Woods,  Brigadier-General  W.  B., 
brigade  of,  174 

Wytheville,  Va.,  200  et  seq. 

Young,  Major  J.  M.,  Fifth  Iowa 
Cavalry,  72 


ERRATA. 

On  page  121,  next  to  last  line,  for  'killed'  read  'danger- 
ously wounded.' 

On  page  123,  line  5,  for  'Tliirty-sevenLh  Georgia'  read 
'  Twentieth  Tennessee. ' 


MESSRS.    CHARLES    SCRIIJNER'S    SONS 

are  publishing,  under  the  general  title  of  the 

Campaigns  oe  the  Civil  War, 

a  series  of  volumes,  contributed  at  their  solicitation  by  a 
numljer  of  leading  actors  in  and  students  of  the  great  conllict 
of  1861-65,  with  a  view  to  bringing  together,  for  the  first 
time,  a  full  and  authoritative  military  history  of  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  Rebellion. 


The  final  and  exliaustive  form  of  this  great  narrative,  in  which  every 
doubt  shall  be  settled  and  every  detail  covered,  may  be  a  possil)ility 
only  of  the  future.  But  it  is  a  matter  for  surprise  that  twenty  years 
after  the  beginning  of  the  RebelHon,  and  wlien  a  whole  generation 
has  grown  up  needing  such  knowledge,  there  is  no  authority  whicii  is 
at  the  same  time  of  tiie  highest  rank,  intelligible  and  trustworthy,  and 
to  which  a  reader  can  turn  for  any  general  view  of  the  field— for  a 
strong,  vivid,  concise  but  truly  proportioned  story  of  the  great  salient 
events. 

The  many  reports,  regimental  histories,  memoirs,  and  other  materi- 
als of  value  for  special  passages,  require,  for  their  intelligent  reading, 
an  ability  to  combine  and  proportion  them  which  the  ordinary  reader 
does  not  possess.  There  have  been  no  attempts  at  general  histories 
which  have  supplied  this  satisfactorily  to  any  large  part  of  the  public. 
Undoubtedly  there  has  been  no  such  narrative  as  would  be  especially 
welcome  to  men  of  the  new  generation,  and  would  be  valued  by  a  very 
great  class  of  readers;— and  there  has  seemed  to  be  great  danger  that 
the  time  would  be  allowed  to  pass  when  it  would  be  possible  to  give 
to  such  a  work  the  vividness  and  accuracy  that  come  from  personal 
recollection.     These  facts  led  to  the  conception  of  the  present  work. 


From  every  department  of  the  Government,  from  the  officers  ot  the 
army,  and  from  a  great  number  of  custodians  of  records  and  specinl 
information  everywhere,  both  authors  and  publishers  have  received 
every  aid  that  could  be  asked  in  this  undertaking ;  and  in  announcing 
the  issue  of  the  work  the  publishers  take  this  occasion  to  convey  the 
thanks  which  the  authors  have  had  individual  opportunities  to  express 
elsewhere. 


The  volumes  of  the  series  will  be  duodecimos  of  about  250 
pages  each,  illustrated  by  maps  and  plans  prepared  under 
the  direction  of  the  authors.  They  will  appear,  as  far  as 
possible,  in  the  chronological  order  of  the  Campaigns  of 
which  they  treat;  and  by  their  preliminary  and  concluding 
chapters  will  be  so  far  connected  that  the  completed  work 
will  practically  cover  the  entire  field  of  the  war. 

The  price  of  each  volume  will  be  $1.00. 


The  following  volumes  are  now  ready  : 

I.— THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION.  By  John  G. 
NiCOLAV,  Esq.,  Private  Secretary  to  President  Lincoln;  late 
Consul-General  to  France,  etc. 

A  prelimin.'iry   volume,  describing  the  opening  of  the  war,  and   covering  the 
period  from  the  election  oi  Lincoln  to  the  end  of  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run. 

XI.— FROM  FORT  HENRY  TO  CORINTH.  By  the  Hon. 
M.  F.  Force,  Justice  of  the  Superior  Court,  Cincinnati ;  lale 
Brigadier-General  and  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.V.,  commanding 
First  Division,  17th  Corps:  in  1862,  Lieut.  Colonel  of  the 
20th  Ohio,  commanding  the  regiment  at  Shiloh ;  Treasurer  of 
the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

The  n.arrative  of  events  in  the  West  from  the  Summer  of  1861  to  May,  1869 '. 
covering  tlie  c.ipture  of  Fts.  Henry  and  Donelson,  the  Buttle  of  Shiloh,  etc.,  etc. 


Ill THE  PENINSULA.     By  Alexander  S.  Wekb,  LL  D  , 

President  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York  ;  Assistant 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  1861-62  ;  Inspector 
General  Fifth  Army  Corps;  General  commanding  2d  Div., 
2d  Corps;  Major  General  Assigned,  and  Chief  of  Staff,  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

The  history  of  McC'cllan's   Peninsula  Campaign,  from  his  appointment  to  the 
end  of  the  Seven  Days'  Figlit. 

IV THE   ARMY   UNDER    POPE.      By  John   C.   Ropes, 

Esq.,  of  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  the 
Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Pope  to  comm.ind  the  Army  of  Virginia,  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  McClellan  to  the  general  command  in  September,  1862. 


v.— THE   ANTIETAM    AND    FREDERICKSBURG.      By 

Francis  Winthrop  Palfrey,  Bvt.  Brigadier  Gen'l,  U.S.V., 
and  formerly  Colonel  20th  Mass.  Infantry;  Lieut.  Col.  of  the 
20th  Massachusetts  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietam  ;  Member  of 
Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  of  the  Massachu- 
setts Historical  Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  McClellan  to  the  general  command,  Sept.  1862,  to  the 
end  of  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg. 


VI.— CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG.  By 
Abner  Doubleday,  Bvt,  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.A.,  and  Maj. 
Gen'l,  U.S.V.  ;  commanding  the  First  Corps  at  Gettysburg, 
etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Hooker,  throtigh  the  campaigns  of  Chancellorsville  and 
Gettysburg,  to  the  retreat  of  Lee  aftei  the  latter  battk. 


VII.— THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND.  By  Henry 
M.  Cist,  Brevet  Brig.  Gen'l  U.S.V. ;  A.A.G.  on  the  staff  of 
Major  Gen'l  Rosecrans,  and  afterwards  oii  that  of  Major  Gen'l 
Thomas;  Corresponding  Secretary  of  the  Society  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland. 

From  the  form.ition  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  the  end  of  the  batdes  at 
Chattanooga,  November,  1863. 


IX.— THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA.  By  the  Hon. 
Jacob  1).  Cox,  Ex-Governor  of  Ohio  ;  late  SetreUiry  of  the 
Interior  of  the  United  States;  Major  General  U.S.V.,  com- 
manding Twenty- third  Corps  during  the  campaigns  of  Atlanta 
and  the  Carolinas,  etc.,  etc. 

From  Sherman's  first  advance  into  Georgia  in  May,  1864,  to  the  beginning  of 
the  March  to  the  Sea. 

X— THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA— FRANKLIN  AND 
NASHVILLE,     liy  the  Hon.  Jacob  U.  Cox. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  March  to  the  Sea  to  the  Surrender  of  Johnston — 
including  also  the  operations  of  Thomas  in  Tennessee. 


The  following  volumes,  now  preparing  for  early  publica- 
tion, will  complete  the  series  : 

VIII.— THE  MISSISSIPPI.  By  Francis  Vinton  Greene, 
Lieut,  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  Army  ;  late  Military  Attache  to  the 
U.  iy.  Legation  in  St.  Petersburg ;  Author  of  "  the  Russian 
Army  and  its  Campaigns  in  Turkey  in  1877-78,"  and  of  "Army 
Life  in  Russia." 

An  account  of  the  operations — esjiecially  at  Vicksburg  and    Port    Hudson — by 
which  tlic  Mississippi  River  and  its  shores  were  restored  to  the  control  of  the  Union. 

XL— THE  SHENANDOAH  VALLEY  in  1864.  The  Cam- 
paign of  Sheridan.  By  George  E.  Pond,  Esq.,  Associate 
Editor  of  the  Army  and  Navy  Journal. 

XII.— THE   CAMPAIGNS    OF   GRANT    IN  VIRGINIA. 

,  By  Andrew  A.  Humphreys,  Brigadier  General  and  Bvt. 
Major  General,  U.S  A.  ;  late  Chief  of  Engineers;  Chief  of 
Staff,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  i863-'64  ;  commanding  Second 
Corps,  1 864-' 65,  etc.,  etc. 

Covering  the  Virginia  Campaigns  of  1864  and  '65,  to  Lee's  surrender. 


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